Opinion
B302292
04-03-2020
In re I.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Real Party in Interest, v. MICHAEL P., Defendant and Petitioner.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc., Law Office of Martin Lee, Phillip Horlacher and Bernadette Reyes for Defendant and Petitioner. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Real Party in Interest, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Social Services. Children's Law Center of Los Angeles, Estaire Press and Margaret K. Lee for Minor and Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04486A) ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in Petition for Extraordinary Writ from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Petition denied. Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc., Law Office of Martin Lee, Phillip Horlacher and Bernadette Reyes for Defendant and Petitioner. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Real Party in Interest, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Social Services. Children's Law Center of Los Angeles, Estaire Press and Margaret K. Lee for Minor and Real Party in Interest.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Michael P. (Father), challenges a juvenile court order denying him reunification service with his daughter, I.P., and setting the matter for a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends that real party in interest Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father did not make reasonable efforts to address and correct problems that had led to the removal of I.P.'s half-brothers in an earlier dependency action (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(10) and (b)(11)), such that provision of further reunification services was not in I.P.'s interest (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2)). Father, who is developmentally disabled and resides in a Regional Center adult group home, maintains that his partial compliance with an earlier case plan and participation in Regional Center services (which assist him with basic living skills), constitute reasonable efforts to address and correct the issues that led to the removal of I.P.'s half-brothers. And, although he lacks standing to do so, Father also argues the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services for I.P.'s mother (Mother), who is not a party here. We find no error and deny the petition.
Undesignated statutory references are to this Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Previous Dependency Actions Involving I.P. and her Half-Siblings
In October 2015, DCFS filed a section 300 petition (case No. DK14019) alleging that then three-year-old I.P. and her one- and two-year-old half-brothers (the boys) required juvenile court protection. The petition alleged that Father had established a "filthy, unsanitary and hazardous home environment." Animal feces and urine were found on the floor throughout the home, I.P., was dirty, unkempt and wore clothes encrusted with fecal matter. In addition, Father and the boys' mother had permitted two known child molesters to reside in the home, with access to the children. Father was arrested for child endangerment. In November 2015, I.P. was released to the care of her mother, A.T. (Mother), who has physical and mental disabilities and lived in an adult care facility. The October 2015 petition was dismissed as to I.P. in March 2016, on condition that her parents abide by a criminal protective order then in place.
Meanwhile, a separate dependency action involving the boys (case No. DK10340) was pending in Lancaster. In that case, Father and the boys' mother were similarly alleged to have maintained a filthy home, with inadequate provisions of food, poor familial hygiene and to have allowed known child molesters access to the boys. Father's case plan required that he participate in individual counseling to address "case issues including sex abuse awareness," and "abide by any restrictions from the criminal court." Father's reunification services were terminated in November 2018, after the court found he had only partially complied with his case plan, and parental rights were terminated as to the boys in October 2019.
The Instant Dependency Action
In early June 2019, DCFS received another referral regarding I.P. and purported harms to which the then seven-year-old child, who has significant disabilities, was at risk in Mother's care. A section 300 petition was filed in mid-July 2019. I.P. was detained from Mother, whose developmental disabilities, mental and physical incapacities, questionable behavior and threats of physical harm to herself and I.P., allegedly rendered her unable to provide appropriate care for, supervise or independently raise the child. I.P. remained in the care of Mother's prior caretaker, who was willing to provide the child a permanent home. I.P. was detained on July 17, 2019, and the matter was set for a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on September 23, 2019.
The child has been diagnosed with pica disorder, is speech delayed and has significant intellectual disorders.
The operative first amended petition (Petition) was filed on September 20, 2019. The Petition added an allegation that I.P.'s half-siblings were juvenile court dependents due to an endangering situation in Father's home, and that reunification services as to the boys were terminated in 2018. As a result of I.P.'s siblings' circumstances, DCFS alleged that Father was unable to provide I.P. appropriate care or supervision, and the child's physical health and safety were at risk. Father appeared on September 23, 2019, and requested visitation with I.P.
