Opinion
For Chris Langer, Plaintiff: Christopher A Seabock, Mark D Potter, Phyl Grace, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Center for Disability Access, San Diego, CA.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
MARGARET M. MORROW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On January 16, 2014, Chris Langer filed this action against Dodaiton, Inc. (" Dodaiton"), Dhaka Corp., and various fictitious defendants, alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (" ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ; the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (" the Unruh Act"), California Civil Code § § 51-53; the California Disabled Persons Act (" the CDPA"), California Civil Code § § 54-54.8; and negligence. On March 17, 2014, Langer filed a first amended complaint substituting defendant Roberto Morales for Dhaka Corp. On April 22, 2014, the clerk entered Dodaiton's default. On May 7, 2014, the court dismissed the claims against Morales for failure to prosecute. Langer filed a motion for entry of default judgment against Dodaiton on June 18, 2014. He seeks statutory damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and injunctive relief requiring Dodaiton to comply with the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (" ADAAG"). Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the court found this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. The hearing calendared for September 29, 2014, was therefore vacated, and the matter taken off calendar. For the reasons stated in this order, the motion is now granted.
Complaint, Docket No. 1 (Jan. 16, 2014).
First Amended Complaint (" FAC"), Docket No. 8 (Mar. 17, 2014).
Default by Clerk Entered, Docket No. 13 (Apr. 22, 2014).
Order Dismissing Defendant Roberto Morales, Docket No. 14 (May 7, 2014).
Motion for Default Judgment Against Dodaiton, Inc. (" Motion"), Docket No. 26 (Jun. 18, 2014).
Id. at 4-5.
I. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
Langer is a paraplegic who cannot walk or stand, and who uses a wheelchair for mobility. Dodaiton owns the store Dolar Y Mas (" the market") located at 1911 East 10th Street, Long Beach, California. The market is a place of business open to the public, and thus a public accommodation.
FAC, ¶ 1.
Id., ¶ ¶ 2, 3.
Id., ¶ 9.
Langer visited the market in June 2013 to shop. Paths of travel are one of the facilities, privileges, and advantages Dodaiton offers to its customers. Langer alleges, however, that there are no accessible parking spaces at the market. He also asserts that two unramped steps render the entrance to the market inaccessible for patrons such as him. Finally, he alleges that, while he did not personally encounter this barrier, defendants have moveable objects at the front entrance of the market that impede the path of travel for wheelchair users. Due to these conditions, he asserts, the market is not accessible to wheelchair users.
Id., ¶ 8.
Id., ¶ 10.
Id., ¶ 14.
Id., ¶ ¶ 11-12.
Id., ¶ 13.
Id., ¶ ¶ 11, 17.
Langer contends that conditions at the property denied him full and equal access to the facility. He alleges, on information and belief, that Dodaiton's failure to remove the barriers was intentional and not an " accident, " because: (1) the barriers are intuitive and obvious; and (2) defendant exercised dominion and control over conditions at the location.
Id., ¶ 17.
Id., ¶ 18.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard Governing Motions for Entry of Default Judgment
A court may enter judgment against a party whose default has been entered under Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Security Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Kloepping v. Firemen's Fund, No. C 94-2684 THE, 1996 WL 75314, *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1996).
Granting or denying a motion for default judgment is a matter within the court's discretion. Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v. Bryant, No. CV 03-6381 GAF (JTLx), 2004 WL 783123, *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2004); see also Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Elias, No. CV 03-6387 DT (RCx), 2004 WL 141959, *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2004). The Ninth Circuit has directed that courts consider the following factors in deciding whether to enter default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts; (6) whether defendant's default was the product of excusable neglect, and (7) the strong public policy favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Bryant, 2004 WL 783123 at *1-2.
Once a party's default has been entered, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning damages, are deemed to have been admitted by the non-responding party. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 8(b)(6); see also, e.g., Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating the general rule that " upon default[, ] the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true"). The court, however, must still " consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law." 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2688, at 63 (1998) (footnote omitted); see also Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir.1992) (" [N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default"); Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (" [Although] the factual allegations of [the] complaint together with other competent evidence submitted by the moving party are normally taken as true . . . this Court must still review the facts to insure that the Plaintiffs have properly stated claims for relief").
If the court determines that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish liability, it must then determine the " amount and character" of the relief that should be awarded. 10A Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, § 2688, at 63; Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 394 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that the district court has " wide latitude" and discretion in determining the amount of damages to award upon default judgment, quoting James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993)).
B. Procedural Requirements
Before a court can enter default judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff must satisfy the procedural requirements for default judgments set forth in Rules 54(c) and 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as with Local Rule 55-1. Local Rule 55-1 requires that a party moving for default judgment submit a motion: (1) indicating when and against which party default has been entered; (2) identifying the pleading as to which default has been entered; (3) indicating whether the defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is represented by a general guardian, committee, conservator or other representative; (4) stating that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 521, does not apply; and (5) affirming that notice has been served on the defaulting party if required by Rule 55(b)(2). Ca CD L.R. 55-1, 55-2; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1174.
Rule 54(c) states that " judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment." Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 54(c).
