Opinion
21A-DC-2858
09-01-2022
Dietrich Lapsley, Appellant-Respondent, v. Anh Lapsley, Appellee-Petitioner
Attorneys for Appellant Marcus L. Rogers Law Office of Marcus L. Rogers Fort Wayne, Indiana Stephen P. Rothberg Law Office of Stephen P. Rothberg Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney for Appellee David C. Pricer Lange & Pricer, LLC Fort Wayne, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Lori K. Morgan, Judge The Honorable Sherry Hartzler, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 02D08-1808-DC-001052
Attorneys for Appellant Marcus L. Rogers Law Office of Marcus L. Rogers Fort Wayne, Indiana Stephen P. Rothberg Law Office of Stephen P. Rothberg Fort Wayne, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee David C. Pricer Lange & Pricer, LLC Fort Wayne, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MAY, JUDGE
[¶1] Dietrich Lapsley ("Father") appeals portions of the trial court's order dissolving his marriage to Anh Lapsley ("Mother"). Father challenges the trial court's decisions involving the parties' child, C.L. ("Child"), as well as the division of the marital estate. He presents multiple issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of Child; and
2. Whether the trial court erred when it awarded Father the parties' lawn equipment as an asset from the marital pot and when it ordered Father to pay Mother a property equalization payment of $54,233.00.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Mother and Father married on June 13, 2015. On July 30, 2015, Mother gave birth to Child. At the time, the family lived in Indianapolis in a house Mother had purchased in 2009. Mother was Child's primary caregiver during this time while Father was self-employed as a landscaper and dietician.
[¶3] In late 2017 and early 2018, Mother sought to re-enter the workforce. Mother found a job in Fort Wayne, where her family lived. In 2018, Mother and Child moved in with Mother's parents in Fort Wayne so Mother could take a job with an educational institution in the area. The parties agreed Father would maintain the residence in Indianapolis and visit Mother and Child in Fort Wayne as he was able based on his work schedule. In May 2018, the parties enrolled Child in a day care program in Fort Wayne.
[¶4] On July 16, 2018, Mother filed a petition for dissolution. The same day, Mother also filed a petition for a protective order against Father because of a domestic violence incident that occurred on July 14, 2018, during which Father allegedly hit, spit on, and choked Mother; damaged Mother's work phone; and took Mother's personal phone, vehicle, and keys. (Ex. Vol. IV at 171.) Mother testified she suffered bruises from that incident. A week later, Mother dismissed the petition for protective order and the petition for dissolution. Sometime during August 2018, Father physically assaulted Mother in Child's presence.
[¶5] On August 19, 2018, Father asked Mother if he could take Child to a family birthday party in Indianapolis from 6:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. that day. Father did not return Child to Mother at the designated time and allegedly told Mother "that [Father and Child] were returning to Indianapolis and that [Mother] could no longer have 'unsupervised' visitation with [Child]." (Appellee's App. Vol. II at 12.) On August 24, 2018, Father enrolled Child in a day care in Indianapolis without Mother's consent. On the enrollment forms Father indicated the parties were divorced and he was enrolling Child in the Indianapolis day care because Child was "back at [his] primary residence[.]" (Ex. Vol. III at 49) (formatting omitted).
At some point during these proceedings, Father began to video record each parenting time exchange with Mother.
[¶6] On August 21, 2018, Mother filed a second petition for a protective order against Father based on the July 14, 2018, incident. The same day, the trial court approved Mother's request and issued a protective order against Father that would expire in two years. On August 25, 2018, Mother refiled her petition for dissolution in Allen County.
[¶7] On August 31, 2018, after allegedly attempting to retrieve Child from Father's care, Mother filed a petition for return of Child and request for emergency hearing. The trial court held a hearing on Mother's petition for return of Child and other provisional motions on September 28, 2018. On October 12, 2018, the trial court, as part of a provisional order related to all matters in the dissolution, ordered Father to return Child to Mother on October 12, 2018, at 6:00 p.m. Father did not do so, and Mother "had to go to [her] house in Indianapolis . . . called the police, bring my court order." (Tr. Vol. II at 49.)
