Opinion
A142954
09-01-2015
KAMILA LARRIPA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ARMAND PRIEDITIS, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. FL090283)
This is an appeal from a family court order denying the post-judgment motion by appellant Kamila Larripa (mother) to relocate to the State of Washington for a tenure-track university teaching position with minor, L.P., her six-year-old son with former husband, respondent Armand Prieditis (father). Mother, who has had primary legal and physical custody of minor, seeks reversal of this order, as well as the subsequent order denying her motion for reconsideration, on the grounds that the trial court relied upon incorrect legal assumptions and failed to address key legal issues presented by her motion, including the detriment minor would face should she move out of state without him. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father complains about the trial court's decision to permit the parties to proceed by way of a settled statement of the oral proceedings of June 6, 2014, rather than by way of a reporter's transcript. We, however, decline to consider his complaint given his failure to file a timely notice of appeal of the court's decision on this issue.
Mother and father married in August 2005. Minor was born in January 2009. Mother and father legally separated about four months later, in June 2009, and their marriage was formally dissolved on October 12, 2011. Following these events, the parties agreed to share joint physical and legal custody of minor, with mother initially having primary physical custody of minor, and father gradually increasing his custodial time as minor got older.
Father's custodial time with minor did in fact increase over time. Shortly after the parties' separation, father had relocated to the San Francisco Bay Area to take a job in Mountain View. During this time, father would generally travel to Humboldt County every other weekend to visit with minor. However, father later received permission from his employer to work remotely, and decided in October 2012 to move back to Humboldt County to spend more time with minor. Father had also become romantically involved with P.R., who lived in Humboldt County and happened to be minor's former preschool teacher. Thus, when father moved back, he lived in a rented house in Arcata with P.R. and her seven-year-old daughter. Father also began volunteering at minor's preschool in order to spend more time with him.
They have since bought a house in the area.
In May 2013, father filed a request with the court for a fifty-fifty timeshare custodial arrangement, which mother opposed. Following a hearing, the court ordered joint legal and physical custody of minor with father, as of January 1, 2014, having minor "alternating weeks, from the time that his school concludes on Thursday until the following Sunday at 3:00 p.m." The order reserved the issue of scheduling holidays and summer vacation.
In March 2014, mother received an offer from the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington to serve as Assistant Professor of Mathematics, a full-time, tenure-track position with generous salary and other benefits, including guaranteed annual raises and free tuition for minor at a college of his choice once he reaches the appropriate age. Mother, who has a Ph.D. in applied mathematics, had been teaching mathematics part-time at Humboldt State University for about five years while providing full-time care for minor. However, her position at Humboldt State was not tenure-track and lacked the substantial salary and other benefits being offered by the University of Puget Sound. Mother, who had been searching unsuccessfully for a tenure-track position commensurate with her degree and experience for over four years, immediately filed her motion in the trial court to relocate to Washington State with minor. Father, however, opposed the motion.
Initially, the trial court ordered the parties to mediate the issue of a revised custody arrangement in light of mother's move-away request. Following mediation, the mediator opined that mother's request should be denied, and that the parties should adhere to a "split week (3 1/2 - 3 1/2) schedule." A court hearing was then scheduled, at which several witnesses, including mother and father, testified.
At this hearing, mother testified, among other things, that she currently had physical custody of minor about 80 percent of the time, excluding holidays (which the parties split equally) and extended summer vacation (which was awarded to father). Mother acknowledged father's desire to have more custody time with minor, but insisted his visitation with minor, except during summer vacation, should occur in Washington. Father, in turn, described minor's deep local attachments (including friendships and familial relationships), and recounted difficulties minor had experienced in the past when changing schools. Father worried about the negative impacts on minor's relationships if he were to move to Washington State with mother. Father also expressed concerns about maintaining contact with minor should minor move to Washington State, given his co-parenting experience with mother. Father did not think he and mother could effectively co-parent if she moved away, noting that she "often makes parenting decisions regarding [minor] without consulting [him]" and refuses to permit him to spend time with minor outside the times provided for in the court custody plan.