The sustained Petition reads: "b-1 [Mother] has mental and emotional problems including, a diagnosis of Schizophrenia, which renders [her] incapable of providing regular care and appropriate supervision for the child. On a prior occasion, [Mother] expressed a desire to harm the child. [Mother] has failed to consistently participate in mental health treatment services. Such mental and emotional condition on the part of [Mother] endangers [I.P.'s] physical health and safety and places [I.P.] at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger. "b-2 [Mother] is diagnosed with Mild Intellectual Disability and Pica Disorder. [Mother] is unable to provide appropriate care and supervision of [I.P.]. Such inability on the part of [Mother] endanger[s] [I.P.'s] physical health and safety and places [I.P.] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and neglect. "b-3 [Father] is diagnosed with Mild Intellectual Disability. Furthermore, [I.P.'s] siblings [the boys] are Dependents of the Juvenile Court . . . due to [Father's] establishing a detrimental and endangering situation for the children. In addition, family reunification services for [the boys] were terminated on 11/30/2018 on behalf of [Father], and [the boys] are receiving Permanent Placement Services. Therefore, [Father] is unable to provide appropriate care and supervision of [I.P.]. Such inability on the part of [Father] endanger[s] [I.P.'s] physical health and safety and places [I.P.] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and neglect."
When interviewed by DCFS in early September 2019, Father acknowledged he had not seen I.P. for five years. Father is developmentally disabled and was then living in a Regional Center facility for adults only. DCFS recommended that Father be denied reunification services on the grounds that his severe mental disability and failure to reunify with his sons rendered him incapable of providing adequate care or supervision to I.P. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2)(10).)
A contested adjudication hearing was conducted on November 1, 2019. The court received into evidence several DCFS reports and exhibits offered by Father. At DCFS's request, the court took judicial notice of the sustained petitions, case plans, findings and orders, and minute orders in the prior dependency actions involving I.P. and/or her siblings. The court found DCFS had proven the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and sustained the Petition.
The court received into evidence DCFS's July 17, 2019 detention report with attachments; an October 2, 2019 Jurisdiction/Disposition report with attachments; and two Last Minute Information Reports with attachments, dated October 1, and November 1, 2019. Father's evidence included a minute order, dated December 6, 2017 (from case No. DK10340); a June 19, 2018 YMCA certificate of completion of a child sexual abuse awareness program; and a March 4, 2016 "certificate of appreciation" reflecting completion of a parenting program.
The court rejected Mother's request that the allegations against her be dismissed on the ground that a diagnosis of schizophrenia, without more, was insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. (§ 350, subd. (c).) The court observed that the record contained competent evidence that Mother was not capable of caring for a child and had at least once had indicated a desire to kill I.P. The court found more than sufficient evidence to sustain the allegations of the petition as to Mother.
Proceeding to disposition, the juvenile court received the same evidence as for the jurisdictional hearing. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence that, returning I.P. to either parent's home did or would pose a substantial danger to her "physical health, safety, protection, [and] well-being." DCFS recommended that Father not be awarded reunification services, because his reunification services as to the boys had been terminated and he had subsequently failed to make sufficient efforts to resolve the issues that to the court's assertion of jurisdiction. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(10) & (b)(11).) The hearing was briefly continued to permit the court to review relevant case law.
When the disposition hearing resumed on November 13, 2019, the court inquired as to the nature of services Father had received or participated in since I.P.'s removal and after termination of jurisdiction in prior actions. The court was informed that Father completed a sex abuse awareness class in June 2018, a parenting program in 2016 and was participating in Regional Center services. The juvenile court found DCFS satisfied its evidentiary burden and that it would not be in I.P.'s best interest to offer reunification services. The court found that the mere fact that Father continued to reside at and participate in services provided by the Regional Center did not constitute reasonable efforts under applicable law. Further, the court found it was not in I.P.'s best interest to offer reunification services given Father's acknowledgment that he had not seen his daughter for at least four years prior to this action, and had no significant relationship with her. By clear and convincing evidence, the court found DCFS had offered the parents reasonable services and it was in I.P.'s best interest to proceed to a section 366.26 hearing for selection of a permanent plan. Father initiated this writ proceeding.
DCFS maintained that Mother was not entitled to reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).) The matter was recessed to permit DCFS to produce competent evidence that Mother was incapable of parenting I.P. That information was subsequently provided and admitted into evidence without objection.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied him reunification services based on section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11) and (c)(2), and erred further in denying reunification services for Mother, based on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2).
1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err When it Denied Father Reunification Services
A. The Standard of Review
We review a juvenile court's denial of reunification services for substantial evidence. (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 216.) Under this standard, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings and conclusions, deferring to that court on issues regarding credibility of witnesses and evidence. (Ibid.) We resolve all conflicts in support of the determination and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the court's order. (Ibid.) Father bears the burden to show the record contains no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the juvenile court's determination. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Findings that Father Failed to Make Reasonable Efforts to Address and Resolve Problems that Led to the Boys Removal
Father maintains there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he failed adequately to address or ameliorate problems that led to the removal of I.P.'s half-brothers in a previous dependency action. He is mistaken.
Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) permit the juvenile court to deny reunification services for a child's parent where it is shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) that parent failed to reunify with the child's sibling or half-sibling or whose parental rights were terminated, and (2) that same parent subsequently failed to undertake reasonable efforts to address and resolve the problems that led to the siblings' removal. (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457-1458.)
The purpose of section 361.5, subdivision (b) is to exempt from the provision of reunification services a parent who is unlikely to benefit from those services, and to ensure the well-being of a child whose parent is unable or unwilling to provide the child a stable, permanent home within a specified time period. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1079-1080.) The "problems that led to removal" referred to in these provisions include both problems identified in the petition in the prior case, and issues that were a "substantial component" of the case plan in the earlier case. (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 (Lana S.).) The juvenile court may not "order reunification for a parent . . . described in [subdivisions (b)(10) or (b)(11)] unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
Application of these principles requires a two-fold analysis. First, the juvenile court must find the parent failed previously to reunify with the child's sibling. Second, the court must find the parent subsequently failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the problems that led to the sibling's removal. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.) The second—"no reasonable effort"— prong of the analysis "provides a means of mitigating an otherwise harsh rule that would allow the court to deny services simply on a finding that services had been terminated as to an earlier child when the parent had in fact, in the meantime, worked toward correcting the underlying problems." (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 842.)
Where a parent has failed to reunify with a dependent child's sibling, the rule generally favoring reunification is replaced by an assumption that it would be an unwise use of resources to offer more reunification services to that parent. (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.) The depth of the problems and potential harm that led to the boys' removal from Father was extensive. The boys were removed after the court found that Father (and the boys' mother) provided a filthy and hazardous home environment. The court also found the parents had placed the children at substantial risk of sexual abuse by permitting one or more known child molesters to live in the home with access to the children. The court found the dangerous home environment Father created placed his sons' physical health and safety at substantial risk of harm. (§ 300, subd. (b).) The earlier dispositional order required Father to complete "individual counseling to address case issues including sex abuse awareness" and "abide by any restrictions from the criminal court." Father's reunification services as to the boys were terminated in November 2018, after the court found Father had only partially complied with the case plan. Parental rights were terminated 11 months later.
The section 300 petition filed in case No. DK14019 as to I.P. alleged: "WIC (b-1) [I.P.'s] father [Father], established a filthy, unsanitary and hazardous home environment for the child in that the home emitted the foul odor of urine and feces. Animal feces and urine were found on the floors throughout the [home]. The carpet in [I.P.'s] bedroom was soiled and filthy. Three year old [I.P.] was found to be in a filthy and unkempt condition. The child's hair was uncombed and dirty. [Her] body emitted a foul odor and [I.P.] wore soiled clothing with fecal matter on [her] shirt. [I.P.'s ] feet were filthy and crusted from being allowed to walk barefoot on filthy floors. On 10/23/15, [Father] was arrested for Child Endangerment. The filthy, unsanitary and hazardous home environment provided for [I.P.] by [Father] endangers [I.P.'s] physical health and safety and creates a detrimental home environment for [I.P.], placing [her] at risk of serious physical harm and damage. "WIC (b-2 [and d-1]) [Father] established a detrimental and endangering home environment for [I.P.] in that [he] allowed two registered sex offenders [one of whom had molested the boys' maternal relatives], to reside in the home of the child and [her half siblings]. . . . [Father] allowed the children to reside in a home and frequently be present in a home where unrelated adult males posed a risk of sexual abuse to the [children]. Such a detrimental and endangering home environment established for [I.P.] by [Father] endangers [her] physical health and safety and places [I.P.] at risk of serious physical harm, damage and sexual abuse."
The record reveals that the juvenile court's March 2016 dismissal of the previous section 300 petition filed on behalf of I.P. (DK14019) was due, in part, to the existence of criminal protective order protecting I.P. from Father.
Here, Father contends that his ongoing participation in Regional Center services should be considered as a reasonable effort to address the problems that led to his sons' removal. The juvenile court found otherwise, and substantial evidence supports that conclusion. Since his reunification services were terminated as to the boys, Father's Regional Center services have been directed, not at addressing the significant issues that placed his children at risk and led to their removal (i.e., the provision of an unsanitary home environment, grossly inadequate personal hygiene, limited food and a very real danger of sexual abuse). Rather, Father's Regional Center services have focused on enabling him to obtain basic personal skills to learn to live independently (e.g., how to brush his teeth, bathe and cook).
