Opinion
B294506
11-20-2019
In re GENESIS C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.S. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.S. Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brittany M. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP05233) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Natalie Stone, Judge. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part. Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.S. Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brittany M. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Brittany M. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders declaring then 12-year-old Karen, 11-year-old Melanie, nine-year-old Christopher, and six-year-old Adrian dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). While the children were residing in Mexico, Mother traveled to California with their younger sibling, then four-year-old Genesis C. Law enforcement arrested Mother after discovering 72 pounds of methamphetamine in Mother's vehicle during a traffic stop. After the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) detained Genesis, at the Department's request Mother brought Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian to California to be assessed, and the four children were also detained.
Mother contends the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because California was not the four children's home state and no emergency existed authorizing assumption of temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.; UCCJEA). Mother also asserts the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because the Department lured Mother to bring the children to California, leading to their detention.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
A.S. (Father), the father of Karen and Melanie, appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional orders retaining jurisdiction and denying Father's request for sole legal and physical custody over Karen and Melanie. On May 28, 2019, while Father's appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Karen and Melanie and entered a custody order granting sole legal and physical custody of the two girls to Father. Because we cannot grant Father effective relief, we dismiss his appeal as moot. As to Mother, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Mother's Arrest, the Referral, and the Investigation
On August 15, 2018 Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies pulled Mother's vehicle over for speeding. Then four-year-old Genesis was seated in a car seat in the rear of the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, the deputies discovered 72 pounds of methamphetamine in the trunk and under the rear car seat, in which Genesis was sitting. Deputies arrested Mother and referred the matter to the Department for investigation.
The investigating social worker interviewed Genesis, who reported Mother had "[b]ags with white stuff" in the vehicle. Genesis had not seen the bags, but Mother had told her the bags were in the trunk. Genesis reported she had seen her Mother and Genesis's stepfather (Mother's husband Federico M.) "slap each other in the face." After an evaluation, a physician reported Genesis had head lice and "[l]ots of dental caries." The Department detained Genesis and placed her in foster care.
The social worker interviewed Mother, who was in custody at the jail. Mother stated she lived in Tijuana, Mexico with Federico and her five children. Mother reported Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian were in Mexico under the care of Federico. Mother denied knowing the drugs were in her vehicle. She explained her vehicle was at a mechanic's shop for repairs and was returned to her the day before she left Mexico. Mother was on her way to California to pick up money for someone in Mexico, for which Mother was going to be paid $5,000. The social worker noted "[M]other was not being forthcoming, as there was a substantial amount of methamphetamine found in her vehicle." The social worker attached to the detention report a photograph showing the numerous bags of drugs found in Mother's car. The social worker requested Mother bring her four other children to the United States to be assessed, and Mother agreed.
Mother did not know the whereabouts of the fathers of Genesis, Christopher, and Adrian. Their fathers are not parties to this appeal.
The social worker interviewed Federico by telephone. Federico was not the father of any of Mother's children. He reported he had a criminal conviction of domestic violence against a prior partner. Federico denied any knowledge of drugs in Mother's vehicle and noted the car had been serviced by the same mechanic twice in one month. Asked about the allegation he and Mother slapped each other, Federico replied, "We just play fight. Nothing serious."
On August 16, 2018 Mother contacted the social worker after being released from custody. Mother submitted to a drug test, which was negative. On August 18 Mother brought Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian to California, where they were interviewed by the social worker. Earlier that day a court issued an order authorizing removal of the four children.
Karen stated to the social worker that she had been residing with Father in Florida and only recently began living with Mother in Mexico. Karen wanted to continue living with Mother. Karen reported two or three times each month Mother took her car to a mechanic in Mexico and the United States. Karen also reported Mother had taken her and her siblings to Northern California "to pick up money," and she, Melanie, and Genesis had made such a trip with Mother as recently as the week before Genesis's detention.
