Summary
denying motion for reconsideration where it "consists largely of a restatement of [the movant's] earlier conclusory assertions"
Summary of this case from Jie Yin v. AlvaradoOpinion
01 CIV. 10628 (DLC)
August 23, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3, plaintiff Ravi Kulkarni ("Kulkarni") moves for reconsideration of the Court's June 13, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order (the "June 13 Opinion"), Kulkarni v. City University of New York, et al., No. 01 Civ. 10628, 2002 WL 1315596 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002), dismissing Kulkarni's second cause of action, specifically, that defendants' "`Consortial Arrangement' and `Allocation System' have adversely affected nonwhites, and in particular, Asians and Asian Indians" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the reasons stated, Kulkarni's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Discussion
Local Rule 6.3 requires a party moving for reconsideration to "set forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." Thus, to be successful on a motion for reconsideration, the movant must demonstrate that the Court has overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were presented to it on the underlying motion. See Local Rule 6.3; Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000); Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); Int'l Top Sports S.A. v. Pan American Snorts Network Int'l, No. 01 Civ. 9668 (HB), 2002 WL 226657, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2002). The decision to grant or deny the motion is within the sound discretion of the district court. Devlin v. Transp. Communications Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983).
Kulkarni argues that the Court overlooked his argument that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i), he need not identify a specific employment practice so long as he has shown that the overall decision making process affecting his employment is incapable of separation for analysis. The June 13 Opinion, however, directly addressed this argument and rejected it. Kulkarni, 2002 WL 1315596, at *1. The June 13 Opinion noted that Kulkarni's disparate impact claim as made out in his second amended complaint consisted of a general description of the organizational structure of the City University of New York Graduate School and University Center, consisting of a "Consortial Arrangement" and an "Allocation System," and the conclusory allegation that this organizational structure has "adversely affected nonwhites, and in particular, Asians and Asian Indians." Id. The June 13 Opinion held that the "Consortial Arrangement" and "Allocation System" were not specific employment practices. Id.
It further held that Kulkarni cannot circumvent the requirement that he identify a specific employment practice by making a conclusory assertion that the hiring process as a whole is incapable of separation for analysis. Id. Kulkarni did not show on plaintiff's motion to dismiss and has not shown on the instant motion that the "Consortial Arrangement" or "Allocation System" are not capable of separation. Rather, Kulkarni's motion for reconsideration consists largely of a restatement of his earlier conclusory assertions. Indeed, in his memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration, he cites his own memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss as stating
as fact that "[t]here is no way to separate the specific employment policy or practice apart from the `Consortial Structure' and `Allocation System.[']" This Court must take plaintiff's alleged facts as true at this stage of the proceeding.
This conclusory allegation is not sufficient to show that the organizational structure Kulkarni otherwise points to as a specific employment practice is incapable of separation for analysis.
To the extent that Kulkarni is complaining about the identity of those officers who implement facially neutral employment practices and the decisions made by those officers in the course of implementing the practices, that complaint is not a disparate impact claim addressed to an identified employment practice. All organizations allocate decision-making authority and that allocation does not, by itself, create a disparate impact claim. If authority is abused, however, and an individual makes decisions on account of a person's race or other barred criteria, then other legal theories permit suit. Indeed, plaintiff's first and third causes of action claim that decision-makers have discriminated against him.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, plaintiff's motion is denied.
SO ORDERED.