Rule 55(a) provides that the clerk must enter the party's default " [w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise." Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 55(a). Rule 55(b)(2) requires service on the defaulting party if that party has appeared in the action. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 55(b)(2) (" If the party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 3 days before the hearing"); see also, e.g., In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that Rule 55(b)(2) notice " is only required where the party has made an appearance"). As Dodaiton has not appeared, service was not required.
Langer has satisfied these requirements. Langer served the summons and first amended complaint on Dodaiton on March 24, 2014. The clerk entered Dodaiton's default as to the first amended complaint on April 22, 2014. Dodaiton is not an infant or incompetent person; nor is it in the military service or otherwise exempted under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, the predecessor to the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act. Langer's motion seeks statutory damages, an injunction, and attorneys' fees and costs -- the same forms of relief sought in his complaint. Additionally, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that, on June 13, 2014, although not required to do so under Rule 55(b)(2), Langer served the motion for default judgment on Dodaiton. Langer has thus complied with the procedural prerequisites for the entry of default judgment. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175 (finding that the procedural requirements of Rule 55 and Local Rule 55-1 had been met where plaintiffs addressed each required factor in their application for default judgment).
Proof of Service, Docket No. 10 (March 28, 2014).
Default by Clerk Entered as to Dodaiton, Docket No. 13 (April 22, 2014); see also Motion at 1.
Motion at 2.
Compare id. with FAC at 8 (Prayer).
Proof of Service of Motion (" Motion POS"), Docket No. 26-13 (Jun. 18, 2014).
C. The Eitel Factors
The court must next determine whether, applying the Eitel factors, granting Langer's motion for the entry of default judgment is appropriate.
1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff
The first Eitel factor considers whether a plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a default judgment is not entered. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Langer contends that he has been, and continues to, suffer discrimination due to physical disability because of Dodaiton's failure to comply with the the ADA, the Unruh Act, and the CDPA. Dodaiton has failed to appear and defend Langer's claims. Absent entry of a default judgment, Langer will likely be without recourse against Dodaiton, given Dodaiton's unwillingness to cooperate and defend. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 (stating that plaintiffs would have no other recourse if a default judgment were not entered). Because Langer will suffer prejudice if he is without recourse against Dodaiton, the first Eitel factor favors entry of a default judgment.
2. The Merits of Langer's Substantive Claim and Sufficiency of the Complaint
The second and third Eitel factors " require that a plaintiff state a claim on which [it] may recover." PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175; see also Discovery Communications, Inc. v. Animal Planet, Inc., 172 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (" The Ninth Circuit has suggested that the [ ] two Eitel factor[s] involving the substantive merits of Plaintiff's claims and the sufficiency of the complaint [ ] 'require that plaintiff's allegations state a claim on which [it] may recover, '" quoting Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)). As noted, Langer's complaint pleads claims for violation of the ADA, the Unruh Act, the CDPA, and negligence. His motion seeks default judgment only on the ADA and the Unruh Act claims. Because Langer has stated a claim under these statutes and can recover his requested relief under them, the court evaluates only these two claims.
See FAC, ¶ ¶ 19-36.
See Motion at 2-6, 7.
a. Discrimination Under Title III of the ADA
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. It provides that " [n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Langer alleges that Dodaiton owns the property where the market is located. Dodaiton is therefore liable for violating the ADA if Langer can show that he suffered discrimination at the market due to his disability. Discrimination under Title III includes " a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable." Id., § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The term " readily achievable" means " easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." Id., § 12181(9).
FAC, ¶ 3; see also Motion, Exh. 1 (" Potter Decl."), ¶ 3; Motion, Exh. 5 (" Public Records").
" To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of his disability." Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal alteration original). In addition, " [t]o succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination on account of one's disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant's place of business [or property] presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable." Parr v. L& L Drive-Inn Restaurant, 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000); see also Johnson v. Beahm, No. 2:11-cv-0294 MCE JFM, 2011 WL 5508893, *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
(1) Whether Langer Has Standing to Bring an ADA Claim
As with all claims, a plaintiff must have Article III standing to assert a claim under the ADA. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (" . . . as with other civil rights statutes, to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a disabled individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage of the litigation"). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to defendant's challenged conduct, and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1162 (S.D. Cal. 2006). Langer has Article III standing because he alleges he was denied equal access to the market and will be deterred from seeking access to the market in the future; this allegation must be accepted as true as a result of Dodaiton's default. The architectural barriers at the market are purportedly the cause of the denial of equal access, and an award of statutory damages and injunctive relief will redress Langer's alleged injuries.
Motion at 1-2; Motion, Exh. 2 (" Langer Decl."), ¶ 6
See FAC, ¶ ¶ 18-28; see also Motion at 4-5.