Melanie and Christopher similarly reported Mother had been having car trouble two or three times a week (according to Melanie) or a month (according to Christopher), for which Mother took the car to a mechanic in Mexico. Mother would then drive to California to pick up money. Melanie and her siblings had made the trips with Mother, including a trip to California the week before Genesis's detention. Christopher similarly reported he was present with Mother on several of the trips, as well as his siblings. Adrian did not know whether Mother took her car to the mechanic or took Adrian to California to pick up money. None of the four children had observed the presence or use of drugs at home or in the vehicle. Nor had they observed domestic violence between Mother and Federico at home.
In a telephone interview, Mother acknowledged she left her car two or three times per month with a mechanic named Giovanni in Tijuana. Mother also admitted taking the children with her to California to pick up money. But Mother stated, "I swear I didn't know about any drugs." B. The Petitions and Detentions
On August 17, 2018 the Department filed a petition on behalf of Genesis pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged Mother placed Genesis in a detrimental and endangering situation by allowing her to be a passenger during the transportation of 72 pounds of methamphetamine, with Genesis seated within reach of the drugs. At the August 20 detention hearing, the court recognized Mexico was the home state of Genesis, but exercised emergency jurisdiction based on the transportation of large amounts of methamphetamine, which posed a danger to Genesis. The parties agreed to the court contacting the court in Mexico, and the court detained Genesis.
On August 21, 2018 the Department filed a petition on behalf of Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The petition alleged Mother endangered the children's physical health, safety, and well-being and placed the children at risk of serious physical harm by placing Genesis in a detrimental and endangering situation as a passenger in Mother's car while Mother transported 72 pounds of methamphetamine.
The Department later filed an amended petition as to all five children, adding two counts alleging Mother "failed to ensure that the children received appropriate educational services while under her care." However, the juvenile court later struck these allegations.
At the August 22 detention hearing as to the four children, Mother's counsel informed the court she intended to file a motion to dismiss "asserting that there's no personal jurisdiction over these children." The court acknowledged "Florida may be the home state" of Karen because she may have resided in Mexico fewer than six months. The court "direct[ed] the Department to contact the appropriate agency responsible for Titusville, Florida, to determine if there are any open referrals or . . . any child custody orders that were issued by the Florida court." The court stated it would "contact the proper court in Mexico with respect to the other children."
The juvenile court detained Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian from Mother and placed them in foster care. The court ordered monitored visitation for Mother a minimum of three times per week. The court ordered the Department to contact Father and to send notice to Father's address in Florida. C. Mother's Motion To Dismiss and Father's Request for Custody
On August 29, 2018 Mother filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Mother asserted Florida was the home state of Karen and Mexico was the home state of Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian, who had lived in Mexico with Mother for longer than a year. Mother argued that because California was not the children's home state, the court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA in the absence of an emergency. Mother asserted "there was not an emergency need to detain these four children" because they were safe at home in Mexico with Mother's husband during Mother's arrest and "there was no current conduct by Mother or any parent that placed those children at risk of imminent harm [or] mistreatment or abuse." Mother further contended the Department engaged in unjustifiable conduct under section 3428 "by filing a removal warrant on these children who had lived and continue to live in Mexico, causing Mother to transport them across three counties to Los Angeles, and then immediately detaining them into non-relative foster care." The Department opposed the motion on the ground the four children were also brought on Mother's trips to California, during which she transported drugs.
Karen had lived in Mexico only since May 2018, fewer than six months as required for home state status under the UCCJEA. (§ 3402, subd. (g).)
Mother also contended California was an inconvenient forum as compared to Mexico but has abandoned this argument on appeal.
At the September 6, 2018 progress hearing, the juvenile court stated it had made contact with the Florida court that had adjudicated Mother and Father's family law matter concerning custody of Karen and Melanie. The court reported the Florida court "today ceded jurisdiction to [the] California courts to adjudicate the petition filed on behalf of Karen and Melanie and to prepare disposition." The court noted it had yet to hear from the Mexico court, and therefore it could not "move forward with adjudicating the petition today for any of the children."
