Opinion
3-12-0545
11-07-2013
In re FORMER MARRIAGE OF Beatriz De La Torre, n/k/a Beatriz X. Borruel, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Daniel De La Torre, Respondent-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Will County, Illinois
Appeal No. 3-12-0545
Circuit No. 06-D-2101
Honorable
Matthew G. Bertani and
John C. Anderson,
Judges, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment.
Justice Schmidt concurred in part and dissented in part.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: In a case in which Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions were imposed on one of the attorneys during the pendency of a motion for modification of child support, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's award of sanctions, finding no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's decision. ¶ 2 In the midst of a petition for modification of child support, disagreements arose between the parties' attorneys, Myrna Smith, who was counsel for Beatriz De La Torre, n/k/a Beatriz X. Borruel, and Jacqueline Aldrich, who with her firm, Wolfe & Stec, Ltd., was counsel for Daniel De La Torre. Aldrich eventually filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), and Smith filed a cross-motion for Rule 137 sanctions. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Smith's motion and granted Aldrich's motion. Sanctions were later imposed on Smith in the amount of $6,980. On appeal, Smith argues that: (1) for numerous reasons, the circuit court erred when it imposed Rule 137 sanctions on her; (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the ARDC complaint; and (3) she was denied due process in that the court was neither impartial nor disinterested. We affirm.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 On May 18, 2007, the circuit court entered an order dissolving the marriage of Beatriz and Daniel. The court granted the parties joint custody of their two children, with Beatriz given residential custody. As a part of the parties' marital settlement agreement, which was approved by the court and adopted into the court's order, Daniel agreed to pay Beatriz monthly child support. ¶ 5 On July 16, 2010, Daniel's attorney, Jacqueline Aldrich, filed a petition for modification, seeking, inter alia, a reduction in his monthly child support payment. On September 9, 2010, Beatriz's attorney, Myrna Smith, filed a motion to strike and dismiss the petition for modification. The case was called for a hearing on November 17, 2010, but the circuit court continued the hearing on the petition and the motion to strike and dismiss until January 13, 2011. ¶ 6 In December 2010, Smith issued a discovery request to Aldrich. On December 10, 2010, Aldrich wrote a letter to Smith that stated:
"In response to your December 7, 2010 correspondence, although itHowever, Aldrich enclosed several documents regarding Daniel's employment "in an attempt to resolve this matter amicably." ¶ 7 Smith responded with a letter dated December 10, 2010, in which Smith stated, "[b]e advised that your sophomoric interpretation of the rules of discovery is neither solicited nor required. For your future edification, please be further advised that arrogance is no substitute for experience." ¶ 8 On December 13, 2010, Aldrich sent a letter to Smith that stated, "please do not confuse arrogance with a correct recitation of the law." After citing Supreme Court Rule 237(b) (eff. July 1, 2005), Aldrich then stated, "it is a perverse oxymoron to write such a spiteful letter on letterhead which recites quotes from the Bible. My letter was in no way meant to insult you, but to respond to your empty threat to file a Motion to Compel Discovery to which you are not entitled." Aldrich was referencing the Bible quote, John 3:16, which Smith had at the bottom of her office stationary. ¶ 9 On January 12, 2011, Aldrich filed an emergency motion to continue the January 13, 2011, hearing. Aldrich stated that Daniel had just learned that his employment would terminate on March 14, 2011, which necessitated an amendment to the petition for modification. Aldrich also noted that there were outstanding discovery issues that needed to be addressed, as both parties had issued discovery requests and had filed objections thereto. ¶ 10 Also on January 12, 2011, Smith sent a letter to Aldrich that stated she could not be in court for the hearing the next day, but that she had no objection to Aldrich's emergency motion to continue. ¶ 11 On January 13, 2011, the circuit court called the case for a hearing. While Aldrich was present, Smith was not. Addressing Aldrich's emergency motion to continue, the following exchange took place:
purported to be a 201(k) letter, please note that a proper 214 Notice to Produce was never served upon my client. The 237 Notice to Produce served for purposes of the November 17 hearing date does not replace a 214 Notice to Produce. As a result, it is our position that there is no outstanding discovery."
