Opinion
NO. 5-17-0029WC
05-09-2018
CARMEN LAMPERT, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Ferrell Hospital, Appellee).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Saline County
No. 16MR7
Honorable Todd D. Lambert, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The Commission's finding that claimant failed to prove that her injury arose out of her employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it committed no error in denying claimant compensation under the Act.
¶ 2 On December 21, 2012, claimant, Carmen Lampert, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2010)), seeking benefits from the employer, Ferrell Hospital. Claimant alleged she sustained a work-related injury to her left leg on November 26, 2012, when she slipped and fell down a set of stairs upon exiting the employer's building. Following a hearing, the arbitrator
determined claimant failed to prove that her injury "arose out of" her employment and denied her benefits under the Act. On review, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. On judicial review, the circuit court of Saline County confirmed the Commission. Claimant appeals, arguing the Commission's decision that she failed to prove her accidental injury arose out of her employment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On August 14, 2014, the arbitration hearing was conducted. Claimant testified she worked for the employer as a registered nurse. On November 26, 2012, she worked a full shift at the employer's hospital and "clocked out" at approximately 8 p.m. Claimant exited the hospital through a door she usually used (hereinafter the Grant Street door), which was the nearest exit to the hospital's "laundry parking lot" where claimant typically parked her car. She testified the Grant Street door led to a set of carpeted, concrete stairs as well as a wheelchair ramp. Claimant chose to descend the stairs. She stated she held on to handrails as she descended the stairs because "it was dark"; however, she "slipped off *** the very top [step] and fell all the way down." Claimant landed "with all [her] weight on [her] left foot." At the time she fell, claimant was carrying a bag over her shoulder but had nothing in her hands. Also, she was not performing any of her job duties.
¶ 5 Claimant testified she experienced a lot of pain after her fall. She retrieved her cell phone and called the employer's nurse's station for help. Claimant was taken by wheelchair to the employer's emergency room for medical treatment. She was diagnosed with a left ankle fracture and, ultimately, underwent two surgeries on her left ankle.
¶ 6 Claimant described the weather at the time of her fall as "misting and kind of
sleety." It was also dark and claimant testified she noticed that lights "on the hospital" were not working. Although she acknowledged that a streetlight was located nearby, she did not recall whether the streetlight was on at the time of her accident.
¶ 7 Claimant testified she was not required by the employer to use either the Grant Street door or the laundry parking lot and she agreed that there were several other hospital exits and parking areas she could have used. Additionally, both the Grant Street door and the laundry parking lot were open to the general public as well as employees. Inside the hospital at the location of the Grant Street door were patient rooms and the employer's x-ray department. Claimant asserted, however, that the Grant Street door was "[u]sually" used by hospital employees. She maintained that most nonemployees used the hospital's front door or its emergency room door to enter the hospital.
¶ 8 Claimant further acknowledged that she could have walked down the wheelchair ramp located outside the Grant Street door instead of using the stairs. She also testified there had been nothing wrong with the steps at the time of her fall. Specifically, claimant described the stairs as being in good condition and not deteriorating. She denied noticing any problem with the carpeting on the stairs. She asserted only that "[i]t was wet" and the stairs were "slippery" at the time of her fall.
¶ 9 The employer submitted a transcript of a recorded statement claimant gave regarding her accident. According to the transcript, claimant stated she had worked for the employer for five years and had used the Grant Street door when leaving work "the last two or three years." She asserted the area outside the door was usually lit up but at the time of her accident "there was no light." Claimant stated it was misting or sleeting outside when she exited the hospital. She held on to handrails as she began to descend the stairs "but [she] didn't even
make it down the first step." Claimant stated she did not "know what happened. [She] just slid off the step or whatever." When asked whether the steps were wet, claimant responded that the employer "just re-carpeted them so *** they weren't really wet." She noted it was only "like a light drizzle" outside. During her testimony at arbitration, claimant agreed that she gave a statement near the time of the accident. However, she testified she was in pain and on pain medication and did not remember what she said.
¶ 10 At arbitration, claimant presented the testimony of two additional witnesses, Terri Debose and Kaylee Owen. Debose testified she worked for the employer from 2009 or 2010 until July 2014. On November 26, 2012, she observed claimant in the emergency room after her fall. Approximately an hour after seeing claimant in the emergency room, Debose went outside to smoke using the Grant Street door and noticed there were "no lights on that night." Debose also asserted "it was slick" outside and that the nearby streetlight "was out." She denied that the electricity had been out at the hospital, but specifically recalled that there "were no lights on when [she] went out" of the Grant Street door. Debose further testified that "most of the [employer's] employees" used the Grant Street door. She asserted more employees used that particular door than did the hospital's patients and visitors. Debose estimated that the employer had 500 employees but agreed that she did not know where they all chose to park.
