Summary
In LaFleur, we interpreted Code § 18.2-53.1 in light of Code § 19.2-311, which allowed alternate sentencing for certain youthful offenders.
Summary of this case from Bullock v. ComOpinion
45692 No. 0249-87
Decided April 5, 1988
(1) Criminal Procedure — Sentencing — Indeterminate Commitment. — Under Code Sec. 19.2-311, a trial court may commit certain youthful offenders for a period of four years which shall be an indeterminate commitment except that it shall not exceed four years.
(2) Criminal Procedure — Sentencing — Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony. — Code Sec. 18.2-53.1 requires the trial court to sentence a person convicted of a felony to prison for two years for a first conviction and to four years for each following conviction; a commitment under Code Sec. 19.2-311 is contrary to the mandatory provision of Code Sec. 18.2-53.1.
(3) Criminal Procedure — Sentencing — Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony. — The mandatory sentence of Code Sec. 18.2-53.1 aims to deter violent criminal conduct by imposing a mandatory penalty; the purpose, keyed to serious crimes and prescribing inflexible penalties, is to deter violent criminal conduct.
(4) Criminal Procedure — Sentencing — Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Felony. — By replacing a wide range of discretionary penalties with inflexible penalties, the legislature intended to deter violent criminal conduct rather than to reform the most dangerous class of criminals.
Morris H. Fine (Fine, Fine, Legum Fine, on brief), for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
SUMMARY
The defendant, a nineteen year old with no prior criminal record, appealed his conviction for the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to sentence him under the provisions of Code Sec. 19.2-311 (Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, Philip L. Russo, Judge).
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mandatory sentencing provisions of Code Sec. 18.2-53.1 prevented the trial court from sentencing the accused to an indeterminate commitment pursuant to Code Sec. 19.2-311.
Affirmed.
OPINION
In this criminal appeal we conclude that the mandatory sentence required upon a conviction for the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony prevents a trial court from sentencing a person to an indeterminate commitment to the Department of Corrections.
The accused, a nineteen year old with no prior criminal record, was convicted on a guilty plea of four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At sentencing the trial court ruled that the mandatory provisions of Code Sec. 18.2-53.1 prevented sentencing the accused to an indeterminate commitment to the Department of Corrections under Code Sec. 19.2-311.
(1-2) The sentencing alternatives under Code Sec. 19.2-311 differ from those required by Code Sec. 18.2-53.1. Under Code Sec. 19.2-311, a trial court may commit certain youthful offenders to the Department of Corrections for a period of four years which shall be an indeterminate commitment except that it shall not exceed four years. On the other hand, Code Sec. 18.2-53.1 requires the trial court to sentence a person convicted of the offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony to prison for two years for a first conviction and to four years for each following conviction. Thus, a commitment under Code Sec. 19.2-311 is contrary to the mandatory provision of Code Sec. 18.2-53.1.
(3) The mandatory sentence in Code Sec. 18.2-53.1 aims to deter violent criminal conduct by imposing a mandatory penalty. "The purpose of [this statute], keyed to serious crimes and prescribing inflexible penalties, is to deter violent criminal conduct." Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 358 (1980). By replacing a "wide range of discretionary penalties" with "inflexible penalties," the General Assembly intended "to deter violent criminal conduct rather than to reform the most dangerous class of criminals." Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 763, 250 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1979) (emphasis added).
This purpose would be eroded by committing an offender under Code Sec. 19.2-311 in lieu of sentencing him under Code Sec. 18.2-53.1. This would substitute a discretionary penalty for an inflexible one. The General Assembly has directed a contrary policy which courts must follow.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err, and we affirm the judgments of convictions.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Hodges, J., concurred.