Opinion
Nos. A2-95-148, A2-95-166.
March 24, 1999.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are plaintiffs' requests for attorney fees. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, a status conference was held in both cases on August 28, 1998. On September 21, 1998, a combined hearing on the plaintiffs' applications for attorney fees was held and the matter taken under advisement. For the reasons set out below, Darvin R. Lane's Application for Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (prevailing party), (see docket # 40 in Case No. A2-95-148), is hereby GRANTED, and Darvin R. Lane is awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of $50,535.82; Dwight L. Lane's Application for Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (prevailing party), (see docket # 39 in Case No. A2-95-166), is hereby GRANTED, and Dwight L. Lane is awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of $24,111.20; Darvin R. Lane's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (bad faith), (see docket # 35 in Case No. A2-95-148), is DENIED AS MOOT; and Dwight L. Lane's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (bad faith), (see docket # 34 in Case No. A2-95-166), is DENIED AS MOOT.
II. DISCUSSION
By Order of June 25, 1996, this Court made amply clear its view that the Lanes were entitled to attorney fees in this matter under 5 U.S.C. § 504 for agency proceedings and under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) for proceedings before this Court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that this Court went too far in its ruling and mandated a remand to the agency for consideration on the merits of the application for attorney fees for agency proceedings prior to judicial review. Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106, 110 (8th Cir. 1997). Consequently, this Court believed it prudent to await the agency's resolution of its fee matter before the Court ruled in order to avoid "piecemeal challenges and review." However, the Eighth Circuit took a different view, and by Judgment entered July 30, 1998, and filed with this Court on September 28, 1998, indicated to this Court that ruling on the applications for fees was presently appropriate. Lane v. USDA, Nos. 98-2589NDF, 98-2595NDF (8th Cir. July 30, 1998).
1. Standards
Under section 2412(d)(1)(A), Title 28, United States Code, "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." The proceedings before this Court were based upon judicial review of an agency action, the Lanes prevailed on the merits, the government conceded at the September 21, 1998, hearing that its position was not substantially justified and the Court does not find an award unjust; thus, the Lanes are entitled to attorney fees under section 2412(d). The remaining question is the amount.
Attorney's fees awarded under statutory provision must be reasonable. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986). The "starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). There is a "strong presumption that the lodestar figure . . . represents a `reasonable' fee." Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565. Adjustments of the lodestar are appropriate only in rare and exceptional cases. Id.
The fee applicant has the burden of supporting the claim and where the documentation is inadequate or the hours not reasonably expended, the award may be reduced. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437;DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533-34 (8th Cir. 1990). The party seeking an award should make a good faith effort to exclude "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" hours from a fee request. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The fee applicant should exercise appropriate "billing judgment" with respect to hours worked, and billing records should "enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims." Id. at 437 ("Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority.") (emphasis in original).
A district court has "discretion in determining the amount of a fee award," but it must "provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award," and must "consider the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee award." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 438. The reviewing court "should weigh the hours claimed against his . . . own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities." Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 1989). It is under the above stated parameters that the Court examines the fee applications here presented.
2. Hourly Rate
At the time these cases were filed, section 2412(d)(2)(A), Title 28, United States Code, provided for the award of "reasonable" attorney fees not "in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee." Shortly after the filing of these cases, the rate cap was raised to $125 per hour. Pub.L. No. 104-121, § 232(b)(1), 110 Stat. 847, 863 (1996) (substituting "$125" for "$75"). This amendment to the statutory cap reflected a cost of living adjustment. Additionally, upon proper proof of an increase in cost of living, recognizing an increase in the statutory cap is appropriate. Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990).
At the time plaintiffs' counsel services were commencing, 1995, the cost of living adjustment to the $75 cap was practically equivalent to the 1996 amended statutory amount of $125. The cap, when adjusted for cost of living increases, has apparently risen slightly for 1997 and 1998. See e.g., Pl. Br. in Support of Fee Application at 36-37 (advising September 1997 rate at $129.44); and Letter of September 3, 1998, from Elness to Webb (advising July, 1998, rate cap at approximately $131.00). In any event, it is important to acknowledge that this is a cap, not a base, nor an automatic hourly rate. Furthermore, cost of living enhancements to the rate cap are to be calculated to the year in which services are performed, not to the year in which fees are awarded. See e.g., Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Nelson, 105 F.3d 708, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 322 (1986) (applying no-interest rule and denying enhancement to attorney fee award to compensate for delay in payment). Nonetheless, plaintiffs suggest that the Court should exceed the statutory rate cap. See Pl. Br. in Support of Fee Application at 36 (although not asserting that enhancements to lodestar are warranted) and award $135.00 per hour.
