Opinion
NO. 01-11-00055-CR
04-26-2012
REX LANE JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 230th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1271497
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Rex Lane Jr., of the felony offense of aggravated robbery and, after finding the allegations in an enhancement paragraph true, assessed his punishment at forty years' confinement. In two points of error, Lane contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his videotaped confession. We affirm.
Background
The complainant, Gabrel Garcia, was robbed at gunpoint by two men while waiting in his hotel room for a female companion, Christi Tucker, to arrive. Garcia testified that he had been waiting for about an hour when Tucker called to tell him that she would be there shortly and asked him to let her in. Thinking Tucker was there, Garcia opened the motel room door, but was greeted instead by a young man standing in the doorway pointing a gun at Garcia's head. The gunman pushed Garcia back into the room, instructed him to turn around and lie on the bed, and took Garcia's property. Approximately two minutes later, a second man entered, tied Garcia's hands behind his back with an extension cord, and then tied his feet to his hands. According to Garcia, the men then pulled him off the bed into a standing position, pushed him into the bathroom, and left. Although told to stay in the bathroom, the extension cord was so loosely tied that Garcia was able to reach the window in time to write down the license plate number of the Trail Blazer in which the men drove off, and he immediately called the police.
Garcia testified that, although instructed not to look at them, he could easily see both men because the lights were on in the motel room. Garcia later identified Lane from a photo-spread as the second man who entered the motel room and tied him up. Garcia also identified Lane in court as one of the men who robbed him.
Detective Lori Roberts, a twenty-seven year veteran of the Houston Police Department assigned to the robbery unit, investigated the robbery. She testified that Lane was first identified as a suspect based upon information HPD received from the motel clerk. According to Roberts, the motel's records, which contained Lane's driver's license information, indicated that Lane had rented the room next to Garcia's and that the Trail Blazer with the license plate number Garcia had recorded was linked to Lane's room registration. Roberts prepared a photo-spread from which Garcia identified Lane as the second man who tied him up. Roberts then obtained a warrant for Lane's arrest.
After his arrest, Lane was interviewed by Detective Roberts and her partner, Officer Steve Hooper. That videotaped interview was admitted into evidence at trial over Lane's objection. During the interview, although Lane initially denied any involvement in the robbery, he ultimately said that he and Tucker lived in the same apartment complex and were friends. He also said that Tucker had met Garcia at a gas station and had arranged to meet him at the motel with the intent to rob him. Tucker thought Garcia had money because he owned his own business and had business cards. Lane drove Tucker, another woman, and that woman's boyfriend to the motel in his sister's Trail Blazer the night of the robbery, and he rented a room close to Garcia's. Lane also admitted that he went into Garcia's room, tied him up and put him in the bathroom, because he did not want Garcia to see them leave in his sister's Trail Blazer. They took Garcia's wallet and his cell phone and tried to use one of his credit cards at an ATM.
Motion to Suppress
We begin by addressing Lane's second point of error. Arguing that the confession was involuntary because the circumstances of the interrogation were inherently coercive, Lane contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the videotaped confession. Specifically, he argues that the totality of the circumstances—the excessive length and cramped conditions of his interrogation, coupled with the fact that the officer "cursed" at him—were such that his free will was overborne, rendering his confession involuntary.
Factual Background
At the suppression hearing, Lane testified that he was interrogated for over an hour in a small room by two officers sitting between him and the door. Although for the first thirty-nine minutes he denied any involvement in the robbery, Lane claimed that he was nervous and afraid and that the officers badgered him until he confessed. Lane also accused the officers of screaming at him and neglecting to give him his Miranda warnings. Lane acknowledged, however, that the officers never hurt him or threatened him and that he never asked to end the interrogation or requested an attorney.
The State controverted pertinent portions of Lane's testimony with the testimony of Officer Hooper, one of the officers present during the interrogation. Hooper testified that he and Detective Roberts interviewed Lane for approximately an hour and ten minutes in one of the twelve-feet-by-twelve-feet interview rooms available at the jail complex. He and Detective Roberts sat between Lane and the door, but, although under arrest, Lane was not handcuffed. According to Officer Hooper, Detective Roberts, the primary interviewer, began the interview by reading Lane his Miranda warnings from the blue card issued by the Harris County District Attorney's Office. Lane affirmatively stated that he understood each of those rights and he verbally agreed to waive his rights so that he could talk with the officers.
Officer Hooper testified that he and Detective Roberts never threatened Lane or promised him anything for his statement. He also testified that Lane never asked for food or drink, and he did not ask to use the restroom during the interrogation. Lane also never asked to end the interrogation, nor did he ask for an attorney. Officer Hooper also testified that Detective Roberts never yelled at Lane, but she did accuse him of lying and referred to some of his comments as "bullshit."
