Opinion
Case No. 2:21-cv-02313-FLA (ASx)
2022-07-20
Glenn LAIRD, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TEACHERS LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.
Timothy R. Snowball, Elena Marie Ives, Shella Sadovnik ALCabes, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiff. Ira Lawrence Gottlieb, Lisa C. Demidovich, Bush Gottlieb ALC, Glendale, CA, P. Casey Pitts, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant United Teachers Los Angeles. Barrett K. Green, Littler Mendelson PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District. Kristin A. Liska, CAAG - Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant Rob Bonta.
Timothy R. Snowball, Elena Marie Ives, Shella Sadovnik ALCabes, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiff.
Ira Lawrence Gottlieb, Lisa C. Demidovich, Bush Gottlieb ALC, Glendale, CA, P. Casey Pitts, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant United Teachers Los Angeles.
Barrett K. Green, Littler Mendelson PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District.
Kristin A. Liska, CAAG - Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant Rob Bonta.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS [DKTS. 27, 28, 31]
FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA, United States District Judge
RULING
Before the court is Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District's (the "District") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 27) ("District Motion"), Defendant United Teachers Los Angeles’ ("UTLA") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 28) ("UTLA Motion"), and Defendant Attorney General Rob Bonta's ("Attorney General") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 31) ("Attorney General Motion") (collectively, the "Motions"). On August 5, 2021, the court found this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for August 6, 2021. Dkt. 37; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) ; Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions.
The court refers to page numbers of docket entries according to the page numbers assigned by the court's CM/ECF header.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Glenn Laird ("Plaintiff" or "Laird") is a high school teacher. Dkt. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 4. When Plaintiff began teaching in 1983, he became a dues paying member of UTLA. Id. ¶ 13. Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code § 45060, the District deducts union membership dues from an employee's paycheck by the amount requested in a revocable written authorization by the employee. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. An employee may terminate the deduction of dues from his paycheck "in writing and [the revocation] shall be effective provided the revocation complies with the terms of the written authorization." Id. ¶ 42 (quoting Cal. Educ. Code § 45060 ). In addition, the collective bargaining agreement between the District and UTLA provides "[t]he District shall deduct UTLA dues from the salary of each employee who has submitted a written authorization. Such an authorization shall continue in effect unless revoked in writing by the employee." Id. ¶ 43.
For purposes of the subject Motions, the court treats the following factual allegations of the Complaint as true. See Wilson v. Hewlett–Packard Co. , 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). Legal conclusions, however, "are not entitled to the assumption of truth" and "must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
On February 11, 2018, Plaintiff completed a new UTLA Membership Authorization ("Membership Authorization") which contained the following language:
This agreement to pay dues shall remain in effect and shall be irrevocable unless I revoke it by sending written notice via U.S. mail to UTLA during the period not less than thirty (30) days and not more than sixty (60) days before the annual anniversary date of this agreement or as otherwise required by law. This agreement shall be automatically renewed from year to year unless I revoke it in writing during the window period, irrespective of my membership in UTLA."
Id. ¶ 51; Dkt. 1-2 (id. , Ex. B). Although Plaintiff signed the Membership Authorization, he crossed out the following language: "during the period not less than thirty (30) days and not more than sixty (60) days before the annual anniversary date of this agreement or as otherwise required by law." Id.
During his teaching career, Plaintiff experienced multiple incidents of on-campus violence. Id. ¶ 18. As a result of these incidents, Plaintiff supported the presence of on-campus police officers. Id. ¶ 30. In 2020, Plaintiff saw several communications from UTLA that advocated removing police officers from campus and contained rhetoric accusing police of being murderers and a force for evil in society. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. As a result of his experiences with violence and opposition to the removal on-campus police, Plaintiff decided to terminate his UTLA membership and stop paying dues. Id. ¶ 39.
On June 12, 2020, Plaintiff sent UTLA a letter terminating his UTLA membership and instructing UTLA to end his dues authorization with the District. Id. ¶ 55. On June 23, 2020, UTLA responded with a letter stating it would not honor Plaintiff's request to terminate the dues payments because the request was received outside of the open period. Id. at ¶ 57; Dkt 1-3 (id. , Ex. C). UTLA did not instruct the District to stop deducting dues as Plaintiff had requested, and the District continued to deduct the membership dues from Plaintiff's paycheck. Compl. ¶ 62.