After hearing argument, the juvenile court found it had emergency jurisdiction. The court reasoned, "Looking at the requirements, the children were present in the state. I understand that counsel for Mother has some issues with how they came to be present in this state, but the fact is they were present in this state. And I agree with county counsel's motion that I don't see any exception for the children improperly having been brought to the state. [¶] In addition, I am finding that there's danger to these children of abuse or—here we have the possibility of retribution. I can only speculate, frankly, about how much exactly 72 pounds of meth is worth, but I don't think it takes an expert to know it's a whole lot of money. And that has now gone missing. [¶] And there's a reasonable suspicion that this was a pattern, either weekly or two to three times a month, that the trips that the children were making were for similar purposes as the one that involved Genesis. And, in and of itself, it's dangerous for them to be in a car with meth quantities like this. Many things could happen, and I don't think that's speculative." The court concluded, "I have temporary emergency jurisdiction until such time as Mexico tells me they want to take jurisdiction."
The juvenile court also noted an "additional allegation" against Federico under investigation that gave the court "very serious concerns," referring to an allegation by Father that Federico sexually abused Melanie. But Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian all denied they or their siblings were sexually abused, and the allegation was not substantiated.
At the September 6 hearing, Father requested custody of Karen and Melanie, which request Mother joined. The court ordered forensic interviews of Karen and Melanie and continued the hearing to September 12. After a further continuance, on October 1 the juvenile court ordered Karen and Melanie released to Father in Florida. Despite the court's sending of a translated letter and e-mails to the Mexico court, the juvenile court still had not received a response. The court continued the jurisdictional hearing to November 20. D. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
At the November 20, 2018 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court announced it had received a response from the Mexico court. The Mexico court stated in an October 31 e-mail, "In my court, there is no matter related to this case." The juvenile court responded, "I'm interpreting your response to mean that your court wishes to decline jurisdiction and allow California courts to take jurisdiction over this matter." The juvenile court requested the Mexico court respond by November 20 if it was not declining jurisdiction. No response was received. At the hearing, Mother's counsel conceded "the [UCCJEA] issue has been resolved," all parties submitted on the issue, and the juvenile court exercised permanent jurisdiction.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the amended petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), as to Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian. The court found "Mother was fully aware of what was happening" and "multiple children in the family were used, essentially, as cover for Mo[ther]'s drug trafficking, and I believe that the kids were at great risk of retribution or just other harm." The juvenile court declared the children dependents of the juvenile court.
At the disposition hearing, Father's counsel requested the court grant Father sole legal and physical custody of Karen and Melanie and terminate jurisdiction. The court denied the request, instead providing reunification services to Mother. But the court placed Karen and Melanie with Father, "who is nonoffending and had joint physical custody previously."
Father and Mother timely appealed from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. E. The Juvenile Court's Termination of Jurisdiction as to Karen and Melanie
At a May 20, 2019 hearing, the juvenile court granted Father sole legal and physical custody over Karen and Melanie, with monitored visitation for Mother until she submitted proof of six consecutive negative drug tests. The court terminated jurisdiction, but stayed its order pending receipt of the juvenile custody order. On May 28 the juvenile court lifted its stay, entered the final custody order, and terminated jurisdiction.
The Department requests we take judicial notice of the May 28, 2019 minute orders and juvenile custody order. We augment the record to include these orders, as well as the May 20, 2019 minute orders. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) Consideration of postjudgment evidence is appropriate when the later orders are relevant to a motion to dismiss an appeal or to determine whether the evidence renders the appeal moot. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676 ["appellate courts routinely consider limited postjudgment evidence" for motions to dismiss]; In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58 [appellate court may consider postappeal rulings that affect its ability to grant effective relief].)
On September 23, 2019 the Department filed a motion to dismiss Father's appeal as moot in light of the final custody order granting Father sole physical and legal custody of Karen and Melanie and terminating jurisdiction. Father has not filed a response to the Department's motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA "to ensure that the provisions of the UCCJEA have been properly interpreted and that substantial evidence supports the factual basis for the juvenile court's determination whether California may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction in the case." (In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 520 (Aiden L.); accord, W.M. v. V.A. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 64, 74 [stating as to UCCJEA, "we review matters of statutory construction de novo, and review the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence"]; In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 670.) B. The Juvenile Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction
1. Subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA
The UCCJEA "provides the exclusive means for determining the proper forum and subject matter jurisdiction for child custody proceedings involving . . . two states." (Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 516; accord, In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593, 597 (A.M.).) "'Under the UCCJEA, a California court must "treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of" determining jurisdiction. (§ 3405, subd. (a).)'" (A.M., at p. 597; In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 490.) "Subject matter jurisdiction over a dependency action under the UCCJEA either exists or does not exist at the time the petition is filed." (Aiden L., at p. 516; A.M., at p. 597.)