The videotape of the interrogation, including Lane's confession, was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. After hearing the testimony, watching the videotape, and considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied Lane's motion to suppress. The trial court subsequently filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in which, among other things, it found that Officer Hooper was a reliable, credible, and truthful witness, whereas Lane was neither credible nor truthful. The court also concluded that the confession was admissible because the State established, under the totality of the circumstances, that Lane had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights under article 38.22 when he agreed to speak with the officers after having been read his Miranda warnings, and that the interrogation was not coercive.
Standard of Review
We review the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We give almost total deference to the trial court's express or implied determinations of historical facts and review de novo the court's application of the law to those facts. Id.We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id.The trial court is the "sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
When, as in this case, findings of fact are made, we determine whether those facts are supported by the evidence. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Furthermore, we review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo, upholding the ruling if it is supported by the record and it falls under any correct legal theory applicable to the case. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Voluntariness of Confession
A statement may be deemed "involuntary" under three different theories: (1) failure to comply with Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 (the Texas confession statute); (2) failure to comply with the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); or (3) it was taken in violation of due process or due course of law because the statement was not freely given due to coercion, force, or improper influence. Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 233 S.W.3d 32, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). A confession is involuntary "only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Cravin v. State, 95 S.W.3d 506, 510 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) ("The Texas Due Course of Law provision has not been held to provide any greater protection than that afforded by the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause."). Determination of a statement's voluntariness is made by examining the totality of the surrounding circumstances. Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). These can include: (1) relevant facts about the interrogation itself, such as the physical location of the interrogation, the length of the detention, and the number of people present; (2) the extent to which the accused was denied access to outside resources, such as family, friends, or a lawyer; (3) whether the accused was denied essential physical needs, such as food, drink, or access to a bathroom; (4) the physical comfort or discomfort of the accused; (5) the mental and physical condition of the accused; and (6) the nature and extent of any promises or threats made to the accused. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Analysis
Lane argues that the totality of the circumstances compel a determination that his inherently coercive interrogation rendered his confession involuntary, and, therefore, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was error. He points to three factors in particular: (1) the excessive length of his interrogation; (2) the cramped conditions of his interrogation; and (3) the fact that one of the officers "cursed" at him.
Both the videotape and the hearing testimony reflect that Lane was interviewed for approximately an hour and fifteen minutes in one of the twelve-feet-by-twelve-feet interview rooms available at the jail complex. Neither the length nor the conditions of Lane's interrogation were, in and of themselves, coercive. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding confession not coerced where defendant detained in six-foot-by-eight-foot interview room for approximately eight hours and did not ask for food, water or to go to bathroom); Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 428-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (stating eight hours of questioning without food did not render confession involuntary in light of defendant's willingness to continue); Giddens v. State, 256 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref'd) (concluding five hour interrogation of defendant with multiple sclerosis not coercive where nothing in record reflected defendant was unwilling to talk). Nor were the facts that Detective Roberts called Lane a liar and used profanity coercive. See Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (rejecting defendant's claim that his confession was coerced because interrogating officers called him a liar and "talked short" to him). Lane conceded at the suppression hearing that there was no physical abuse, threats, or promises in exchange for his statement. He also conceded that he never asked to terminate the interview or for an attorney. Both Officer Hooper's testimony and the videotape reflect that Lane never requested food or drink, and he did not ask to use the restroom. Officer Hooper's testimony and the videotape further reflect that despite Lane's testimony to the contrary, Detective Roberts did read Lane his Miranda warnings and that Lane affirmatively stated that he understood each of those rights and verbally agreed to waive his rights so that he could talk with the officers.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we hold that the trial court's finding that Lane's statement was voluntary was not an abuse of discretion, and we overrule Lane's second point of error.
Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Conviction
Lane's first point of error contends that the evidence is insufficient because the State failed to prove that he was the person who perpetrated the offense.
Our review of evidentiary sufficiency determines whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and we view this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony, the jury may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness's testimony, and we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We accord almost complete deference to the jury's determinations of credibility and resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination.").
Lane confessed to his involvement in Garcia's robbery in a videotaped confession that was played for the jury. This videotaped confession alone is sufficient to establish Lane's identity as the perpetrator. See Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (stating identity of perpetrator of offense may be established by extrajudicial confession alone); Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 70-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (same). But here, the jury also heard Garcia's testimony that he clearly observed both men because the room was well lit. Garcia went on to identify Lane in a photo-spread and in court as the man who tied him up. Lane argues that Garcia's testimony is unreliable because he saw Lane only out of the corner of his eye and fleeting glimpses render his identification unreliable. Garcia's veracity and the clarity of his sight are jury issues, and the jury presumably believed Garcia. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (stating jurors are exclusive judges of facts, credibility of witnesses, and weight to be given to witnesses' testimony).
Because, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found that Lane's identity as the perpetrator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we overrule Lane's first point of error. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jim Sharp
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011) (law of parties).