Where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he must also demonstrate a significant possibility of future harm. See San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996). " In the ADA context, in determining the likelihood that a plaintiff will return to defendant's facility, courts have examined such factors as (1) the proximity of the place of public accommodation to plaintiff's residence, (2) plaintiff's past patronage of defendant's business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff's plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff's frequency of travel near defendant." Hubbard, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1162. Although Langer does not allege an unambiguous intention to return to the market, this is not fatal to a finding that he has standing to seek injunctive relief. Indeed, " [d]emonstrating an intent to return to a non-compliant accommodation is but one way for an injured plaintiff to establish Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief. A disabled individual also suffers a cognizable injury if he is deterred from visiting a noncompliant public accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his disability there." Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949 (emphasis added); see also Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2008) (" Once a disabled individual has encountered or become aware of alleged ADA violations that deter his patronage of or otherwise interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation, he has already suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant's conduct and capable of being redressed by the courts, and so he possesses standing under Article III"); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (" We hold that a disabled individual who is currently deterred from patronizing a public accommodation due to a defendant's failure to comply with the ADA has suffered 'actual injury'"). Since Langer has alleged that he was deterred and continues to be deterred from visiting the Market, he has adequately pled that he has Article III standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA.
Motion at 1-2; Langer Decl., ¶ 6.
(2) Whether Langer Has Shown That He Is Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA
The ADA defines disability as " [a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . .[, ] a record of such an impairment[, ] or being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Major life activities as defined by the ADA include walking and standing. Id., § 12102(2). Langer alleges that he is " a paraplegic, [who] cannot walk [and who] uses a wheelchair for mobility." Because this allegation is accepted as true, he has established that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits the major life activities of walking and standing. Langer is therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and has satisfied the first element of a Title III discrimination claim.
FAC, ¶ 1.
(3) Whether Langer Has Shown That the Market Is a Place of Public Accommodation
A general merchandise market is a place of public accommodation. Id., § 12181(7)(B), (E). Langer asserts the Market is a " facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and a business establishment." Accepting this allegation as true, Langer has proved the second element of his Title III discrimination claim.
Id., ¶ 9.
(4) Whether Langer Has Shown That the Market's Architectural Barriers Denied Him Public Accommodations Due to Disability
The next two elements of an ADA architectural barriers claim evaluate whether architectural barriers worked to discriminate against the plaintiff on account of physical disability. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950 (" an ADA plaintiff suffers an injury-in-fact either because discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from returning to a facility or because they 'otherwise interfere with his access to' the facility, " quoting Doran, 524 F.3d at 1042 n. 5). Langer contends that during his visit to the Market, he encountered three barriers: (1) a lack of accessible disabled parking; (2) the lack of an accessible entrance to the Market because of two unramped steps; and (3) moveable objects in the front of the Market. An investigator for the Center of Disability Access went to the Market and took photographs of the alleged barriers. He measured the steps leading to the Market and asserts the first step is five (5) inches high, while the second is six (6) inches high. He also asserts that he observed there was no accessible parking at the Market. Langer contends that due to these barriers, he has been deterred from attempting further visits to the store.
FAC, ¶ ¶ 11-14; Langer Decl., ¶ 4.
Motion at 1; see also Motion, Exh. 4 (" Garcia Photos").
See Motion, Exh. 3 (Declaration of Victor Garcia in Support of Application for Default Judgment (" Garcia Decl.")), ¶ ¶ 3-4.
Motion at 1-2; Langer Decl., ¶ 6.
Langer contends the barriers violate the ADAAG. Any business that provides parking spaces must provide disabled parking spaces. 28 C.F.R., Part 36, Appendix D (ADDAG, § 4.1.2(5)). Under § 4.1.2(5)(b), " one in every eight of th[e disabled parking] spaces, but not less than one . .., must be 'van accessible' as required by [§ ] 4.6.4." Section 4.6.4 states that van accessible parking spaces must be marked " by a sign showing the symbol of accessibility." As for paths of travel, § 4.3.8 requires that " accessible route[s] . . . not include stairs, steps, or escalators, " and that " [i]f an accessible route has changes in level greater than 1/2 in[ch] (13 mm), then a curb ramp, ramp, elevator, or platform lift . . . shall be provided. . . ." Under § 4.3.8, the minimum clear width of an accessible route is 36 inches. Langer alleges that moveable objects in front of the store make the path of travel less than 36 inches wide.
FAC, ¶ ¶ 19-28.
Id., ¶ 27. Although Langer did not personally encounter the " moveable objects at the front entrance that impede the path of travel, " this does not preclude him from challenging the barrier. The Chapman court held that " an ADA plaintiff who establishes standing as to encountered barriers may also sue for injunctive relief as to unencountered barriers related to his disability." Id.
Accepting Langer's allegations as true, and noting that they are corroborated by Garcia's declaration and photographs, the court concludes he has satisfied the third and fourth elements of a Title III discrimination claim by showing that the barriers he encountered and that exist are prohibited by the ADA, and denied him full and equal access to the Market due to his disability.
(5) Whether Langer Has Shown That Removal of The Barriers Is Readily Achievable
Whether removal of a barrier is readily achievable involves consideration of four factors: " A) the nature and cost of the action needed . . .; B) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon the operation of the facility; C) the overall financial resources of the coveredentity; the overall size of the business of a coveredentity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and D) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; [and] the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity." Hubbard, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1168 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)).