[¶8] On January 7, 2019, Mother filed petitions to modify the trial court's provisional order and to restrict parenting time. She alleged Father routinely did not comply with the trial court's provisional order awarding Mother primary custody of Child and Father parenting time with Child. She asserted Father also refused to return Child on several occasions or left him unattended at the agreed-upon custodial exchange location. On May 4, 2019, Father dropped Child off with Mother's mother. Starting on that day, Mother would not allow Father to exercise parenting time with Child. On May 8, 2019, Mother filed a motion for abatement of parenting time or, in the alternative, supervised parenting time. On May 13, 2019, Father filed a motion to strike Mother's May 8, 2019, petition as repetitive. On May 15, 2019, Father filed a petition for rule to show cause as to why Mother should not be held in contempt for failure to allow Father to exercise parenting time with Child.
[¶9] On July 26, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on all pending motions filed between January and May 2019. The trial court denied Father's rule to show cause and granted his motion to strike Mother's May 8, 2019, petition for abatement of parenting time or supervised parenting time. The trial court concluded:
14. [Child's] exposure to trauma is limited to the parenting time exchanges. Thus, given the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that a parenting time schedule that minimizes the contacts between the parties is necessary.
15. [Father's] exercise of midweek parenting time increases the frequency of the parties' contacts and negatively impacts [Father's] ability to meet his financial obligations to his son. Therefore the presumption favoring the application of the standard Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines is deemed rebutted.
16. It is in [Child's] bests interests to restore [Father's] parenting time consistent with this order.
17. The Court concludes that a parenting schedule that provides for alternate weekends with the addition of consecutive days in the stead of midweek visits is in [Child's] best interests.
18. The history of this case is such that neither party comes to the court with "clean hands". Prospectively, the court cautions the parties to fully comply with its orders.(Appellee's App. Vol. II at 47.) Regarding Mother's petition for modification of provisional order and restriction of parenting time, the trial court stated "[t]he Petitioner's Verified Motion for Modification of Provisional Orders and on [sic] her Verified Petition to Restrict Parenting Time are denied insofar as the same related to the restriction or requirement for the supervision of [Father's] parenting time." (Id.) (internal formatting omitted).
[¶10] On August 14, 2019, Mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's July 26, 2019, order. She argued the trial court's order granting Father parenting time from Wednesday 6:00 p.m. to the following Monday at 6:00 p.m. on alternate weekends had resulted in Child missing his pre-kindergarten instruction for "more than half a week" because Father lived in Indianapolis and Child's school was in Fort Wayne. (Id. at 49.) Mother proposed "[t]he parties could each respectively pick up [Child] after school on their assigned parenting days to avoid contact with each other." (Id. at 50.) On February 11, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Mother's motion for reconsideration. The trial court granted Mother's motion and ordered Father "to transport [Child] to pre-school on Monday, Thursday, and Friday mornings consistent with his parenting time schedule." (Id. at 51.)
[¶11] In February 2020, Child's preschool teacher, who would also be his kindergarten teacher, expressed concern about Child progressing into kindergarten because he had not yet met certain academic benchmarks. In the months following and during the subsequent summer, Mother taught Child outside of school in an effort to help Child attain those academic benchmarks. Child's school permitted Child to progress to kindergarten in fall 2020. However, Child missed forty-five days of instruction during the 2020-21 school year because Father failed to transport Child to school during Father's parenting time. As a result, Child's academic progress was significantly disrupted, which resulted in Child's school requiring Child to repeat kindergarten.
[¶12] On July 1, 2020, Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time. She argued Child's pending attendance in kindergarten made the transportation arrangement as outlined in the trial court's February 11, 2020, order "impossible[.]" (Id. at 57.) Mother asked the trial court to modify the parenting time order to adhere to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines for a school aged child with consideration of the distance between the parties' residences. The trial court held its final dissolution hearings on July 2, July 16, July 30, August 11, and August 25, 2021. On November 11, 2021, the trial court issued its order dissolving the parties' marriage. Regarding child custody, the trial court awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of Child. The trial court awarded Father parenting time with Child with certain deviations from the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, which the trial court outlined in its order. The trial court also ordered Father to pay $48.00 a week in child support.