"Under section 3421, California may assume jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following apply: California is the child's 'home state,' meaning the state in which the child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the child custody proceeding was commenced (§§ 3421, subd. (a)(1), 3402, subd. (g); a court of another state does not have jurisdiction because it is not the child's home state (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)); a court of the child's home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground California is the more appropriate forum (ibid.); all courts having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground California is the more appropriate forum (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3)); or no other state has jurisdiction under the foregoing tests (§ 3421, subd. (a)(4))." (A.M., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.)
"Section 3424 provides an exception to the exclusive jurisdictional bases for making an initial child custody determination or modifying a sister state custody order. (§§ 3421, subds. (a), (b), 3423.) A California court may exercise 'temporary emergency jurisdiction' when a 'child is present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse.' (§ 3424, subd. (a).) An 'emergency' exists when there is an immediate risk of danger to the child if he or she is returned to a parent." (Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 517, fn. 5; accord, In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097.) "'Although emergency jurisdiction is generally intended to be short term and limited, the juvenile court may continue to exercise its authority as long as the reasons underlying the dependency exist.' [Citations.] Nonetheless, the proper exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction does not confer authority to make a permanent child custody order." (Aiden L., at p. 517, fn. 5; accord, In re Gino C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 965-966.)
2. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's assumption of emergency jurisdiction under section 3424
Mother contends the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian because California was not their home state and no emergency existed within the meaning of section 3424 authorizing the court's exercise of temporary jurisdiction. It is undisputed Florida is the home state of Karen, and Mexico is the home state of Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian. However, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction.
Mother argues "concerns that the siblings might have had tooth decay and head lice like Genesis did not present the immediate risk of danger required for section 3424 jurisdiction." This may be true, but Mother ignores the factual basis for the juvenile's court assumption of jurisdiction under section 3424: the Department presented substantial evidence Mother frequently trafficked drugs from Mexico to California and routinely brought her children on the journey. The juvenile court found it was dangerous for the children to be in the car with their Mother when she was transporting large quantities of methamphetamine and they were in danger of retribution from Mother's loss of the drugs. As the juvenile court found, "a large criminal enterprise involving large amounts of methamphetamine [is] a very, very dangerous situation for any children associated with that." Mother does not dispute this evidence and fails to challenge the court's factual finding Mother was knowingly involved in large-scale drug trafficking.
A.M., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at page 599 is instructive. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's assumption of emergency jurisdiction under section 3424 where evidence showed mother and father's "attempt to use the children in their scheme to smuggle heroin across the international border presented a substantial risk of danger to the children." (A.M., at p. 599.) Although Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian were not present with Genesis when Mother was arrested with 72 pounds of methamphetamine, substantial evidence showed they had been passengers on multiple prior trips for the same purpose, subjecting them to the same risk of danger found to justify the exercise of emergency jurisdiction in A.M. Additionally, Mother remained free from law enforcement custody after August 16, 2018, and the record contains no evidence Mother stopped transporting drugs across the border. The risk of danger to the children from being passengers during Mother's drug trafficking trips, or being subject to retaliation for Mother's loss of the large quantity of drugs, supported the court's assumption of temporary emergency jurisdiction under section 3424.
We reject the Department's argument Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction is moot in light of the Florida and Mexico courts declining jurisdiction. As noted, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction over a dependency action under the UCCJEA either exists or does not exist at the time the petition is filed." (Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 516.) Further, the Department relies on the court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction to support the Department's position the court was not deprived of jurisdiction under section 3428 as a result of the Department's conduct in requesting Mother bring the children to California.