The Ninth Circuit has yet to decide who has the burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable. Various district courts in the circuit, however, have applied the burden-shifting framework adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Cross Disability v. Hermanson Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001). There, the court held that the " [p]laintiff bears the initial burden of production to present evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable." Id. at 1006. If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant, who " bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [his] affirmative defense that a suggested method of barrier removal is not readily achievable." Id. ; see Beahm, 2011 WL 5508893 at *2 (noting that district courts in the Ninth Circuit often apply the Colorado Cross framework); see also Hubbard, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1168 (noting that defendants bear the ultimate burden of proving that removal is not readily achievable); Sceper v. Trucks Plus, No. Civ S-09-0801 GEB EFB, 2009 WL 3763823, *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009) (agreeing with the District of Arizona that until the Ninth Circuit provides additional and specific instruction to lower courts, it would follow the overwhelming majority of federal courts that apply the burden-shifting framework, especially in the context of a default judgment where defendants had not appeared).
In Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery, LLC, 531 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the burden-shifting analysis of Colorado Cross in the context of removal of barriers in historical buildings. Molski appears to be limited to the historic building context, as the Ninth Circuit's rationale for putting the entire burden on defendant was that ADA guidelines for historic buildings place the burden on the " party with the best access to information regarding the historical significance of the building, " rather than " on the party advocating for remedial measures." Id. The decision does not address non-historic building compliance and is not controlling in this case. See Beahm, 2011 WL 5508893 at *2.
Langer provides little information concerning any of the relevant factors. Federal regulations, however, illuminate the types of barrier removals that are likely to be readily achievable. Under 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b), examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers include installing ramps, insulating lavatory pipes under sinks to prevent burns, repositioning the paper towel or other dispenser, installing accessible door hardware, and creating designated accessible parking spaces.
Langer's allegation that removal of the barriers is readily achievable, which is accepted as true, is sufficient to satisfy his burden of production. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hall, No. 2:11-cv-2817-GEB-JFM, 2012 WL 1604715, *3 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (plaintiff's allegation that architectural barriers were " readily removable" and that he sought injunctive relief to remove all readily achievable barriers" satisfied his burden); Beahm, 2011 WL 5508893 at *3 (holding that plaintiff's allegation that architectural barriers were readily removable was sufficient because it was accepted as true on default); see also Sceper, 2009 WL 3763823 at *4 (granting default judgment on plaintiff's ADA claim even though plaintiff did not specifically allege that removal of barriers was readily achievable, and pled instead that defendants were required to remove architectural barriers). Due to its default, Dodaiton has failed to meet its burden of showing that barrier removal is not readily achievable. The court thus concludes that Langer has established the fifth and final element of a Title III discrimination claim. He has therefore stated a viable cause of action under the ADA.
b. Discrimination Under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act
The Unruh Act provides that " [a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their . . . disability[ ] [or] medical condition . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act permits the recovery of monetary damages, in the form of actual and treble damages or statutory damages of $4,000 per violation. See M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 731 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a)). A violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act, see Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); " no showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA violation." Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Langer's complaint alleges a cognizable ADA claim, he has also sufficiently alleged that Dodaiton violated the Unruh Act.
c. Conclusion Regarding Second and Third Eitel Factors
Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and considering the evidence Langer has adduced, the court concludes that he has stated a disability discrimination claim under both the ADA and the Unruh Act. The second and third Eitel factors thus favor entry of default judgment on these claims.
3. The Sum of Money at Stake
The fourth Eitel factor balances " the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of the [defaulting party's] conduct." PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Default judgment is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in relation to defendant's conduct. See Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. C 06-03594 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) (citing Totten v. Hurrell, No. 00-2718, *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001)).
Langer seeks judgment in the amount of $6,885.00, including statutory damages, attorneys' fees and costs. This, plus any amount that would have to be spent to comply with an injunction, would be the entirety of Dodaiton's liability should the court enter default judgment. Although not a form of monetary recovery, the injunction will undoubtedly require that Dodaiton incur expenses to remove barriers at the Market. As noted, however, the ADA limits this liability to removal of barriers that are readily achievable, and in this way caps a defendant's liability. As a result, the court finds that the amount sought is neither too large nor unreasonable when compared with Dodaiton's actions. Given Dodaiton's failure to appear and defend, and thus its failure to show that it has complied with the ADA or the Unruh Act, the court finds that statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and an injunction are needed. Courts frequently enter default judgments in ADA and Unruh Act cases that impose similar financial liabilities on the defendant. See, e.g., Moore v. Cisneros, No. 1:12-cv-00188 LJO SKO, 2012 WL 6523017, *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012) (noting that an award of $10,119.70 in the context of a default judgment was " not a particularly large sum of money, nor does it appear unreasonable in light of Defendants' actions"); Johnson v. Huynh, No. CIV S-08-1189 JAM DAD, 2009 WL 2777021, *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding that $12,000 was a " relatively small award of damages" in a default judgment case); Mantic Ashanti's Cause ex rel. Pinnock v. Darwish Plaza, 05-CV-1615 WQH, 2006 WL 1360969 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2006) (finding the amount at stake reasonable when plaintiffs sought a total of $16,276.68 consisting of $12,000.00 in statutory damages for, inter alia, architectural entrance barriers and impermissibly narrow paths of travel). For these reasons, the fourth Eitel factor favors the entry of default judgment against Dodaiton as well.