Mother's father (hereinafter, grandfather) also testified at the hearing, stating his belief that a major custody change or a significant amount of travel would not be in minor's best interests. Grandfather also testified that he and his wife intended to move to Tacoma if mother moved there in order to continue their close relationship with minor, and opined that father should likewise consider moving. At the time of the hearing, grandfather and his wife lived next door to mother and minor in Arcata.
Father's life partner, P.R., testified that she was very close to minor, as was her seven-year-old daughter, who had a "sibling-like" relationship with him. Similarly, father's 18-year-old daughter from a previous marriage testified that she was quite close to minor, and spent time with him whenever she could. She had recently moved to Arcata to attend Humboldt State, and enjoyed playing with minor. She described father as a "good parent" to both her and minor, and described father's household as having a "good atmosphere."
Finally, the director of minor's preschool testified that "it would be hard for [minor] (and most children) to change schools," and that father is a "good and loving parent" who "wants to be involved in [minor's] life" and regularly volunteers at the school, interacting well with the children. The director also noted that mother had made certain derogatory statements about father, including that he had "some disturbing tendencies," that, once she had gotten to know father, she rejected as unwarranted.
Following this hearing, the trial court denied mother's motion, finding that it would be detrimental to minor and not in his best interests to relocate with mother to Washington State. In doing so, the trial court acknowledged there was no question in this case regarding her fitness as a parent, or her good faith in seeking to relocate to Washington to assume the Assistant Professor role at University of Puget Sound. Further, the court had previously acknowledged the lack of suitable employment options for mother in the Humboldt area, given her advanced skill set and experience. The court thus referred the parties back to mediation for the purpose of determining an appropriate custody arrangement and visitation schedule depending on mother's ultimate decision with respect to the University of Puget Sound job offer.
Thereafter, on June 27, 2014, mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order, which the court denied after a hearing on the ground that she had failed to state any valid reason in law or fact for granting her motion. In doing so, the court responded to mother's argument in her motion that it had failed to apply the proper legal standard when denying her move-away request. Specifically, the court confirmed, contrary to mother's suggestions, that it had "strongly considered" the detriment minor would suffer if she moved to Washington State without him, as well as his best interests with respect to her proposed move, before denying her motion. Mother's timely notice of appeal of both orders followed.
The University of Puget Sound agreed to keep mother's job offer open to enable her to bring this appeal. However, it recently gave mother a firm deadline of September 15, 2015, to respond to the offer.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the trial court committed two legal errors in denying her motion to relocate to the State of Washington with minor. First, mother contends the trial court erroneously presumed that she would not relocate in the event her motion was denied, rather than presuming, as the law requires, that she would go through with her relocation plan without minor. (See Fam. Code, § 7501, subd. (a) ["A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child."]; accord In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 29 ["after a judicial custody order is in place, a custodial parent seeking to relocate bears no burden of establishing that it is 'necessary' to do so"] (Burgess).) Second, she contends the trial court misapplied the law governing parental relocation motions, and thereby committed a gross abuse of discretion, by focusing unduly on certain factors (e.g., the detriment to father of minor moving away), while neglecting to consider other relevant factors (e.g., the detriment to minor of mother moving away without him).
The governing law is generally not in dispute. " 'A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child.' (§ 7501, subd. (a).) Accordingly, when a custodial parent proposes to relocate a child, 'the noncustodial parent has the burden of showing that the planned move will cause detriment to the child in order for the court to reevaluate an existing custody order.' [(In re Marriage of] LaMusga [(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072,] 1096 [LaMusga].) 'The extent to which a proposed move will detrimentally impact a child varies greatly depending upon the circumstances. We will generally leave it to the superior court to assess that impact in light of the other relevant factors in determining what is in the best interests of the child.' (Id. at p. 1097.) If the noncustodial parent carries the threshold burden of showing that the planned move would cause detriment to the child, the 'court must perform the delicate and difficult task of determining whether a change in custody is in the best interests of the child[].' (Id. at p. 1078.)" (In re Marriage of Winternitz (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 644, 648-649 (Winternitz). See also Jacob A. v. C.H. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1602 (Jacob A.) [when considering a move-away request, the court "has no authority to issue an order for the purpose of coercing [the parent] into abandoning her plans to relocate"].)
