Opinion
CAUSE NO. IP 00-1139-C H/K
September 4, 2002
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
After all parties waived their right to a jury trial, this action was tried to the court on September 24, 2001. Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court now states its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The substance rather than the label shall govern whether a matter should be treated as a finding of fact or a conclusion of law.
Findings of Fact
On April 22, 1983, a state court sentenced Robert Lampe to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) for four years on three counts of theft and suspended a sentence on a fourth count. Ex. 1. Lampe applied for work release on September 28, 1983. DOC approved Lampe's application and transferred him to the Atterbury Work Release Center on November 9, 1983. See Ex. 4. Upon transfer, DOC also conditionally approved Lampe for assignment to Indiana's now-defunct "Regulated Community Assignment" (RCA), beginning February 27, 1984. Ex. 4.
Offenders assigned to the RCA program were allowed to live in private residences and worked in the community under the supervision of DOC's parole services division. Among other requirements, RCA participants agreed to report as instructed to a supervising parole agent, to attempt to remain employed, to obtain written permission before obtaining a driver's license, to consult a parole agent before purchasing or leasing a vehicle, not to change work or residence without obtaining written permission in advance from a parole agent, not to travel outside the parole district without prior approval, and — most important here — not to leave the State of Indiana. Ex. 5. Lampe signed a Regulated Community Assignment Agreement when he was released from the Atterbury Work Release Center on March 2, 1984. Ex. 5. The RCA Agreement noted Lampe's projected release date as July 26, 1984. Id.
On March 9, 1984, Lampe reported to a District Parole Office pursuant to the RCA Agreement and advised that he would reside at the home of a friend. Ex. 7.
After this initial interview, however, Lampe left Indiana. He did so without permission, and he never reported to a parole agent again. On April 3, 1984, Lampe's parole agent reported that Lampe had violated the terms of RCA by changing employment without notifying the agent and by failing to report as instructed. Ex. 8. DOC issued a "Warrant for Retaking Escaped/Administratively Released Prisoner" for Lampe. Ex. 10. State Parole Agent Michael D. Brown made two unsuccessful attempts to locate Lampe and then returned the unexecuted warrant to the Supervisor of Parole Services. Exs. 11 13.
For the next fifteen years, from 1984 until 1999, Lampe lived in Florida. On July 9, 1999, in the course of a traffic stop in Florida based on a burned-out taillight, the outstanding warrant was discovered and Lampe was arrested. He waived extradition and was transferred to the custody of Indiana officials. See Ex. 23. Upon his return to Indiana, Lampe did not appear before a court. He was instead transported directly to the DOC's Reception and Diagnostic Center (RDC) in Plainfield, Indiana, which is DOC's central intake facility for offenders. He went through the orientation process at RDC on July 23, 1999. Ex. 43 (bearing signature of "Robert Douglas," which Lampe testified was his signature, Tr. 69).
Lampe was summoned to appear before a DOC Conduct Adjustment Board (CAB) made up of defendants John Klingenstein, Harry Miller, and John Carnes. See Ex. 25. Klingenstein and Miller were parole agents, while Carnes was a sergeant at RDC.
Lampe's due process claims depend on the procedures used in connection with the CAB. Lampe was "screened" on the charge by one Robin Oliver on July 29, 1999, at least 24 hours before the CAB hearing. The screening informed Lampe of the nature of the charge against him and informed him of his rights to call witnesses or to confront witnesses against him and to have a lay advocate appear for him. The court finds that Lampe was told he was charged with escape, not with a "parole violation," as Lampe claimed.
On July 30, 1999, Lampe appeared before the CAB. He told the CAB, whether accurately or not, that he understood his rights. Lampe did not dispute — he could not dispute — his unauthorized departure from Indiana. Lampe "pled guilty," effectively admitting the charged violation. He also explained to the CAB that he felt that if he had stayed in Indiana, he would have done "something bad." (That point is consistent with Lampe's testimony to this court, in which he said he left Indiana because his ex-wife was "bothering" him, and he was afraid he would harm her and find himself in very serious trouble.)
The CAB imposed a sanction of the loss of 300 days of earned credit time, resulting in a new projected release date of January 21, 2001, about a year and a half after the CAB decision. The CAB also demoted Lampe from credit class I to credit class III, which would slow the rate at which he earned credit time. The CAB explained that it was imposing the sanction to protect the integrity of the RCA program. See Ex. 14.
The court does not credit Lampe's account in several particulars.
