Opinion
No. 08-2496-CV.
February 18, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Underhill, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
David G. LaPointe, Winchester, CT, pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant.
Nicole D. Dorman, Karsten, Dorman Tallberg, LLC, West Hartford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Winchester Board of Education.
Alexandria L. Voccio, Howd Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees Robert S. Bixby Jr., Lynn A. Brewer, Scott Goodell, Todd Hayward and Kathleen O'Brien.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant David G. LaPointe appeals pro se from an April 21, 2008 judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Defendants on his due process and First Amendment claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and determine whether the district court properly concluded there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1995).
On appeal, LaPointe contends that he has a constitutionally protected property interest in his elected position as the Chairman of the Winchester Board of Education sufficient to support a procedural due process claim. We have held, however, that elected officials lack such a protected property interest in their elected offices because "`public offices are mere agencies or trusts, . . . not property.'" Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577, 20 S.Ct. 890, 44 L.Ed. 1187 (1900)); see also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (reaffirming the holding of Taylor). LaPointe's attempt to distinguish his claim from those in Velez, Taylor, and Snowden based on the fact that his "relationship is between [himself] and the Board," Appellant's Br. at 5, rather than between himself and the public is unavailing. After LaPointe was elected Chairman, his position remained in the realm of a public agency or trust, and, similarly, the nature of his relation to the public as a public officer did not change. See Taylor, 178 U.S. at 577, 20 S.Ct. 890. He continued to hold office for the benefit of his community and, if anything, his election to Chairman conferred a heightened responsibility to the public.
We decline to consider LaPointe's First Amendment and substantive due process claims on appeal because his attorney explicitly waived those claims in both LaPointe's memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and during oral argument before the district court. See Laza v. Reish, 84 F.3d 578, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1996). We deny LaPointe's motion to supplement the record on appeal as moot, because the videotapes he seeks to submit are not material to our disposition of this case.
We have carefully considered all of LaPointe's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.