Although mother and father share joint legal and physical custody, the trial court, for the purpose of deciding mother's move-away request, deemed mother as the sole custodial parent in light of the fact that, for most of minor's life, she has been his primary custodial parent. Neither parent questions the validity of this assumption by the trial court for purposes of appeal. As such, nor do we.
"As the LaMusga court stated, '[T]his area of law is not amenable to inflexible rules.' (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101.) Rather, courts must 'exercise their discretion to fashion orders that best serve the interests of the children in the cases before them. Among the factors that the court ordinarily should consider when deciding whether to modify a custody order in light of the custodial parent's proposal to change the residence of the child are the following: the children's interest in stability and continuity in the custodial arrangement; the distance of the move; the age of the children; the children's relationship with both parents; the relationship between the parents including, but not limited to, their ability to communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to put the interests of the children above their individual interests; the wishes of the children if they are mature enough for such an inquiry to be appropriate; the reasons for the proposed move; and the extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody.' (Ibid.)" (Winternitz, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.)
On appeal, we review a trial court order granting or denying a petition to relocate for abuse of discretion. (Jacob A., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1598.) "Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable basis on which the court could conclude its decision advanced the best interests of the child." (Jacob A., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1599.) However, a "discretionary order that is based on the application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion, and is subject to reversal even though there may be substantial evidence to support that order." (Mark T. v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1124-1125 (Mark T.).)
Mother claims the trial court misapplied this essentially discretionary standard. In so arguing, she relies upon language in Jacob A. that " '[w]hen the trial court is faced with a request to modify the existing custody arrangement on account of a parent's plan to move away (unless the trial court finds the decision to relocate is in bad faith), the trial court must treat the plan as a serious one and must decide the custody issues based upon that premise. The question for the trial court is not whether the parent may be permitted to move; the question is what arrangement for custody should be made [when the parent moves].' [Citations.]" (196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1599, 1600 [reversing the denial of move-away request where "[t]he trial court attempted to determine a custody arrangement that was in the child's best interests, but failed to analyze the issue based on the presumption that mother would be moving"]. See also F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 22 [trial court abused its discretion by "not properly treat[ing] Father's plan to move . . . as a serious one and thereby avoided addressing the ultimate question raised by Father's move-away motion—i.e., what arrangement for custody would be in Child's best interests if and when Father moves"].) According to mother, the trial court failed to follow these principles by wrongfully assuming she would not move to Washington if her motion were denied. This error, mother continues, thereafter infected the trial court's decision-making by, among other things, shifting too much of the court's attention to the issue of whether her proposed move with minor to Washington would be detrimental to minor's relationship with father, and away from the more crucial issue of whether a change in custody arrangement, in which minor no longer spends most of his time with mother, would be detrimental to him, or contrary to his interests in stability and continuity.
According to mother, this error can be traced directly to the failures of the court-appointed mediator (Mr. Hale), who "improperly inquired into the sincerity of [her] intent to move if her move-away request were denied, and then recommended a 'split week (3-1/2 / 3-1/2) schedule' if [she] and [father] could not reach an agreement - a schedule that would effectively require [her] to remain in California."
As father initially points out, however, while mother's challenge on appeal hinges on her theory that the trial court misapplied the law when deciding her move-away request, mother never asked the trial court to prepare a statement of decision to set forth its legal reasoning, much less alerted the trial court to a specific erroneous legal conclusion in said statement. Yet, because an "appealed judgment is presumed to be correct" and all "all intendments and presumptions" must be indulged in support of the judgment, if there is no statement of decision, the reviewing court must "presume that the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which substantial evidence exists in the record. In other words, the necessary findings of ultimate facts will be implied and the only issue on appeal is whether the implied findings are supported by substantial evidence." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 267, citing, among other cases, In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133, 1136 ["[Code of Civil Procedure] Sections 632 and 634 were amended in 1981 to provide respectively, as they do now, that a statement of decision must be rendered at the request of a party, explaining the factual and legal basis for the court's decision on the issues specified by that party, and that if the statement fails to resolve a controverted issue or is ambiguous the defects must be brought to the court's attention to avoid presumptions in favor of the judgment"].) The court in Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz went on to explain: "There are instances in which a court's oral comments may be valuable in illustrating the trial judge's theory, but they may never be used to impeach the order or judgment on appeal. [Citation.] This is because a trial court retains inherent authority to change its decision, its findings of fact, or its conclusions of law at any time before entry of judgment and then the judgment supersedes any memorandum or tentative decision or any oral comments from the bench. [Citations.] Thus, a trial judge's prejudgment oral expressions do not bind the court or restrict its power to later declare final findings of fact and conclusions of law in the judgment. [Citation.] In the absence of a statement of decision, a reviewing court looks only to the judgment to determine error. [Citation.] Absent contrary indication in the final judgment or statement of decision, the appellate court will assume that, during the period before rendition of judgment, the trial court realized any error and corrected it." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) Based upon these principles, father contends mother's misapplication-of-law theory cannot support reversal of the judgment in this case.