[¶13] Additionally, the trial court divided the marital estate. The trial court determined the marital pot contained $54,095.00 in assets and $226,635.00 in debts. The trial court found the marital estate had "a negative net value of (-) $172,540.00." (Id. at 48.) The trial court found Father had rebutted the presumption of an equal distribution of the parties' marital estate and awarded Mother "69.9% of the negative marital estate" and Father "30.1% of the parties' negative marital estate." (Id. at 49.) The trial court further ordered Father to pay Mother $54,233.00 "by way of property equalization judgment between the parties." (Id.) The trial court also ordered the parties to sell the house in Indianapolis and divide the proceeds based on the unequal distribution of the marital estate.
Discussion and Decision
[¶14] When a party, here Father, requests special findings under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) we may set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. See Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 2002) (appellate court uses clearly erroneous standard when reviewing special findings requested by a party pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A)). The trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous "only if (i) its findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law or (ii) its conclusions of law do not support its judgment." Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 566, 576 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). We will disturb the judgment if there exists no evidence to support the trial court's findings. Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind. 1999). "We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment." Id. We also give due regard to "the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Indiana Trial Rule 52(A).
1. Child Custody
[¶15] Father first argues the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of Child to Mother. Custody determinations fall squarely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion. Klotz v. Klotz, 747 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 2001). We will not reverse unless the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. In determining child custody, the trial court is to consider nine statutory factors:
Father does not make an argument regarding the trial court's decision to award Mother sole legal custody of Child, except to say it is not in Child's best interest. He cites neither case law nor the relevant statute. Therefore, the issue is waived for failure to make a cogent argument supported by relevant authority. See Srivastava v. Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation, Inc., 779 N.E.2d 52, 54 n.1 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires the argument to include cogent reasoning, as well as citations to statutes and cases relied upon; failure to include cogent argument with support therefor results in waiver of the issue), trans. denied.
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child's parent or parents;
(B) the child's sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.
(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:
(A) the child's parent; or
(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court is required to consider all factors as listed in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, but it is not "required to enter a finding as to each factor it considered." Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022, 1031 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
[¶16] Here, the trial court made several findings of fact that the trial court ultimately relied upon, including:
12. The parties are parents to a beautiful, bright-eyed, six (6) year old little boy who has been embroiled in these custody proceedings since he was three (3) years old. Notably, a video of [Child] taken by [Father] during a parenting time exchange was illustrative of the strain and emotional distress placed on this [Child] of tender years as his parents battle for custody. Neither party is blameless. I.C. 31-17-2-8(1)(3) and (4)(a)(c).
13. Each party has removed [Child] from the care of the other parent for periods of time; [Father] during the initiation of these proceedings, and [Mother] over the course of these proceedings as found further herein. Thus, the Court cannot find that placement of [Child] in the physical custody of either party will ensure the noncustodial parent will enjoy regular parenting time. I.C. 31-17-2-8(4).
14. The Court finds that each party has taken actions and made decisions contrary to the wellbeing of [Child]. I.C. 31-17-2-8(4)(5).
15. [Mother] had enrolled [Child] in Kindergarten against the advice of the educators and to [Child's] short-term and long-term educational detriment. I.C. 31-17-2-8(4)(c).
16. Each parent has subjected [Child] to multiple investigations by State authorities and medical examinations, in which child abuse or neglect was never substantiated. I.C. 31-17-2-8(4)(c).
17. [Father] video tapes nearly ever [sic] interaction in the plain view of [Child], contending that [Mother] will accuse him of something. However, neither he nor his witnesses dispute that he caused [Mother] injuries in 2018, prior to the initiation of the divorce, in the household shared with [Child]. These injuries consisted of bruises about her body. [Father] only denies choking her. I.C. 31-17-2-8(7) and I.C. 31-17-2-5(6).
18. The Court finds that there is no evidence of illness or disability preventing the parties from communicating to advance the best interests of [Child]; however, each party unequivocally refuses to do so. The parenting time exchanges have occurred at [a] neutral public setting and have been fraught with discord in the presence of [Child]. I.C. 31-17-2-8(6) and I.C. 31-17-2-5(2)(6).
19. [Father] currently resides in Indianapolis, Indiana, and has a lawncare business and works for a meal preparation business. I.C. 31-17-2-8(5)(a)(b)(c) and I.C. 31-17-2-5(5)[.]