After the court said that it would grant the motion, Aldrich and the court engaged in a discussion which resulted in the case being set for a hearing on the petition for modification to be held on March 23, 2011. ¶ 12 Next, Aldrich and the court discussed setting a date to hear the outstanding discovery issues. When the court asked what date Aldrich wanted, she responded, "[y]ou know, I don't have dates for Ms. Smith. I can get a date. And if it's not good for her, come back and change this." The court set February 10, 2011, as the date on which it would hear the outstanding discovery issues. Aldrich then sent a letter to Smith dated January 13, 2011, which said:"THE COURT: Is this -- is this by agreement as well?I did get correspondence from Ms. -- ah, from Ms. Smith this morning that she had no objection to continuing the Motion.
MS. ALDRICH: It is, your Honor.
THE COURT: And I trust your representation.
MS. ALDRICH: Thank you."
"Enclosed please find a copy of the court order entered today granting my motion to continue and re-setting the hearing date to March 23, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.¶ 13 On February 8, 2011, Smith filed a "Motion to Vacate and/or Otherwise Modify the Ex Parte Order of January 13, 2011." In that motion, Smith stated that while she did not object to continuing the case on the petition for modification, she stated that "there was absolutely no agreement nor discussion to set a hearing date on 'Objections to Discovery.' " Smith requested the court to vacate the part of its January 13, 2011, order that set the case for a February 10, 2011, hearing on discovery issues. Smith also stated in the motion:
Please be advised that Judge [Matthew G.] Bertani wanted me to set a hearing date before then to address the objections to discovery, which I scheduled for February 10. If you are unavailable on the 10, please provide me with some available dates thereafter and I will enter an agreed order re-setting the February 10 hearing date."
"[s]imply because Jacqueline Aldrich perceives herself an 'insider' in Will County, and while the undersigned Petitioner's counsel is not a regular in Will County, nonetheless Aldrich is not entitled to unilaterally transgress the boundaries of an Agreed Order by means of ex parte self-serving misrepresentations to the detriment of petitioner's counsel, viz., to blindside or obtain an unwarranted advantage against opposing counsel."¶ 14 On February 9, 2011, in response to Smith's motion to vacate, Aldrich filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that Smith violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) in her motion. Among other things, Aldrich's motion stated that Smith's motion was of a harassing nature, given the allegations of ex parte communications with the circuit court and given the personal attack claiming that "Aldrich perceives herself as an 'insider' in Will County." As additional support for her harassment allegation, Aldrich stated:
"a. On or about December 16, 2010, SMITH filed an [Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC)] complaint against Respondent's counsel stemming from a series of letters relative to discovery compliance, which the ARDC determined warranted no action. (Copies of the letters at issue in the ARDC complaint are attached hereto and incorporated herein as 'Exhibit D' and a copy of the ARDC complaint will be made available to the Court for an in camera inspection if deemed necessary).The motion requested the circuit court to impose sanctions against Smith in the form of attorney fees. ¶ 15 Smith filed a response to Aldrich's motion for sanctions in which she denied Aldrich's allegations. Smith also claimed that Aldrich fabricated certain facts, including her statement during the January 13, 2011, hearing that she "probably did discuss" the discovery issues with Smith. Smith sought a dismissal of Aldrich's motion and an award of attorney fees. ¶ 16 Smith also filed a cross-motion for sanctions. First, Smith alleged that the petition for modification "was baseless from inception" because Smith believed that any supposed increase in Daniel's time supervising the children did not constitute a change in circumstance sufficient to modify his child support obligation. Smith claimed that Aldrich's attempt to amend the petition for modification "was in stark recognition" that the original petition was meritless. Smith averred that Aldrich filed the original petition merely to harass Beatriz, and, therefore, Aldrich should be sanctioned. Second, Smith claimed that Aldrich's discovery requests for Beatriz's financial information were meant to harass Beatriz, as that information was irrelevant to the petition for modification. Third, Smith alleged that Aldrich lied to the court when she said that she had discussed the discovery issues with Smith, as evidenced by Aldrich's response to Smith's motion to vacate in