On July 7, 2020, Plaintiff sent UTLA a second letter, reaffirming that he wanted to end his membership and instructing UTLA to end his dues authorization with the District immediately. Id. ¶ 63; Dkt. 1-4 (id. , Ex. D). UTLA again refused to honor Plaintiff's request to terminate dues payments on the grounds that Plaintiff's request was received outside of the open period. Compl. ¶ 64; Dkt. 1-5 (id. , Ex. E). In August 2020, Plaintiff contacted the District regarding the issue, but it referred him back to UTLA. Compl. ¶¶ 65-67. On December 14, 2020, during the open period, Plaintiff sent a third letter to UTLA reiterating his request. Id. ¶ 70; Dkt. 1-7 (id. , Ex. G). Following the receipt of Plaintiff's third letter, UTLA honored Plaintiff's request to end his membership and dues deductions. Compl. ¶¶ 71-72; Dkt. 1-8 (id. , Ex. H). UTLA informed Plaintiff that dues would be deducted from his paycheck for the month of January 2021, but that the money would be returned to him at some unspecified date. Compl. ¶ 72. According to Plaintiff, he has not received the $89.54 in dues deducted from his January paycheck. Id. ¶¶ 72-74.
On March 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action, asserting three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983"), for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. See generally Compl. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)"). Dkts. 27, 28, 31.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [of federal courts’] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction "can be either facial, confining the inquiry to allegations in the complaint, or factual, permitting the court to look beyond the complaint." Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. , 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, when considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review evidence, such as declarations and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States , 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv. , 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of claims asserted in a complaint. Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery , 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). A district court properly dismisses a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts "to support a cognizable legal theory." Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp , 824 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (internal citations omitted). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ " Ebner v. Fresh, Inc. , 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
When evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must accept all well-pleaded material facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Caltex , 824 F.3d at 1159. Legal conclusions, however, "are not entitled to the assumption of truth" and "must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court must normally convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment if it considers evidence outside the pleadings. United States v. Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id.
II. Analysis
A. Standing and Plaintiff's Claims for Prospective Relief
Article III of the Constitution requires courts to adjudicate only actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a ‘case or controversy,’ and an Article III federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit." Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush , 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004). "Standing is determined by the facts that exist at the time the complaint is filed." Clark v. City of Lakewood , 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show he "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). A plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element at the pleading stage. Id.
"For injunctive relief, which is a prospective remedy, the threat of injury must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). "[T]he threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact and allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient." Id. (quotations omitted, emphasis in original). " ‘[S]ome day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury" required to establish standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). " ‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’ " Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ). A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief based on a past injury must show that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of the prior injury to establish standing, regardless of whether the injunction contemplates intrusive structural relief or the cessation of a discrete practice. Lyons , 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660 ; Gest v. Bradbury , 443 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]here ... [plaintiffs] seek declaratory and injunctive relief, they must demonstrate that they are ‘realistically threatened by a repetition of the violation.’ " (emphasis in original)).
Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue declaratory or injunctive relief, which are forms of prospective relief, because he has already resigned his union membership and the challenged conduct, the deduction of union dues from his paycheck from June 2020 to January 2021, ended before he filed his Complaint. District Mot. 8; UTLA Mot. 11-13; Attorney General Mot. 10-12 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 70-74). Defendants further note that Plaintiff has not pleaded any other future injury he might suffer, that would merit injunctive or declaratory relief. Defendants, thus, contend Plaintiff is no longer subject to the statutory regime he challenges and lacks standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. UTLA Mot. 12-13; Attorney General Mot. 11-12.
Plaintiff counters he has standing because he is eager to rejoin UTLA, "[b]ut for UTLA's continuing position calling to ‘defund the police,’ " and plans to immediately rejoin the union "when possible." Dkt. 34 ("Opp.") at 35-36. According to Plaintiff, unless he is granted declaratory and injunctive relief by the court, he will be put into a position to suffer an imminent threat to his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights once he rejoins UTLA. Id. at 36; Dkt. 34-1 ("Laird Decl.") ¶ 15. The court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff fails to identify an injury that is actual and imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
As an initial matter, the Complaint does not contain any allegations of future injury. See generally Compl. As stated, "[s]tanding is determined by the facts that exist at the time the complaint is filed," Clark , 259 F.3d at 1006, and a plaintiff must clearly allege sufficient facts to establish standing, Spokeo , 578 U.S. at 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540. While Plaintiff argues in his Opposition that he intends to rejoin UTLA "when possible," the Complaint does not plead any facts regarding any intent to rejoin the UTLA in the future, let alone any facts to suggest he intends to rejoin if concrete and specific events occur. See generally Compl. Plaintiff does not assert he has concrete plans to rejoin UTLA within a specific period of time or based upon a specific set of events, and states only that "he greatly desires to rejoin UTLA" but cannot because of "UTLA's continuing position calling to ‘defund the police.’ " Opp. 35-36. Plaintiff's stated intent to rejoin UTLA, "when possible," is conditional and entirely speculative, and insufficient to support a finding of actual and imminent future harm.