Specifically, the court does not credit Lampe's testimony that any defendant said: "I like to screw with you RCA m*****f*****s," or words to that effect. The court also does not credit Lampe's testimony that a CAB member threatened him with a criminal charge of escape. Further, there is no evidence that Lampe requested a lay advocate, or that he asked to confront witnesses against him or to present his own witnesses.
A few weeks after the CAB decision, Lampe was transferred from RDC to a lower security facility. While there, he reached the conclusion that he had been treated improperly in the CAB process. On November 18, 1999, he filed a belated appeal of the CAB decision. His appeal admitted his violation, which he described as a parole violation, and offered by way of explanation of his actions:
"Due to serious marital problems I felt parole in Indiana would be an impossible situation. It is not original, and not a very good excuse, but the primary reason I moved to Florida, without permission, thereby violating parole." Ex. 15.
That appeal was denied by RDC Superintendent Clarence E. Trigg, who explained that the violation of "escape" had been shown. Ex. 15. Lampe then sought review by DOC Commissioner Ed Cohn, arguing that the CAB did not have authority to handle RCA violations and that he could not have committed escape because he had not been confined in a jail or prison. Ex. 16. That appeal was also denied. Lampe then sought a final level of administrative review by C.A. Penfold, submitting the appeal on February 10, 2000. Ex. 18. Lampe again offered his explanation for his departure from Indiana and argued that he could not have escaped, that he was entitled to appear before the parole board rather than a CAB, and that he intended to seek federal habeas corpus relief and later civil damages. Ex. 18.
Penfold responded with a decision on February 28, 2000. Penfold found that the evidence supported the charge of escape and noted that Lampe had pled guilty to the charge. However, Penfold found that the sanctions imposed were too severe under the circumstances. He set aside the deprivation of 300 days in earned credit time, which meant that Lampe's release date became March 1, 2000, just two days later. Ex. 19. Lampe was released from DOC custody early the morning of March 1, 2000. His release occurred 237 days after his arrest in Florida.
When Lampe left Indiana while in the RCA program in 1984, he still had 150 days left until his projected release date, assuming he had stayed in credit class I. Thus, even if no additional punishment had been imposed for his violation of the RCA requirements, he still could have been required to serve at least 150 days more in prison, and possibly as much as 300 days, if he had been demoted to a lower credit class. (With a sanction that included deprivation of credit time that Lampe had already earned, the sanction could have been even greater, as the CAB originally decided.)
If Lampe had been on parole under Indiana law at the time he left for Florida, and if he had been brought before the Indiana Parole Board on a charge of violating conditions of parole, the Parole Board could have penalized him with a "balance of time" punishment of approximately fourteen and a half months in prison. See Tr. 131, 172. The court also finds that, if Lampe's case had been presented to the Parole Board, it is more likely than not that he would have received a punishment more severe than the punishment ultimately imposed through the CAB process and the subsequent appeals. Parole Board chairman Raymond Justak, who has many years of experience in dealing with parole violations, including departures from supervision, testified credibly that a parolee who absconded from parole as Lampe did from the RCA program would have his parole revoked and would be sentenced to the balance of his DOC sentence, with an opportunity for further review by the Parole Board one year later if the balance was longer than one year. Tr. 171-72.
Conclusions of Law Lampe seeks money damages from defendants under both federal and state law. Lampe's federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that defendants deprived him of liberty without due process of law by revoking his previously earned good time credits and by returning him to prison on the basis of a constitutionally inadequate hearing and an uninformed guilty plea. Lampe seeks damages under Indiana law for the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the persons of the defendants.
Defendants have not argued that the state law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
I. Federal Due Process Claims A. Lampe's Procedural Rights
Lampe's due process claims against the defendants are built upon the premise that the RCA program was equivalent, for constitutional purposes, to parole. Lampe argues that he was therefore entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Under Morrissey, a parolee charged with a violation that may result in revocation is entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing before an impartial decision-maker. Id. at 485-87. The parolee is then entitled to a final hearing for which the minimum requirements of due process include "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole." Id. at 488-89. In some circumstances, the parolee may also be entitled to assistance of counsel. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-90 (1973) (declining to adopt bright-line rule on right to counsel for revocation of parole and/or probation).When a prison disciplinary proceeding results in a deprivation of liberty, such as a loss of earned credit time, the federal Constitution also imposes procedural requirements, but they are not as extensive as those that apply to parole revocation. The requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings include (1) advance written notice of the claimed violation; (2) a written statement of the fact-finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) a qualified right to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence in his defense; and (4) a right to an impartial decision-maker. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563, 566-67, 571 (1974); accord, e.g., Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court established a fifth due process requirement for prison disciplinary proceedings that revoke good time credits, which is that the decision must be supported by at least "some evidence." 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
The record in this shows that defendants complied with the requirements of Wolff and Hill. Lampe received advance written notice of the claimed violation, and he was notified of his (qualified) rights to call witnesses and to present evidence on his behalf. He chose to plead guilty to the charged violation, which is amply supported by the evidence, and he received a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. There is no credible evidence that the decision-makers were not impartial. Lampe's own admissions provide more than "some evidence" supporting the finding of guilt.