which Aldrich said that the parties had not discussed the discovery issues. Fourth, Smith alleged that Aldrich "unilaterally violated the ARDC secrecy provisions" by telling the circuit court that Smith had filed a complaint against Aldrich with the ARDC, as that complaint was in the investigatory stage at the time Aldrich mentioned it. Smith claimed that the ARDC complaint was irrelevant to this case. ¶ 17 Aldrich filed a response to Smith's cross-motion, and Smith replied to that response. In Smith's reply, filed April 7, 2011, she alleged that "Aldrich is angry that this female Hispanic to whom Aldrich believes she is superior filed a complaint against her with the ARDC." She also stated that she "was compelled to file a complaint against Aldrich with the ARDC because of Aldrich's anti-Christian bigotry, bias, and prejudice against [Smith]." Smith alleged, inter alia, that Aldrich's act of placing an exhibit sticker at the bottom of Smith's stationary was an attack on Smith's religious beliefs because the sticker covered up a Bible passage Smith included on her stationary. ¶ 18 On April 18, 2011, the case was called for a hearing on pending matters. First, after Smith called Aldrich as an adverse witness and after arguments of counsel, the circuit court granted in part Smith's motion to vacate the January 13, 2011, order with respect to the setting of a hearing on the discovery issues. ¶ 19 Second, the case proceeded to a hearing on the cross-motions for sanctions. Smith testified that the conflict between her and Aldrich started with their discovery dispute. Smith opined that her December 13, 2010, letter in which she used the phrase, "sophomoric interpretation," was a civil and professional way to respond to Aldrich's letter of December 10, 2010. Smith claimed that the case had "become a personal attack against me by [Aldrich]." She also admitted that the ARDC concluded that no action was warranted by Smith's complaint. ¶ 20 When she was questioned about what she meant by "insider," Smith eventually responded, "[b]elieving that you can do whatever you want to do and get away with it." When asked what facts she had to support her belief that Aldrich was an "insider," Smith stated, "[h]er overall demeanor, her arrogance towards me." Smith also stated, "[t]he fact that she's told me repeatedly she's here every day. And so, you know, that conveys to me that she thinks that she can do whatever she wants to do." ¶ 21 When she was questioned about her allegations of religious bigotry against Aldrich, Smith stated that her April 7, 2011, pleading spoke for itself. When she was asked for facts in support of her allegation of ethnic bigotry against Aldrich, Smith cited merely Aldrich's "overall demeanor," "behavior towards me," and arrogance. Smith admitted that Aldrich never used any racial or religious slurs toward her. ¶ 22 Smith also stated that she believed she was not interjecting religion into her correspondences with Aldrich even though her stationary had the Bible passage, John 3:16, on it. Smith claimed that Aldrich "questioned and mocked" her religious faith by including the "perverse oxymoron" comment in Aldrich's December 10, 2010, letter, and by placing an exhibit sticker over the Bible passage on one of Smith's letters. Smith alleged that Aldrich was persecuting her and that the placement of the exhibit sticker was a show of disrespect for Smith's faith. Smith stated, "[s]he did that deliberately. That was not a mistake. She was sending me a message with that." Smith admitted, though, that all of the exhibit stickers used by Aldrich were placed in the same spot on all documents. ¶ 23 Aldrich testified that she was Catholic and that she never uttered any racial or religious slurs towards Smith. She also stated that she never told the court that she had an agreement with Smith to set a hearing date on their discovery issues. She also stated that she was angry, upset, and surprised when she learned of Smith's ARDC complaint against her. She confirmed that the ARDC concluded that no action was warranted by Smith's complaint. ¶ 24 Aldrich testified that she interpreted Smith's "insider" to mean:
b. Not only was the ARDC complaint in and of itself harassing to counsel for Respondent, SMITH's allegations contained therein were vicious, willful, meritless, and overlooked the harassing nature of her own December 13, 2010 correspondence, which prompted counsel for Respondent's letter (complained of to the ARDC). A portion of SMITH's December 13, 2010 [sic] provided as follows:
'Be advised that your sophomoric interpretation of the rules of discovery is neither solicited nor required. For your future edification, please be further advised that arrogance is no substitute for experience.'c. Since making said complaint, SMITH has continued to include snide remarks in correspondences to counsel for Respondent that
lack civility and professionalism."
