Opinion
B313869
07-20-2022
In re D.A. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. W.G., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21CCJP01006, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CURREY, J.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over the four children of W.G. (mother) and A.A. (father) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The court found the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to: (1) their parents' substance abuse; and (2) their parents' failure to make an appropriate plan for their ongoing care, in that the parents left the children with their maternal grandmother, Y.M. (maternal grandmother), who has an extensive history with the Department of Children and Family Services (Department). Subsequently, the court removed the children from their parents and granted the parents reunification services. It declined to place the children with maternal grandmother.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On appeal, mother argues the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. She also contends the court erred by declining to consider legal guardianship under section 360, subdivision (a) as an alternative to removal, and by denying her request to have the children placed with maternal grandmother. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This appeal concerns D.A., A.A., H.A., and N.A. When this case was initiated, D.A. was nine years old, A.A. was seven years old, H.A. was five years old, and N.A. was three years old. The parents were homeless, and the children were residing with maternal grandmother.
In January 2021, the Department received a referral alleging the children had been subjected to neglect. The reporting party stated the children's maternal aunt, A.G. (maternal aunt), had petitioned for legal guardianship of the children because school staff refused to discuss education related decisions with her or maternal grandmother unless guardianship was in place. According to the reporting party, maternal aunt lived in Tijuana, Mexico, but misrepresented that she lived with maternal grandmother in Azusa. Among other things, the reporting party also disclosed: (1) the parents left the children in maternal grandmother's care because they were "heavy methamphetamine addicts" who were unable to care for them; (2) the reporting party was concerned about maternal grandmother's ability to care for the children, as "her own children went into foster care[ ]"; and (3) the reporting party "had concerns that the parents will take the children away from maternal grandmother's home."
On February 1, 2021, maternal aunt's petition for legal guardianship was denied. A little over two weeks later, maternal grandmother told the Department she filed a petition for legal guardianship of the children, which was set for hearing on March 5, 2021. She did not provide the Department any documents relating to her petition.
Following an investigation, on March 1, 2021, the Department detained the children from maternal grandmother. Two days later, the Department filed a petition on their behalf under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to: (1) mother's abuse of methamphetamine and father's failure to protect them from her substance abuse (count b-1); (2) father's abuse of methamphetamine and mother's failure to protect them from his substance abuse (count b-2); and (3) the parents' implementation of an inappropriate plan for their care, "in that [the parents] left [them] in the care of . . . maternal grandmother[,]" who has an "extensive . . . history" with the Department (count b-3).
At the jurisdictional hearing held on June 9, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the petition as alleged with respect to both parents. It also ordered the Department to set up visits for maternal grandmother and to continue assessing her for placement.
Before the dispositional hearing, the Department submitted a Last Minute Information report, in which it assessed maternal grandmother's appropriateness for placement. The Department recommended against placing the children with her based on concerns about her ability to ensure they received services as required to address their needs, protect them from their parents and provide a safe and stable environment free of conflict, cooperate and be honest with the Department, and comply with court orders.
The dispositional hearing took place on June 29, 2021. There, mother's counsel represented mother "was interested in a [section 360, subdivision (a)] guardianship." In the alternative, he stated mother "object[ed] to the removal of the . . . children from her custody[,]" and that "[i]f the court [was] not inclined to release [the children to her], mother would ask for placement with . . . maternal grandmother[.]" Father's counsel "submit[ed] on the [Department's] recommendation[ ]" for the children's removal and for the parents to receive reunification services.
The juvenile court declared the children dependents of the court under section 300, subdivision (b), removed them from their parents, ordered them to be suitably placed by the Department, and granted the parents reunification services and monitored visits. It also ordered the Department to continue assessing the grandparents for placement and unmonitored visits. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivision (b) A. Governing Legal Principles
When the petition was adjudicated in this case, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provided that the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, . . . or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's . . . substance abuse."
"'The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.' [Citation.]" (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) In deciding whether the child is at risk of harm, the court may consider past events, as "[a] parent's past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior. [Citation.]" (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the hearing, however, "[t]here must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]" (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
We review a juvenile court's jurisdictional orders for substantial evidence. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) Under this standard, "we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and orders." (Ibid.) "We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]" (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
"Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. It is not synonymous with 'any' evidence. [Citation.] The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]" (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) "The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) "' . . . "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)
B. Analysis
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by sustaining all three counts asserted in the section 300 petition. In so doing, she does not dispute that she and father abused methamphetamine. Nor does she dispute that, due to their ongoing substance abuse, they were unable to adequately care for and supervise the children on their own. Instead, mother solely contends jurisdiction was unwarranted because "the children were safely placed in the custody and care of . . . maternal grandmother[,] who met all of their needs and protected the children from [m]other and [f]ather when [they were] under the influence [of drugs]." In support of her argument, she primarily relies on In re Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92 (Kaylee H.).