Father's contention appears to have merit. While mother counters that the court's July 3, 2014, written order expressly incorporated the court's oral findings made at the June 10, 2014 hearing, the law is quite clear that, if "the judgment_expressly incorporate[s] the findings of fact (but not the conclusions of law) contained in the court's memorandum decision," this "is sufficient to make the court's factual findings part of the judgment and they will accordingly guide our review of factual matters." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) However, the reviewing court is "not similarly constrained as to the court's conclusions of law and the judgment . . . will not be impeached either by the court's oral comments or the memorandum decision as they pertain to legal theories or conclusions." (Ibid.) The reason for this distinction is the same as set forth above: "A formal statement of decision enables a reviewing court to determine what law the trial court employed. A failure to request a statement of decision results in a waiver of findings and conclusions necessary to support the judgment and we will accordingly infer such conclusions." (Id. at p. 269.)
Specifically, page one of the Order states: "Mother's proposed move . . . would be detrimental to the child as stated in the findings made on the record . . . . It is in the child's best interests not to relocate with Mother . . . as stated in the findings made on the record."
However, in any event, even aside from mother's failure to request a statement of decision, we conclude based upon our review of the relevant record that the trial court properly understood and exercised its discretion in answering the relevant question of whether, if mother were to move to Washington, it would be in minor's best interests to move with her and visit father in Washington or California, or to remain in California with father and visit mother there or in Washington. (See F.T. v. L.J., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 22 [identifying the "ultimate question" raised by the father's move-away motion as, "what arrangement for custody would be in [the child's] best interests if and when Father moves"].)
Specifically, the record in this case reflects that, when finding that relocating with mother to Washington State would be detrimental to minor and not in his best interests, the trial court relied upon the following facts. First, the court found it would be detrimental to minor to move with mother because: (1) minor's time with father, who is "actively involved" in his life and striving for increased custody rights, would be "dramatically reduced"; (2) father would be unable to continue volunteering regularly at minor's school, which, according to minor's teacher, is very important to minor; (3) minor would have to leave the area where he has lived his entire life, where his friends and relatives live, and where his school is located; (4) minor's relationships with, among others, his half-sister, his father's life partner (who is very close to minor and is his former preschool teacher), and his father's partner's seven-year-old daughter (who "is like a sister"), would be negatively impacted; and (5) father and mother's co-parenting counseling would be negatively impacted, which, in turn, would be detrimental to minor.
Second, the trial court found it would be in minor's best interests to remain with father in Arcata rather than move with mother to Washington State because, in addition to the detrimental factors listed above, minor could better maintain his regular activities, friendships, and "all of the relationships that he has." The court added that "the proposed move is distant enough that it would make frequent visits very difficult."
Then, based upon the totality of these factors, the trial court issued the following order: "Should Mother move to Washington, Father shall become [minor's] primary physical custodian during the school year and Mother shall have liberal visitation with [minor]. . . . [¶] In the event that Mother determines she will move, the parties are referred to mediation on July 3, 2014, to mediate visitation between Mother and [minor.]" To the contrary, "[i]n the event that Mother determines she will not move, the parties are referred to mediation on July 3, 2014, to mediate increased custodial time between Father and [minor.]"
Mother does not challenge the trial court's decision to refer the parties back to mediation to resolve the issues of visitation and custodial time once she decides whether or not to move.