"because I practice in Will County, that I was taking advantage of the fact that I practice in Will County, that I was entering into communications with your Honor ex-parte without Ms. Smith's knowledge and that because -- I took that to mean that she thought because I practiced here regularly, that I think I can do whatever I want and I don't have to follow the rules and that I am in cahoots with your Honor and I guess any other judge in Will County."Aldrich also denied ever telling Smith that she was in the Will County courthouse every day. ¶ 25 At the close of Smith's case, Aldrich and her firm moved for a directed finding on Smith's four-count cross-motion for sanctions. The circuit court found that Smith failed to meet her burden on all four counts. With regard to count I, the court found that Aldrich's petition for modification was not groundless. With regard to count II, the court found that Aldrich's discovery request for Beatriz's financial information was not oppressive, overly burdensome, or harassing in nature. With regard to count III, the court noted that it at least "in part encouraged or invited the setting of a hearing date on objections to discovery," and found that there was no evidence that Aldrich attempted to deceive the court. With regard to count IV, the court noted that it did not read the ARDC complaint, but found that "the basis of the complaint *** was consistent in time with some of the testimony in this case" such that it was not sanctionable for Aldrich to raise the ARDC complaint's existence in this case. ¶ 26 With regard to Aldrich's motion for sanctions, the court stated that Smith's "insider" allegation had nothing to do with her motion to vacate and should not have been included in the motion. Further, the court stated that Smith's allegation accused Aldrich of wrongdoing, and stated that "you can't be an insider unless the Court is in on it. And the Court recognizes insider and the Court favors insiders, and to that extent it was -- it was an allegation directed at Ms. Aldrich personally and further by implication at a Court." The court noted that it had never met Aldrich or Wolfe before, and found that Smith's statements were harassing and without legal foundation, and, therefore, were sanctionable. ¶ 27 Additionally, the court found that while it was "distasteful" for Aldrich to raise the ARDC complaint in her motion for sanctions, it was relevant because it was further evidence of Smith's course of conduct and animosity. The court also found that Smith's language in her letter of December 13, 2010, was spiteful and venomous, and that Aldrich was in fact correct in her interpretation of the law in her December 10, 2010, letter to Smith. Lastly, the court stated:
"And to say that her placing of a label on an exhibit in a place where *** one would normally put a label on an exhibit, smack dab in the middle of the bottom of a letter, is further evidence of the besmirching of the great Christian faith and of her beliefs and [sic] is patently ridiculous.Accordingly, the court granted Aldrich's motion for sanctions against Smith. ¶ 28 In the months following the circuit court's rulings on the cross-motions for sanctions, the parties filed several pleadings, one of which was Smith's July 14, 2011, motion for substitution of judge. Smith alleged that Judge Bertani was prejudiced against her. A hearing on that motion was held on August 17, 2011, by Judge Robert J. Baron. Judge Baron found that the motion's allegations did not rise to the level of prejudice; however, "for reasons of public perception," the case was reassigned to Judge John C. Anderson. ¶ 29 Because Smith's motion for substitution was filed before Judge Bertani could issue a written ruling that memorialized his oral rulings on the cross-motions for sanctions, Judge Anderson issued a written order on September 9, 2011, that summarized Judge Bertani's rulings. ¶ 30 After the parties litigated Daniel's petition for modification and the circuit court issued a ruling thereon, the case proceeded to a determination of the amount of sanctions Smith would have to pay. On May 31, 2012, Judge Anderson considered an itemized fee request and issued a written order that directed Smith to pay $6,890 in attorney fees as sanctions. Among other things, Judge Anderson found:
We have freedom of religion in this country. It is a wonderful thing. We don't have freedom to be ridiculous.
