Opinion
B321578
04-25-2024
In re R.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. VIVIANA H., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Gino de Solenni, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 20CCJP02390 Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Dismissed.
Gino de Solenni, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SEGAL, ACTING P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Viviana H., the mother of Romualdo B. II and Sebastian B., appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings sustaining allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 against Viviana and the children's father, Romualdo B., Jr. In August 2023, while this appeal was pending, both parents pleaded no contest to a subsequent petition under section 342. We requested, and the parties submitted, supplemental briefing on whether we should dismiss Viviana's appeal as moot. Because we cannot provide Viviana any effective relief, we dismiss the appeal.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Juvenile Court Sustains a Petition Under Section 300
On March 25, 2022 the Department filed a petition under section 300 on behalf of Romualdo, who was 10 years old, and Sebastian, who was eight years old, alleging seven counts against Viviana and Romualdo Jr. under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (j).
On June 7, 2022 the juvenile court sustained amended counts under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The court found that Viviana and Romualdo Jr. "failed to obtain necessary recommended mental health services" for Romualdo, who had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and paranoia, was having nightmares and thoughts of Romualdo Jr. killing him and Sebastian, and who had been physically violent toward his mother and brother. The court found that, by failing to obtain proper medical care for Romualdo, Viviana and Romualdo Jr. placed Romualdo and Sebastian at risk of serious physical harm and medical neglect. The court ordered case plans for Viviana and Romualdo Jr. that included requiring both parents to take co-parenting classes and conjoint counseling with the children and to comply with all medical appointments.
Viviana appealed from the juvenile court's June 7, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition order, challenging only the jurisdiction findings. Romualdo Jr. did not appeal.
B. The Juvenile Court Sustains a Subsequent Petition Under Section 342
In June 2023 the Department filed a subsequent petition under section 342 asserting allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). On August 3, 2023 the juvenile court sustained two amended counts in the subsequent petition alleged under section 300, subdivision (b). The court found that Romualdo Jr. was periodically unable to provide appropriate parental care and supervision of Romualdo and that Romualdo Jr. used inappropriate physical discipline to punish Romualdo for his mental condition. The court also found Viviana and Romualdo neglected the children by "enmeshing" them in the parents' custody dispute over the children and by "focusing on the issues with each other rather than placing the focus [on] the children's needs." The court found that, by engaging in this conduct, Viviana and Romualdo Jr. endangered Romualdo's and Sebastian's physical health, safety, and well-being and placed them at risk of serious physical harm and neglect. Neither parent appealed from the August 3, 2023 order sustaining the subsequent petition under section 342.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The juvenile court "'asserts jurisdiction with respect to a child when one of the statutory prerequisites listed in section 300 has been demonstrated.'" (In re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080; see In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) Therefore, as "a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to the other findings." (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452; see In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
"A court is tasked with the duty '"to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."'" (In re. D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276; see In re L.B. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 827, 837.) In dependency proceedings, an appeal "becomes moot when events '"render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief."'" (D.P., at p. 276; accord, In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 264; In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369.) "A reviewing court must '"decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding."'" (D.P., at p. 276; see L.B., at p. 837.)
Even when a case is moot, however, a reviewing court has '"inherent discretion'" to reach the merits of an appeal. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) A reviewing court generally will exercise that discretion when a case involves an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the court's determination. (Ibid.) In D.P. the Supreme Court identified several other factors for courts to consider in deciding whether discretionary review of a moot dependency appeal is appropriate. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, the court may consider whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing a child protective agency's decision to file a new dependency petition or a juvenile court's determination about further reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court may consider the allegations against the parent: "The more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the parent's interest in challenging such findings." (Id. at p. 286.) Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot because a parent promptly complied with his or her case plan: "It would perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has issued additional orders." (Ibid.)
B. Viviana's Appeal Is Moot
Viviana argues substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings against her under the section 300 petition. Viviana, however, does not challenge the jurisdiction findings against Romualdo Jr. in the section 300 petition, and she did not appeal from the findings against her or Romualdo Jr. in the subsequent petition under section 342. As a result, her appeal is moot in two ways.
