Opinion
No. 11-14-00166-CR
06-16-2016
MARCUS KRISTOPHER LACY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 70th District Court Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A-41,114
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The jury convicted Marcus Kristopher Lacy of murder and assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of ninety years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The jury also assessed a $10,000 fine. In three issues on appeal, Appellant asserts that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his claim of self-defense, (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his claim of sudden passion, and (3) the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his claim of sudden passion. We affirm.
Background Facts
On July 14, 2012, Appellant stabbed and killed Charles Jennings in Jennings's apartment. Appellant and Jennings were the only people present at the time of the stabbing. Appellant testified that he and Jennings had been drinking heavily the entire day when Jennings got an "attitude." Appellant testified that he was trying to leave the apartment with his bottle of whiskey when Jennings snatched it away from him. Appellant testified that he took the bottle back and that Jennings lunged at him with a knife. Appellant knocked Jennings to the ground, took the knife, and then stabbed Jennings in the neck multiple times and killed him. Afterward, Appellant told the landlord of the apartment building that he had simply found Jennings dead in Jenning's apartment. Appellant hid the knife used to kill Jennings and later, fled to New Mexico for several days. Appellant used drugs heavily while he was in New Mexico and hallucinated that Jennings was coming after him. He then turned himself in to the police.
Analysis
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim. Self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, and a jury's verdict of guilt is an implicit finding that it rejected a defendant's self-defense theory. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). For self-defense claims, the defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support the claim. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913-14 (contrasting self-defense from affirmative defenses and explaining how burdens shift for self-defense). If the defendant produces some evidence, the State has "the burden of persuasion to disprove the raised defense." Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594. The State's burden does not require the production of any additional evidence; instead, "it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; see Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. "Because the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove a" claim of self-defense "by establishing its case beyond a reasonable doubt, we review both legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the jury's rejection of such a defense under" the legal sufficiency standard. Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd).
We review a sufficiency of the evidence issue under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288-89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Thus, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction involving a claim of self-defense, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's rejection of a defendant's self-defense theory by examining all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense and also could have found against the defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. 307).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
There is no dispute that Jennings died as a result of injuries inflicted by Appellant. Under the Penal Code, a person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011). However, the Penal Code also states that an individual "is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Id. § 9.31(a). Furthermore, the Penal Code provides that an individual "is justified in using deadly force against another . . . if the actor would be justified in using force against the other" and "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary . . . to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force." Id. § 9.32(a). "'Deadly force' means force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 9.01(3). A reasonable belief is a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the actor. Id. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2014).
Appellant bases his legal sufficiency challenge in large part on the fact that he was the only witness to the altercation who testified at trial. Appellant testified that he began drinking heavily at 8:30 a.m. on the morning of the stabbing. He drank throughout the day, and sometime after dark, he headed to Jennings's apartment to watch TV. Appellant testified that a third person, Kenny, was apparently drinking and watching TV with Appellant and Jennings, although he left before the stabbing. Appellant testified that, at some point that night, Jennings got an "attitude." Appellant testified that he got up to leave Jennings's apartment and reached for a bottle of whiskey that he had brought to the apartment. Appellant asserted that Jennings "snatched" the bottle of whiskey and that Appellant grabbed it back. Appellant testified that Jennings then stood up with a steak knife and lunged at him. Appellant asserted that he knocked the knife out of Jennings's hand, knocked Jennings to the ground, picked up the knife, and then stabbed Jennings in the neck.
At trial, Appellant described the stabbing and testified, "It just happened. You know what I'm saying? It just happened. And as I took him down, I just -- I f----d, I f----d up. You know what I'm saying? I f----d up. That's what I did, man. That's what I did. I f----d up." Appellant further testified, "I overreacted. When he came at me, I lost it." Appellant testified that he may have slit Jennings's throat more than once. He also testified that he was enraged during the incident, but he acknowledged, "I should have ran it through the wall. I should of jumped out the window and punched something. You know what I'm saying? Other than what I did." When Appellant was asked what he did after the stabbing, he testified, "I ain't going to lie. I formulated a plan. It came to me." Pursuant to his plan, he hid the knife. Appellant then washed his hands and told Jennings's landlord that he had found Jennings dead in the apartment.
Appellant walked away from the incident without incurring any defensive wounds. The police arrived, and Appellant was arrested for public intoxication; however, he was released from custody the next day. He then fled to New Mexico for several days before turning himself in. The day before the stabbing, a witness heard Appellant tell Jennings that "[Jennings] better watch out or [Appellant will] come in his window while he's asleep and cut his throat."
The only evidence that Appellant was acting in self-defense came from his own testimony. As such, his theory of self-defense was inherently a credibility question for the jury to resolve. The credibility of Appellant's self-defense testimony was solely within the jury's province to determine, and they were free to reject it. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. Additionally, the jury heard evidence from a witness that the day before the stabbing Appellant told Jennings that he "better watch out or [Appellant will] come in his window while he's asleep and cut his throat." This testimony contradicted Appellant's claim of self-defense. Additionally, Appellant testified that he "f----d up," "overreacted," and "lost it" during his encounter with Jennings. A rational jury could conclude from this testimony that Appellant did not reasonably believe his actions were immediately necessary to protect himself from Jennings. See PENAL § 9.32(a)(2). Lastly, Appellant's actions to cover up the incident after it occurred indicated a consciousness of guilt on his part. See King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The jury could have rationally believed Appellant's testimony that he cut Jennings's throat while also heavily discounting his narrative of events and inferring from other evidence that Appellant was not acting in self-defense. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (stating that the factfinder may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness's testimony). Furthermore, Appellant admitted that he knocked Jennings to the ground, took the knife from him, and cut his throat and killed him. We conclude that the State adduced sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the elements of murder and also could have found against Appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule Appellant's first issue.