In Kaylee H., the parents placed their one-month-old daughter in the care of her paternal great-uncle while they worked to resolve their substance abuse issues and legal problems. (Kaylee H., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.) With their consent, the paternal great-uncle petitioned the probate court for guardianship. (Ibid.) The probate court appointed the paternal great-uncle as the child's temporary guardian and referred the case to the social services agency to investigate whether a dependency case needed to be opened on the child's behalf. (Id. at pp. 97-98.) The guardianship investigator reported the paternal great-uncle and his wife "did not have any criminal or child protective history, and there were no specific concerns about [his] suitability as guardian." (Id. at p. 98.) The social worker who investigated the probate court's referral decided a section 300 petition was not necessary, and recommended that permanent guardianship be established for the child in probate court. (Ibid.)
Subsequently, at the juvenile court's direction, the social services agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging the parents had used methamphetamine in the last couple of years and placed her in the care of the paternal great- uncle who was seeking guardianship. (Kaylee H., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.) At the detention hearing, the father filed a motion akin to a demurrer challenging the petition's legal sufficiency. (Ibid.) The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that, if true, the allegations demonstrated there was a substantial risk of future harm to the child if she were to be in her parents' care. (Id. at p. 99.)
When Kaylee H. was decided, section 331 stated: "When any person has applied to the social worker . . . to commence juvenile court proceedings and the social worker fails to file a petition within three weeks after the application, the person may, within one month after making the application, apply to the juvenile court to review the decision of the social worker, and the court may either affirm the decision of the social worker or order him or her to commence juvenile court proceedings."
The Court of Appeal determined the juvenile court erred by denying the father's motion. (Kaylee H., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 107-108.) It explained, "[r]ather than finding a risk of harm based on the child's current circumstances, as required under section 300, subdivision (b), the juvenile court found that the child would be at risk of future harm based on a conditional event, which may or may not occur." (Id. at p. 108, fn. omitted.) The Court of Appeal held dependency jurisdiction was unwarranted because: (1) with the parents' consent, the paternal great-uncle had been granted temporary guardianship of the child; (2) his application for permanent guardianship was uncontested; and (3) the evidence did not indicate he was inappropriately caring for the child or was unable to protect her from her parents' problems. (Id. at p. 109.)
Mother's argument predicated on Kaylee H. is without merit. As discussed below, Kaylee H. is distinguishable from this case in several respects. Therefore, Kaylee H. does not apply.
At the outset, we note that unlike the paternal great-uncle in Kaylee H., the record does not indicate maternal grandmother had temporary guardianship of the children. Nor does it demonstrate she petitioned for legal guardianship. We acknowledge that in February 2021, maternal grandmother told the Department she filed a petition for legal guardianship, which was set for hearing on March 5, 2021. However, she did not provide the Department with any documentation relating to any such petition. Moreover, we could not locate any other evidence showing she did, in fact, seek legal guardianship.
In addition, unlike the paternal great-uncle in Kaylee H., maternal grandmother has an extensive history with the Department. In December 1999, the juvenile court sustained a section 300 petition filed on behalf of her four children, including mother. In so doing, it found the children were at risk of harm due to: (1) maternal grandmother's use of inappropriate physical discipline; (2) her failure to protect the children from physical abuse by her roommate; (3) her substance abuse; and (4) her failure to protect the children from sexual abuse. Maternal grandmother did not reunify with her children; all of their dependency cases were terminated with either adoption or legal guardianship in place.
Next, in contrast to Kaylee H., the record reflects maternal grandmother did not ensure all of the children's needs were being met while they were in her care. Specifically, the record indicates N.A. and H.A. did not receive services as needed to address significant behavioral issues stemming from special needs.
