Summary
adopting Judge Hoffman's dissenting opinion below, at 214 Pa. Super. 80, 251 A.2d 739, 741-742
Summary of this case from Marine Office of America v. Quarry AssociatesOpinion
November 13, 1969.
March 20, 1970.
Insurance — Damage to property "caused by accident" — Damage resulting from negligence of insured.
In this case, in which it appeared that plaintiff-authority, in performing a landfill operation, negligently dumped refuse into a landfill, polluting the water wells of neighboring property owners, it was Held that the harm caused by the negligence of the authority was harm "caused by accident" within the meaning of an insurance policy by which defendant agreed to pay all sums which the insured authority should become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property "caused by accident".
Mr. Justice JONES and Mr. Justice COHEN concurred in the result.
Mr. Chief Justice BELL filed a dissenting opinion.
Argued November 13, 1969. Before BELL, C. J., JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.
Appeal, No. 421, Jan. T., 1969, from order of Superior Court, No. 1104, Oct. T., 1968, affirming judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, July T., 1964, No. 60, in case of Lancaster Area Refuse Authority v. Transamerica Insurance Company. Order of Superior Court reversed and case remanded.
Same case in Superior Court: 214 Pa. Super. 80.
Assumpsit upon case stated. Before BROWN, J., without a jury.
Finding for defendant and judgment entered thereon. Plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment of the court below, dissenting opinion by HOFFMAN, J., in which MONTGOMERY and SPAULDING, JJ., joined. Appeal by plaintiff to Supreme Court allowed.
John I. Hartman, Jr., with him Windolph, Burkholder Hartman, for appellant. B. M. Zimmerman, with him Zimmerman, Zimmerman, Myers Gibbel, for appellee.
In November, 1960, appellant, the Lancaster Area Refuse Authority (the Authority), commenced a landfill operation near the City of Lancaster. Refuse dumped by the Authority into this landfill polluted the water wells of two neighboring property owners. In suits brought by the property owners against the Authority for damages, a jury awarded verdicts in their favor, but the trial court entered judgments n.o.v. for the Authority. The Superior Court reversed these judgments, holding that sufficient evidence had been introduced at trial to support the verdicts based on the Authority's negligence. Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse Authority, 201 Pa. Super. 614, 193 A.2d 670 (1963). After the Authority had paid the judgments, it demanded reimbursement from the Transamerica Insurance Company (Transamerica) which had insured it against property damage liability. By the insurance policy the insurer agreed, inter alia, "[t]o pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident." Transamerica denied coverage, whereupon the Authority brought the suit from which this appeal arises.
The suit was tried as a case stated, the question at issue being whether the injury to the property owners at the hand of the Authority was "caused by accident." The trial court held that it was not, relying upon the opinion of the Superior Court in the Reinhart case, that this injury was caused by negligence and, hence, was avoidable. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed per curiam without opinion, 214 Pa. Super. 80, 251 A.2d 739 (1969). Judge HOFFMAN filed a dissenting opinion in which Judges MONTGOMERY and SPAULDING joined.
The first paragraph of the dissenting opinion erred in stating that in Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse Authority, 201 Pa. Super. 614, judgment was entered in favor of the property owners and affirmed in the Superior Court. The jury returned a verdict for the property owners, the lower court gave judgment n.o.v. for the Authority, and the Superior Court reversed, entering judgment on the verdict for the plaintiffs.
We granted allocatur to consider the narrow question whether harm which is caused by negligence may still be harm "caused by accident" within the meaning of the insurance contract. We hold that it may and adopt the reasoning of the dissenting opinion, in the Superior Court.
The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter judgment for the appellant.
Mr. Justice JONES and Mr. Justice COHEN concur in result.
I dissent. If the Court would define the meaning of the pertinent and controlling words in the policy: "caused by accident," it would be clear under the facts of this case that its Order or Judgment could not be sustained.