Like the juvenile court, we reject Father's assertion that his participation in Regional Center services, voluntary completion of a parenting class, or court-ordered counseling to address sexual awareness, constitutes sufficient evidence to show he has addressed, let alone resolved, the significant issues that led to the children's detention and, ultimately, the boys' removal. The reference in section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of "problems that led to removal," include not just issues reflected in the prior case petition, but also include issues that were a "substantial component" of the case plan in that action. (See Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) As discussed above, the problems that led to removal of I.P.'s siblings from Father's care were far more extensive than those summarized in the sustained petition in the boys' dependency action (DK10340A-B).
Indeed, the March 3, 2016 minute order in the earlier action involving I.P. and her siblings (case No. DK14019), reflects that the court's willingness to dismiss the petition as to I.P. was contingent on Father's compliance with "any restrictions from the criminal court" order protecting I.P., as well as his participation in "individual counseling to address case issues including sex abuse awareness."
The level of success the parent has achieved in addressing the problems that led to the child's siblings' removal is a relevant factor in determining whether the parent's current efforts are reasonable. Reasonable efforts, as used in the bypass provisions, does not mean merely that any effort by the parent, however genuine, to address the problems that led to removal constitutes reasonable effort. Rather, it is appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent and context of the parent's efforts, and other factors regarding the quality and quantity of such efforts, in evaluating their "reasonableness." The parent's progress, or lack of progress, in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the parent's efforts. (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.)
On this record we reasonably may infer the juvenile court considered the appropriate factors in assessing the reasonableness of Father's efforts overall. Father was provided reunification services until the section 366.22 hearing in his sons' case, yet remained unable to reunify with them despite partially completing sexual abuse awareness and parenting classes (which the court had not ordered). The quality and nature of Father's effort to take advantage of Regional Center services, taken alone, was insufficient to permit the court to conclude that returning I.P.'s siblings to Father's care would not create a substantial risk of detriment. Similarly, Father's own testimony was insufficient to convince the juvenile court that he had addressed case issues regarding his lack of protectiveness, ability to parent or awareness of sexual abuse. It is not our place to second guess those determinations. (See In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193, abrogated on another ground by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 ["'issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court'"].)
The extent, quality and quantity of Father's effort also fell short of reasonableness in light of the fact that he failed to complete the court-ordered individual counseling to address sexual abuse awareness in the boys' case. The case plan ordered by the juvenile court was tailored to Father, a parent with an intellectual disability. The juvenile court understood it was important that Father complete such counseling, rather than the standard course mainstream sex abuse counseling program Father chose to attend. (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420 [a parent's mental illness or developmental disability must be the "starting point" for a reunification plan tailored to accommodate the parent's unique needs]; § 16501.5, subd. (b); In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, 329 [the adequacy of the plan and the department's efforts are judged according to the specific circumstances of each case].) As a Regional Center client living in an adult care facility, it was reasonable to infer that Father required individual counseling tailored to his personal limitations, provided at an appropriate pace to address sexual abuse in order to show reasonable effort. That did not occur here. As demonstrated by Father's admission that he did not understand "why he participates in therapy at his current residential Regional Center." His confusion demonstrates that the therapy in which he has participated has failed adequately to address sexual abuse or other relevant case issues. The context of Father's efforts also demonstrate a lack of reasonableness. The majority of Father's counseling services have been aimed at gaining the personal skills necessary for daily living ("personal care activities, such as brushing his teeth, cooking, bathing, and putting on his deodorant"). Necessary as they are for independent living, none of these skills address parenting abilities, child protection or sexual abuse awareness.
On this record, there was no basis for the juvenile court to conclude that Father had made reasonable efforts to address the reasons for I.P.'s siblings' removal. Although Father's improvement in learning to live independently will confer some benefit on his ability successfully to parent, the juvenile court considered this and concluded such services were insufficient to address Father's need and ability to identify risk and to protect his children from risk. We will not revisit the issue. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [under substantial evidence standard, the appellate court lacks "power to judge the effect or value of the evidence" and must reject evidence unfavorable to the order "as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact"].) In sum, the termination of parental rights for I.P.'s siblings entailed a finding of parental unfitness and confirmed for the juvenile court that additional efforts would also be inadequate.
In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127 is instructive. In Diamond H., the appellate court affirmed a juvenile court order denying reunification services for a parent pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). (Id. at pp. 1139-1141, disapproved on other grounds by Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735.) The court observed that a parent's "chronic mental disorder, even with education, therapy and medication, prevented her from being able to safely parent [her child] throughout childhood." (Diamond H., at pp. 1135-1136.) There, despite the fact that the mother received 11 years of services and made positive changes in her life, her other children were in permanent plans. The mother had not addressed the problems that led to the siblings' removal to the point that she could safely parent a child without full time supervision. (Id. at pp. 1136-1138.) There, despite the mother's efforts, her "lack of success . . . showed she was unlikely to benefit from further services" and the provision of such services would be "fruitless." (Id. at p. 1138.)