Motion at 2, 8-10; Potter Decl., ¶ 5.
4. The Possibility of Dispute
The next Eitel factor considers the possibility that material facts may be in dispute. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. As noted, Langer has adequately alleged disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and the Unruh Act by identifying the architectural barriers present at the Market in his complaint. Dodaiton has failed to appear and has thus admitted all material facts alleged in Langer's pleadings. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 (" Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages, " citing Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987)). Since Langer's factual allegations are presumed true and Dodaiton has failed to oppose the motion, no factual disputes exist that would preclude the entry of default judgment. This factor, therefore, favors the entry of default judgment against Dodaiton.
In addition, Langer has adduced evidence -- in the form of a declaration of an investigator who visited the site and photographs taken by the investigator-- which corroborate his allegations. The photographs indicate that both the Market's entrance and the disabled parking are inaccessible. This factor, therefore, favors the entry of default judgment against Dodaiton.
Garcia Decl., ¶ 4 (" I took the photographs attached as exhibit 4 and they truly and accurately depict the inaccessible entrance and inaccessible handicap parking lot on the day that I investigated"); Photos at 1-9.
5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect
The sixth Eitel factor considers whether a defendant's default may have been the product of excusable neglect. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Here, the possibility of excusable neglect is remote. There is no indication that Dodaiton allowed its default to be taken through excusable neglect. Dodaiton had adequate notice that it had been sued as it was properly served with the summons and complaint, the first motion for the clerk to enter default, and this motion for default judgment. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect because defendants " were properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support of the instant motion"). It is therefore reasonable to infer that Dodaiton's default was not the product of excusable neglect. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of the entry of default judgment.
See Proof of Service, Docket No. 7 (Feb. 28, 2014).
Application for Clerk to Enter Default, Docket No. 12 (Apr. 15, 2014).
Motion POS.
6. Policy of Deciding Cases on the Merits
" Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible." Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The mere enactment of Rule 55(b) indicates, however, that " this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive." PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 (quoting Kloepping, 1996 WL 75314 at *3). Rule 55(a) allows a court to decide a case before the merits are heard if a defendant fails to appear and defend. See id. (" Defendant's failure to answer Plaintiffs' Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible"). Since Dodaiton has failed to respond to Langer's claims, the seventh Eitel factor does not preclude the entry of default judgment against it.
7. Conclusion Regarding the Eitel Factors
Other than the policy of deciding cases on the merits, all of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of the entry of default judgment. Consequently, the court finds it appropriate to grant Langer's motion for default judgment against Dodaiton.
D. The Character and Amount of Plaintiff's Recovery
As noted, Langer seeks injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs under the ADA and the Unruh Act, as well as statutory damages under the Unruh Act. Under Rule 8(a)(3), a plaintiff's demand for relief must be specific, and he " must 'prove up' the amount of damages." Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Banh, No. CV 03-4043 GAF (PJWx), 2005 WL 5758392, *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2005); Bryant, 2004 WL 783123 at *5 (" Plaintiffs must 'prove up' the amount of damages that they are claiming"). Rule 54(c) limits the relief that can be sought in a motion for entry of default judgment to that identified in the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 54(c) (" A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings"). See also PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1174 (stating that a default judgment " shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the [complaint]"). Defaulting defendants are not deemed to have admitted facts concerning damages alleged in the complaint. See id. at 1177 (" Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages, " citing Televideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18).
FAC at 8; Motion at 5-6.
1. Statutory Damages
Langer seeks $4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Act. The Unruh Act provides that a plaintiff subjected to discrimination is entitled to recover $4,000 for each occasion on which he was denied equal access. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Proof of actual damages is not a prerequisite to the recovery of minimum statutory damages. Hubbard, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1170 (citing Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000)). To recover statutory damages, the plaintiff need only show that he was denied full and equal access, not that he was wholly excluded from enjoying defendant's services. Id. ; Hubbard v. Twin Oaks Health and Rehabilitation Center, 408 F.Supp.2d 923, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2004). " A plaintiff is denied full and equal access only if the plaintiff personally encountered the violation on a particular occasion, or the plaintiff was deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion." Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(b).
FAC at 8.
" A plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion only if both of the following apply: (1) The plaintiff had actual knowledge of a violation or violations that prevented or reasonably dissuaded the plaintiff from accessing a place of public accommodation that the plaintiff intended to use on a particular occasion; (2) The violation or violations would have actually denied the plaintiff full and equal access if the plaintiff had accessed the place of public accommodation on that particular occasion." Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(c). The Ninth Circuit has stated that a plaintiff can recover statutory damages even if he did not enter the facility. Hubbard v. Genuine Parts Co., No. 03 CV 00196 J JAH, 2003 WL 24219646, *2 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2003) (citing Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d at 835).