I find that the motion to vacate and the allegations set forth therein were beyond the real and reasonable grounds of zealous advocacy. And the allegations of bias, of prejudice, of anti-Christian sentiments, of persecution, at least on the evidence I have, are absurd.
* * *
I am a practicing Catholic and that makes me a practicing Christian, Ms. [Smith]. But you, at least based on the evidence that I see, you appear to be a
practicing paranoid Christian. And I don't know why. I mean, there has been a lot of venom in this courtroom and it has come from one side in large part, although Mr. Wolfe, as good cross examiners want to do, did use inflection and things like that, but it is clear to me that you dislike this young lady. I don't know her from Adam or I guess I should say Eve. But the dichotomy between her demeanor and your demeanor is striking and it lends credibility to her testimony, and your allegations that a label besmirches the Catholic or the Christian faith and demeans your religion undermines your credibility."
"The Court also notes that the time incurred by [Wolfe & Stec, Ltd. (WS)] in connection with this dispute would have likely been substantially less had it not been for Ms. Smith's courtroom conduct, which generally includes a combative attitude that is unnecessary and extends beyond the reasonable boundaries of zealous advocacy. This style of advocacy includes, among other things, interposing objections which are unreasonable and unfounded, launching personal attacks, asking the same questions repeatedly, and making inquiries that are simply bizarre at times. For example, even during the hearing on WS' fee petition, she inquired whether a letter 'C' on WS' invoices stood for 'conspiracy,' and she also contended that Judge Bertani was prejudiced against her 'because of the way she looks.' "¶ 31 Smith filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court's rulings regarding the Rule 137 sanctions imposed upon her.
¶ 32 ANALYSIS
¶ 33 On appeal, Smith argues that: (1) for numerous reasons, the circuit court erred when it imposed Rule 137 sanctions on her; (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the ARDC complaint; and (3) she was denied due process in that the court was neither impartial nor disinterested. ¶ 34 First, Smith argues that the circuit court erred when it imposed Rule 137 sanctions on her. Smith posits numerous arguments attacking the propriety of the court's order, including that the court did not meet the requirements of Rule 137 in issuing its order in that Judge Bertani did not clearly set forth the reasons for granting sanctions. Further, Smith attacks Judge Bertani's oral findings and claims that his findings did not warrant sanctions. Additionally, Smith argues that she did not violate Rule 137 because she had an objectively reasonable argument for her views. Smith argues that Aldrich lied to Judge Bertani on January 13, 2011, when she said she had probably discussed with Smith that there were outstanding discovery issues, which led to the scheduling of a hearing on those issues that Smith alleged was strictly for the benefit of Aldrich. Smith also alleges that Judge Bertani misconstrued Smith's use of "insider," as she said that Aldrich perceived herself to be an insider, not that Aldrich was in fact an insider. Smith claims that Judge Bertani also erred when he construed that comment to be directed at the court as well as Aldrich. ¶ 35 Rule 137 states, in relevant part:
"Every pleading, motion and other document of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other document and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessaryRule 137 also requires the judge issuing sanctions to "set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order." Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). ¶ 36 "A party requesting sanction bears the burden of proving both that the statements in the pleadings are untrue and that they were made without reasonable cause." Carus Chemical Co. v. Calciquest, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 897, 901 (2003). We review the circuit court's decision to impose sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Belfour v. Schaumburg Auto, 306 Ill. App. 3d 234, 243 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person could agree with the court's decision. Id. ¶ 37 Our review of the record in this case reveals that Judge Bertani did in fact set forth Smith's allegation that "Aldrich perceives herself as an 'insider' in Will County" as the allegation not well grounded in fact that was violative of Rule 137. Judge Bertani further articulated his reasons for imposing the sanctions, including his statement that "you can't be an insider unless the Court is in on it. And the Court recognizes insider and the Court favors insiders, and to that extent it was -- it was an allegation directed at Ms. Aldrich personally and further by implication at a Court." Despite Smith's claim to the contrary, we agree with Judge Bertani that Smith's allegation-even though it stated "Aldrich perceived herself to be an 'insider' " (emphasis added)-did implicate the court as well as Aldrich. There was nothing objectively reasonable about Smith's inclusion of that statement in her motion to vacate, as Smith's own testimony showed that she had no facts to support her "insider" allegation. ¶ 38 We also find no errors in Judge Bertani's findings regarding Smith's course of conduct and animosity, including that the language Smith used in her letter of December 13, 2010, was spiteful and venomous, and that Smith's claims of bigotry and prejudice were unfounded. Furthermore, because there were in fact outstanding discovery issues at the time of the January 13, 2011, hearing, it is unclear to this court how Smith was aggrieved by the setting of a date for a hearing on those issues or how that act was somehow only for the benefit of Aldrich. ¶ 39 Moreover, Smith's claim that Judge Bertani erred by not reducing his findings to writing is of no avail. Smith moved for a substitution of judge just over one month after the oral ruling, before a written order was issued. We are not persuaded by Smith's claim that "Judge Bertani presumably possessed ample time in which to reduce his oral ruling to writing." ¶ 40 For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed Rule 137 sanctions against Smith. Moreover, even if reasonable minds could differ on the propriety of the court's decision to impose sanctions, we would still be required to affirm under the standard of review. See McNeil v. Ketchens, 397 Ill. App. 3d 375, 398 (2010). ¶ 41 Second, Smith argues that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the ARDC complaint. Smith's argument misunderstands the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. ¶ 42 " '[S]ubject matter jurisdiction' refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs." Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). In this case, the circuit court's consideration of the ARDC complaint in its decision had nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction. The court was not attempting to hear the ARDC case. Smith's argument is therefore without merit. ¶ 43 Third, Smith argues that she was denied due process in that the circuit court was neither impartial nor disinterested. Smith posits several arguments in this section of her brief. First, she argues that Aldrich and her firm injected Judge Bertani into the dispute between Smith and Aldrich by suggesting that Smith's claim that an ex parte order was entered was a claim that alleged wrongdoing on the part of Judge Bertani as well. Smith contends that Judge Bertani therefore should have recused himself. Second, Smith argues that Judge Anderson erred when he found that Smith "impugned the integrity of the court" and, even if that finding was not erroneous, he erred when he awarded $6,980 in attorney fees because that figure did not represent the costs Aldrich and her firm incurred as a result of the allegedly false statements. ¶ 44 Initially, we note that Smith fully participated in the hearing on sanctions and did not object to Judge Bertani hearing the Rule 137 issues. Accordingly, she has forfeited her claim that Judge Bertani should have recused himself. See People v. Jones, 206 Ill. App. 3d 477, 480 (1990). Furthermore, as we have previously noted, Judge Bertani did not err when he found that Smith's "insider" allegation also implicated the court. Accordingly, Judge Anderson's finding that Smith "impugned the integrity of the court" was proper. ¶ 45 With regard to the award of $6,980 in attorney fees, we note that at the hearing on sanctions, Judge Anderson found:
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other document is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other document, including a reasonable attorney fee." Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
"The Court also notes that the time incurred by [Wolfe & Stec, Ltd. (WS)] in connection with this dispute would have likely been substantially less had it not been for Ms. Smith's courtroom conduct, which generally includes a combative attitude that is unnecessary and extends beyond the reasonable boundaries of zealous advocacy. This style of advocacy includes, among other things, interposing objections which are unreasonable and unfounded, launching personal attacks, asking the same questions repeatedly, and making inquiries that are simply bizarre at times. For example, even during the hearing on WS' fee petition, she inquired whether a letter 'C' on WS' invoices stood for 'conspiracy,' and she also contended that Judge Bertani was prejudiced against her 'because of the way she looks.' "Our review of the record reveals that Judge Anderson's findings on this matter were appropriate and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. We also find no error in the itemized amount of the award, as we agree with the circuit court that it was reasonable given the circumstances of litigating this dispute. ¶ 46 Lastly, we note that in their response brief, the Aldrich and her firm request that we impose Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) sanctions on Smith for filing a frivolous appeal. Smith, in turn, requests in her reply brief that we impose Rule 375(b) and Rule 137 sanctions on Aldrich and her firm for alleged factual mischaracterizations. We have reviewed these claims and deny both motions.