Reasonable fees are to be based upon "prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, n. 11 (1984) (refusing to lower award to nonprofit counsel; fees calculated according to rates "prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation"); see also McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1458-59 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing to lower award for "rural" attorney); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding award based on prevailing rates notwithstanding services contracted at a discounted rate). An attorney's regular hourly billing rate "provides a useful starting point for determining a reasonable fee," but should also be "compared to the ordinary fee for similar work in the community." McDonald, 860 F.2d at 1459 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs' counsel bill their clients $95.00 per hour for general legal work done by the senior attorneys, $75.00 per hour for the junior attorney, and $50.00 per hour for law clerk, and believe these to be prevailing market rates in Pembina County, North Dakota, for the relevant time frame. See Certification by [Pl.] Attorneys. at 4; Askew Affidavit at 2. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' counsel assert that a rate of $135.00 per hour for senior attorney time is "reasonable" in this case based on the Johnson factors. See Pl. Br. in Support of Fee Application at 15-20, 25-35 (discussing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)).
It is the Court's view that the relevant market area is broader than that which plaintiffs' counsel suggest. The Court finds that the relevant market area is the State of North Dakota, or at least its northeastern quadrant, and that the rate "prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation," is $125.00 for the senior attorneys for the time period over which all the services were rendered in this case. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11.
The Court further finds that $95.00 per hour for junior attorney time, and $50.00 per hour for law clerk time are reasonable, prevailing market billing rates for the relevant time period as well. Such support work is compensable under the fee shifting statute. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989); Miller v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1993).
The Court does not find an enhancement from these reasonable, prevailing market rates warranted in this case. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. 711, 728 (1987) (providing that enhancements, while permissible, should be the exception rather than the rule). Further, as these rates do not exceed any applicable statutory cap when adjusted for cost of living increases, an exception to the cap need not be discussed further.
3. Reasonable Number of Hours Expended
Much more troublesome to the Court is the amount of time expended and claimed by plaintiffs' counsel in the fee application. The Court does not question plaintiffs' counsel's integrity or dedication, or whether counsel actually expended the hours claimed. Nonetheless, the Court must make serious inquiry into the reasonableness of the hours billed, if not the actual time expended, on the issues. The Court recognizes its obligation to fully and fairly compensate the plaintiffs' attorneys in this case; however, the Court has an obligation to the public as well to approve only a reasonable award.
The Court has closely examined the time sheets submitted in support of the applications for fees. The interpretation of individual entries on the time sheets was a frustrating task. As a result, the Court was forced to rely on the summaries. The Court, given counsel's certification, presumes the summaries accurately reflect the underlying time sheets. The Court has corrected for mathematical errors on Dwight's recapitulation page regarding total time spent by senior attorneys.
Plaintiffs break down their respective requests in the following areas: (1) pre-litigation services, (2) preparation of complaint, (3) preparation of brief in support of motion for summary judgment, (4) preparation of brief seeking rule-making record, (5) oral argument, (6) preparation of brief with regard to substantial justification, (7) preparation of § 2412(d) (prevailing party) application for fees and brief in support, (8) preparation of § 2412(b) (bad faith) motion for fees and brief in support, (9) legal research by recent law school graduate, and (10) expenses. The government, conceding that the plaintiffs have prevailed on the substantive matters before the Court and that there was no substantial justification for the government's position, nonetheless challenges the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested. The government registers several objections including: claims related to the Privacy Act cases, appeal issues, Freedom of Information Act efforts, bad faith allegations, work performed prior to agency rejection, generally excessive billing practices, and an unwarranted amount of time spent on preparation of the fee application itself.
a. On the Merits
The Court has been assured and accepts that the time billed was actually expended in the manner so certified. The Court's obligation however is to examine and reimburse primarily for hours spent "on the merits," i.e., in preparation of the complaint, preparation and support of the motion for summary judgment, rule-making record issue, and substantial justification issue. See categories 2-6 on "Summaries of Services and Expenses" Attached to Certification by Attorneys. There was no trial on the merits, merely a single hearing, and the plaintiffs were successful. But only approximately 25% of the total senior attorney time claimed in Dwight's case, and approximately 53% of the total senior attorney time claimed in Darvin's case, was spent on these substantive issues before the Court. These depictions of hours spent on the merits should be considered quite generous given that much of this time was spent on the phone and in conference consulting clients, non-parties, and each other on purely legal issues.
