LaPorte v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co.

Full title: KRISTY L. LaPORTE v. BOSTON MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. ET AL

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville

Date published: Aug 14, 2003

2003 Ct. Sup. 9682 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

35 CLR 346

Opinion

No. CV 03-0080400

August 14, 2003

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT (110) AND MOTION TO DISMISS (108)

SCHOLL, JUDGE.

In the Amended Complaint in this action the plaintiffs are identified as Kristy L. LaPorte and the Estate of Daniel Satryb. The defendant has moved to dismiss the action as to the Estate of Daniel Satryb for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because an estate has no legal existence. In Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 3 Conn. App. 598, 600, cert. den., 196 Conn. 807 (1985), the court stated: "`It is elemental that in order to confer jurisdiction on the court the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is he or it must be a person in law or a legal entity with legal capacity to sue. 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parties, 20, 21. An estate is not a legal entity. It is neither a natural nor artificial person, but is merely a name to indicate the sum total of the assets and liabilities of the decedent or incompetent. Bar Association v. Connecticut Bank Trust Co., 20 Conn. Sup. 248, 262 [ 131 A.2d 646 (1957)]. Not having a legal existence, it can neither sue nor be sued. Vonchina v. Estate of Turner, 154 Cal.App.2d 134, [ 315 P.2d 723 (1957)]; 2 Locke Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice 375.' Estate of Schoeller v. Becker, 33 Conn. Sup. 79, 79-80, 360 A.2d 907 (1975)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In response to the Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs have filed a motion to amend the complaint to correct the name of the second plaintiff to "Kristy L. LaPorte, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Satryb." The plaintiffs argue that pursuant to General Statutes § 52-128¹ they may amend the name of the plaintiff in this regard. However in Isaac the Court stated: "The trial court correctly considered the defendants' motion to dismiss before reaching the plaintiff's request to amend and motion to substitute. When a question of jurisdiction is brought to the court's attention, that issue must be resolved before the court can move on to other matters. Baldwin Piano Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297-98, 441 A.2d 183 (1982). This would appear to be particularly true where the question raised concerns subject matter, as opposed to personal, jurisdiction. See id., 298-99 (Peters, J., concurring)." Id.

1 General Statutes § 52-128 provides: "The plaintiff may amend any defect, mistake or informality in the writ, complaint, declaration or petition, and insert new counts in the complaint or declaration, which might have been originally inserted therein, without costs, within the first thirty days after the return day and at any time afterwards on the payment of costs at the discretion of the court; but, after any such amendment, the defendant shall have a reasonable time to answer the same."

In the case cited by the plaintiffs, Nygren v. Steier, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV00 0156706 (January 10, 2001, Doherty, J.) ( 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 699), the court considered a motion to substitute a party made pursuant to Practice Book § 9-20² prior to its determination of a motion to dismiss and held that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the action should be saved from dismissal by the substitution of the plaintiff. The court noted that several Superior Courts have ruled on a motion to substitute a plaintiff while a motion to dismiss challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction was pending. These courts have held that they have subject matter jurisdiction for the limited purpose of deciding the motion to substitute. The court in Nygren also noted that the Appellate Courts have upheld the substitution of a party plaintiff to cure an original party's lack of standing.

2 Practice Book § 9-20 provides: "When any action has been commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, the judicial authority may, if satisfied that it was so commenced through mistake and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, allow any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff."

Later in Lupannacci v. Stamford, 48 Conn. Sup. 1, 4 (2002), the court allowed the substitution of a plaintiff while a motion to dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction was pending. The court noted that a series of more recent decisions of the Appellate Court "have established that the granting of a motion to substitute a party plaintiff may save a case from dismissal despite the general rule that courts must decide jurisdictional issues first." Subsequent to Lupannacci, the Appellate Court in Fairfax Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 72 Conn. App. 426, 437 n. 12 (2002), continued this trend when it noted: "Usually, when the issue of subject matter jurisdiction arises, it must be determined before any other matters can be considered and rulings made thereon. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996); Baldwin Piano Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297-98, 441 A.2d 183 (1982); Kohn Display Woodworking Co. v. Paragon Paint Varnish Corp., 166 Conn. 446, 448, 352 A.2d 301 (1974). There is decisional authority, however, that allows an amendment to a complaint to add an alternative basis for subject matter jurisdiction after jurisdiction has been questioned. LaBow v. LaBow, 171 Conn. 433, 370 A.2d 990 (1976); see also DiLieto v. County Obstetries Gynecology Group, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 150435 (January 31, 2000) ( 26 Conn.L.Rptr. 345); see also General Statutes § 52-109; Practice Book § 9-20. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., the third-party plaintiff wanted to amend its complaint in an attempt to make it fit `within the parameters of the limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity . . .' Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, NE., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 100. In the current case, the movants desired to be joined as parties plaintiff and did not seek to amend the allegations of the complaint." More recently in Cardi Materials v. CT Landscaping Bruzzi Corp., 77 Conn. App. 578, 580 n. 2 (2003), the Appellate Court held that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action on a contract where the plaintiff was not a party to the contract and the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the plaintiff's lack of standing. But there the court noted that the plaintiff did not move that the proper party be substituted as plaintiff but that such a substitution may have been permissible pursuant to General Statutes § 52-109 and Practice Book § 9-20.

Here the Plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint to named Kristy L. LaPorte, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Satryb. Whether the court considers this a motion to amend pursuant to Practice Book Practice Book § 10-60³ and General Statutes §§ 52-123⁴ and 52-128 or a motion to substitute pursuant to General Statutes § 52-109,⁵ it appears that the motion should be granted to correct what the plaintiffs claim was an honest mistake in the identification of one of the plaintiffs. Allowing the amendment to change the name of one of the plaintiffs from the "Estate of Daniel H. Satryb" to "Kristy L. LaPorte, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Satryb" where LaPorte was already named as a plaintiff in this matter and such a change does not bring in an entirely new party but simply corrects a misnomer or defect in description of her status as suing not only individually but also in her capacity as Administratrix, is therefore appropriate under the rules and statutes so as to save her claims from dismissal.

3 Practice Book § 10-60 provides: "a party may amend his or her pleadings or other parts of the record or proceedings at any time subsequent to that stated in the preceding section in the following manner: (1) By order of judicial authority; or (2) By written consent of the adverse party; or (3) By filing a request for leave to file such amendment . . ."

4 General Statutes §§ 52-123 provides: "No writ, pleading, judgment or any kind of proceeding in court or course of justice shall be abated, suspended, set aside or reversed for any kind of circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects, if the person and the cause may be rightly understood and intended by the court."

5 General Statutes § 52-109 provides: "When any action has been commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, the court may, if satisfied that it was so commenced through mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, allow any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff."

The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted and the Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Jane S. Scholl, J.