20. [Mother] resides in Fort Wayne, Indiana, in the home of her parents and is employed full-time at IVY Tech in Fort Wayne. [Child] is adjusted to his school. I.C. 31-17-2-8(5)(a)(b)(c) and I.C. 31-17-2-5(5).
21. Unfortunately, each party has weaponized the issue of custody and used [Child] as the instrument to do so. Although statutorily considering the wishes of the parties as to custody, the Court ultimately considers what is best for [Child].(Appellant's App. Vol. II at 36-7.) Father argues Findings 15 and 20 do not support the trial court's decision because they contradict each other. He also contends Finding 17 is incorrect as a matter of law. We address each argument in turn.
[¶17] Finding 15 concerns Mother's decision to enroll Child in kindergarten against the advice of educators and seemingly to the Child's detriment. Finding 20 indicates "[Child] is adjusted to his school." (Id. at 37.) Father argues the portion of Finding 15 indicating detriment to child contradicts Finding 20 because Child cannot be adjusted to his school if Mother's past decision negatively impacted Child's educational advancement. We disagree with Father's interpretation of the findings. As noted in Finding 15, Mother enrolled Child in Kindergarten notwithstanding the advice of an educator. Finding 15 recounts a decision Mother made in the past, which decision was believed at that time would be to Child's detriment. Finding 20 gives information about Child's current condition, that is, he is adjusted to his school. The findings do not contradict each other.
We note Father ignores testimony that he contributed to the impairment of Child's education advancement by refusing to transport Child to school when Child was in his care, resulting in Child missing forty-five days of school.
[¶18] Finding 17 concerns domestic violence between the parties, which is a factor the trial court may consider when determining child custody. See Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8(7) (the trial court may consider, when determining child custody, "[e]vidence of a pattern of domestic violence by either parent"). Father contends Finding 17 is incorrect as a matter of law because the court's finding cites one incident of domestic violence in 2018, and one incident does not rise to the level of the "pattern" of domestic violence set forth for consideration in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8(7). However, Father's argument ignores the plain language of the finding. Finding 17 states Father caused Mother "injuries in 2018" - it does not indicate whether those injuries were inflicted during one incident of domestic violence or multiple incidents. (App. Vol. II at 36.) Mother testified Father physically assaulted her and she sustained bruises two times in 2018 - the first in July 2018 and the second in August 2018. Thus, the trial court's finding is not incorrect as a matter of law because (1) the trial court did not indicate the timing of the injuries, and (2) there were, in fact, two incidents of domestic violence in 2018.
[¶19] Both parties engaged in reprehensible conduct as it pertains to Child. Their constant squabbling over the most minor of details makes Child's custody arrangement an ongoing war, with each parent taking small battle victories, while Child is the perpetual victim of their egregious behavior. However, the trial court's consideration of the factors pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 ultimately tips the scales in favor of Mother. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's findings support its decision to award Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of Child. See Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 949 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (trial court did not err when it awarded custody to Mother because it considered factors pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8).
2. Division of Marital Assets
[¶20] Father also contends the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded the lawn equipment to Father as an asset. Indiana subscribes to a "one-pot" theory of marital property. Morey v. Morey, 49 N.E.3d 1065, 1069 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Thus, when parties petition for dissolution of marriage, the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:
(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;
(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:
(A) after the marriage; and
(B) before final separation of the parties; or
(3) acquired by their joint efforts.Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a); see also Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98 (defining "property" for the purposes of dissolution as "all the assets of either party or both parties"). Even if the court later determines that it will set a particular asset aside to one of the parties, it must first include such asset in the marital estate and assign it a value. Quinn v. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d 1212, 1223 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). This "one-pot" theory ensures that all assets are subject to the trial court's power to divide and award. Morey, 49 N.E.3d at 1069.
[¶21] Then, when the court divides the property, it
shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. If the court determines that one party rebutted the presumption of equal division, "then the court must state its reasoning in its findings and judgment." Morey, 49 N.E.3d at 1072.