In Appellant's second and third issues, he asserts that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his claim of sudden passion. Murder is typically a first-degree felony. PENAL § 19.02(c). But at the punishment phase of a trial, "the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree." Id. § 19.02(d); see McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "Sudden passion," under the circumstances of this case, means passion provoked by the decedent that "arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation." PENAL § 19.02(a)(2). An "adequate cause" is a cause that would "commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection." Id. § 19.02(a)(1).
The issue of sudden passion is akin to an affirmative defense because the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 & n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Bradshaw v. State, 244 S.W.3d 490, 502 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. ref'd). As an affirmative defense, sudden passion may be evaluated for legal and factual sufficiency, even after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Brooks. See Butcher v. State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669-70. In a legal sufficiency review of an affirmative defense, reviewing courts should first examine the record for a scintilla of evidence favorable to the factfinder's finding and disregard all evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20; Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669-70. The factfinder's rejection of a defendant's affirmative defense should be overturned for lack of legal sufficiency only if the appealing party establishes that the evidence conclusively proves his affirmative defense and that "no reasonable [factfinder] was free to think otherwise." Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670).
In a factual sufficiency review of a finding rejecting an affirmative defense, courts examine all of the evidence in a neutral light. Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20; Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671. A finding rejecting a defendant's affirmative defense cannot be overturned unless, after setting out the relevant evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so much against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased. Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20; Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671.
In reviewing Appellant's legal sufficiency challenge, we first review the evidence supporting the jury's rejection of Appellant's claim of sudden passion. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670. We note at the outset the testimony that Appellant had threatened to "cut [Jennings's] throat" on the day prior to the murder. Appellant's subsequent conduct, which was consistent with his previous threat, supports the jury's rejection of his claim of sudden passion. Additionally, we have noted that Appellant's efforts to cover up the incident constituted evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The jury also heard evidence that Appellant expressed to the police his disdain for Jennings, describing him as a "grouchy ass old man," a "stupid s--t man," an "ignorant old man," and "an old bastard."
The evidence that conflicts with the jury's rejection of Appellant's claim of sudden passion is virtually identical to the evidence upon which he based his claim of self-defense. As we noted previously, Appellant's assertions about his altercation with Jennings were inherently dependent on the jury's evaluation of his credibility. The jury was free to reject any or all of his version of the events. Appellant's testimony about the altercation did not conclusively prove his claim of sudden passion. Accordingly, Appellant's legal sufficiency challenge to the jury's rejection of his claim of sudden passion must fail. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670. We overrule Appellant's second issue.
In reviewing Appellant's factual sufficiency challenge to the jury's rejection of his claim of sudden passion, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine if the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the jury's determination. See id. at 671. As noted previously, the contrary evidence in this case consisted of Appellant's version of the altercation, which the jury rejected. Appellant's narrative of the encounter did not greatly outweigh the evidence supporting the jury's rejection of Appellant's claim of sudden passion. Furthermore, Appellant acknowledged that he suffered no injuries from the altercation. The evidence showed that Appellant was a 32-year-old former Marine who was 6' 3" tall and weighed 160 to 170 pounds on the day he killed Jennings. Conversely, Jennings was 62 years old and 5' 5" tall, and weighed 92 pounds on the day he was killed. While Appellant introduced evidence from a witness who testified that Jennings had previously threatened her with a knife, she also testified that she did not "really feel threatened" by Jennings. She also testified that she considered Appellant to be a bully.
Appellant testified that Jennings had attacked him with a knife on previous occasions but that Appellant had not called the police or assaulted Jennings on those occasions. The prosecutor asked Appellant, "So what made this date any different from those?" Appellant replied, "I overreacted. When he came at me, I lost it. I lost it." However, when the prosecutor asked Appellant if he "really fear[ed] for [his] life," Appellant replied, "I felt that, I felt that if you come in here with a knife, you know, I'm going to take, I'm going to keep you -- I'm going to keep you from hurting me." The jury could have reasonably concluded from this testimony that Appellant acted coolly and deliberately when he stabbed Jennings. See Johnson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that even if the jury determines that the decedent engaged in provocative conduct, it may still reject a claim of sudden passion if it determines that the defendant acted coolly and deliberately).
Based on all of the evidence, the jury could have disbelieved Appellant's narrative of events and inferred from other evidence that Appellant's acts were purposeful, rather than a result of sudden passion, and that Jennings did not provoke Appellant. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the jury's answer to the sudden-passion special issue is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust or clearly wrong. We overrule Appellant's third issue.
This Court's Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JOHN M. BAILEY
JUSTICE June 16, 2016 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
Willson, J., and Bailey, J.