The Court bases these estimates on categories 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the respective summaries and the total time spent by senior attorneys as represented on recapitulation pages.
The plaintiffs are charged with exercising appropriate "billing judgment," see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, and there are several instances of billing for activities the Court does not find reimbursable. The Court also finds that the time spent on the merits excessive. The Court concludes that a 1/4 across the board cut in time claimed on the tasks delineated above by the senior attorneys appropriate and reasonable. In Dwight's case, the Court deducts 35.75 senior attorney hours billed in this regard; and in Darvin's case, the Court deducts 93.51 senior attorney hours in this regard.
For example, phone conversations with the then North Dakota Agriculture Commissioner, conferences regarding attempts to introduce new legislation, discussions with various Senate offices, and submissions to Farm Journal for editorials are interesting endeavors but hardly directly related to issues presented to the District Court; hence, not properly presented here. The Court also notes with interest the hiring of a private investigator and several conferences related thereto, but assumes that plaintiffs have attributed those billings to the "bad faith" issue which the Court addresses separately.
Upon review of the underlying billing statements, it is evident that most of the law clerk's time was also directed to the substantive merits. It is the Court's view that the total hours expended by the law clerk were possibly unguided and undoubtedly excessive. The Court concludes that a 1/2 across the board cut in the total time claimed by the law clerk appropriate and reasonable. In Dwight's case, the Court deducts 74.1 of the total law clerk hours billed; and in Darvin's case, the Court deducts 174.2 of the total law clerk hours billed.
As best the Court can discern from adding all law clerk time from respective dates of agency rejections to date clarification order was entered and dividing by total on recapitulation page, the "time spent researching by recent law school graduate" on the merits approximated 74% of all of his time billed to Dwight, and 89% of his time billed to Darvin.
b. Non District Court Issues
Time expended prior to the rejection of plaintiffs' respective claims by the agency is not properly claimed here for proceedings before the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The Court therefore denies the requests for compensation for time prior to the agency's denial of plaintiffs' respective claims. Thus, in Dwight's case, the Court deducts 68.48 senior attorney hours and 6.75 law clerk hours for time billed between December 22, 1994, and October 27, 1995. In Darvin's case, the Court deducts 61.60 senior attorney hours and no law clerk hours for time billed between December 22, 1994, and September 25, 1995.
Further, plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation here for appeals issues, especially given that they have already claimed and been awarded fees by the Eighth Circuit. The Court found several inappropriate entries in this regard, and is not confident that all were detected. In Dwight's case, the Court deducts 3.35 senior attorney hours and 0.63 law clerk hours, and in Darvin's case, the Court deducts 3.95 senior attorney hours and 0.63 law clerk hours for time billed relating to appeals issues.
Lane v. USDA, No. 96-3285NDF (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 1998) (summarily awarding $12,500 in fees and $102.25 in costs).
See generally entries on the underlying time sheets dated August through December 1996.
c. Bad Faith Allegations
The Court is mindful that where a plaintiff has "won substantial relief, [he] should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised."Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. But where a claim is "distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded." Id. The Court also notes that it must "consider the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee award." Id. at 438.
As previously noted, this Court made amply clear by its Order of June 25, 1996, its view that the Lanes were entitled to attorney fees in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) for proceedings before this Court. This Court finds that efforts expended by plaintiffs' attorneys on the alternative theory of recovery, i.e., the bad faith claims, were unnecessary and unreasonable and thus are properly excluded. In any event, the plaintiffs abandoned the § 2412(b) theory by not supporting the motion with a brief in a timely manner. The motion pursuant to section 2412(b) was properly summarily dismissed. See Local Rule 7.1(C) ("failure to file a brief by the moving party shall be deemed an admission that, in the opinion of counsel, the motion is without merit"). In any event, there can be no double recovery for the fees, and since plaintiffs had a winning argument under § 2412(d), their alternative argument was inconsequential. Plaintiffs' respective motions for Attorney's Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) are, again, properly denied as moot.