Langer has submitted a declaration that provides affirmative evidence of his damages. He states that he visited the Market, encountered access barriers, and was deterred from attempting to visit thereafter because of the barriers. This suffices to show that a statutory damages award of $4,000 is appropriate. The court will therefore award Langer $4,000 in statutory damages.
Langer Decl., ¶ ¶ 3-4, 6.
2. Injunctive Relief
Langer also seeks injunctive relief under the ADA and the Unruh Act compelling Dodaiton to remove architectural barriers at the Market. A court may grant injunctive relief for violations of the Unruh Act under Civil Code § 52.1(h). To be entitled to injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2), Langer must show that Dodaiton has violated the ADAAG. " In the case of violations [of the accessibility provisions] of this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. . . ." Id. ; see Moeller v. Taco Bell, 816 F.Supp.2d 831, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2011). A plaintiff is not required to satisfy the other prerequisites generally needed for injunctive relief since " [t]he standard requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied when an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal statute which specifically provides for injunctive relief." Moeller, 816 F.Supp.2d at 859 (quoting Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2010)). Thus, injunctive relief is proper when architectural barriers at defendant's establishment violate the ADA and removal of the barriers is readily achievable. See, e.g., Moreno v. La Curacao, 463 Fed.Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) (Unpub. Disp.); Johnson v. Singh, No. 2:10-cv-2547 KJM JFM, 2011 WL 2709365, *3 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2011); Sceper, 2009 WL 3763823 at *4.
Motion at 2.
As noted, Langer has stated a viable Title III discrimination claim. There are various architectural barriers at the Market that violate the ADAAG, and the removal of the barriers is readily achievable. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (whether the removal of barriers is readily achievable depends, inter alia, on the " administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity"); Disabled Rights Action Committee v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 880 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing § 12181(9), noting that defendants entered into a short-term license to use an arena at the University of Las Vegas for the purpose of conducting a rodeo, stating that their " Title III obligation would be determined with respect to the short term nature of [their] relationship with the Center, " and noting that " [m]eaningful relief could . . . be granted by enjoining [them] from making certain kinds of operational decisions regarding conditions over which they have control -- e.g., enjoining them from removing accessible floor seating, or requiring the erection of temporary ramps or lifts").
Injunctive relief compelling Dodaiton to remove barriers at the Market so that it is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities is therefore appropriate. The court will therefore enter an order enjoining Dodaiton to remove all architectural barriers identified in Langer's complaint -- i.e., to provide disabled access to the Market's entrance, by inter alia, installing ramps and removing moveable objects, and to provide accessible disabled parking spaces in accordance with the ADAAG.
3. Attorneys' Fees
Local Rule 55-3 provides that " [w]hen a promissory note, contract or applicable statute provides for the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees, " those fees shall be calculated according to a schedule set forth in the rule. Ca CD L.R. 55-3. Both the Unruh Act and the ADA authorize a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F.Supp.2d 998, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (awarding attorneys' fees for violation of the ADA and Unruh Act). Under the schedule set forth in Rule 55-3, Langer can recover $600 in attorneys' fees. The rule expressly provides, however, that an attorney claiming a fee in excess of the one set by the schedule " may file a written request at the time of entry of default judgment to have [his fee] fixed by the [c]ourt." Id. Langer asks the court to award actual attorneys' fees of $2,465.00.
The court entered a $4,000 judgment. Under the schedule, therefore, Langer is entitled to fees of $600 ($300 + (30% of any amount over $1,000)). See Ca CD L.R. 55-3.
Motion at 8-10; Potter Decl., ¶ 5.
Whether to grant fees in excess of the amount authorized by a local rule is discretionary, and requires a showing that the fees are reasonable. See Hudson Ins. Co. v. Am. W. Landscape Inc., No. CV 12-10939 BRO-VBK, 2013 WL 4874982, *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013) (" Using the schedule set forth in Local Rule 55-3 to calculate attorneys' fees, Plaintiffs' counsel should be awarded $5,180.19 in reasonable attorneys' fees. The Court has discretion to grant fees in excess of this amount upon a written request at the time of entry to have the attorneys' fees fixed by the court. Plaintiff has not provided specific evidence seeking attorneys' fees in excess of the scheduled attorneys' fees. . . . Thus, the Court is unable to find that any attorneys' fees over the scheduled amount [are] reasonable").
a. Legal Standard Governing Award of Attorneys' Fees
To determine whether departure from the attorneys' fees schedule is reasonable in this case, the court must engage in a traditional attorneys' fee analysis under Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). " The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. This figure, known as the " lodestar, " presumptively provides an accurate measure of reasonable fees. See Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the calculation of attorneys' fees in the ERISA context). Although a " district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, '" a court may increase or decrease the lodestar amount only in rare or exceptional cases. Id. (" The lodestar amount is presumptively the reasonable fee amount, and thus a multiplier may be used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high, " quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1994) (" Only in rare instances should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the basis of other considerations").
