Summary
holding that amended complaint naming "John Doe" was time-barred by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 and did not "relate back" to the date of filing under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03, even though the UM carrier had notice of the claim well before the statute of limitations expired
Summary of this case from Thompson v. TRW Autos. U.S. LLCOpinion
No. E2006-01643-COA-R3-CV.
May 14, 2007 Session.
Filed June 28, 2007.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Roane County; No. 13179; Russell E. Simmons, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.
Jason R. Reeves, Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Deborah Lane.
Donald D. Howell and Richard T. Scrugham, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, USAA Insurance Company.
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Herschel P. Franks, P.J., and D. Michael Swiney, J., joined.
OPINION
Deborah Lane filed a complaint against William Montgomery within one year of a three-vehicle automobile accident, in which, according to the complaint, she was injured as a result of the defendant's negligence. When the plaintiff filed her suit, she secured the service of process and a copy of the complaint on her uninsured motorist carrier, USAA Insurance Company ("USAA"). In his answer to the complaint, Montgomery generally denied any negligence and liability to the plaintiff. Later, in a response to one of the plaintiff's interrogatories, Montgomery specifically stated that he was not involved in the accident involving the plaintiff. The trial court granted Montgomery summary judgment. Following the grant of summary judgment and some 26 months after the accident, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint substituting an unknown person, "John Doe," for Montgomery as the sole named defendant. USAA filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that, since the plaintiff's claim against "John Doe" was barred by the statute of limitations, her claim against USAA was also barred. The trial court granted USAA's motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
The accident in this case occurred on August 11, 2003. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle traveling east on Interstate 40 in Roane County. A vehicle traveling west on the Interstate struck a westbound vehicle driven by Melissa A. Bryant, causing Ms. Bryant's vehicle to cross the median and strike the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The vehicle that struck Ms. Bryant's vehicle left the scene of the accident without stopping.
On August 6, 2004, i.e., five days before the expiration of the one-year period of limitations, the plaintiff filed suit against Montgomery, alleging that he "negligently and carelessly operated a 2000 GMC Truck on I-40 West causing same to collide with [the] vehicle in which [the p]laintiff traveled. . . ." The complaint sought monetary damages of "at least $100,000" for the injuries and damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the accident.
Though not clear from the record before us, it appears that the plaintiff obtained Montgomery's name from the Tennessee Highway Patrol. Apparently, shortly after the accident, Montgomery, who was driving a vehicle that resembled the vehicle that had hit Ms. Bryant and left the scene of the accident, was stopped by a patrolman.
This allegation is curious because it is clear from Ms. Bryant's affidavit and even the plaintiff's deposition testimony that the John Doe vehicle never struck the plaintiff's vehicle and, in fact, was never in the eastbound traffic lanes of I-40.
In September 2004, Montgomery filed an answer generally "den[ying]" the plaintiff's allegation that Montgomery "negligently and carelessly operated" a vehicle "causing same to collide with [the] vehicle in which [the p]laintiff" was traveling. USAA filed an answer in its own name, alleging that, on the date of the accident, it "did not have a policy of insurance in effect affording uninsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff."
On December 14, 2004, Montgomery filed his responses to the plaintiff's interrogatories. In response to an interrogatory seeking his narrative of the events leading up to and following the accident, Montgomery stated that
I drove my vehicle through Roane County, Tennessee, on Interstate 40 without incident. I was not involved in the motor vehicle accident that is the subject of this action
(Emphasis added). When asked in the interrogatories to identify any other person believed to be responsible for the accident, Montgomery stated the following: "Person unknown who was driving the vehicle that was actually involved in this accident."
In June 2005, Montgomery filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there were no issues as to any material facts with respect to the plaintiff's claims against him. Montgomery relied upon the following facts to support his motion:
The plaintiff's complaint is based on allegations of negligence against this defendant for causing a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 11, 2003, in Roane County, Tennessee. This accident was caused by a gold SUV that was westbound on Interstate 40 when it changed lanes striking a 1999 Ford Contour being driven by Melissa A. Bryant. Ms. Bryant's vehicle then crossed the median and struck the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding, causing her injuries that are the subject of this action. The driver of the gold SUV left the scene of the accident without stopping.