Further, although Plaintiff argues he is afraid his "First Amendment rights ... will be put in jeopardy" when he rejoins, if injunctive relief is denied, his stated condition predicate to rejoining the UTLA is entirely disconnected from the constitutional violation alleged in this action. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff's Complaint is premised on the theory that his wages were wrongfully taken from him as a result of UTLA's failure to honor the terms of the Membership Authorization in which Plaintiff struck certain language pertaining to the open period. See generally Compl. Plaintiff does not argue that he would be subject to the same Membership Authorization if he were to rejoin UTLA, or that UTLA would accept a future attempt by Plaintiff to strike provisions regarding the open period, thus he has not alleged a risk that he would be harmed in the same way. Accordingly, Plaintiff's stated conditional intent is too speculative and hypothetical to constitute a realistic threat of future injury. See Davidson , 889 F.3d at 967.
In Davidson , 889 F.3d at 969-70, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a previously deceived plaintiff consumer may be able to establish threat of future harm by plausibly alleging she was prevented from purchasing the defendant's product in the future, although she would like to, because she was unable to rely on the allegedly false or misleading advertising at issue. In such circumstances, a plaintiff's alleged inability to purchase a product would constitute a concrete threat of future harm sufficient to establish standing, since grant of the relief requested (an injunction against engaging in the allegedly false and misleading advertising) would satisfy the plaintiff's stated condition and allow her to purchase the product in the future. See id. Here, unlike Davidson , a grant of the declaratory and injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff (regarding terminating deduction of union dues) would alone be insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff's stated conditions for him to rejoin UTLA, since he would still be unwilling to rejoin UTLA while it maintained its alleged position regarding the police. Thus, Plaintiff does not face a realistic threat of actual or imminent repeated injury, and his claims only rise to a possible future injury. See Lyons , 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660 ; Davidson , 889 F.3d at 969.
Having found the Complaint fails to allege future harm, the court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of Article III standing.
B. The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend XI. Although its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one State by citizens of another State or foreign state, courts have long recognized that the Eleventh Amendment also bars suits brought against a State by its own citizens, under principles of sovereign immunity. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666, 669-70, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). While this immunity from suit is not absolute, the Supreme Court has recognized only two circumstances in which an individual may sue a State:
First, Congress may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment – an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance. Second, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.
Id. at 670, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (citations omitted).
When a suit is brought against state officials, the question arises as to whether it is actually a suit against the State itself. In general, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state officials when the State is the real, substantial party in interest, where the relief sought nominally against the officials would operate against the State. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). "[A]s when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether the suit seeks damages or injunctive relief." Id. at 101-02, 104 S.Ct. 900.
In Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action under the United States Constitution does not constitute a suit against the State, and is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because "an unconstitutional enactment is ‘void’ and therefore does not ‘impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S.Ct. 900 (citing Young , 209 U.S. at 160, 28 S.Ct. 441 ). "[W]hen a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief." Id. at 102-03, 104 S.Ct. 900 (citing Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) ).
In contrast, Young is inapplicable to suits against state officials for violations of state law, as "a federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law." Id. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900.
1. Sovereign Immunity and the District
The District argues that Plaintiff's claims against it are barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. District Mot. 6-8. The court agrees.
Plaintiff does not address this argument in his Opposition, and thus concedes that his claims against LA Unified are barred.
"Under California law, [public] school districts are agents of the state that perform central governmental functions." Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. , 963 F.2d 248, 253 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, suits brought against "[a public school] district in its own name are subject to the same Eleventh Amendment constraints as suits against the state." Id. at 254. Although the Ex Parte Young doctrine provides an exception for actions against officials for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief, an action against a public school district in its own name, by definition, falls outside the scope of the exception. See In re Lazar , 237 F.3d 967, 976 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity inapposite where an action was brought "against the State Board, and not against the appropriate officers of the State Board").
Here, Plaintiff asserts claims against the District, which is an agent of the State, in its own name; thus, sovereign immunity applies. See Belanger , 963 F.2d at 253 ; In re Lazar , 237 F.3d at 976 n. 9. Plaintiff contends he is entitled to maintain his suit against the District to seek nominal damages, "[b]ecause sovereign immunity only applies to actual monetary payment sought from the state to provide actual compensation for measurable injuries." Opp. 34. The court disagrees.
In Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist. , 623 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit recognized that, absent a waiver, sovereign immunity bars suits seeking nominal damages against a public school district. While the Opposition cites legal authority that discusses nominal damages, Plaintiff does not actually cite any authority that supports his contention regarding sovereign immunity. See Opp. 34. Plaintiff's argument, thus, fails.
This point is discussed further below, as it applies to the Young exception to sovereign immunity, in the court's discussion of the Attorney General's Motion.
Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims against the District, without leave to amend.
2. Sovereign Immunity and the Attorney General
In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and nominal damages in addition to seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. See Compl. at Prayer. Because Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, as discussed above, only Plaintiff's claims for damages remain.
The Attorney General argues Plaintiff's remaining claims for damages, including any nominal damages, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Attorney General Mot. 12-13. Plaintiff acknowledges he cannot recover compensatory damages from the Attorney General, but argues he can seek nominal damages because such damages do not provide actual compensation. Opp. 34. The court disagrees. As Plaintiff acknowledges, nominal damages are a form of retrospective relief. See id. at 33 ("A request for nominal damages to redress a past constitutional injury has deep roots in the common law.") (collecting authority).
The Ex parte Young exception does not permit suits for retrospective relief. Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 105, 104 S.Ct. 900 ; Porter v. Jones , 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Supreme Court explained:
[T]he need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan , supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U.S. at 664, 94 S.Ct. 1347. But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," 415 U.S. at 667, 94 S.Ct. 1347, an award of retroactive relief necessarily " ‘[falls] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.’ " Id. , at 665, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman , 467 F.2d 226, 237 (C.A.2 1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921, 93 S.Ct. 1552, 36 L.Ed.2d 315 (1973) ). In sum, Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 105-06, 104 S.Ct. 900.
Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims for damages against the Attorney General. As Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims for prospective relief, as stated above, the court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims against the Attorney General in their entirety.
C. State Action and the Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Claims Against UTLA
"To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Although § 1983 makes liable only those who act under color of state law, even a private entity can, in certain circumstances, be subject to liability under section 1983." Id. at 1139 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Specifically, a plaintiff must show that ‘the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.’ " Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) ).
Courts apply a "two-prong framework for analyzing when governmental involvement in private action is itself sufficient in character and impact that the government fairly can be viewed as responsible for the harm of which the plaintiff complains." Ohno v. Yasuma , 723 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Lugar , 457 U.S. at 937-42, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ). First, the court "asks whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from ‘the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.’ " Id. Second, the court "determines whether the party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor." Id.
As to the first prong, Plaintiff argues the state action stems from "UTLA's seizure and use of Mr. Laird's lawfully earned wages without his affirmative consent," which Plaintiff contends was government seizure of money pursuant to a state-created "system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte application of one party." Opp. 19 (citing Lugar , 457 U.S. at 942, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ). According to Plaintiff, the "source of the alleged constitutional harm" was "UTLA's statutory authority to represent that Mr. Laird had waived his First Amendment rights based upon non-existent contractual provisions," which Plaintiff contends is a "right or privilege created by the state." Id. at 19-20 (citing Compl. ¶ 5).
UTLA responds that the conduct alleged does not constitute state action because "Plaintiff ignores the conditions placed by California upon the alleged ‘right or privilege’ at issue here: California law permitted UTLA to request deductions from Plaintiff's pay only if he had affirmatively authorized the deductions via a signed authorization that had not been revoked in a manner that ‘complie[d] with the terms of the written authorization.’ " Dkt. 35 ("UTLA Reply") at 8-9. According to UTLA, "Plaintiff's claims are premised on his contention that UTLA acted in a manner contrary to this state law—i.e., that UTLA continued to request deductions from Plaintiff's pay even after he ‘effectively ended his membership and revoked his dues deduction authorization pursuant to the terms of his agreement with UTLA.’ " Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). UTLA cites Lugar , 457 U.S. at 940, 102 S.Ct. 2744, to argue that "private-party conduct contrary to state policy cannot be deemed conduct undertaken pursuant to a state-created right or privilege for the purposes of Section 1983." Id. The court agrees with UTLA.
In Lugar , 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744, the Supreme Court recognized that the " ‘private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State.’ " See also id. at 940, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (holding plaintiff's claim for deprivation of property resulting from defendants’ "malicious, wanton, willful, oppressive [sic], [and] unlawful acts," cannot be attributed to a state rule or state action, as "the conduct of which [plaintiff] complained could not be ascribed to any governmental decision; rather, [defendants] were acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State."); Zielinski v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Loc. 503 , 499 F. Supp. 3d 804, 809 (D. Or. 2020) (finding no state action where the plaintiff's "claimed constitutional harm stem[med] from [the union] forging Plaintiff's signature on the agreements and authorizing dues deductions without his consent"); Mendez v. Cal. Tchrs. Ass'n , 419 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ("To the extent plaintiffs allege that the Union defendants misinformed them about their legal obligations to join the union or pay membership dues, their claims would be against the Union defendants under state law."), aff'd , 854 F. App'x 920 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Loc. 503 , ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 764, 211 L.Ed.2d 478 (2022).
Cal. Educ. Code § 45060(a) provides for the deduction of union dues only upon written authorization by the employee. Subdivision (c) states: "[t]he revocable written authorization shall remain in effect until expressly revoked in writing by the employee, pursuant to the terms of the written authorization." Here, Plaintiff alleges UTLA failed to instruct the District to stop deducting union dues from his pay after he made a valid request to revoke his membership and authorization pursuant to the terms of his Membership Authorization. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 62. Thus, in alleging that UTLA refused to honor his valid written revocation of authorization, Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, Plaintiff alleges that UTLA was "acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State," which only permits the deduction of union dues pursuant to a valid authorization. See Collins v. Womancare , 878 F.2d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege that the deduction of union dues resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege created by the state or a rule imposed by the state.
As for the second prong, "[t]he Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining whether a private party's actions amount to state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus test." Tsao , 698 F.3d at 1140 (brackets and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff argues that UTLA acted " ‘in concert’ " with the state " ‘in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional right,’ " and thus the joint action test applies. See Opp. 20 (quoting Tsao , 698 F.3d at 1140 ). "Joint action exists where the government affirms, authorizes, encourages, or facilitates unconstitutional conduct through its involvement with a private party, or otherwise has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the non-governmental party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Ohno , 723 F.3d at 996 (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
The Ninth Circuit squarely addressed this question in Belgau v. Inslee , 975 F.3d 940, 946-49 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2795, 210 L.Ed.2d 928 (2021), finding that "private dues agreements do not trigger state action and independent constitutional scrutiny." See also id. at 949 (quoting Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC , 877 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2017) ("there is no state action simply because the state enforces [a] private agreement")). In Belgau, id. at 945, employees signed union membership cards which authorized union dues to be deducted from their pay. These employees later notified the union that they wished to end their membership and stop paying union dues. Id. at 946. However, based on the terms of their membership agreements, which authorized dues deductions through the end of irrevocable one-year terms, the state continued to deduct union dues from their pay. Id.
Plaintiff argues that Belgau is inapposite because unlike the plaintiffs there, he was not subject to a binding agreement once he requested to end his union membership. Opp. 23-24. But like Plaintiff here, the plaintiffs in Belgau were also challenging the validity of their union membership agreements. See id. at 950 ; see also Belgau v. Inslee , 359 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1012 (W.D. Wash. 2019), aff'd , 975 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020) (Plaintiffs "dispute[d] whether the agreements they signed [were] valid."). As in Belgau , 975 F.3d at 947, "[t]he state's role here was to permit the private choice of the parties, a role that is neither significant nor coercive." The deduction of union dues from Plaintiff's pay based on UTLA's representations that Plaintiff authorized such deductions, does not amount to state action. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 52, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) ("Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.") (finding no state action where the State merely enforced decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment made by private insurer); see also Bain v. Cal. Tchrs. Ass'n , Case No. 2:15-cv-02465-SVW (AJW), 2016 WL 6804921, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) ("Automatic payroll deductions are the sort of ministerial act that do not convert the Union Defendants’ membership dues and expenditures decisions into state action."); Roberts , 877 F.3d at 844 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims against UTLA without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, (Dkts. 27, 28, 31) without leave to amend, as amendment would be futile.
Having already dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims, the court does not address whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
IT IS SO ORDERED.