¶ 47 CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. ¶ 49 Affirmed. ¶ 50 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting in part and concurring in part. ¶ 51 I understand that the sanctioned lawyer would try the patience of even the most temperate judge. I also understand that she took some unreasonable positions. However, the sanctions in this case were awarded because of her statement in a pleading that her opponent "perceives herself as an 'insider' in Will County." The majority has already set forth the circumstances giving rise to Smith's allegations. In imposing sanctions, the trial judge included this statement that "you can't be an insider unless the Court is in on it. And the Court recognizes insider and the Court favors insiders, and to that extent it was - - it was an allegation directed at Ms. Aldrich personally and further by implication at a Court." It seems clear that the main reason for awarding the Rule 137 sanctions was the perception that Smith was maligning the circuit court of Will County. She was not. ¶ 52 Words are important, especially to lawyers and the law. I am not sure for what purpose Smith included the allegation regarding Aldrich's perception of herself as an insider. However, that statement simply and clearly, on its face, does not implicate the court. It implicated only Aldrich's perception of herself. Smith did not say Aldrich was an insider. She said Aldrich perceives herself as an insider. ¶ 53 We live in a state known nationally for corruption. We would all like to believe that there is not one court in this state where anyone could be considered an insider. While we all wish that were true, those of us who, as lawyers, have traveled the state trying cases realize it is most likely not true. Sanctioning a lawyer for this statement can only chill the speech of other lawyers who find themselves getting "homered" in some courtrooms. If we are going to reach the goal where there are no insiders and no favoritism, that can only be done when lawyers feel free and encouraged to point out such conduct when they see it. That, of course, is not what happened here. ¶ 54 There is no evidence of any misconduct by either trial judge in this case. Even more important, there is no allegation in Smith's pleading of misconduct on the part of either trial judge in this case. To read into a pleading that which is not there, and then to sanction a lawyer for the imagined language is not only error, it is counterproductive to our goal of bias-free courtrooms. ¶ 55 In hearings on the motions for sanctions, Aldrich's attorneys argued strenuously that the statement "Aldrich perceives herself to be an 'insider' in Will County" implicated the Will County circuit court. Now, again, Smith's behavior in this case is less than laudable. Many of her positions were extreme and overly emotional. To call her overzealous would be to raise understatement to an art form. On the other hand, she received an ex parte order setting the matter for hearing on discovery objections when she never agreed to that. She also had no way of knowing that the trial judge may have coaxed Aldrich into including that language in the order. What she did know was that while some discovery had not been answered, there had also not been any motions filed, or any requests for a Supreme Court Rule 201(k) conference. Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(k) (eff. Jan. 1, 2013). The request for a Supreme Court Rule 201(k) conference is the necessary predecessor to a motion to compel discovery. In common practice, a motion to compel answers precedes a hearing on discovery disputes. Therefore, things were not proceeding as they normally proceed. I think the most reasonable construction to be given the statement is an accusation that Aldrich thought she could pull one over on the court. The trial court and the majority clearly mischaracterized the statement at issue as an attack on the court. ¶ 56 Therefore, I would reverse the sanctions against Smith. However, I concur in the majority's ruling in paragraph 46 to deny both of the opposing motions for sanctions on appeal.