Defendant William Jeffery Montgomery was traveling on I40 west on August 11, 2003, driving his 2000 GMC gold Yukon. Said defendant traveled through Roane County, Tennessee, without incident and was not involved in the collision that caused the accident about which the plaintiff complains.
(Emphasis added). Montgomery relied upon his own affidavit and the affidavit of Juwon Johnson to substantiate his assertion that he was not involved in the accident. Mr. Johnson's affidavit states that he was traveling with Montgomery at the time and place in question and that they were not involved in an automobile accident. The record also contains the affidavit of Ms. Bryant, in which she provided the following pertinent information:
On August 11, 2003, I was West bound on I-40 in my vehicle, a 1999 red Ford Contour, near the exit for Gallaher Road in Roane County, Tennessee.
I began to come around in the inside lane a large gold SUV in the outside lane. As I began to pass this vehicle, it suddenly moved over into my lane, striking my vehicle, causing it to cross the median and hit a Chevrolet Monte Carlo that was East bound on I-40.
I can only identify the vehicle that struck my vehicle in the West bound lane as being a large gold SUV. It appeared to be a Suburban or something similar to a Suburban. It could have been a Yukon, but I cannot state that for certain.
I did not see the license plate of the vehicle that struck mine, and I cannot identify the occupants of the vehicle that struck mine.
I have no personal knowledge that William Jeffrey Montgomery was the operator of the vehicle that struck mine and caused the accident on August 11, 2003.
(Paragraph numbering in original omitted).In July 2005, the plaintiff was deposed and provided the following account of the accident:
Q: Okay. What do you remember about the accident happening?
A: All I remember is the dog was on my lap, and I look over at the median and I see this red car coming over the median. . . . and we got struck. . . .
Q: Okay. You saw then a red car coming through the median that eventually struck the car you and your brother were in?
A: That's correct.
Q: Did you see any other vehicle that was involved in this accident?
A: No, sir. I was looking straight ahead.
Q: Are you aware that there was an allegation that a car, that an SUV, struck the red car and caused the red car to cross the median?
A: That's what I understand.
Q: Did you see that vehicle that struck the red car and caused it to cross the median?
A: No, sir.
Q: So as you sit here today you don't have any idea who that third car was, the one that struck the red car?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know of anyone [illegible] know of whose car that was?
A: Other than the passenger or the driver of the red vehicle, I do not know.
Q: So that would be Ms. Bryant, the lady that was driving the red car?
A: I believe so.
Q: So you think maybe she might know who hit her then?
A: I believe so.
Q: Other than her, you're not aware of anyone who might have any knowledge about anyone who struck the car?
A: Not to my knowledge.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Montgomery summary judgment, finding, in effect, that the evidence before the court reflected that Montgomery was not involved in the subject accident. The plaintiff did not appeal this judgment.
Thereafter, the plaintiff orally moved for leave to amend her complaint. The trial court granted the motion, and, on October 18, 2005, some 26 months after the accident, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint substituting "John Doe" for Montgomery as the named defendant. USAA filed an amended answer alleging, in part, that the plaintiff's action against "John Doe" was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
USAA subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting (1) that the plaintiff is not covered under the uninsured motorist provisions of its policy; and (2) that the plaintiff's suit against "John Doe" is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted USAA's motion, but only on the defense of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this judgment.
II.
Summary judgment is addressed in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must determine "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Because a motion for summary judgment presents a pure question of law, our review is de novo on the record below with no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's judgment. Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co. , 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1993).
III.
The issue before us, simply stated, is whether the plaintiff's amended complaint against "John Doe" is time-barred. The plaintiff concedes the obvious — she filed her amended complaint well outside the one-year period of the statute of limitations. However, she argues that T.C.A. § 28-3-104 (2000) does not operate to bar the amended complaint because USAA "was placed on notice of the accident and the potential need of uninsured motorist coverage by being timely served with [her] original [c]omplaint." The plaintiff also argues that the amended complaint is not time-barred because, according to her, it relates back to the date of filing of the original complaint. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03.
T.C.A. § 28-3-104 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued:
(1) Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, breach of marriage promise. . . .