In Dwight's case, the Court deducts 123.71 senior attorney hours and 5.79 junior attorney hours billed for the preparation of the § 2412(b) motion; in Darvin's case, the Court deducts 89.7 senior attorney hours and 2.85 junior attorney hours billed for the preparation of the § 2412(b) motion.
The Court presumes that plaintiffs have properly summed hours dedicated to the § 2412(b) motion on the respective summaries as the Court relies upon and adopts these numbers.
d. Preparation of the § 2412(d) Fee Application
Approximately 39% of the total senior attorney time originally claimed in Dwight's case, and approximately 26% of the total senior attorney time originally claimed in Darvin's case, was spent on preparation of the § 2412(d) fee application itself. Taking into consideration the hours eliminated by the Court for the reasons discussed above, these percentages increase proportionally. The original requests by plaintiffs, solely for fee applications, total almost $86,000. This is simply shocking!
The Court again presumes that the respective summaries are accurate and compares § 2412(d) hours to the total time spent by senior attorneys on the recapitulation page. Dwight's total (senior plus junior attorney) § 2412(d) request calculates to $30,872.25; Darvin's is $25,493.25 (based on $135 and $75 per hour requests).
This calculation is based on the requested hours at the requested rates for both (b) and (d) based motions in both cases.
Granted, "where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. But even excellent results, such as those obtained by plaintiffs here, do not justify billings on engrossing, time consuming tangents. The requests submitted display an over-exuberance by plaintiffs' counsel in this regard. Time dedicated to fee application is compensable. Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1334 (8th Cir. 1988). However, the Court finds that the amount of time claimed here for preparing the fee application is not reasonable; it is outrageous.
The number of hours to be awarded is committed to the discretion of the Court, and the Court "should weigh the hours claimed against his . . . own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities." Gilbert, 867 F.2d at 1066. The Court cannot imagine that it would take an experienced, professional attorney more than a full forty-hour work week to research, prepare, review and revise an application substantiating and justifying compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), especially given the guidance that it had from this Court prior to embarking on the task in this case.
The Court finds that forty (40) hours is a reasonable, if not generous, amount of time for the preparation and submission of the § 2412(d) fee application in each of these cases. The Court therefore deducts in Dwight's case, 177.25 senior attorney hours and 20.58 junior attorney hours billed for the preparation of the § 2412(d) motion; in Darvin's case, the Court deducts 140.8 senior attorney hours and 14.47 junior attorney hours billed for the preparation of the § 2412(d) motion.
The Court is not aware of any supplement to the application for fees under § 2412(d) to compensate participation in the two above-referenced hearings that were held in August and September of 1998. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs "are entitled to compensation for the fees and costs associated with defending against the government's fee challenge." Miller, 983 F.2d at 861. The Court finds that fifteen (15) total senior attorney hours is a reasonable amount of time for the preparation and participation in the above referenced hearings in each of these cases; the Court further finds that twelve (12) total senior attorney travel hours in each of these cases is reasonable as well. See generally Gilbert, 867 F.2d at 1066 (Court may apply "own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities").
The Court received a supplement to the fee application after this Order was drafted, but before filed with the Clerk of Court. As indicated in the text, the Court has granted reasonable senior attorney time and senior attorney travel time to be attributed to the support of the applications in August and September, 1998. The Court finds no necessity to alter its findings in light of the late submission. Upon review of the supplementation, the Court notes that almost half of the hours billed relate to publicity, appellate issues, or issues raised in a different case, i.e., A2-98-43, and are not properly submitted here as part of Case Nos. A2-95-148, -166. Moreover, the Court is not aware that the predicates to a fee and cost award have been established in Case A2-98-43. However, the Court will allow the additional costs submitted as is reflected below.
4. Calculation of the Lodestar
As set out above, attorney fee awards must be reasonable. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 562. A reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The Court has determined above that the reasonable hourly rates in this case are as follows: $125.00 per hour for the senior attorneys, $95.00 per hour for the junior attorney, and $50.00 per hour for the law clerk. By applying the deductions detailed above, the Court establishes that the number of hours reasonably expended in Dwight's case are as follows: 149.75/senior attorney; 0/junior attorney; 66.72/law clerk; and 23.70/senior attorney travel. It follows that the attorney fee award in Dwight's case is $23,536.00, plus costs of $575.20, for a total of $24,111.20. The Court establishes that the number of hours reasonably expended in Darvin's case are as follows: 312.02/senior attorney; 0/junior attorney; 173.57/law clerk; and 25.00/senior attorney travel.