3. The Department's conduct in requesting Mother bring the children to California did not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction
Mother argues the Department engaged in "unjustifiable conduct" within the meaning of section 3428, when it requested Mother bring Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian, who were then residing in Mexico, to Los Angeles for an assessment and then detained the children upon their arrival.
Section 3428 provides, "(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424 . . . if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this part because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless one of the following are true: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under Section 3427." "'Unjustifiable conduct' requires a court to decline jurisdiction only when the court's jurisdiction is invoked as a result of unclean hands . . . . [¶] . . . 'Although [section] 3428 does not expressly say so, it seems primarily directed at a petitioning parent's wrongful taking of the child across state lines in an attempt to "create" jurisdiction in a chosen forum.'" (In re Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 512 [trial court properly exercised jurisdiction under UCCJEA despite wife's allegation husband kidnapped son from her in Pakistan where California court had assumed jurisdiction before the alleged kidnapping].)
We are skeptical the Department engaged in "unjustifiable conduct" within the meaning of section 3428 by requesting Mother bring Genesis's siblings to California for an assessment, then detaining them after they described what appeared to be drug trafficking trips across the border with the siblings in the car. However, we need not resolve this issue because section 3428 by its plain language does not apply to the juvenile court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction under section 3424. (See § 3428 ["Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424 . . . if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this part because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction . . . ."].) As discussed, the juvenile court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction. Thus, section 3428 did not apply to bar the court's assumption of jurisdiction regardless of the Department's conduct.
Mother's reliance on Hafer v. Superior Court (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 856 is misplaced. The Court of Appeal there concluded the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over children who resided in Idaho under the predecessor statute to the UCCJEA, while separately finding an "adequate basis to deny the California forum for unclean hands" because the mother had abducted the children from Idaho before invoking the jurisdiction of the California court. (Hafer, at pp. 857-858, 862-863.) In reaching its decision, the Hafer court noted the children had not been adequately treated for "badly decayed teeth and painful ear problems [and] a urinary tract infection," but it found the father's delay in diagnosing and treating the children's medical problems did not constitute sufficient neglect to "warrant deprivation of custody on an emergency basis." (Id. at pp. 862-864.) Here, as discussed, the juvenile court exercised emergency jurisdiction based on the dangers of the children's continued exposure to serious criminal drug trafficking activity, not Genesis's head lice and tooth decay. C. Father's Appeal Is Moot
Mother does not dispute that once Florida and Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction, the juvenile court properly exercised permanent jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(3), which provides jurisdiction where "[a]ll courts having jurisdiction . . . have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum . . . ."
Father contends the juvenile court erred by "denying him sole custody of Karen and Melanie and declining to terminate jurisdiction over them." The Department argues Father's appeal must be dismissed as moot because during the pendency of this appeal the juvenile court granted Father sole physical and legal custody of Karen and Melanie and terminated its jurisdiction over the two girls. We agree Father's appeal is moot.
A dependency appeal "'"becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief."'" (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623; accord, In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644 [appeal moot where minor was over 18 at time of appeal]; In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61 [mother's appeal moot where juvenile court awarded her custody of minor and dismissed dependency proceedings].)
Termination of jurisdiction will not render an appeal moot where an erroneous jurisdictional finding results in an order that continues to affect the parent adversely. (See In re J.P., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 623 [father's appeal not moot where he lost legal and physical custody of his children with only monitored visitation]; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547-1548 [father's appeal not rendered moot by termination of jurisdiction where juvenile court awarded sole physical and legal custody to mother and restricted father's visitation].)
The procedural posture here is similar to In re N.S., in which the court concluded the mother's appeal was moot because she was awarded custody of her child and "the jurisdictional findings [were] not the basis of any current order that [was] adverse to her." (In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 61; see In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494-1495 [court could not grant effective relief where father did not challenge final custody order granting him visitation].)
Because Father has not shown any prejudice from the jurisdictional findings or dispositional orders for which we can grant effective relief, we dismiss his appeal.
DISPOSITION
Father's appeal is dismissed. The juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders as to Karen, Melanie, Christopher, and Adrian are affirmed.
FEUER, J. WE CONCUR:
PERLUSS, P. J.
SEGAL, J.