Like the parent in Diamond H., Father's chronic condition prevents him from being able to safely and independently parent I.P., even with the assistance of his Regional Center program. Indeed, the fruitlessness of providing reunification services to Father are evident from his admitted lack of insight as to the reasons his sons were removed from his care. He has not even acknowledged it was his home environment that precipitated the danger. Although he concedes the house was "dirty," he declined to clean it because it was not his home. Rather, Father claims he took the boys and I.P. to a friend's house, and made no mention of how unacceptably unsanitary the place was for children to reside. Father also said he did not know that the people there did "bad things" to kids. Although the police told Father the boys were abused and "touched by those guys," there is no indication that Father understands the extent of his children's abuse, let alone how he should have been more protective. As with the parent in Diamond H., Father is a sympathetic figure. Nevertheless, like her, Father's chronic limitations and lack of insight provide substantial evidence that he was unlikely to benefit from reunification services, and the court did not err in determining it would be fruitless to offer them. 2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Concluding that Reunification Services Were Not in I.P.'s Best Interest
Even if we assume Father showed that he made a reasonable effort to address the issues that caused his sons' removal, we would conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding Father was not entitled to reunification services.
A juvenile court's determination under section 361.5, subdivision (c), as to whether the provision of reunification services would be in a child's best interest is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229 (William B.).) Where, as here, a section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) or (b)(11) finding is made, the court is precluded from ordering reunification services unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the child's best interest. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) The parent bears the burden to rebut this statutory presumption and show that reunification services would serve the child's best interest. (Ibid.; William B., supra, at p. 1227.)
In determining a child's best interests, the court considers "'a parent's current efforts and fitness as well as the parent's history'; '[t]he gravity of the problem that led to the dependency'; the strength of the bonds between the child and the parent and between the child and the caretaker; and 'the child's need for stability and continuity.' [Citation.]" (William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228.) Part of the "best interests" analysis requires a finding that further reunification services are likely to be successful. Thus, there must be a reasonable basis to conclude reunification is possible before services may be offered to a parent to whom such services need not otherwise be provided. (Id. at pp. 1228-1229.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the provision of reunification services for Father was not in I.P.'s best interest. I.P. has no bond with Father. The only adult with whom I.P. shares a bond is Mother's former caretaker, whom I.P. calls her "mom." I.P. has been in foster care most of her life and lacks the stability and permanency she needs. Even when I.P. did live with a parent, the child was either forced to move frequently (mother regularly changed homes on a whim), or lived in a unhealthful, dangerous environment (with her half-brothers in Father's care). Moreover, I.P. is developmentally disabled, and has special and significant needs. Given Father's significant limitations, coupled with an absence of any bond between the two, the court was well within its discretion to find it would not serve in I.P.'s best interests to provide reunification services to Father.
3. Father Lacks Standing to Challenge the Order Denying Reunification Services for Mother
"Standing to challenge an adverse ruling is not established merely because a parent takes a position on an issue that affects the minor [citation]; nor can a parent raise the minor's best interest as a basis for standing [citation]. Without a showing that a parent's personal rights are affected by a ruling, the parent does not establish standing." (In re D.S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 671, 674; see Code Civ. Proc., § 902 [only an "aggrieved" party may appeal].) A personal interest in a judgment does not confer standing.
"Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in its favor, only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. [Citations.] An aggrieved person, for this purpose, is one whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision. [Citations.]" (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236; In re Joshua S. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 147, 150 [standing requires a legally cognizable interest, i.e., one must be injuriously affected by a ruling in an immediate, substantial manner, not merely as a nominal or remote consequence.) These principles apply with full force in dependency proceedings. (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236.) Father lacks standing to challenge the denial of services for Mother on her behalf because his personal rights are not affected by the juvenile court's denial of Mother's reunification services. (In re D.S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.)
We reject Father's contention that his personal rights were affected because the bypass of reunification services for Mother resulted in the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The setting of a hearing, by itself, does not confer or deny rights to a parent. Father's interest in this action is to reunify with I.P. The court's order denying reunification services for another parent does not adversely affect that interest. Absent a showing that his own rights were violated, Father lacks standing to contest the court's denial of Mother's reunification services and we lack jurisdiction to consider his claim. (See In re D.S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.)
In some cases, a parent does have standing even though the challenged order does not directly affect their person rights. However, those cases primarily concern issues regarding placement because resolution of a placement issue may affect the decision to terminate parental rights. (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 237.) --------
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DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE, J.
We concur:
MANELLA, P. J.
CURREY, J.