Opinion
01-CV-7410 (JG).
November 16, 2004
PAUL C. MATTHEWS, ESQ., New York, New York, Attorney for Plaintiff.
GREGORY O'NEILL, ESQ., JAMES M. HAZEN, ESQ., Hill, Betts Nash, LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joel LaFemina moves pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 for a new trial. He also moves to compel the production of records. For the reasons stated below, both motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
LaFemina worked on a clam boat. On September 8, 1999, he was in the hopper fixing links on the chain bag attached to the dredge. The hopper is the large, rectangular metal container that clams are unloaded into. The dredge is a two-ton piece of steel equipment that is lowered to the bottom of the ocean. The chain bag is attached to the end of the dredge; it drags along the bottom and catches the clams. When a haul of clams is retrieved, it is dumped from the bag into the hopper. The chain links on the bottom side of the bag are routinely damaged, and they are routinely fixed by a deckhand like LaFemina while the bag and dredge are suspended over the hopper. Once the repairs are completed, the mate jumps out of the hopper, and the dredge is lowered until it rests on the sides of the hopper, from which position it is then moved overboard for another haul.
LaFemina claimed that he was still kneeling on a pile of clams, repairing the bag, easily visible to the captain, when the captain negligently lowered the dredge onto him, injuring him severely. The captain testified to a critically different version of events: LaFemina was not visible when the dredge was lowered. The defendant's theory of the case, which was the only theory consistent with the captain's testimony, was that LaFemina had deliberately concealed himself by lying (or crouching) down in the hopper to induce the captain to believe he was out of harm's way and then to lower the dredge. In other words, the defendant claimed that LaFemina fraudulently staged the appearance of an accident; by hiding, he induced the captain to begin lowering the dredge to rest on top of the hopper, and then he screamed from within the hopper, feigning that he was struck and injured by the dredge.
On June 24, 2004, the jury trial found that (a) the captain had been negligent; (b) that negligence played no part in causing an injury to the plaintiff; (c) the ship was not unseaworthy.
DISCUSSION
LaFemina contends that he is entitled to a new trial, limited solely to the issue of damages, because the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and unfair in light of the evidence presented at trial. I disagree with both assertions. The verdicts make perfect sense and accord precisely with how I would have found the facts had I been the factfinder.Rule 59 provides that "[a] new trial may be granted . . . in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). A court may grant a new trial if, for example, "substantial errors were made in admitting or excluding evidence, or in charging the jury. . . ." Sharkey v. Lasmo, 55 F. Supp.2d 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Under Rule 59, a court's decision whether to grant a new trial is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993). However, a district court "should not grant a new trial unless it is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
In addition, it is well-established that "[c]ourts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable." Sentilles v. Inter-Carribean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 110 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted). A trial judge may only "substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury, provided the judge is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1998).
This rule applies with particular force "[w]here the resolution of the issues depended on assessment of the credibility of witnesses." Metromedia Co., 983 F.2d at 363. "A jury's credibility assessments are entitled to deference," Landau, 155 F.3d at 104-05 (quotation marks omitted), and where a verdict is based on such assessments, "it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial," Metromedia Co., 983 F.2d at 363. While a trial judge may set aside a jury's credibility assessments to avoid a seriously erroneous verdict or a miscarriage of justice, a district judge may not "freely substitute his or her assessment of the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury simply because the judge disagrees with the jury." Landau, 155 F.3d at 104.
The critical factual dispute in this case was whether LaFemina was visible to the captain when, working on the bridge above and forward of the hopper, the captain lowered the dredge. On this issue, the testimony of the two central witnesses was irreconcilable: LaFemina testified that he was kneeling on top of a pile of clams, in full view of the captain. The captain testified that LaFemina was not visible at all.
The other deckhand, Jonathan Horovitz, testified as a defense witness, but he did not testify that he observed the location of LaFemina as the dredge was lowered. ( See Tr. 265.)
Another aspect of plaintiff's case was his claim that, in determining whether LaFemina was away from the hopper and out of harm's way, the captain should not have relied simply on looking down at the hopper from the bridge and calling out to him.
LaFemina's credibility, in my view, was virtually nonexistent. He repeatedly concealed information about his prior history of chronic back and neck pain from the doctors he went to in his effort to build this case. He unsuccessfully attempted to conceal that history from the defendant. He freely, and with a nonchalance I will not soon forget, admitted taking a fraudulent deduction of nearly $11,000 to avoid paying taxes on the income he received from the defendant after the "accident." There was evidence, which I credited entirely, that LaFemina was planning to leave his fishing job to become an acupuncturist, and was contemplating precisely the sort of bogus lawsuit the defendant has accused him of bringing in this case.
Against that backdrop, the jury's verdicts are not inconsistent at all. The captain was negligent because it was not good enough, i.e., it fell below his duty of care, to simply look down at the hopper to see that LaFemina was nowhere in sight, and then call out to him. Since the normal practice would have been for LaFemina to be standing to the side of the hopper, fully visible to the captain, and the boat is a noisy workplace, the captain should have investigated further before lowering the dredge onto the hopper. Thus, the captain was negligent.
However, LaFemina staged the alleged accident. Hiding down in the hopper, he merely pretended, once the captain lowered the dredge, that it had been lowered onto him, causing injury. In his deeds and in his demeanor as a witness, LaFemina acted like a man who fabricated a lawsuit to obtain a large payoff based on preexisting physical problems. Thus, the jury's verdict that the negligence did not play any part, even the slightest part, in causing an injury to LaFemina was wholly supported by the evidence.
In sum, the jury's verdicts are fully consistent with the evidence, and there is not even the slightest unfairness to LaFemina, much less a miscarriage of justice, in allowing them to stand. Thus, his motion for a new trial is denied.
LaFemina challenges the dismissal of his punitive damages claim. That claim was dismissed because, in my view, such damages were unavailable in this case. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Martin J. Norris, 2 The Law of Seamen § 30:69 (5th ed. 2003). I acknowledge that the issue is not beyond dispute, see, e.g., In re Horizon Cruises Litigation, 101 F. Supp.2d 204, 211-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), but in light of the jury's determination of the facts, an extended discussion is unnecessary here. Even if punitive damages were available generally in such cases, they would not be available to a seaman who induced an act of negligence and then sought to fabricate a personal injury action around it.
Finally, plaintiff's post-trial applications to subpoena and/or obtain discovery from Dr. Hirsch were rejected, and are rejected again here, because there is simply no justification for plaintiff having waited so long to seek such relief. LaFemina and his attorney were well aware that Dr. Hirsch, a defense psychiatrist who was not called as a witness at trial, had examined LaFemina. The efforts now being made to procure his records and/or testimony should have been made earlier. Moreover, given the jury's rejection of the heart of LaFemina's claim, it is inconceivable that a psychiatrist's testimony could have made any difference in the outcome of the case.
The rest of LaFemina's motion challenges evidentiary and jury charge determinations made at trial. Those claims have no merit and are denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LaFemina's motion is denied. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the defendant.
So Ordered.