[¶22] The trial court has discretion to divide marital property, and we reverse only if the court abused its broad discretion. Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005, 1012 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court: (1) entered a ruling clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, (2) misinterpreted the law, or (3) disregarded evidence of factors listed in the controlling statute. Id. When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital property, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition. Morey, 49 N.E.3d at 1069. Even if the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, "we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court." Id. This court will not reweigh evidence and will consider the evidence "in a light most favorable to the judgment." Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 102.
2.1 Assignment of Lawn Equipment as an Asset to Father
[¶23] In its dissolution order, the trial court divided the marital estate and entered Finding 78, which states, "[t]he Court resolves by a preponderance of the evidence that [Father] shall be charged the value of the items titled 'lawn equipment.'" (Appellant's App. Vol. II at 46.) Father argues this finding is not supported by the evidence. However, this statement is a conclusion, not a finding. Therefore, we will determine if there are findings to support the trial court's award of the lawn equipment to Father.
[¶24] Relevant to the issue of the assignment of the lawn equipment, the trial court made two findings, which state: "19. [Father] currently resides in Indianapolis, Indiana, and has a lawncare business . . . 20. [Mother] resides in Fort Wayne, Indiana, in the home of her parents . . ." (Id. at 36-7.) The fact that Father has a lawncare business supports the trial court's conclusion that Father should be assigned the lawncare equipment. Additionally, as Mother lives with her parents, she would seemingly have no location to properly store the equipment, which also supports the trial court's conclusion. Thus, Father has not demonstrated clear error in the court's reaching this conclusion. See, e.g., Haggarty v. Haggarty, 176 NE.3d 234, 252 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (wife could not demonstrate clear error when trial court's findings regarding terms of pre-nuptial agreement supported its conclusions regarding those terms).
2.2 Equalization Payment
[¶25] Moreover, Father argues the trial court erred when it ordered Father to pay Mother an equalization payment of $54,223.00 because the trial court's findings do not support that conclusion. In its order, the trial court listed the contents of the parties' marital pot as:
(Image Omitted) (App. Vol. II at 48.) However, he trial court's calculation of the marital estate is flawed. While the trial court lists the parties' house on Wood Hollow Drive as an asset, its calculation of the estate's total assets does not include the value of the home. This appears to be a simple math error, but the consequences of the error are significant. Because the trial court undercalculated the assets in the marital pot and relied on that miscalculation in dividing the marital estate, its subsequent calculations related to the parties' division of property are flawed. We therefore conclude the trial court erred when it ordered Father to pay Mother an equalization payment of $54,223.00 because that conclusion was not supported by the trial court's finding regarding the marital pot's assets and debts. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Carpenter, 891 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (trial court erred when it concluded certain tax exemptions regarding certain children of the marriage should be modified because the trial court's findings did not support that conclusion).
We also note it would seem the trial court, in the portion of its order regarding the equalization payment, deducted the amount Father overpaid in child support from his required equalization payment. The trial court found, "[Father] has overpaid support in the amount of $2,521.00 as of June 1, 2021." (App. Vol. II at 42.) In the portion of its order regarding Father's equalization payment to Mother, the trial court stated the ordered payment of all fees indicated within the order, the first to be paid was "[t]he property equalization judgement owed to [Mother], less [Father's] overpayment." (Id. at 51.) The trial court listed that amount as $51,702.00, which is the equalization payment of $54,223.00 minus the amount Father overpaid in child support, $2,521.00. We remind the trial court that "[c]hild support is intended to provide support and maintenance for the parties' minor child" and "is held distinct from other accounts to protect the child's right to receive support." Maloblocki v. Maloblocki, 646 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995). Therefore, any property equalization payment determined based on this opinion should not be reduced by Father's overpayment of child support.
Conclusion
[¶26] The trial court did not err when it awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of Child because the evidence supports the trial court's findings and those findings support its conclusions. Additionally, it did not err when it assigned the lawn equipment as an asset to Father because the trial court's findings regarding Father's occupation and Mother's inability to store such equipment support the trial court's conclusion. However, the trial court erred when it ordered Father to pay Mother a property equalization payment of $54,223.00 because the trial court's finding regarding the assets and debts of the marital pot is incorrect and thus any further calculations based thereon are incorrect. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
[¶27] Affirmed, reversed, and remanded.
Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.