Summary
holding that Morgan State University "qualifies for [Eleventh Amendment] immunities as an arm of the State of Maryland"
Summary of this case from 92 Op. Att'y Gen. 180Opinion
Civil No. CCB-04-1719 (ECF-Exempt).
June 30, 2005
MEMORANDUM
Cynthia Laney, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint alleging that (1) Morgan State University ("MSU") discriminated against her on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; (2) MSU discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and (3) MSU retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. In response, MSU filed a motion to dismiss Laney's claims, arguing that MSU, as an arm of the State of Maryland, is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment with respect to Laney's ADEA claim and retaliation claim. In addition, MSU contends that Laney has failed to state a claim under Title VII. The parties have fully briefed the motion and no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6. Having reviewed the parties' briefs, I have concluded that MSU is an arm of the State and is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Furthermore, Laney has failed to state a claim under Title VII because the only discrimination she alleged was based on age and Title VII does not offer a remedy for age discrimination. Accordingly, MSU's motion to dismiss will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Laney alleges she was employed in good standing for thirty-three years with MSU before she was laid-off. (Pl.'s Compl. at 2). At the time, Laney was told the lay-offs were necessary due to budget constraints. ( Id.). Later, however, she learned that younger employees were still employed at MSU and she had been replaced by a younger employee. ( Id. at 2-3). Laney alleges that ten of the eleven employees laid-off due to the budget constraints at MSU were over the age of forty. ( Id. at 3). In addition, Laney alleges that MSU "retaliat[ed] against [her] for exercising [her] 1st Amendment rights. Spoke out against MSU gaining autonomy status." ( Id.).ANALYSIS
"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). When ruling on such a motion, the court must "accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true," and "construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). Consequently, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. In addition, because the court is testing the legal sufficiency of the claims, the court is not bound by the plaintiff's legal conclusions. See e.g., Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the "presence . . . of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)" when the facts alleged do not support the legal conclusions); Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff's alleged facts failed to support her conclusion that the defendant owed her a fiduciary duty at common law).
Laney is a pro se plaintiff. The Supreme Court has stated that "a pro se complaint, `however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to `less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers' and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suit in federal court by private individuals against a state unless the state has consented to suit and/or Congress has lawfully abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003); Lewis v. Bd. of Ed., 262 F.Supp.2d 608, 612 (D. Md. 2003). Maryland has not consented to suit in federal court. Though Congress attempted to abrogate the states' immunity in enacting the ADEA, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA "did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). Laney has brought suit against MSU for age discrimination under the ADEA. Consequently, at issue is whether MSU is entitled to protection under the Eleventh Amendment as an arm of the State of Maryland.
Courts have consistently held that Maryland's public state universities are "arms of the state," entitled to protection under the Eleventh Amendment. Maryland Stadium Authority v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2005). See also Middlebrooks v. University of Maryland at College Park, 980 F.Supp. 824, 827 (D. Md. 1997); Palotai v. University of Maryland College Park, 959 F.Supp. 714, 716 (D. Md. 1997); Bickley v. University of Maryland, 527 F.Supp. 174, 181 (D. Md. 1981) (stating that "the University of Maryland is `an arm of the State partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity'"); Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F.Supp. 541, 549-50 (D. Md. 1976) ( vacated on other grounds). While most of these opinions specifically address the University of Maryland at College Park, courts have noted that this protection also extends to MSU. See Moreno, 420 F.Supp. at 549-50 (stating "[i]n Langsner Judge Herbert F. Murray held that Morgan State University was a state agency and not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983") (citing Langsner v. Morgan State College, Civil No. HM-74-1359 (D. Md. 1976)); Persaud v. Morgan State University, 1994 WL 446797, 1 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that MSU was protected from certain claims under the Eleventh Amendment); Sawicki v. Morgan State University, WMN-03-1600 (docket entry nos. 1, 19, 29); Williams v. Richardson, RDB-04-1810 (docket entry no. 6).
Despite this, Laney argues that MSU is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because "[MSU] chose not be under the umbrella of the University of Maryland. [MSU] chose to obtain autonomy status." (Pl.'s Response in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 1). Even if MSU has chosen autonomy status and is not under the umbrella of the University of Maryland, it is still entitled to protection under the Eleventh Amendment as an arm of the State of Maryland. MSU was created as "the State's public urban university with a mission of instruction, research, and service," Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 14-101(a)(2); MSU's Board of Regents is "appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate," Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 14-102(b); MSU is required to "use the statewide Financial Management Information System administered by the Department of Budget and Management as its accounting, budgeting, personnel, and payroll system," Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 14-104(n); and the Board of Regents shall approve a plan for MSU that shall be submitted "to the Maryland Higher Education Commission, to the Governor and . . . to the General Assembly" for an annual review. Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 14-104(m)(3). Furthermore, the Maryland statutory code includes a provision stating "[t]his subsection may not be construed to waive or abrogate the immunity of the University under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution." Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 14-104(p)(5). Based on these factors and the consistent holdings in this district on the matter, I conclude that MSU qualifies for immunity as an arm of the State of Maryland. Consequently, Laney's age discrimination claim under the ADEA must be dismissed because it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. at 91.
Laney also brought a claim under Title VII. In her complaint, however, age was the only form of discrimination alleged by Laney. Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, does not prohibit age discrimination. Because Title VII does not provide a remedy for age discrimination and no other form of discrimination was alleged, Laney's Title VII claim must be dismissed.
Finally, Laney alleged that MSU retaliated against her because she exercised her First Amendment rights in speaking out against MSU gaining autonomy status. Though not explicit in her complaint, Laney's retaliation claim appears to arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even if Laney had pled the facts necessary to state a claim for retaliation under § 1983, see Kirby v. City Of Elizabeth City, North Carolina, 388 F.3d 440, 445-446 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), her claim must be dismissed because MSU, as an arm of the State of Maryland, "is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 66-69 (1989) (holding that § 1983 did not abrogate the sovereign immunity of states). See also Middlebrooks v. University of Maryland at College Park, 980 F.Supp. at 827; Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996). As a result, MSU is not subject to suit under § 1983 and Laney's retaliation claim must be dismissed.
While Laney's claims against MSU are barred in federal court, no determination is being made whether she may have a claim in Maryland state court under Maryland law. See Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B, § 14 et seq.; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92.
A separate Order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby Ordered that:1. The defendants' motion to dismiss (docket entry no. 6) is GRANTED;
2. the Clerk shall CLOSE this case; and
3. the Clerk shall send copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum to the plaintiff and counsel of record.