Opinion
41405.
SUBMITTED JULY 7, 1965.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1965.
Revocation of probation. Oconee Superior Court. Before Judge Barrow.
Vane G. Hawkins, for plaintiff in error.
Thomas W. Ridgway, Solicitor General, contra.
The evidence authorized the judgment of the trial court revoking the probationary feature of the defendant's sentence.
SUBMITTED JULY 7, 1965 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1965.
On July 24, 1963, after pleading guilty in two cases, each charging her with maintaining a disorderly house, the defendant was sentenced to serve eighteen month on each charge, the sentences to run consecutively. Upon payment of a fine the defendant was permitted to serve such sentences on probation provided she complied with the terms of probation which included a provision that she should "not participate directly or indirectly as owner, employee or operator of any business activity catering to the public in the counties of Clarke, Walton or Oconee." On April 14, 1965, the defendant was served with a petition for the revocation of probation and was ordered to show cause why the probation of the second sentence (the first having been already served), should not be revoked. On such hearing the trial court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to complete such sentence in prison. Error is now assigned on such judgment adverse to the defendant.
"The quantum of evidence sufficient to justify the trial court in revoking a probationary sentence is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction in the first instance. Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526 ( 51 S.E.2d 571); Price v. State, 91 Ga. App. 381 ( 85 S.E.2d 627). Where, after notice and hearing, the court revokes the probationary feature of the sentence, and there is some evidence which would indicate that there had been a violation thereof, this court will not interfere unless a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court appears. Olsen v. State, 21 Ga. App. 795 ( 95 S.E. 269)." Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 319 ( 103 S.E.2d 126).
There was evidence adduced that the defendant was waiting on customers in a "truck-stop" restaurant located in Oconee County, that she agreed to make a cash pay-off if "free games" were won on a pin ball machine located therein, and that she actually did make a cash pay-off (using funds from the establishment's cash drawer) when twenty-three games were won. While there was contradictory evidence which would have exonerated the defendant from the charge of violating the terms of her probated sentence, the evidence authorized the finding of the trial court and such judgment will not be disturbed.
Judgment affirmed. Eberhardt and Pannell, JJ., concur.