Court Modified Recapitulation of Billing Statement Dwight L. Lane; Case No. A2-95-166
Time spent by senior attorneys —
734.26 (from summary) — 174.57 (correction for math error) — 11.70 (travel) — 4.70 (no charge) — 35.75 (deduction for "on the merits" excessiveness) — 68.48 (deduction for billings between 12/22/94 and 10/28/95) — 3.35 (deduction for Circuit issues) — 123.71 (deduction for § 2412(b) (bad faith) issue) — 177.25 (deduction for § 2412(d) excessiveness) + 15.00 (fall 1998 hearings) 149.75 x 125.00 (reasonable hourly rate) $ 18,718.75
Time spent by junior attorney —
26.37 (from summary) — 5.79 (deduction for § 2412(b) (bad faith) issue) - 20.58 (deduction for § 2412(d) excessiveness) -0- x 95.00 (reasonable hourly rate) $ -0-
Time spent by law clerk —
148.20 (from summary) — 74.10 (deduction for excessiveness) — 6.75 (deduction for billings between 12/22/94 and 10/28/95) - 0.63 (deduction for Circuit issues) 66.72 x 50.00 (reasonable hourly rate) $ 3,336.00
Travel time of senior attorneys —
11.70 (from summary) + 12.00 (fall 1998 hearings) 23.70 x 62.50 (half of senior attorney rate) $ 1,481.25
Sub-total attorneys' fees: $ 23,536.00 Costs: + 531.95 + 43.25 (supp. application received 3/24/99) Grand total fees and costs: $ 24,111.20
Court Modified Recapitulation of Billing Statement Darvin R. Lane; Case No. A2-95-148
Time spent by senior attorneys —
708.08 (from summary) — 13.00 (travel) — 8.50 (no charge) — 93.51 (deduction for "on the merits" excessiveness) — 61.60 (deduction for billings between 12/22/94 and 10/28/95) — 3.95 (deduction for Circuit issues) — 89.70 (deduction for § 2412(b) (bad faith) issue) — 140.80 (deduction for § 2412(d) excessiveness) + 15.00 (fall 1998 hearings) 312.02 x 125.00 (reasonable hourly rate) $ 39,002.50
Time spent by junior attorney —
17.32 (from summary) — 2.85 (deduction for § 2412(b) (bad faith) issue) - 14.47 (deduction for § 2412(d) excessiveness) -0- x 95.00 (reasonable hourly rate) $ -0-
Time spent by law clerk —
348.40 (from summary) — 174.20 (deduction for "on the merits" excessiveness) — -0- (deduction for billings between 12/22/94 and 10/28/95) - 0.63 (deduction for Circuit issues) 173.57 x 50.00 (reasonable hourly rate) $ 8,678.50
Travel time of senior attorneys —
13.00 (from summary) + 12.00 (fall 1998 hearings) 25.00 x 62.50 (half of senior attorney rate) $ 1,562.50
Sub-total attorneys' fees: $ 49,243.50 Costs: + 1,144.07 + 148.25 (supp. application received 3/24/99) Grand total fees and costs: $ 50,535.82
Court finds fault which Court finds plaintiff caused plaintiff's damages suffered compensable damages as follows: as follows:
Defendant: 40 % Out of pocket expenses: $1,950.25
Plaintiff: 30 % Past and future pain and suffering $350,000.00
United States of America, et al.: 30 % Permanent impairment: $350,000.00
Total: 100% Total: $701,950.25
After discounting this amount to present value and reducing the award by 60 percent, court awards $280,780.00 to plaintiff.
It follows that the attorney fee award in Darvin's case is $49,243.50, plus costs of $1,292.32, for a total of $50,535.82.
The lodestar figure is strongly presumed to represent a reasonable fee. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565. Adjustments of the lodestar are appropriate only in rare and exceptional cases.Id. The Court does not find an enhancement of the lodestar warranted in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
Darvin R. Lane's Application for Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) is hereby GRANTED, and Darvin R. Lane is awarded fees and costs in the amount of $50,535.82. Dwight L. Lane's Application for Fees and Other Expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) is hereby GRANTED, and Dwight L. Lane is awarded fees and costs in the amount of $24,111.20. Plaintiffs' respective motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) are DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
RODNEY S. WEBB, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT