Opinion
No. 15–P–1483.
12-23-2016
Janet LAFRENIERE v. Philip BYERS & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Janet Lafreniere, filed a complaint in the Superior Court against adjacent property owners, the defendants, Philip Byers and Stephanie Byers, seeking a declaratory judgment that she has an access easement over a driveway situated between their two residences. Following a bench trial, the judge ruled in favor of the defendants that no such easement exists. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts several claims of error centering on her view that there was either an express or implied grant of an easement. We disagree and affirm.
Background. The judge found the following undisputed facts. Until his death in 2006, Paul Callahan was the owner of the property located at 27–31 Highland Street in Woburn, which includes a single-family home at 31 Highland Street and a two-family home at 27–29 Highland Street. The homes are separated by a paved driveway leading to a garage. Pursuant to Paul Callahan's will, the property at 27–29 Highland Street passed to Bernard Callahan. To effectuate this transfer, Mary Murphy, the executrix of Paul Callahan's estate, had a subdivision plan (plan) prepared for the division of the lot into two parcels. The plan, dated January 19, 2007, shows two lots: lot 1, which includes the single-family home at 31 Highland Street, the garage, and the driveway; and lot 2, which includes the two-family home at 27–29 Highland Street. The plan also indicates an access easement over the front eighty feet of the driveway, but provides no further details regarding for what or whom the access easement is intended. Nor did Murphy prepare an easement deed as to the driveway, or convey an easement to any person or entity, or record any easement in the registry of deeds.
Murphy was alive at the time of the trial, but was not called as a witness. Accordingly, her intent at the time the plan was prepared was not before the judge.
In February of 2007, the Woburn planning board endorsed the plan as not needing approval under the subdivision law. In July of 2007, Murphy executed a deed transferring 27–29 Highland Street to Bernard Callahan. The deed does not reference an easement over any portion of the driveway of 31 Highland Street. Bernard Callahan then transferred 27–29 Highland Street to a realty trust; that deed also does not reference an easement over the driveway of 31 Highland Street. Both deeds were recorded in the registry of deeds.
In November of 2007, Murphy listed 31 Highland Street for sale through a broker. The listing advertised 8,961 square feet of land, a two-automobile detached garage, and off street parking for eight automobiles. The listing did not indicate that 31 Highland Street is burdened by an easement over any portion of the driveway. In November of 2008, the defendants purchased 31 Highland Street from Murphy. The deed to the defendants, which does not bear their signatures or initials, describes 31 Highland Street as "[b]eing Lot 1 on [the plan].... Said Lot 1 is subject to an Access Easement benefiting Lot No. 2 as referenced on said Plan." The defendants, who were unsophisticated buyers, do not recall any conversations about the property being subject to an easement, and did not agree to buy 31 Highland Street subject to an access easement over the driveway. At the closing, the broker asked the defendants if Bernard Callahan and his sister could occasionally use the driveway to park in the back of 27–29 Highland Street. The defendants agreed.
Bernard Callahan died in 2012. The sole remaining trustee of the realty trust conveyed 27–29 Highland Street to the plaintiff in 2014. In January of 2015, she commenced this action.
Discussion. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that an express easement was created by the approval by the Woburn planning board of the plan and by the deed conveying 31 Highland Street to the defendants. In the alternative, she argues that the evidence was sufficient to find an implied easement or an easement by estoppel. In reviewing her claims, we accept the judge's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but review his conclusions of law de novo. See Martin v. Simmons Properties, LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014).
1. Express easement. We agree with the judge that the issue is akin to that in Patel v. Planning Bd. of N. Andover, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 477 (1989) ( Patel ). In that case, despite an intent to create an easement, this court held "that neither the steps taken nor the attendant circumstances" were sufficient to result in the creation of an express easement. Id. at 480. Specifically, where no written deed of an easement was given to the abutting property, we observed that "[t]he mere approval and recording of a subdivision plan which refers to a roadway does not convey an easement in favor ... of those owning property abutting the subdivision.... Nor did the deeds to the successive purchasers ..., each of which referred to the recorded plan, create any right to an easement on the part of abutters ... as such persons were strangers to the deed." Id. at 480–481. Here, as in Patel, Murphy neither granted nor recorded an easement in favor of 27–29 Highland Street when she was so able, and did not own the property at 27–29 Highland Street when she sold 31 Highland Street to the defendants, making the plaintiff, and her two predecessors in title, strangers to the 31 Highland Street deed. See Hodgkins v. Bianchini, 323 Mass. 169, 172 (1948). Accordingly, no express easement in favor of 27–29 Highland Street exists.
Although the case here involves a driveway rather than a roadway, the analysis in Patel applies with equal force.
2. Implied easement. The plaintiff's claim of an implied easement is similarly unavailing. Easements by implication are "created when land under single ownership is severed and the easement is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of one of the parcels." Post v. McHugh, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 200, 205 (2010), quoting from Silverleib v. Hebshie, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 911, 912–913 (1992). Whether an easement by implication exists is a matter of the presumed intent of the parties, which is "to be gathered from the language of the instruments when read in the light of the circumstances attending their execution." Boudreau v. Coleman, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 621, 629 (1990) (quotation omitted).
Here, common ownership of the two properties ended when Paul Callahan died. The judge found no evidence that Paul Callahan intended to convey an access easement over the driveway to Bernard Callahan. Furthermore, Bernard Callahan's actions do not support a conclusion that he had an easement over the driveway at 31 Highland Street. Nor is there evidence of Murphy's intention to create an easement when she subdivided the property and conveyed it to the defendants. See note 2, supra. To the contrary, 31 Highland Street was advertised and sold as containing a driveway with sufficient space to hold eight parked vehicles, which was the defendants' understanding when they purchased the property. Finally, the plaintiff has no viable claim of easement by necessity, as her property is not landlocked. See Kitras v. Aquinnah, 474 Mass. 132, 139 (2016).
In the winter, Bernard Callahan would occasionally ask the defendants if he could drive his automobile over their driveway and park on the grass behind 27–29 Highland Street.
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3. Easement by estoppel. Because the plaintiff's claim is not against a grantor or a predecessor in title, the line of cases involving easement by estoppel have no application here. See Patel, supra at 481–482, citing Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 755 (1945), and Casella v. Sneierson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 (1949).
Judgment affirmed.