Opinion
No. 32943.
January 17, 1938. Suggestion of Error Overruled March 14, 1938.
1. TAXATION.
Where chancery clerk in obedience to statute sends required notice of tax sale by registered mail to lienor, whether lienor receives it or not is of no consequence as respects validity of sale (Code 1930, sections 3259-3262).
2. TAXATION.
Where chancery clerk's notation on record of mailing of notice of tax sale to lienor failed to set forth that notice was sent by registered mail as required by statute, failure to comply with statute rendered tax title void as to that lienor (Code 1930, sections 3259-3262).
APPEAL from the chancery court of Harrison county. HON. D.M. RUSSELL, Chancellor.
Wells, Wells Lipscomb and L.O. Smith, Jr., all of Jackson, for appellant.
We submit that the statutes applicable to the assessment of property for taxes, the levy of taxes, and the sale of property for the collection of delinquent taxes are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayers. Such a rule is just, equitable, and reasonable, since jurisdiction of the taxpayer is acquired by the board of supervisors by publication without personal service of summons when the assessment on property is adopted and made final and notice by publication is given of the sale of property for the collection of taxes. It is a harsh and summary method for collection of taxes and the statutes applicable to the procedure should receive strict interpretation.
Hopkins v. Sandige, 31 Miss. 668; Dunbar v. Interior Lbr. Co., 59 So. 852; Rainey v. Lamb Hardwood Lbr. Co., 45 So. 367.
Notice to the public of the equalization meeting in compliance with Section 3162 of the Mississippi Code was not given by the board of supervisors of Harrison County, Mississippi.
Sec. 3162, Code of 1930; Cameron v. Whittington, 82 So. 311, 120 Miss. 595; Smythe v. Whitehead, 97 So. 529, 133 Miss. 184; Burns v. Burns, 97 So. 814, 133 Miss. 485; McCoy v. Watson, 122 So. 368, 154 Miss. 307; Bustamente v. Bescher-Schultz Co., 43 Miss. 172; Glenn v. Wragg, 41 Miss. 654; Ponder v. Martin, 80 So. 388; Moore v. Summerville, 31 So. 793; Diggs v. Ingersoll, 28 So. 825; Sec. 1596, Code of 1930.
The board of supervisors of Harrison County was not legally in session on August 22, 1930, September 30, 1930, and August 18, 1932, when it attempted to adopt orders with regard to the assessing of the property for taxes and the sale of same for the collection of the alleged taxes.
Sections 202, 203, 3165, Code of 1930; Words and Phrases (1st Series), page 192; Smith v. Nelson, 57 Miss. 138; Tierney v. Brown, 6 So. 737; Davis v. Grice, 106 So. 631, 141 Miss. 412; City of Grenada v. Grenada County, 150 So. 657, 167 Miss. 814; Crump v. Bd. of Suprs., 52 Miss. 107; Marathon Lbr. Co. v. State,
139 Miss. 125, 103 So. 798; Palmer v. State, 20 So. 156, 73 Miss. 780; Williams v. Simon, 99 So. 433, 135 Miss. 562.
Notice of maturity of tax sales, as required by Section 3259 of the Code of 1930, was not given the Lamar Life Insurance Company.
Billups v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 169 So. 32, 175 Miss. 771; Sections 3259, 3261, Code of 1930.
The only evidence that might be offered of the mailing of the notice is the tax sale book and in fact it was the only evidence offered on behalf of appellee that notice by registered mail was given the Lamar Life Insurance Company as provided by Section 3259 of the Mississippi Code of 1930 and the notation shows that notice was not given as provided by statute.
Roebuck v. Bailey, 166 So. 359, 176 Miss. 234.
Gardner Backstrom, of Gulfport, for appellee.
We admit that the general rule is that revenue statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the purchaser at a tax sale. However, it nowhere appears in this record that any of the revenue statutes were not strictly and literally complied with.
In view of Section 3144 of the Code of 1930, there can be no merit in the contention that the taxpayer should be given notice by publication or otherwise that in those years when land is required to be assessed that such assessment will be operative for the following year. The statute fixes that status, and from the time when the memory of man has not run to the contrary it has been the law of this state that all persons, taxpayers or others, were charged with knowledge of the general statute laws of the state. Section 3162 of the Code of 1930, does not require that the land assessment roll is operative for the year in which it is made and for the following year. All persons are charged with notice of that fact, and a publication of that fact could neither afford them protection nor burden them with an added responsibility.
The notice in the case at bar is in exactly the same form and words as has been twice before this court and has been twice adjudged sufficient in form by this court.
State v. Wyoming Mfg. Co., 138 Miss. 249, 103 So. 11; Rawlings v. Ladner, 174 Miss. 611, 165 So. 427.
We lay down the simple proposition that if the August, 1930, and August, 1932, terms of the board of supervisors of Harrison County, Mississippi, were authorized to continue in session up to the first day of the next intervening terms, under the statutes designating these meetings as meetings for the transaction of business under the revenue law, the orders in question were entered when the board of supervisors was in legal session.
Davis v. Grice, 141 Miss. 412, 106 So. 631.
The special meeting and the recessed special meeting were held in strict compliance with the provisions of said section 3178, and no objection to defendant's assessment can be predicated thereon.
We say without fear of successful contradiction that the record in the case at bar reflects an instance where the taxing authorities observed every requirement of the law for the assessment and sale of the land in question with a scrupulous exactness which all local taxing authorities may well follow.