The trial court's factual findings, soundly based in witness testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing, adequately support its ultimate decision to deny mother's move-away request. In particular, the record reflects the trial court properly weighed a variety of relevant issues relating to minor's well-being, including his emotional welfare, relationships with family and friends, and his schooling and other activities, before making the reasoned judgment that father should assume physical custody of minor in Arcata if mother were to move away. In doing so, the trial court deemed significant the fact that both mother and father are loving, competent parents; that father had a strong desire to share custody of minor and had assumed substantial parenting responsibilities relating to minor's school and social activities; and that minor had deep, meaningful familial and other ties to the Humboldt area. The trial court also considered each parent's willingness or capacity to co-parent with the other. No doubt, each of these factors is relevant to the underlying question of whether relocation would be in minor's "best interests." Indeed, this type of discretionary evaluation is exactly what the law required. (See Winternitz, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 649 [appellate courts generally leave to the trial court "the delicate and difficult task" of determining whether a change in custody is in the child's best interests in light of the particular circumstances of the case]; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32 ["in considering all the circumstances affecting the 'best interest' of minor children, [the court] may consider any effects of such relocation on their rights or welfare"].)
We acknowledge the point raised by mother and amicus curiae that parent's co-parenting would be negatively impacted by her move, even if minor's custody is transferred to father. According to amicus curiae Blumberg, the trial court's reliance on the detrimental impact on minor of any interruption to the co-parenting counseling engendered by mother's move illustrates the trial court's failure to apply the legal presumption that a custodial parent is entitled to relocate with the child. (E.g., LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) However, while we accept the point that, as a practical matter, parents' co-parenting counseling would be detrimentally impacted if mother moved away with or without minor, the court was nonetheless authorized to consider the underlying nature of parents' relationship, including the degree to which they have been able to communicate and cooperate, when deciding mother's motion. (See Winternitz, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) Moreover, even assuming the trial court erred by relying upon this particular factor when finding that relocating with mother would be detrimental to minor, it nonetheless remains true that, based upon the other relevant factors identified by the court, a reasonable basis exists in the record to support its ultimate decision.
Moreover, while mother and amici curiae are correct that "the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements — and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker — weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements" (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33), the trial court could, and did, find this need outweighed in this case by other factors weighing in favor of transferring minor's physical custody to father should mother move out of state. (See LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1097 ["The extent to which a proposed move will detrimentally impact a child varies greatly depending upon the circumstances. We will generally leave it to the superior court to assess that impact in light of the other relevant factors in determining what is in the best interests of the child"]; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 39 ["Although the interests of a minor child in the continuity and permanency of custodial placement with the primary caretaker will most often prevail, the trial court, in assessing 'prejudice' to the child's welfare as a result of relocating even a distance of 40 or 50 miles, may take into consideration the nature of the child's existing contact with both parents — including de facto as well as de jure custody arrangements — and the child's age, community ties, and health and educational needs"].) And, while mother and amici curiae insist the trial court disregarded minor's strong emotional ties to mother - the inevitable product of having spent most of his life in her care - and the detriment he will face if primary custody shifts to father, the record reflects otherwise. As stated above, the trial court, when denying mother's motion for reconsideration, confirmed to mother that it had "strongly considered" the detriment minor would suffer if she moved to Washington State without him. Thus, despite the vehement protestations of mother and amici curiae, there is simply no basis to presume, in the absence of actual evidence, the trial court acted contrary to its own words. (See People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 176 ["as a general rule, we presume the trial court properly followed established law"], citing Evid. Code, § 664. Cf. F.T. v. L.J., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 22 [concluding the court misapplied the law in deciding a move-away motion where the court affirmatively stated that it would "assume that [father] is staying" if his motion is denied].)
Amici curiae are the California Women's Law Center, and a group of 19 distinguished California law professors represented by Grace Ganz Blumberg, Distinguished Professor of Law Emerita, UCLA School of Law.
