Opinion
C/A No. 3:18-850-CMC-PJG
04-05-2018
Glen Keith LaConey, Plaintiff, v. Alan McCrory Wilson; Kinli Abee; R. Knox McMahon; Jocelyn Newman, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Glen Keith LaConey, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff indicates he is currently being held in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County, South Carolina, on state criminal charges of harassment in the first degree and threatening the use of destructive devices. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 10.) He indicates he was arrested on July 3, 2014 and released on bond on October 3, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff was indicted on November 12, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff was appointed a public defender. (Id.) Trials for his charges were originally set for December 7, 2015 and May 31, 2016, but were delayed for unknown reasons. (Id.)
On July 21, 2016, Plaintiff's bond was revoked and a competency hearing was ordered by Defendant Judge R. Knox McMahon, after he originally rejected the State's multiple requests for a competency hearing. (Id. at 11.) On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff submitted to a competency examination. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the bond revocation and competency hearing were "designed to oppress and to coerce [Plaintiff] into a plea arrangement which [Plaintiff] has persistently rejected." (Id.) A competency hearing was scheduled for February 2, 2018, despite the fact that a trial date was set for November 7, 2016. (Id. at 12.) On November 7, 2016, Plaintiff was transported to court, expecting a trial, but instead was taken to the probate court to be screened for participation in a mental health court program. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the mental health court program was "pretext designed to induce" him into a plea agreement. (Id.)
On August 31, 2017, Defendant Judge Newman denied Plaintiff's motion for reinstatement of bond. (Id.) On February 2, 2018, Judge Newman held a competency hearing and found Plaintiff competent to stand trial. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff's trial was scheduled for the week of June 11, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the case has not been officially docketed for trial, the State has not produced discovery, and Plaintiff has not been "formally arraigned." (Id.)
Plaintiff raises numerous allegations of unlawful actions in this state criminal proceeding. Plaintiff claims the delay in holding a trial on his charges violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial, is presumptively prejudicial, and is intended to "oppress and coerce" him into a plea agreement. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff contends that the officers of the Richland County Court of General Sessions should be disqualified from and conflicted out of his case, and any actions they have taken are null and void. (Id. at 17.) Thus, he argues his right to a trial before a fair and impartial tribunal has been compromised. (Id.) He alleges error in the trial court's findings in the competency hearing and revocation hearing. (Id. at 20.) He argues that his detention is unlawful under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. (Id.) He argues that Judge McMahon's order appointing counsel is null and void, and in violation of his right to counsel, due process, and equal protection. (Id.) He further alleges that all of the defendants participated in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. (Id.) He claims the State's failure to produce discovery violated his right to due process and equal protection. (Id.)
Plaintiff indicates that his charges stem from the allegation that he made a bomb threat to the Richland County Courthouse.
As to relief from this court, Plaintiff seeks immediate release from detention, vacation of the trial court's order appointing counsel, dismissal of his indictments, and to enjoin the trial court from entertaining further proceedings. (Id. at 22.) Alternatively, he seeks a change of venue because of the delay in receiving a trial. (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages against the defendants. (Id.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
B. Analysis
1. Equitable and Injunctive Relief
To the extent Plaintiff seeks equitable or injunctive relief in his state criminal prosecution, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in this court. First, while Plaintiff has not filed this case as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he seeks immediate release from detention. However, "an attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution" is not attainable through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Moreover, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The first part of the test is satisfied in this case because Plaintiff indicates that he is currently detained on state criminal charges. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted that "the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). And here, the court observes that Plaintiff has made no allegation that he attempted to raise these issues to the state trial court, or that he would be unable to do so. Because Plaintiff can pursue his claims in his pending state criminal matter, especially considering that he indicates he has counsel in that matter, he is precluded from seeking federal relief at this time. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for equitable and injunctive relief should be summarily dismissed without prejudice because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Claims for Damages
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against the named defendants, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and § 1915A(b)(2) because the defendants are immune from suit. Plaintiff does not expressly raise a recognizable cause of action against the defendants, but he indicates he seeks monetary damages from them because of the constitutional violations he alleges. Thus, in accordance with the court's duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings, the court construes the Complaint as seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
But, solicitors are immune from suit where a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 for the solicitors' prosecution of the plaintiff. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) ("Solicitors are immune from §1983 claims where their challenged actions are 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' "); see also Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining "the Imbler Court specified that absolute immunity protects prosecutors' decisions 'whether and when to prosecute' "). Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Alan McCrory Wilson and Kinli Abee concern only their actions in prosecuting Plaintiff's state criminal charges. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8.) Thus, Plaintiff's claims for damages against these defendants should be dismissed with prejudice because they are immune from suit.
See McLean, 566 F.3d at 400-01 (providing that dismissal of a pro se litigant's claim with prejudice is appropriate where the claim is substantively meritless and cannot be cured by amendment of the complaint).
Similarly, Defendants McMahon and Newman are shielded by judicial immunity. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (providing that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages, for judicial actions taken within their jurisdiction); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."). Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Judicial immunity is protection from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Here, judicial immunity applies to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants McMahon and Newman because the allegations all arise out of their presiding over Plaintiff's state criminal proceeding. Plaintiff acknowledges that judges are immune from suit, but argues such immunity should not apply here because they knowingly and willfully engaged in actions that they should have known would disqualify them from the case and deprive them of jurisdiction. (Compl., ECF No. 18 at 29.) However, no such "knowing or willfullness" exception to judicial immunity exists. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants McMahon and Newman should be dismissed with prejudice because they are immune from suit.
See McLean, 566 F.3d at 400-01.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without issuance and service of process. April 5, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).