¶ 11 Debose acknowledged that, at the time of arbitration, she no longer worked for the employer. She stated that she gave notice of her intent to leave her employment but left early after another employee "smarted *** off" to her. Debose denied that the encounter made her angry.
¶ 12 Owen testified she worked for the employer as a certified nursing assistant from 2007 until approximately three months prior to the arbitration hearing. She worked with claimant
but was not on duty at the time of claimant's fall. Owen stated she always used the Grant Street door and asserted that door was "where 75[%] of the employees went in and out" of the hospital. Owen further testified that, after claimant's November 2012 fall, both the carpet and the lighting outside of the Grant Street door changed. She stated the carpet had a hole at the top of it and, after claimant's accident, was replaced with "whole new carpet." Also, the light above the exit doorway, which "wasn't working most of the time," did work after claimant's fall.
¶ 13 At arbitration, the employer presented the testimony of Caleigh Bruce, its vice-president of human resources. Bruce stated she worked for the employer in November 2012 and was aware of no changes to the stairs after claimant's accident. She further testified that, due to her position with the employer, she was familiar with the employer's parking policy for employees. According to Bruce, there were several parking options and hospital doors available for use by both employees and the general public.
¶ 14 Bruce testified that employees were not required or told to park in the laundry parking lot and she stated that lot was also open to the general public. She acknowledged that she did not see who went in and out of the Grant Street door as it was not near her office; however, she stated that the door was open for use by the general public. Additionally, Bruce denied that the electricity was out at the hospital at the time of claimant's accident, stating that the generator log, which tracked generator use at the hospital when the power was out, did not give the date of claimant's fall "as being one that the electricity was out."
¶ 15 Bruce also testified that she was familiar with Debose. She recalled that Debose gave notice that she was quitting her job but "did not follow that notice out." Bruce stated Debose "left [work] in the middle of a shift" and did not return after telling other employees that she was going "to go check on another job." The record further contains a stipulation of the
parties, wherein they agreed that, after testifying, Bruce reviewed Debose's personnel file and realized she had mistakenly testified that Debose left in the middle of a shift. Bruce's affidavit, correcting her testimony, was attached to the stipulation. In her affidavit, Bruce asserted that Debose gave the employer two-weeks' notice that she was leaving her employment. Two days later, she had a confrontation with her supervisor at the end of her shift and indicated she would not be returning to work. Debose then posted a status on her Facebook page, indicating she no longer worked for the employer and making a derogatory comment about her former "boss."
¶ 16 Additional exhibits submitted by the parties included claimant's medical records, photographs of the hospital and the location of claimant's fall, and a diagram of the hospital and surrounding area. The parties also submitted exhibits containing weather records from the date of claimant's accident. Claimant's exhibit contained a website printout describing the weather history for Harrisburg, Illinois, (which the arbitrator noted was nine miles southwest from the accident site). It provided details of the weather conditions at that location on November 26, 2012, in 20 minute increments, beginning at 12:15 a.m. The printout identified the temperature on November 26, 2012, at 7:55 p.m. as 41 degrees and the "[c]onditions" as "[r]ain." At 8:15 p.m., the temperature was again documented as 41 degrees while the weather conditions were described as "[l]ight [r]ain."
¶ 17 The employer's exhibit consisted of weather records from the National Climatic Data Center. The records indicate the readings contained in the report were collected at the Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport (which the arbitrator noted was seven miles west of the accident site). For November 26, 2012, they document "weather types" of light, heavy, and moderate rain at 6:15 p.m., 6:35 p.m., 6:55 p.m., with "precipitation totals" of 0.06 inches at those stated times. The records also document "weather types" of rain and light rain at 7:55 p.m. and 8:15 p.m.,
respectively, but with no listed "precipitation totals." Again, the temperature around the time of claimant's accident was documented as 41 degrees.
¶ 18 On October 16, 2014, the arbitrator issued her decision in the matter. She denied claimant's claim for benefits on the basis that she failed to establish that her injury "arose out of" her employment. In particular, the arbitrator found claimant was injured as the result of a personal or a neutral risk to which she was not exposed to any greater degree than the general public. In so holding, the arbitrator noted claimant was not required by the employer to use the Grant Street door or the laundry parking lot. Rather, she voluntarily chose the hospital exit and parking area she utilized and both areas were open to the general public. The arbitrator also noted that claimant chose to descend the stairs outside of the Grant Street door rather than to use the adjacent wheelchair ramp.