First, Viviana acknowledges that, because Romualdo Jr. did not appeal from the June 7, 2022 order, and because she does not in her appeal challenge the findings against him, the juvenile court will still have jurisdiction over the children if she prevails in this appeal. That means her appeal is moot. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283 ['"where jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered moot'"]; In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137, 150-151 ["'[b]ecause the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one parent only'"]; In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308 [a "'jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both'"].)
Second, as stated, neither parent appealed from the August 3, 2023 jurisdiction findings on the subsequent petition under section 342. We take judicial notice of those findings. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 450; see In re Karen G. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1390 ["It is not uncommon for an appellate court to take judicial notice of subsequent proceedings in the juvenile court and find the appeal has been rendered moot."]; see also In re L.B., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 837 ["'"On a case-by[-]case basis, the reviewing court decides whether subsequent events in a dependency case have rendered the appeal moot and whether its decision would affect the outcome of the case in a subsequent proceeding."'"]; In re Damian L., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 369 ["'While appellate courts rarely consider postjudgment evidence or evidence developed after the ruling challenged on appeal, such evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of determining whether the subsequent development has rendered an appeal partially or entirely moot.'"].) Thus, even if we reversed the findings on the petition under section 300 (even those relating to Romualdo Jr. that Viviana does not challenge), the juvenile court would still have jurisdiction over the children based on sustained allegations against both parents in the subsequent petition under section 342. (See In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 ["no effective relief would be provided to mother by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition because jurisdiction was established independently under the subsequent petition"].)
Viviana argues her appeal is not moot because she is "still required to complete the requirements of the caseplan and the Department still oversees the parenting of the children subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction." She also argues that, even if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction based on Romualdo Jr.'s conduct, relief from this appeal could make her a non-offending parent. As discussed, however, even if we reversed the June 7, 2022 jurisdiction findings concerning Viviana, the juvenile court would still have jurisdiction under the August 3, 2023 jurisdiction findings, which were against both parents. In other words, Viviana was and remains an offending parent. And to the extent Viviana takes issue with the disposition order, she forfeited any challenge to that order by failing to present any argument directed to it. (In re M.B. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 617, 620, fn. 1; see In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409, fn. 4 [father forfeited his challenge to juvenile court order where "his opening brief contain[ed] no argument challenging" it]; In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 707, fn. 4 [in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, failure to raise an issue in an appellate brief forfeits the issue].)
Finally, Viviana argues that, even if the appeal is moot, we should exercise our "inherent discretion to reach the merits of her appeal" because "the challenged jurisdiction finding [i.e., under the section 300 petition] could impact current or future dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing the Department's decision to file a new dependency petition or the juvenile court's determination about further reunification services." She also suggests that the nature of the allegations "pertain directly to the mother's ability to recognize and provide care for her children's needs" and that the "challenged finding could play a role in future family law custody proceedings."
We decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Viviana's moot appeal. Viviana does not argue that her case involves an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, that the controversy between the parties may recur, or that a material question remains for the court's determination. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Nor can we identify anything in this case that would justify exercising our discretion to consider her moot appeal; her concerns about future adverse consequences are speculative. (See id. at p. 278 [speculative future harm is insufficient to avoid mootness].)
Viviana asserts the nature of the allegations sustained against her supports exercising our discretion. Not in this case. While all dependency jurisdiction arises from sustained allegations of harmful or neglectful conduct by a parent, the jurisdiction findings against Viviana-failure to obtain necessary medical health services for Romualdo-were not particularly egregious or stigmatizing. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277 ["Although a jurisdictional finding that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally stigmatizing, complaining of 'stigma' alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal."]; cf. In re M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452 ["findings that mother knowingly or negligently exposed her children to a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse are pernicious" and carried "a particular stigma"].) On balance, the factors identified in In re D.P. do not warrant discretionary review of Viviana's moot appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: FEUER, J., MARTINEZ, J.