To assist the court in calculating the lodestar figure, a plaintiff must submit " satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (" [T]he fee applicant bears the burden of submitting 'evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed, '" quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The relevant community is that in which the district court sits. See Schwarz v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). Declarations regarding the prevailing market rate in the community suffice to establish a reasonable hourly rate. See Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998); Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that declarations from attorneys in the community can provide adequate proof of the reasonableness of counsel's rates); see also Earthquake Sound Corp. v. Bumper Industries, 352 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the affidavit of " an attorney practicing in the same region as Earthquake's attorneys, " which opined that " Earthquake's attorney rates were reasonable and customary").
" When a fee applicant fails to meet her burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested rates, the court may exercise its discretion to determine reasonable hourly rates based on its experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in the community." See, e.g., Viveros v. Donahoe, No. CV 10-08593 MMM (Ex), 2013 WL 1224848, *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013) (citing Plan Administrator v. Kienast, No. 2:06-cv-1529, 2008 WL 1981637, *4 (W.D. Pa. May 2, 2008) (" If a party fails to meet its burden to demonstrate a prima facie case that the requested rates were the prevailing rates in the community, 'the district court must exercise its discretion in fixing a reasonable hourly rate, '" quoting Washington v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir. 1996)); Moreno v. Empire City Subway Co., No. CV 05-7768 (LMM) (HBP), 2008 WL 793605, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (where the fee applicant " has submitted no evidence of the prevailing market rate for attorneys of like skill litigating cases similar to plaintiff's . . . it is within [the court's] discretion to determine the reasonable hourly rate at which plaintiff[']s counsel should be compensated based on [the court's] familiarity with plaintiff's case and the prevailing rates in the [relevant community]"); Shephard v. Dorsa, No. CV 95-8748 ER (JGx), 1998 WL 1799018, *2 (C.D.Cal. July 2, 1998) (determining a reasonable hourly rate based on " (1) the Court's own experience in considering the prevailing market rates in Los Angeles, (2) other fee awards in the relevant market, and (3)[the] Altman Weil, Pensa, Survey of Law Firm Economics (1996)" in a case where the fee applicant failed to establish the reasonableness of the lawyer's hourly rate)).
" A district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" See Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). " The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
After computing the lodestar, the court must assess whether additional considerations require adjustment of the figure, such as the novelty or complexity of the issues, the skill and experience of counsel, the quality of representation and the results obtained. See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.1975); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 889-900, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1988); Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990-91 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986).
b. Whether the Hourly Rate Requested By Langer's Counsel Is Reasonable
Langer has submitted the declaration of his attorney, Mark Potter, as evidence that the rates requested are reasonable. Potter states the amount of time he expended working on Langer's case, and also provides his hourly billing rate. The evidence proffered by Potter and the court's own experience, as well as published data concerning hourly rates, suggest that the hourly rate requested is reasonable. See Martin v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. C 06-6883 VRW, 2008 WL 5478576, *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2008) (electing to calculate the lodestar figure using published data on hourly rates by referring to figures reported in the Laffey Matrix, as adjusted by locality pay differentials); see also Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., No. CV 08-00519 MMM, 2009 WL 605789, *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) (" In this case, the court elects to evaluate whether RMS's requested hourly rates are reasonable based on its experience with similar cases and its knowledge of prevailing rates in the community").
Potter requests an hourly rate of $425. He states that he has been in practice for more than twenty years and that during that time, he has dealt exclusively with disability-related issues. Potter contends his rate is reasonable based on prevailing market rates and that it has been approved by numerous federal and state courts. The 2013-14 Laffey Matrix indicates that the average hourly rate for an attorney with more than twenty years of experience is $510 an hour. Adjusted by locality pay differentials, see Martin, 2008 WL 5478576 at *7, the data suggests that a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with Potter's level of experience in Los Angeles would be approximately $525 an hour. In the court's experience, hourly rates for attorneys who have been in practice more than twenty years are significantly higher than $525 an hour. Potter's $425 per house rate is therefore below the average rate for a lawyer with similar experience in the community, and is thus reasonable.
Potter Decl., ¶ 7.
Although Potter proffers four federal decisions awarding attorneys' fees to the Center for Disability Access, only two of the cases award Potter fees. In those cases, Judges Christina Snyder and Stephen Wilson awarded fees to Potter and other attorneys at the requested rate of $425. (See Motion, Exh. 6 (Minute Order Granting Attorneys' Fees in Arroyo v. Svela, No. CV 7814 CAS (SSx); Exh. 10 (Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, No. CV 10-7499 SVW).)