¶ 19 The arbitrator further found testimony from claimant's witnesses, that most employees used the laundry parking lot, was "highly exaggerated" and "not credible." She noted that the employer's evidence indicated the laundry parking lot was "very small" with "only 13 parking spaces." Additionally, she pointed to Debose's estimation that the employer had 500 employees.
¶ 20 The arbitrator also noted claimant chose to use the staircase after observing both the lighting and weather conditions. With respect to claimant's assertion that the lights outside the Grant Street door were not working, the arbitrator found it significant that claimant did not attribute her fall to the darkness or an inability to see. Instead, claimant reported that she "slipped" on the top step and fell. Finally, the arbitrator relied on claimant's testimony that she observed no defect in the stairs and that they were in good condition.
¶ 21 On October 2, 2015, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's
decision without further comment. On January 3, 2017, the circuit court of Saline County confirmed the Commission.
¶ 22 This appeal followed.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, claimant argues the Commission erred in finding she failed to prove the injury to her left ankle arose out of her work for the employer. She concedes that she was not injured as the result of an employment-related risk but, rather, a neutral or personal risk. However, claimant maintains she was exposed to the neutral or personal risk to a greater degree than the general public because (1) it was dark and the stairs were wet and slippery, creating a dangerous condition and (2) she traversed the stairs at issue more often than the general public.
¶ 25 "To obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has suffered a disabling injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment." Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203, 797 N.E.2d 665, 671 (2003). "The 'arising out of' component is primarily concerned with causal connection" and is satisfied if the claimant shows "the injury had its origin in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury." Id.
¶ 26 An initial step when considering the "arising out of" component of a workers' compensation claim is to determine the type of risk to which the claimant was exposed at the time of injury. Baldwin v. Illinois Workers' Compensation, 409 Ill. App. 3d 472, 478, 949 N.E.2d 1151, 1156 (2011). "Risks to employees fall into three groups: (1) risks distinctly associated with the employment; (2) risks personal to the employee, such as idiopathic falls; and (3) neutral risks that have no particular employment or personal characteristics." Id.
¶ 27 Here, evidence showed claimant fell while traversing stairs after exiting the employer's hospital at the end of her work day. It is undisputed by the parties that claimant was not exposed to a risk distinctly associated with her employment at the time of her fall. Further, although the Commission described claimant's risk of injury as being both personal and neutral, the record fails to reflect that the risk of injury at issue in this case was personal to claimant. "Personal risks include nonoccupational diseases, injuries caused by personal infirmities such as a trick knee, and injuries caused by personal enemies and are generally noncompensable." Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 149, 162-63, 731 N.E.2d 795, 806 (2000). Here, no evidence was presented that claimant suffered from any medical condition or personal infirmity that caused her fall. Instead, claimant was injured as the result of a neutral risk, the risk of descending a staircase, which had no particular employment or personal characteristics. See Village of Villa Park v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL App (2d) 130038WC, ¶ 20, 3 N.E.3d 885 ("Falling while traversing stairs is a neutral risk."); Baldwin, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 478 ("By itself, the act of walking up a staircase does not expose an employee to a risk greater than that faced by the general public.").
¶ 28 "Injuries resulting from a neutral risk generally do not arise out of the employment and are compensable under the Act only where the employee was exposed to the risk to a greater degree than the general public." Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1014, 944 N.E.2d 800, 804 (2011). The increased risk may be either qualitative, in that some aspect of the employment contributed to the risk, or quantitative, in that the employee is exposed to the common risk more frequently than the general public. Id.
¶ 29 "Whether an injury arose out of and in the course of one's employment is generally a question of fact and the Commission's determination on this issue will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Dukich v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2017 IL App (2d) 160351WC, ¶ 32, 86 N.E.3d 1161. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent." City of Springfield v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 388 Ill. App. 3d 297, 312-13, 901 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (2009). On review, "[t]he appropriate test is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding, not whether this court might have reached the same conclusion." Metropolitan Water, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.
¶ 30 As stated, claimant argues she was exposed to the risks associated with traversing stairs to a greater degree than the general public. In asserting a qualitatively increased risk, she contends the stairs outside the Grant Street door were in a dangerous condition because it was dark outside due to nonworking lights and because weather conditions on the day of her accident caused the stairs to become "wet" and "slippery."