Defendants argue that Lampe was on RCA, not on parole, so that the procedural requirements for revocation of parole under Morrissey did not apply.
Defendants argue that RCA was a "minimum security" assignment within DOC, so that the procedural requirements relevant to prison disciplinary actions applied.
The requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment are a matter of federal, not state law. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980) (federal due process governed procedures applicable to transferring prisoner to mental hospital). As a result, defendants' efforts to distinguish Indiana's now-defunct RCA program from the parole status at issue in Morrissey are not persuasive.
The minimum requirements of procedural due process in any given set of circumstances "are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action." Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491 (holding that state's procedures for transferring prisoner to mental hospital were constitutionally inadequate); accord, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that state's procedures for revocation of good time credits were constitutionally inadequate); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that state's procedures for revocation of probation were constitutionally inadequate); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that state's procedures for revocation of parole were constitutionally inadequate).
In 1997, more than two years before defendants revoked Lampe's earned credit time, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a remarkably similar argument. In Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997), the issue was whether the Morrissey requirements applied when the state of Nebraska re-imprisoned a state prisoner who had been on "pre-parole." Although there were some slight differences between parole and pre-parole status, the Supreme Court held that the "pre-parolee" had a liberty interest that could not be distinguished from a parolee's interest for purposes of applying the requirements of due process under Morrissey.
Much like RCA participants in Indiana, the pre-parolee in Young could live and work in the community, was required to report weekly to a state official, and was required to abide by various conditions and limits on his behavior and travel.
See 520 U.S. at 149-50, 152. Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Supreme Court, found that Nebraska's pre-parole program "differed from parole in name alone," so that the requirements of Morrissey applied when an offender was returned to prison. Id. at 145.
In light of Young v. Harper, Indiana's RCA program was not distinguishable from parole for purposes of determining the applicable constitutional requirements of due process. There is no substantive difference between parole in Morrissey or Indiana law, on one hand, and RCA on the other hand, that would justify different due process guarantees. Both parole and RCA permitted the offender to live and seek employment in the community. See Ex. 5; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(1). Both programs required the offender to perform certain tasks, such as register with the Parole Services Department and report periodically to a parole officer. See Ex. 5; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(9). DOC's Parole Services Department supervised both parole and RCA assignees. See Ex. 5. Both programs also required that the offender avoid certain conduct, such as engaging in criminal conduct or possessing a firearm. See Ex. 5; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(8). An offender in either program should have understood that failing to meet such conditions might result in re-imprisonment. See Ex. 5; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3).
An Indiana court has also described RCA as "a form of parole," Hornaday v. State, 639 N.E.2d 303, 305 n. 2 (Ind.App. 1994), although the description was not essential to the court's decision.
Although the deprivation of Lampe's liberty was subject to the procedural requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer, his due process claims fail on the merits, as a result of his guilty plea, and under the doctrine of absolute immunity.
B. The Merits
First, the record shows that even though the defendants called themselves a conduct adjustment board, they substantially complied with the parole revocation procedural requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer, and any failure to comply with those more extensive requirements was harmless. Lampe received a reasonably prompt hearing, approximately one week after he arrived at a DOC facility. Rather than having two separate hearings, he had one prompt hearing, which fulfilled the purpose of Morrissey. He received notice of the claimed violation. Even if that notice was only oral and not written, the CAB members were not responsible for the screening, and Lampe has not challenged the adequacy of that notice. Lampe also was told that he had the (qualified) right to present witnesses and evidence, and that he had the right to appear and to be heard in person. He appeared before a neutral and detached hearing body.