Mother reported N.A. was diagnosed with autism. The evidence shows he had a "speech impediment" and required constant supervision and redirection because he had "an excessive tendency to place his fingers and objects into his mouth[,]" and was not receptive to redirection. His caregiver reported N.A. also engaged in other concerning behaviors. She stated N.A. "often ha[d] a blank look on his face and then w[ould] start to hum, [and] express saliva from his mouth that bec[a]me foamy." She also stated N.A. would "also hum, place his hands in his mouth[,] and rock back and forth in place." Mother related N.A. previously received services from the Regional Center, but maternal grandmother discontinued his services because she did not believe he needed them.
Similarly, the record demonstrates H.A. also exhibited concerning behaviors requiring intervention. The Department social worker who interviewed H.A. in April 2021 reported that H.A. only "stated a few words[,]" and that the social worker "was unable to understand [H.A.]" H.A.'s caregiver reported she was "also unable to understand [him]" and his "verbalization [was] extremely limited." She stated that "[i]n order to meet [his] needs," she "physically point[ed]" at things "to provid[e] various option[s,]" to which H.A. would respond by nodding or shaking his head. The caregiver related that, after refusing to comply with "simple requests[,]" H.A. "exhibit[ed] temper tantrums that include[d] hitting, throwing objects, hiding under his bed, lifting the bed, kicking, hiding under the dining table and throw[ing] all the chairs[,] and throw[ing] his clothes into the hallway." She also reported H.A. would hit and bite N.A. Despite exhibiting these behaviors, the record does not reflect H.A. was receiving any services while in maternal grandmother's care.
Lastly, unlike the paternal great-uncle in Kaylee H., the record indicates maternal grandmother may not be able to protect the children from their parents. Specifically, the evidence shows mother often engages in erratic, aggressive, and combative behavior toward her and others in the children's presence, especially when under the influence of drugs. Her actions have escalated into many altercations requiring police intervention.
Although not entirely clear, the record reflects the children began residing with maternal grandmother sometime in 2020.
Maternal grandmother reported that when mother was under the influence of drugs, mother would go to her home while the children were in her care and start fights with her. In January 2021, H.A. told the Department: "'My mommy fights with grandma.'"
Police call logs demonstrate the police received seven calls between February and September 2020 due to disputes between mother and maternal grandmother at maternal grandmother's home. On February 22, 2020, mother told the police that maternal grandmother was holding her six-year-old daughter against her will. During that call, maternal grandmother had locked herself in the bedroom with one of the children, and mother was yelling at them. On August 31, 2020, maternal grandmother told the police that mother had been drinking and was under the influence of a controlled substance, and that she was trying to take the children away. In September 2020, the police were called twice due to mother and maternal grandmother arguing over the children.
Mother was present when the Department attempted to detain the children from maternal grandmother on March 1, 2021. The social workers called the police because mother became extremely combative and aggressive; she threatened the social workers, accused them of having a false warrant for the children's detention, and refused to release the children. Upon arrival, the responding police officer remarked he was "very familiar" with mother and maternal grandmother "because he has [had] at least 20 contacts at the home due to disputes between [them]." When the social workers "attempted to detain the children, mother charged toward[ them]" and had to be restrained by the police. During the incident, maternal grandmother told the social workers "she was afraid to help in assist[ing] . . . the children[,]" as "mother has physically hit her in the past, and [she] is scared of mother."
In addition to being on the receiving end of mother's hostility, maternal grandmother also assisted mother in instigating altercations with others. For example, on March 22, 2021, at the end of a visit, mother became hostile toward the children's caregiver and accused her of mistreating the children. Mother stated she was going to report the caregiver to the police, and in response, the caregiver called the police. At some point, mother called maternal grandmother, who "showed up with a paper that stated she had legal custody of the children[ ]" and began to threaten the caregiver. Both of them stated they knew where she lived, that they knew her children, and that "they could cause harm." After the police helped the children into the caregiver's car, mother and maternal grandmother opened the car door and tried to remove the children from their car seats. The children were crying, and D.A. asked them to let go of the door. The police "had to intervene and ask [mother] and [maternal grandmother] to move away from the vehicle."
Another incident occurred the next day, on March 23, 2021. On that date, mother, father, maternal grandmother, and maternal grandmother's boyfriend went to a Department office unannounced. When a social worker came outside to speak with them, they told her "that law enforcement was on the way because the Department was not doing what [it was] supposed to do and their children were in danger." The social worker stated that all of them yelled at her until the police arrived and deescalated the situation.
