Opinion
No. FA 10 411 4489 S
March 1, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is the third of (at least) three lawsuits involving the same parties. First in time was an action filed in 2009 in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa, captioned " In Re the Marriage of John Lanata and Michelle Lanata," No. FN 2009-003534 (the "Arizona action"). Next came the case of " John Lanata v. Michelle Lanata," filed March 10, 2010, in this judicial district, and originally assigned Docket No. KNL CV 10-6003540 (the "collection suit").
Since the labels "plaintiff" and "defendant" have different meanings as applied to each of these suits, this memorandum will refer to the parties by their proper names instead.
Because of the identity of the parties and the issues between the two Connecticut cases, the court has transferred the collection suit to 'the family docket in Norwich. It has been reassigned docket number KNO CV 10 610021 3S, which docket number shall be used on any future filings in that matter.
At present there are two issues before this court. First, does this court have subject matter jurisdiction to determine alimony and property settlement issues on application of a party whose marriage has already been dissolved in another state? Secondly, should this court grant John Lanata's motion (#109) to stay the proceedings in the instant case pending completion of the collection suit?
This case began in August of 2010, when Michelle Lanata filed here a pleading captioned "Application for Alimony and an Equitable Property Settlement." Her complaint alleged, inter alia, that she and the respondent had once been husband and wife but that an Arizona court had dissolved their marriage on January 2, 2010 leaving her target demands not equitably resolved. Respondent has appeared through counsel.
Certain relevant facts are undisputed. The parties intermarried on November 20, 2000. The Arizona decree dissolved that marriage. Ms. Lanata was personally served in Connecticut with the Arizona process, but did not appear there. The Arizona judgment is now final, and no appeal has been taken. The collection suit is John Lanata's effort to enforce the financial awards made to him by the Arizona decree.
When the instant case first appeared before this court at short calendar, the court on its own motion raised the question of its subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Lanata has submitted a brief on the issue. Mr. Lanata filed no brief, but has lodged with the court certain exhibits which he expects would be of use to the court in arriving at a decision.
Michelle Lanata correctly observes that whether the Arizona decree is binding upon her as to alimony and property issues depends upon whether or not that court had personal jurisdiction over her when it entered its final orders. The requirement that there be such jurisdiction is an aspect of the laws of both Connecticut and Arizona, and indeed is constitutionally unavoidable both generally; see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 226 (1945), and, as applied to domestic matters, see, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). Estin held that while one state's court may dissolve a marriage without attaining personal jurisdiction over the distant spouse, it may not go further and assert authority as to the parties' financial circumstances. The case recognized that as a result, a "divisible divorce" occurs, with one state allowed to dissolve the marriage, but another empowered to rule upon the finances.
In Connecticut jurisprudence, the circumstances which this case presents are unusual but not unprecedented. Under similar or at least analogous circumstances, several superior court decisions have held that this court does possess the authority to consider an application for financial orders by someone in Michelle Lanata's position. In Scharer v. Scharer, Docket No. FA 01 0451858, Hartford Judicial District (2001; Alander, J.), the court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint filed here by a woman seeking alimony, whose marriage had previously been dissolved by a California decree. Similarly, in Chambrello v. Chambrello, Docket No. FA 99 0080464 Judicial District of Litchfield (2002; Frazzini, J.) [ 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 299], the court denied a man's motion to dismiss (on the basis of a prior North Carolina divorce), of his former wife's Connecticut case seeking a number of forms of relief, including a property settlement. The court in Beckham v. Beckham, Docket No. FA 064104434, New London Judicial District at Norwich (2006; Swienton, J.), relied upon both of those cases in denying Mr. Beckham's motion to dismiss his wife's Connecticut action, which he based upon the fact that he had previously filed an action which was then pending in the state of Nevada. In all three cases, the Connecticut courts determined that the subject matter jurisdiction of this court was not defeated by the prior pendency of an action in another state, even if that action might have gone to judgment. The Scharer and Beckham decisions both expressly recognize the rule set forth in Estin.
John Lanata has neither moved to dismiss the case, nor filed a brief on the question of subject matter jurisdiction when asked to do so. For the present, therefore, the court presumes that the holdings of the three cited cases as to this court's jurisdiction ought to apply here also.