(Despite his accusations, he has not shown that the defendants were biased against him.) He also received a written statement by the CAB as to the evidence relied upon and the CAB's reasons for imposing the chosen punishment.
The record does not show that Lampe was told that he had a qualified right to confront witnesses against him. That omission was harmless in this case, however. The only witnesses against Lampe could have been the parole agent to whom Lampe failed to report as required, and perhaps one or more witnesses who would have testified that Lampe was present in the State of Florida between 1984 and his arrest on July 9, 1999. There simply is no dispute about those facts. Lampe has not identified anything that he would have done differently if he had been told that he had a right to confront witnesses against him. The court sees no basis for expecting that a confrontation with any witness would have affected the outcome of the proceeding.
Lampe was not told that he had any right to an attorney, nor was he given access to an attorney. In fact, Lampe probably did not have a right to an attorney, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court rejected a blanket rule requiring that parolees be given the right to an attorney in revocation proceedings. Instead, the Court opted for a case-by-case approach, teaching that there will be some cases in which fundamental fairness will require that counsel be provided. 411 U.S. at 790. The Court explained:
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.411 U.S. at 790-91.
In Lampe's case, the facts supporting the violation have always been uncontested. Lampe's explanation for his decision to depart secretly from Indiana — fear that he would harm his ex-wife in response to friction between them — offers no serious grounds for mitigation. An attorney presumably would have argued that Lampe's apparently clean record for 15 years in Florida should have weighed in his favor. It is highly unlikely, though, that even the most brilliant advocate could have convinced the responsible authorities not to require Lampe to finish his original sentence, plus at least a relatively modest additional punishment for violating the terms of a program that offered him early release from prison. There also is no reason to expect that Lampe was unable to speak effectively for himself.
Because the Supreme Court decided Young two years before the defendants decided Lampe's case, the defense of qualified immunity is not available to them based on the difference between parole revocation and prison discipline. At least from the objective viewpoint that applies to qualified immunity, the law was well-established in 1999 that someone in Lampe's position was entitled to the protections of Morrissey v. Brewer. But in light of the Supreme Court's case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in parole revocation, the law was not well-established in 1999 that Lampe had the right to counsel under these circumstances. If he had such a right, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any deprivation of that right under these circumstances.
From a practical standpoint, it is easy to understand how the defendants came to apply prison disciplinary procedures. Because Lampe had remained a fugitive for over fifteen years, DOC had little institutional memory about handling issues under the defunct RCA program. Before Young was decided, it would not have been unreasonable for DOC officials to expect they might be able to apply prison disciplinary procedures. And because the RCA program was defunct, it is easy to imagine how the implications of Young for the RCA program might have escaped the notice of DOC officials.
C. Guilty Plea as Waiver
Defendants argue that Lampe's guilty plea to the charge of escape before the CAB precludes him from raising any objection to the proceeding. Generally, "when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, `he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.'" Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29-30 (1974), quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). However, a defendant can challenge the resulting conviction by showing that the guilty plea was not voluntary or knowing. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). If the plea is not voluntary and knowing, it violates due process and is void. See United States v. Gilliam, 255 F.3d 428, 433 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Parker, 245 F.3d 974, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2001) (defendant may withdraw plea made involuntarily and unknowingly).A plea is not knowing unless the defendant receives "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In examining whether a plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, the court examines the circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether the defendant was informed of his rights and understood the consequences of his plea. Gilliam, 255 F.3d at 433.
At the summary judgment stage of this case, the court found there was a serious question under Indiana law whether Lampe's departure from the state without permission and his failure to report to the parole officer could support the escape charge against him. At trial the defendants came forward with evidence of DOC regulations defining offenses. Among the most serious "Class A" offenses is escape, which is defined as "intentionally fleeing from lawful detention or knowingly or intentionally failing to return to lawful detention following temporary leave or other authorized absence granted for a specific purpose or time period." Ex. 32. Lampe argues that he was not in "detention" because he was not confined in a jail or prison. In the RCA program, however, he was still in a form of state custody that restricted his liberty and movement.
The defendants also offered evidence showing that prior similar RCA violations had been treated the same way that Lampe's was, by treating it as a DOC disciplinary matter before a CAB. Tr. 164; Ex. 40 at page 5.5. In light of this evidence, the court concludes that there was no legal obstacle to defendants' decision to treat Lampe's departure from Indiana as escape for purposes of DOC discipline. Whether Lampe's departure from the RCA program would have qualified as the crime of escape under the state's criminal code does not matter for these purposes.