In sum, based on the evidence above, the juvenile court could reasonably find maternal grandmother has not ensured all of the children's needs were met while they were in her care, and may not do so in the future. It could also appropriately find maternal grandmother may not be able to protect the children from mother's erratic, confrontational, and aggressive behavior, which becomes worse when she is under the influence of drugs. Thus, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the children remained at substantial risk of serious physical harm even while in maternal grandmother's care. The court's jurisdictional findings are therefore supported by substantial evidence.
II. Section 360, Subdivision (a) Legal Guardianship A. Governing Legal Principles
Section 360, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: "[I]f the [juvenile] court finds that the child is a person described by Section 300 and the parent has advised the court that the parent is not interested in family maintenance or family reunification services, it may, in addition to or in lieu of adjudicating the child a dependent of the court, order a legal guardianship, appoint a legal guardian, and issue letters of guardianship, if the court determines that a guardianship is in the best interest of the child, provided the parent and the child agree to the guardianship, unless the child's age or physical, emotional, or mental condition prevents the child's meaningful response."
Section 360, subdivision (a) "was intended to create a new and alternative procedure for appointing a guardian when the parent acknowledges early in the dependency proceedings that he or she cannot, and will not be able to, even after family reunification services, provide adequate care for the child." (In re Summer H. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325.) It is a "parent- driven statute" (id. at p. 1321), which "is triggered by the custodial parent's express approval of both a guardianship for the child and the prospective guardian and the juvenile court's finding, based on all the evidence, . . . that the proposed guardianship is in the child's best interests." (Id. at p. 1331.)
B. Analysis
Mother contends the juvenile court erred because it "did not address [her] request for a section 360, subdivision (a) legal guardianship[.]" Although not entirely clear, she appears to argue that, when her counsel stated she "was interested in a [section 360, subdivision (a)] guardianship[ ]" at the dispositional hearing, the court was vested with discretion to order guardianship under the statute as an alternative to removing the children from their parents and granting reunification services. Consequently, she contends that because the juvenile court "[f]ailed to exercise the discretion . . . vested [in it] by law[,]" the dispositional order must be reversed.
In response, the Department concedes the juvenile court did not address mother's request for legal guardianship at the dispositional hearing. According to the Department, however, the juvenile court did not err by declining to consider legal guardianship because the prerequisites for ordering one under section 360, subdivision (a) were not satisfied. Specifically, it argues that, rather than expressing disinterest in reunification services, father (i.e., a custodial parent), "indicat[ed] his interest in such services[.]" We agree with the Department.
As noted above, the juvenile court may not order a legal guardianship under section 360, subdivision (a) unless the child's custodial parents "ha[ve] advised the court that [they are] not interested in . . . family reunification services[ ]" and "agree to the guardianship[.]" (§ 360, subd. (a).) As the Department points out, father has never expressed disinterest in reunification services. On the contrary, he has repeatedly told the Department that he wants to reunify with his children, and is willing to work with the Department, follow court orders, and participate in all services as needed to do so.
With respect to disposition, the Department recommended that the juvenile court remove the children from their parents and order the parents to participate in reunification services. At the dispositional hearing, father "submitt[ed] on the [Department's] recommendation." In so doing, father did not "advise[ ] the court that [he] is not interested in . . . family reunification services[.]" (§ 360, subd. (a).) Nor did he "agree to . . . guardianship[.]" (Ibid.) Instead, he agreed to participate in reunification services in order to regain custody of the children. (See In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 ["[T]he mother's 'submitting on the recommendation [of the social services agency]' constituted acquiescence in or yielding to the social worker's recommended findings and orders[.]"].)
Under these circumstances, we conclude section 360, subdivision (a) was not "triggered" in this case. (In re Summer H., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331.) Accordingly, the juvenile court did not have discretion to order a legal guardianship pursuant to the statute at the dispositional hearing. It therefore did not err by declining to address mother's request for it to do so.
III. Section 361.3 Relative Placement Preference A. Governing Legal Principles
Section 361.3, subdivision (a) provides: "In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative[.]" Under this statute, "'[p]referential consideration' means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated." (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, preferential consideration "'does not create an evidentiary presumption in favor of a relative, but merely places the relative at the head of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the child's best interests.' [Citation.]" (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863 (Alicia B.).)
When deciding whether to place a child with the requesting relative, the juvenile court must consider the multitude of factors set forth in section 361.3, subdivision (a). (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) "The linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor. [Citation.]" (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862-863.)