Amicus curiae Blumberg, admonishes the court for failing to consider how the identified disruptions in minor's life from mother' proposed relocation could have been mitigated or eliminated. According to amicus, "the court did not consider a technique currently available, inexpensive or costless, and regularly employed by trial courts in California and many other states, namely face-to-face computer programs, such as Skype, which are widely used to maintain relationships with family members and friends who reside elsewhere." However, while relevant, the court's failure to consider these and other technologies facilitating parent-child contact does not compel the conclusion the court failed to properly exercise its discretion. Moreover, amicus points to no legal authority requiring a trial court to consider mitigating factors before changing a custody arrangement.
Mother relies on a particular statement by the trial court - to wit, that "[t]he first step, after that ruling [to deny her motion] is to determine is mother going to move" - to argue the court disregarded her presumptive right to relocate. (See Jacob A., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1602 [the court's legal analysis "must begin" with the premise that the parent has a right to move and has decided to move].) However, while we agree the trial court could have used more appropriate language in this instance, the record as a whole, set forth above, reflects the trial court's proper exercise of discretion. (See pp. 10-12, ante.) As such, we decline to find the trial court misapplied the law on the basis of this isolated comment. Indeed, we expect most parents would reassess the decision of whether to relocate following a trial court order denying their request to relocate with the child. (See F.T. v. L.J., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 23 [the court must not issue an order denying a relocation request with the expectation that it will not take effect because the custodial parent will opt not to relocate rather than lose primary physical custody of the child; however, "the law allows a court to conduct a hearing based on the intention to move and make a custody order conditioned on the move being effectuated"].)
Indeed, amicus curiae, the California Women's Law Center, goes so far as to call the trial court's denial of mother's motion "discriminatory" and detrimental to the rights of women to freedom and equality. While we whole-heartedly agree with amicus that the rights of women (and, in particular, custodial mothers) to seek financial security and independence through mobility must be recognized and promoted in our courts, there is no factual basis in this case for their assertion that the trial court acted with any discriminatory animus or motivation.
As aptly noted by amicus curiae, the California Women's Law Center, single custodial parents are more likely to be female in our society, and women remain more likely than their male counterparts to face financial hardship and economic disparity following divorce.
We also acknowledge the additional arguments raised by amicus curiae, the California Women's Law Center, that the trial court's ruling violates mother's constitutional rights to travel, gender equality and privacy. These arguments, which, we note, are rather undeveloped in briefing, rest on the same purported deficiencies in the trial court's legal reasoning that we have just finished rejecting. As the California Supreme Court has clarified, "while [Family Code] sections 3006 and 3007 recognize the general right of a parent with sole custody to supervise and make decisions regarding a child's residence and education, section 7501, fairly read, contemplates that even a parent with sole legal and sole physical custody may be restrained from changing a child's residence, if a court determines the change would be detrimental to the child's rights or welfare." (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 957.) These constitutional arguments thus fail for the same reasons as the others - to wit, the trial court's decision was a proper exercise of its discretion.
Finally, we acknowledge mother's criticisms of the mediator's report - including her challenge to the appropriateness of his proposal that parents share equal custody of minor on a weekly basis (to wit, 3.5 days each). As mother rightly notes, if she were living in Tacoma and father remained in Arcata, such an arrangement would be nearly impossible. However, as an initial matter, mother does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting the report. Moreover, as the trial court stated in its order denying mother's motion for reconsideration, it considered the parties' arguments regarding the soundness of the mediator's report, "and gave it appropriate weight in rendering judgment." Nothing more was required of the trial court. (See LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1093 ["The weight to be accorded to [relevant] factors must be left to the court's sound discretion"].)
We are not without great sympathy for mother's predicament. By all accounts, she is a loving parent, and we do not doubt that a change in minor's custody would be painful. However, as mother's own authority states: "The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the 'best interest' of the child. We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked." (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32. See also LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1093 [" 'A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness' "].) Accordingly, for all the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
The requests for judicial notice filed by amicus curiae, the California Women's Law Center on July 8, 2015 and by father on August 5, 2015, are denied as unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (See Health First v. March Joint Powers Authority (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1137, fn. 1.) --------
DISPOSITION
The orders denying mother's petitions to relocate with minor and for reconsideration are affirmed.
/s/_________
Jenkins, J.
We concur: /s/_________
Pollak, Acting P. J.
/s/_________
Siggins, J.