Opinion
Civil File No. 99-1255 MJD/JGL
March 5, 2001
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Plaintiff's motion for default judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37.
Pro se Plaintiff Land filed this claim, alleging she was not hired for a position as a Correctional Officer by Washington County due to her relation to her father, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions and GRANTS Defendant's motion.
Background
On January 22, 1996, Mr. Land's daughter, Plaintiff Melissa Land, applied for a position with Defendant Washington County as a Correctional Officer. The county notified Plaintiff of the testing process and subsequently administered a written test and a reading test.
After the tests, Plaintiff had an interview with Sheriff Jim Frank. Upon completion of the application process she was placed on a list of possible Correctional Officers. Plaintiff was not selected for a position as a Correctional Officer that year.
On May 1, 1998, Plaintiff submitted a second application. Although she was notified of the written exam testing date, Plaintiff did not take the written exam, and Washington County informed her that the score from her 1996 written exam would be used on the new application. Ms. Land was interviewed and considered for the position, but again was not offered the job.
Plaintiff claims that even though she scored very highly on the tests, she was passed over for applicants with lower scores due to her affiliation with her father. Larry Land, Plaintiff's father, was a Correctional Officer with Washington County until 1996, when he was dismissed for what he claims are discriminatory reasons. Mr. Land asserts that his dismissal was the end result of a dispute between himself and Sheriff Jim Frank, who participates in the hiring process for Correctional Officers. The Lands believe that this dispute, and the ensuing unsuccessful litigation brought by Mr. Land against the county, prejudiced the county unfairly against Melissa Land in her application for employment.
Mr. Land was a Union Shop Steward for Teamsters Local 320, the Union that represented the Washington County Sheriff's Department. He contends, among other things, that Sheriff Frank had him removed as Union Steward and the ensuing dispute ultimately led to his being removed from his job. There is no allegation that his dismissal was in any way related to his alleged disability.
Washington County presented evidence that all those who were hired had more law enforcement or other work experience than the Plaintiff. Defendant also rebuts the charge that the county discriminated against Plaintiff based on her relation to her father, by asserting that two of Melissa Land's brothers are employed by the county as Correctional Officers. Melissa Land admits that both of her brothers had relevant employment experience before being hired by Washington County.
Following discovery, both parties now move this Court for summary judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs also move for default judgment on the issue of Defendant's alleged failure to respond to certain interrogatories, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55.
Analysis Default Motion
Under R. 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for default judgment is appropriate when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Plaintiff contends that Defendant's incomplete responses to Plaintiff's interrogatories can be construed as a failure to defend. The Court finds that Defendant adequately defended this complaint. The motion for default is denied.
In the alternative, Plaintiff moves the Court for an order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(1)(b)(2) compelling Defendant's response to certain interrogatories. The Court finds that this issue is moot as it was adequately considered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff in his Order of October 4, 2000.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c). The court must view evidence and inferences which reasonably may be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial; mere allegations or denials are not enough. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See id., 477 U.S. at 250.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual, as defined by the ADA, is one who with a disability, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of a job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8). The term "discriminate" includes, inter alia, "(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, in a Title VII case for a discriminatory adverse employment decision, the Plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The same is also true in ADA cases. See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1996); Den Hartog v. Wasatch, 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to ADA associational discrimination case). The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. An employer need only provide an admissible, legitimate explanation for its actions to defeat an individual's claim of discriminatory treatment. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The plaintiff must then offer evidence to demonstrate that the employer's stated reasons for the adverse employment action are merely a pretext for the actual discriminatory motive. See id, 450 U.S. at 256. The ultimate burden of persuasion for the action rests with the employee. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).
This case differs slightly from the usual ADA claim because Plaintiff is claiming that she was discriminated against based on her known association with her father, who she claims is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). In order to present a prima facie case of associational discrimination under the ADA, plaintiff must show 1) she was "qualified" for the job at the time of the adverse employment action; 2) she was subjected to adverse employment action; 3) she was known by the employer at the time to have a relative or associate with a disability; and 4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the employer's decision. See Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085.
Plaintiff has not met the requirements of a prima facie case for associational discrimination under the ADA. Even if the Court assumes that she met the qualifications for the position of Correctional Officer, Ms. Land has not submitted adequate evidence regarding her father's disability. Mr. Land submitted an affidavit attesting that he suffered from "organic brain syndrome and organic personality disorder" as well as arthralgia and severe hypertension; however, he has submitted no medical records or other documents confirming this fact. In addition, Ms. Land offered no evidence that Washington County knew of her father's disability. While this knowledge may be inferred from the fact that Washington County is Mr. Land's former employer, something more is required to demonstrate that the officials responsible for making hiring decisions knew of Mr. Land's condition, and of Mr. Land's relation to Melissa Land.
Finally, and most importantly, Ms. Land has offered no evidence which could lead to a reasonable inference that her father's disability was a determining factor in the decision not to hire her. Plaintiff asserts that her father has had personal disagreements with Sheriff Jim Frank, that Sheriff Frank had the final determination in her hiring process, and that she was not hired because of Sheriff Frank's animosity towards her father. According to Plaintiff, the alleged animosity springs from disputes over union representation. No evidence was offered that Sheriff Frank made his hiring decision based on Larry Land's disability.
Even if Ms. Land had demonstrated facts to support a prima facie case of associational discrimination, she has offered no evidence to show that Washington County's stated reason for not hiring her, namely, her lack of relevant employment experience, was pretextual. The only evidence Land has offered regarding disability at all is the affidavit of one former employee of Washington County who was not allowed to return to work following a medical condition that rendered her unable to climb stairs. This isolated, circumstantial evidence of hostility towards the disabled does not convince the Court that Defendant's stated reason was a mere pretext for discrimination against Plaintiff.
Based on a review of all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions and GRANTS Defendant's motion. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment is DENIED.
3. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Let judgment be entered.