"If the court does not place the child with a relative who has been considered for placement pursuant to [section 361.3], the court shall state for the record the reasons placement with that relative was denied." (§ 361.3, subd. (e).) Noncompliance with section 361.3, subdivision (e), however, does not automatically warrant reversal. Where "the reasons for denying placement are clear from the evidence and discussion at the hearing and support the court's decision, the court's failure to make findings [under section 361.3, subdivision (e)] is harmless." (In re Joseph T., (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 798.)
We review a juvenile court's custody placement orders for abuse of discretion. (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.) "'"The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court."' [Citations.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
B. Analysis
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by declining to place the children with maternal grandmother because "the record does not support that placement with . . . maternal grandmother would be detrimental." She also argues reversal is required because the court did not comply with section 361.3, subdivision (e). The Department responds that "while the juvenile court did not state the basis of declining placement with . . . maternal grandmother, ....any error was harmless" because its decision was supported by "ample evidence." Again, we agree with the Department.
Based on the evidence discussed in section I.B., ante, the juvenile court could reasonably infer: (1) maternal grandmother failed to reunify with her own children after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging they were at risk of harm due to her inappropriate physical discipline, her failure to protect them from physical abuse by her roommate, her failure to protect them from sexual abuse, and her substance abuse; (2) maternal grandmother did not ensure H.A. and N.A. received services as needed to address significant behavioral issues stemming from special needs while they were in her care; (3) maternal grandmother was involved in numerous altercations with mother, both as a victim of mother's aggression and as an instigator of conflict, in the children's presence, which resulted in police intervention more than 20 times; (4) maternal grandmother has expressed being afraid of mother because mother has hit her; and (5) maternal grandmother misrepresented to the Department that she filed a petition for legal guardianship of the children.
In addition to the evidence referenced above, the Department reported that it told maternal grandmother visits were not available to her due to concerns related to COVID-19 and her involvement in the altercation with the children's caregiver on March 22, 2021. Nevertheless, maternal grandmother "repeatedly arrive[d] to the parents' visits" without prior approval. The Department also reported that although maternal grandmother admitted she did not have a driver's license, social workers observed her driving on prior occasions.
On this record, the juvenile court could appropriately conclude placement with maternal grandmother was not appropriate based on several factors set forth in section 361.3, subdivision (a). (See § 361.3, subd. (a)(1) ["The best interest of the child, including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs."]; § 361.3, subd. (a)(5) ["The good moral character of the relative . . ., including whether any individual residing in the home . . . has been responsible for acts of child abuse or neglect."]; § 361.3, subd. (a)(7) [requiring consideration of, among other things, the relative's ability to "[p]rovide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child[,]" "[e]xercise proper and effective care and control of the child[,]" "[p]rotect the child from his or her parents[,]" "[f]acilitate court-ordered reunification efforts with the parents[,]" "[f]acilitate implementation of all elements of the case plan[,]" and "[a]rrange for appropriate and safe child care, as necessary."].)
We note that, in challenging the juvenile court's placement order, mother cites the following cases: Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, In re Antonio G. (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, and In re N.V. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 25. None of these cases are helpful to her, because they do not bear upon the issues at the heart of her argument (i.e., whether the record supports the juvenile court's placement order and whether reversal is required because the court failed to state the findings on which its order was based). (See Cesar V. v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1033-1034 [dispositional order reversed where social services agency abandoned consideration of a relative for placement based solely on her child abuse history, and juvenile court failed to exercise its "independent judgment" in evaluating her suitability under section 361.3]; In re Antonio G., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377-379 [dispositional order reversed where social services agency did not evaluate a relative for placement because the children were removed from her home, and juvenile court did not independently review her suitability under section 361.3]; In re Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 [juvenile court may review social service agency's denial of a request for exemption from the rule disqualifying a relative with a criminal conviction for placement for abuse of discretion]; In re N.V., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-31 [juvenile court's exclusion of evidence regarding social service agency's reasons for rejecting relative's home for placement was harmless because agency had yet to visit relative's new home].)
In sum, "[t]he relative placement preference . . . is not a relative placement guarantee [citations], and the record contains ample evidence that the preference was overridden in this case." (In re Joseph T., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) Accordingly, we conclude that "[b]ecause the reasons for denying placement are clear from the evidence . . . and support the [juvenile] court's decision, the court's failure to make findings [under section 361, subdivision (e)] is harmless. It is not reasonably probable such findings, if made, would have been in favor of [mother]." (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, P.J., WILLHITE, J.