The question which to date has not been answered in this case is whether Arizona had personal jurisdiction over Michelle, a premise she vigorously contests. If it did, then the full faith and credit provisions of the United States Constitution provide an independent basis upon which to deny her the relief she seeks. This court notes that the Arizona court conducted an evidentiary hearing as to personal jurisdiction, and specifically found that it did have such jurisdiction over her; John Lanata has provided this court with a copy of the recent Supreme Court case of Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354 (2010). Maltas holds that a foreign judgment is only enforceable here when it is shown that its entry comports with the conditions for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the law of that state. While Mr. Lanata apparently believes that this controls the instant case, he has not yet stated that in so many words, much less proven that his conclusion is valid.
Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof . . ."
Michelle, however, alleges here that the information supplied to that court was false and amounts to a fraud upon the court. This court is neither an appellate court for the Superior Court of Arizona, capable of overruling its factual findings, nor allowed, under the full faith and credit clause, to ignore the specific factual findings made therein. It is nevertheless true that a foreign judgment is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying a judgment as would apply to a judgment of this state; Nastro v. D'Onofrio, 76 Conn.App. 814 (2003); and that "[a]s a matter of federal constitutional law, a judgment debtor may challenge the enforcement of a foreign judgment . . . if the judgment is jurisdictionally flawed because the foreign court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the defendant or if that jurisdiction resulted from an extrinsic fraud. Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life Accident Health Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 U.S. 691, 704 (1982)." Segal v. Segal, 86 Conn.App. 617 (2004) (emphasis added).
The adjective "extrinsic" in this quote may be material in later proceedings, and this court finds useful its explication in the case of Towne v. Towne, 8 Conn.Sup. 12 (1940, O'Sullivan, J.):
In determining whether the decree of one state will be recognized in another by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution or, lacking circumstances requiring the application of this constitutional mandate, then by reason of interstate comity, the element of fraud is quite important. The fraud, however, must be concerned in some manner with the question of jurisdiction. A decree may not be impeached solely for false testimony Deyette v. Deyette, 92 Vt. 305, 104 Atl. 232; Porter v. Hammitt, 78 Colo. 320, 241 Pac. 543; Allard v. La Plain, 147 Wash. 497, 266 Pac. 688; Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S.W. 121; Littlefield v. Paynter, 111 Kan. 201, 206 Pac. 1114. In his work on Conflict of Laws (Vol. 2 [1935] § 440.4), Beale makes note of the distinction which is drawn by the authorities between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. The latter, he observes, is that which goes to the existence of a cause of action and cannot be employed for the purpose of impeaching a foreign decree. "The fraud," he, says," which will be available to a defendant in his attack upon a foreign judgment, in the main, is fraud which has deprived him of the opportunity to make a full and fair defense. There are many varieties of such fraud. Thus, where the defendant failed to present his case because the plaintiff agreed to drop the suit [citing, Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544] or to compromise the case [citing, Davis v. Headley, 22 N.J.Eq. 115], or notified the defendant that the proceeding had been dismissed [citing, Duringer v. Moschino, 93 Ind. 495], or by any other agreement or promise lulled the defendant into a false security [citing, U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61], the judgment may be attacked by the defendant."
This court has before it merely Michelle's initial application with affidavit, her memorandum of law, and arguments of counsel; it has not yet held any evidentiary hearing in this case. When and if such a hearing is held, this court can make the factual findings necessary to support a conclusion one way or the other as to the personal jurisdiction dispute.
In the collection action, John Lanata seeks enforcement of the Arizona decree's property settlement in his favor. If that decree was invalid as to Michelle for lack of personal jurisdiction, his efforts may prove fruitless. In that action, Michelle has filed a motion to dismiss which has not yet been adjudicated; and which raises essentially the same factual questions as she relies upon in her family court pleading. Since the instant case will remain active on this court's docket, it is in the interest of both parties and of judicial economy to make this and the collection action companion cases for all further proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1) The motion for stay is denied;
2) The collection action shall be transferred from the civil division in New London to the family division in Norwich, and shall be a companion to the instant case;
3) All parties and counsel shall attend a status conference in both matters on March 24, 2011, at 2:00 p.m. at the Norwich Courthouse, at which time a schedule will be set for further proceedings in each case.