The Laffey Matrix is a " widely recognized compilation of attorney and paralegal rate data" that is used in the District of Columbia. In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4293 VRW, 2007 WL 4249902, *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007). The Laffey Matrix is named after the case in which it was first used to determine hourly rates for lawyers of different levels of experience. See id. (citing Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 354, 371-72 (D.D.C. 1983)). " The Laffey [M]atrix has been regularly prepared and updated by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and used in fee shifting cases, among others." Id. Courts in this circuit are divided as to whether the Laffey Matrix is an accurate measure of attorneys' fees in mixed rate cases outside the District of Columbia. Compare id. (" The Laffey [M]atrix is especially useful when the work to be evaluated consists of that by a mix of senior, junior and mid-level attorneys, as well as paralegals"); Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, No. C-02-4546 VRW, 2007 WL 951821, *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) (" One reliable source for rates that vary by experience levels is the Laffey [M]atrix used in the District of Columbia") with Housing Rights Center v. Sterling, No. CV 03-859 DSF, 2005 WL 3320738, *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2005) (" The Laffey Matrix also does not comport with the reality of Los Angeles firm billing practices. It sets a single rate for associates with one to three years experience, another for four to seven years, another for eight to ten years, another for eleven to nineteen years, and a single rate for all attorneys with twenty years or greater experience. It also sets a single rate for paralegals, regardless of experience. There is much more variance from year to year in Los Angeles"). In this case, the court relies primarily its own knowledge of reasonable rates in the Los Angeles community, and looks to the the Laffey Matrix as merely another factor bearing on reasonableness. Because Potter has requested a rate below prevailing rates in this community, the court would conclude that the requested rate is reasonable even if it did not consult the Laffey Matrix.
See Dep't of Justice, Laffey Matrix, 2003-2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laffey_Matrix%202014.pdf (last accessed Feb. 12, 2015).
To calculate the adjusted rate, the court has multiplied the original rate by the percentage increase, and added that amount to the original rate. See Viveros, 2013 WL 1224848, at *5 n. 32; Martin, 2008 WL 5478576 at *7; Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores, LLC, No. CV 06-04149 MMM, 2008 WL 8150856, *15 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008). The cost of living in Los Angeles is 2.94% higher than in the District of Columbia. (See Judicial Salary Plan Pay Rates, http://www.uscourts.gov/Careers/Compensation/JudiciarySalaryPlanPayRates.aspx.)
c. Whether the Number of Hours Billed Is Excessive
Potter states that he spent 5.8 hours working on the case by (1) discussing the case with Langer during an initial meeting; (2) conducting an onsite inspection of the property at issue; (3) researching public records to determine ownership of the property; (4) drafting the summons, complaint, first amended complaint; (5) filing and serving both the complaint and first amended complaint; (6) reviewing and executing the request for default; and (7) drafting this motion. Because the number of hours requested appears facially reasonable, the court finds it appropriate to award fees for 5.8 hours of Potter's time. Compare Jones v. Corbis Corp., No. CV 10-8668-SVW, 2011 WL 4526084, *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (" [T]aking into account the Court's overall sense of the case, and in particular this Opposition, the Court will reduce the attorney's fees claimed in connection with Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification by 10%, " citing Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2216, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (" [T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time")).
Potter Decl., ¶ 5.
Multiplying 5.8 hours by an hourly rate of $425, the court calculates a loadstar of $2,465.00. This amount is in line with other attorneys' fees awards in cases involving default judgments under the ADA and Unruh Act. See Loskot v. D & K Spirits, LLC, No. CV 10-0684 WBS DA, 2011 WL 567364, *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (awarding $4,325.00 in attorneys' fees based on an ADA default judgment); Delgado v. Mann Bros. Fuel, No. CV 10-0720 AWI-DLB, 2010 WL 5279946, *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (recommending an attorneys' fees award of $5,735.59 in connection with an ADA/Unruh Act default judgment).
In Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010), the Supreme Court stated that the lodestar can be enhanced in " rare" and " exceptional" cases where it does not adequately take into account one or more factors that are properly considered in determining a reasonable fee. Id. at 1674 (citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986)). The Court held that " an enhancement may be appropriate where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney's true market value, as demonstrated in part during the litigation." Id. at 1675. Langer has not requested that the court enhance the lodestar amount, and the court cannot discern any reason to do so based on its understanding of the case. Consequently, the court will not enhance the lodestar amount, and will award Langer fees of $2,465.00.
4. Costs
Langer also seeks to recover costs of $420.00, representing filing fees and service costs. These fees are reasonable and the court will award them.
Potter Decl., ¶ 5.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court grants Langer's motion for default judgment against Dodaiton. The court awards Langer $4,000 in statutory damages, $2,465 in attorneys' fees and $420 in costs. The court will also enter an injunction against Dodaiton, compelling it to remove all architectural barriers identified in Langer's complaint to the extent it controls those aspects of the store under state law -- i.e., to provide disabled access to the Market's entrance, by inter alia, installing ramps and removing moveable objects, and to provide accessible disabled parking spaces in compliance with the ADAAG.
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
On May 7, 2014, the court dismissed plaintiff Chris Langer's claims against defendant Roberto Morales, doing business as Dolar & Mas. On May 18, 2015, the court entered an order granting plaintiff Chris Langer's motion for entry of default judgment against defendant Dodaiton, Inc (" Dodaiton"). Consequently, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
1. That Langer recover $4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Civil Rights Act from Dodaiton;
2. That Langer recover $2,465 in attorneys' fees from Dodaiton;
3. That Langer recover $420 in costs from Dodaiton;
4. That Dodaiton is enjoined to remove all architectural barriers identified in Langer's complaint -- i.e., to provide disabled access to the Market's entrance, by inter alia, installing ramps and removing moveable objects, and to provide accessible disabled parking spaces in compliance with the ADA Accessibility Guidelines; and
5. That the action be, and is hereby, dismissed.