¶ 31 Here, claimant testified it was dark outside when she exited through the Grant Street door and that lights located on the employer's hospital were not working. However, as noted by the Commission, claimant did not in any way attribute her fall to the darkness. Specifically, "[s]he did not testify she missed a step or was unable to see the step due to darkness." Rather, claimant repeatedly stated she "slipped" on the top step of the staircase and fell. Under these circumstances, it was not error for the Commission to determine that the lighting (or lack of lighting) outside the Grant Street door did not contribute to claimant's fall or increase her risk of injury.
¶ 32 At arbitration, claimant did attribute her fall to the weather conditions at the time
of her accident. She testified that it was "misting and kind of sleety" when she exited the hospital. She presented evidence of the weather conditions on the day of her accident that showed it was raining at the time of her fall and asserted that the stairs were "wet" and "slippery." However, even assuming the accuracy of claimant's testimony, we cannot find such circumstances warrant a finding that claimant was exposed to a neutral risk to a greater degree than the general public.
¶ 33 In Dukich, 2017 IL App (2d) 160351WC, ¶ 35, the claimant was injured when she slipped and fell on wet pavement located on the employer's premises as she walked from the building where she worked to her car. In affirming the Commission's finding of no compensable injury, we noted that "the dangers created by rainfall are dangers to which all members of the public are exposed on a regular basis" and were "unlike defects or particular hazardous conditions located at a particular worksite." Id. ¶¶ 36, 40-42 (distinguishing circumstances involving rainfall from those involving accumulations of snow and/or ice on employer-controlled property). As a result, under neutral-risk principles, claimant could only recover if she could "establish that she was exposed to the risks of injury from rainfall to a greater degree than the general public by virtue of her employment." Id. ¶ 36. In finding "[t]he claimant presented no such evidence," we stated as follows:
"Although the employer provided the claimant a designated parking space, there is no evidence that the employer exercised any control over the particular route the claimant took to her car or required the claimant to traverse the particular handicap ramp on which she was injured. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that the claimant's employment duties somehow contributed to her fall or enhanced the risk of slipping on wet pavement. For example, the claimant was not
carrying any work-related items or hurrying to complete a work-related task at the time she slipped and fell." Id.
¶ 34 The same factual circumstances exist in this case. The employer did not exercise any control over the route claimant took in and out of its hospital. It also did not require her to park in any particular location. Further, claimant's work duties did not contribute to her fall, in that she was not carrying work-related items when she fell, nor was she hurrying to complete work for the employer. In short, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the risk posed by the weather conditions at the time of claimant's fall was increased by some aspect of her employment.
¶ 35 Claimant also asserts that she was exposed to a quantitatively increased neutral risk by virtue of her employment. Specifically, she contends she traversed the stairs at issue more often than the general public. In Dukich, we rejected a similar argument, stating as follows:
"Even assuming arguendo that the claimant had to traverse the same path twice or more per day to get to her car, she still could not recover benefits because there is no evidence that the wet pavement she encountered on that path was any different or more dangerous than any other wet pavement regularly encountered by members of the general public while walking in the rain. [Citation.] In Caterpillar [Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 62-63, 541 N.E.2d 665, 669 (1989)], our supreme court denied benefits to a claimant who twisted his ankle while stepping off of a curb as he was walking from his workplace toward the employee parking lot on his employer's premises. Although our supreme court acknowledged that the claimant 'regularly crossed' the curb upon which he was injured 'to reach his car,' it denied benefits because '[c]urbs, and the risks
inherent in traversing them, confront all members of the public' and there was 'nothing in the record to distinguish [the curb upon which the claimant was injured] from any other curb.' [Citation.] Thus, the supreme court found that the claimant was no more likely to twist his ankle at his workplace than he would have been had he been engaged in any other business." Id. ¶ 37.
¶ 36 Similarly, in this case, there was no evidence presented to distinguish the outdoor stairs claimant was traversing—even if those stairs were wet from rainfall—from any other outdoor stairway. At arbitration, claimant acknowledged the stairs were in good condition. Although the stairs may have been "wet" or "slippery" due to rain, she did not argue that the stairs outside the employer's Grant Street door became any more slippery than any other outdoor surface or stairway when exposed to rainfall. Id. ¶ 38 (noting the claimant did not argue that the pavement she fell on was "unusually slippery when exposed to rainfall"). Thus, like in Dukich, we find no evidence suggesting that claimant in this case "was more likely to slip and fall on her employer's premises than she or any other member of the public would be likely to fall on any other" outdoor stairway that was exposed to rainfall. Id.
¶ 37 The Commission's finding that claimant failed to show an injury that arose out of her employment was sufficiently supported by the record and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, it committed no error in denying claimant compensation under the Act.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's judgment, confirming the Commission's decision.
¶ 40 Affirmed.