Defendant's last contention is that the sale is void as to it for the reason that the clerk's notation on the margin of the record of the tax sale in question does not show that the notice of the approaching maturity of said tax sale was sent to it by "registered" mail, although no contention is made that it was not so sent. It is neither denied nor proved that such notice was not sent by registered mail nor that it was not received by the defendant. The argument appears to be that the statute requires that the notation itself upon the margin of the record should show that it was sent by registered mail, and that if the marginal notation does not so show, the sale was and is void as to the lienor whether the notice was so sent or not. The statute does not so provide.
Section 3261, Code of 1930.
The clerk's notation is certainly a full compliance with the requirements of the statute.
Alvis v. Hicks, 150 Miss. 306, 116 So. 612.
It is not charged in the answer, nor did the defendant attempt to show, that the statutory notice had not been sent to it by registered mail.
Section 1578, Code of 1930; Wheeler v. Ligon, 62 Miss. 560; Mitchell v. Tubb, 107 Miss. 221, 65 So. 216; Hawkins v. Mangum, 78 Miss. 97, 28 So. 872.
The clerk of the chancery court of Harrison County, Mississippi, must be presumed to have sent the statutory notice of the approaching maturity of the tax sale in question to the Lamar Life Insurance Company, at Jackson, Mississippi, its post office address, by registered mail, unless and until the contrary is shown, and it has not been shown in this case.
Argued orally by L.O. Smith, Jr., for appellant and by Oscar Backstrom, for appellee.
George W. Billups exhibited an original bill of complaint against the appellant and others, alleging that he had purchased a lot in the city of Biloxi at a sale for taxes thereon, and that the appellant claimed title thereto. The prayer of the bill was for the quieting of the complainant's title and the cancellation of the title claimed by the appellant. After the filing of the bill of complaint, Billups sold the land to the appellee. The appellant answered the bill, alleged that the claimed tax title to the lot was void, and that it, the appellant, owned the lot. The decree was in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and as the appellant was in possession of the lot, process was awarded the appellee for dispossessing the appellant and putting the appellee in possession.
On August 1, 1930, the then owners of the land executed a deed of trust thereon to the appellant to secure an indebtedness due by the grantors to it. This deed of trust was foreclosed in February, 1935, and the appellant purchased the land at the foreclosure sale. The state and county taxes on the land for the year 1931 were not paid, and it was sold therefor on September 19, 1932, to George W. Billups, to whose title the appellee has succeeded.
The appellant says that the appellee's tax title is void for several reasons. But the conclusion we have reached as to one of them renders it unnecessary for us to discuss the others.
The one for discussion is this: Did the chancery clerk fail to comply with the requirements of sections 3259, 3260, and 3261, Code 1930? If he did so fail, the tax title is void.
These sections provide:
"3259. It shall be the duty of said clerk of the chancery court to examine the record of deeds, mortgages and deeds of trust in his office for a period of six years prior to the date of sale to ascertain the names and addresses of all mortgagees, beneficiaries and holders of vendors liens of all lands sold for taxes, and shall, within the time fixed by law for notifying owners, send by registered mail to all such lienors so shown of record the following notice, to-wit: [form of notice omitted]."
"3260. The notice shall be mailed to said lienors, if any, to the post-office address of the lienors, if such address is set forth in the instrument creating the lien, otherwise to the post-office address of said lienors, if actually known to the clerk, and if unknown to the clerk then addressed to the county site of the said county."
"3261. Upon completing the examination for said liens, the clerk shall enter upon the tax sale book upon the page showing the sale a notation to the effect that such examination had been made, giving the names and addresses, if known, of said lienors, the book and page where the liens are created, and the date of mailing by registered mail the notice to the lienors. If the clerk find no liens of record he shall so certify on said tax sale book. In each instance the clerk shall date the certificate and sign his name thereto."
Section 3262, Code 1930, provides that "a failure to give the required notice to such lienors, shall render the tax title void as to such lienors, and as to them only."
The notation made by the clerk on the record was as follows: "Examination by me made as to lienors of land herein sold, and notice required by law mailed to Lamar Life Insurance Company, and L.B. Jones, Trustee, Jackson, Miss., lienors as per d/t recorded Book 77, page 283. This the 10 day of July, 1934. Eustis McManus, Clerk." This notation, it will be observed, fails to set forth that the notice was sent to the appellant, The Lamar Life Insurance Company, "by registered mail." The appellee says this omission is of no consequence for two reasons: (1) The certificate sets forth that the notice was mailed to the Lamar Life Insurance Company, and that it was mailed in the manner provided by the statute will be presumed; and (2) that if the Lamar Life Insurance Company actually received notice, whether it was forwarded by registered mail is immaterial, as this record does not disclose that the notice was not actually received, and its receipt will be presumed until the contrary appears.
Neither of the invoked presumptions is here applicable. The statute expressly provides what the clerk shall do and what the evidence thereof shall be. When a chancery clerk, in obedience to this statute, sends the required notice by registered mail, whether the lienor receives it or not is of no consequence, for the statute will have been complied with. The fact that the notice was forwarded by registered mail is not permitted by the statute to rest in parol, but must appear from the notation thereof by the chancery clerk on the record, and unless this notation is made, the fact, in legal contemplation, does not exist. Ita lex scripta est.
The decree of the court below will be reversed, and the bill of complaint will be dismissed.
So ordered.