Accordingly, the court concludes that Lampe's plea of guilty to the charge of escape was a knowing and voluntary decision on his part. The evidence at trial showed that he had been properly screened, and he was informed that he could be imprisoned with a loss of earned credit time. His plea of guilty bars his due process claims arising from the punishment he received.
D. Immunity Defenses
At trial, defendants argued for the first time that they were protected by absolute immunity applicable to parole boards. The Seventh Circuit has long held that parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity for the exercise of their powers in parole revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996); Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1183-84 (7th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has not directly decided the question but has indicated its general agreement. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985) (holding that prison disciplinary board members are entitled to only qualified immunity, and distinguishing parole board members in this regard).
In a similar due process case involving revocation of an inmate's early release, Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1442 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit expressed "concern" about the district court's failure to address the defendants' claims of absolute and qualified immunity before trial. In this case, however, the defendants pled absolute immunity in their answer but did not present the defense by motion until after plaintiff had presented his evidence at trial.
Plaintiff Lampe argues to the contrary that these defendants called themselves a Conduct Adjustment Board and should therefore be limited to qualified immunity based on the direct holding of Cleavinger v. Saxner and the policy considerations that supported that holding.
Defendants rely upon the "functional" approach followed by the Seventh Circuit in Wilson, Walrath, and Thompson to pin plaintiff on the horns of a dilemma. The first horn is that if Lampe's status was properly subject to the procedures applicable to a prison disciplinary board, like the CAB here, then his rights were not violated at all. The second horn is that, if Lampe was on "parole" for purposes of the federal Constitution, so that he was entitled to the more extensive protections of Morrissey v. Brewer, then the defendants were performing the "function" of a parole board in a revocation proceeding, such that absolute immunity applies. Either way, the defendants win.
The question is close, but the court agrees with defendants that the second horn of the dilemma applies here. Under Young, the defendants were deciding whether to revoke Lampe's parole. The functional approach in Wilson, Walrath, and Thompson focuses on the function carried out by the defendants. In this case, these defendants were assigned by the State of Indiana to decide whether to deprive Lampe of his liberty for his violation of the terms of the RCA program.
For purposes of the federal Constitution, they were being asked in substance to decide whether to revoke what amounted to parole. Even if they were not the Indiana Parole Board itself, they were carrying out its function. Under Wilson, Walrath, and Thompson, therefore, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity on Lampe's federal claims.
The court recognizes that this conclusion would be sufficient by itself to resolve the federal claims. The court has addressed the issue last, after addressing the merits of plaintiff's claims, because absolute immunity is a close question in this unusual case and because defendants raised the issue so late.
II. State Law Claims
Plaintiff Lampe also claims that defendants committed the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment.Under Indiana law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof that the defendant: (1) engaged in "extreme and outrageous" conduct that (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) caused (4) severe emotional distress to another. Creel v. I.C.E. Associates, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1276, 1282 (Ind.App. 2002), citing Bradley v. Hall, 720 N.E.2d 747, 752 (Ind.App. 1999). The requirements for proving this tort are "rigorous." Creel, 771 N.E.2d at 1282, quoting Ledbetter v. Ross, 725 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Ind.App. 2000). "[T]he conduct at issue must exceed all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society and cause mental distress of a very serious kind." Creel, 771 N.E.2d at 1282, citing Ledbetter, 725 N.E.2d at 123-24.
Plaintiff has not shown that defendants engaged in any conduct that comes remotely close to satisfying this rigorous standard. The evidence shows at most that the defendants dug out old standard operating procedures for a defunct program, and those procedures instructed them incorrectly to use the procedural requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings rather than those for parole revocation. There is no evidence of harm to Lampe. The court does not doubt that Lampe endured distress from the whole experience, but the experience and the distress were caused by his decision in 1984 to violate the terms of the RCA program and to become a fugitive for fifteen years, and not by any actions the defendants took.
Lampe's claim for false imprisonment also fails on the merits. The tort of false imprisonment is defined as the unlawful detention of a person against his or her will. Lazarus Department Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Ind.App. 1989). In light of Lampe's admitted violation of the terms of RCA, the punishment he was given was lawful and justified under state law as well as federal constitutional law. The length of imprisonment he actually experienced was legally permissible, and was shorter than likely would have occurred if Lampe had been brought before the Indiana Parole Board, as he now claims should have occurred.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will enter final judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff Robert Lampe.
So ordered.