(Emphasis added).
We first address the plaintiff's assertion that the complaint against "John Doe" is not barred by the statute of limitations because, according to her, it relates back to the date of filing of the original complaint. As previously noted, the initial complaint was filed within the one-year period of limitations.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 provides as follows:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in amended pleadings arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party or the naming of the party by or against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and if, within the period provided by law for commencing an action or within 120 days after commencement of the action, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
(Emphasis added). The plaintiff argues that Rule 15.03 applies and saves her amended complaint from being barred by the statute of limitations because USAA (1) "received such notice of the institution of the action that [it was] not prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits" and (2) "knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party," the action would have been originally brought against "John Doe." See id. To support this argument, the plaintiff stresses the fact that USAA received a copy of her original complaint and summons within the period of time specified in Rule 15.03. The plaintiff's argument on this issue misses the mark. The rule in question — Rule 15.03 — refers to "the party to be brought in by amendment," (emphasis added), and addresses notice to that party and the knowledge of that party. The party to be brought in by the plaintiff's amended complaint in this case is "John Doe," not USAA. While no prejudice to USAA from the late filing of the amended complaint appears on the face of the record, that is not the issue. Simply stated, the language of Rule 15.03 is not implicated by the facts of the instant case. Rule 15.03 says what it says and we are duty-bound to follow and apply the language as promulgated by the Supreme Court.
In the case of Gafford v. Caruthers , No. 91C-2709, 1994 WL 420917 (Tenn.Ct.App. M.S., filed August 12, 1994), we addressed the issue of whether a claim could proceed against an uninsured motorist carrier when the claim against the uninsured motorist is time-barred:
Here, [the UM carrier] argues that the [plaintiff] is not legally entitled to collect from the uninsured motorist because plaintiff allowed the statute to lapse on her claim against the John Doe tortfeasor and should, therefore, not be entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policy. [The UM carrier] argues, and we agree, that if there is no tort liability, the insurer has no liability under the contract.
In order to determine the rights an insured has under the policy of insurance, it must be ascertained whether a cause of action exists against the tortfeasor. The failure to bring a cause of action against the tortfeasor within the limitation period bars the claim.
Under the [uninsured motorist] statute, if the insured is not entitled to compensation from the uninsured motorist, the insured would not be entitled to compensation from the uninsured motorist carrier. This statute cannot be read as providing a victim of an uninsured motorist with a more effective remedy against his own uninsured motorist carrier than he would have against the uninsured motorist himself.
Here, the plaintiff is not entitled to coverage under the [u]ninsured [m]otorist [s]tatute because her action [against the tortfeasor] is barred by the one year stat[ute] of limitations.
Id. , at *2. In other words, we "held that because the statute of limitations had run against the `John Doe' defendant, then the plaintiff could not maintain an action against her uninsured motorist carrier." Lipscomb v. Doe , 32 S.W.3d 840, 848 n. 7 (Tenn. 2000).
The rationale utilized by this Court in the Gafford case applies with equal force to the facts of the instant case. The accident in this case occurred on August 11, 2003. The plaintiff did not amend her complaint substituting "John Doe" as the named defendant until October 18, 2005. This amendment was filed well outside the period of the one-year statute of limitations; therefore, the plaintiff's cause of action against "John Doe" is time-barred. Because the plaintiff no longer has a
cause of action against the unknown tortfeasor, she can no longer maintain an action against USAA to recover uninsured motorist benefits. See Gafford , 1994 WL 420917, at *2.The plaintiff argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Gafford because, unlike the facts in Gafford , the UM carrier in the instant case received a copy of the summons and original complaint within the period "provided by law for commencing an action or within 120 days after commencement of the action." See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. We agree that the facts in Gafford and those in the instant case differ as to when the UM carrier first received legal notice of the filing of the original complaint. However, notice to the uninsured motorist carrier is immaterial to the core question in the instant case. The question is not whether, and to what extent, USAA had notice. The question is whether the plaintiff's cause of action against "John Doe" is time-barred. It clearly is. Consequently, the plaintiff has no cause of action against her UM carrier.
IV.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court for the collection of costs assessed below, pursuant to applicable law. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Deborah Lane.