Opinion
No. CV 03 0518836 S
July 15, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION #112 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff's Revised Complaint is brought in three counts and sounds in wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The plaintiff alleges that he was employed by the defendant from February 27, 2002 until July 26, 2002. He further alleges that on April 10, 2002 he was injured at work while operating on an outdated and unsafe piece of machinery while in the course of his employment and at the direction of the defendant.
On April 26, 2002 the plaintiff filed a notice of claim for workers' compensation with the defendant and the Workers' Compensation Commission. The claim is currently pending.
The plaintiff returned to work on "light duty" status on July 15, 2002. He alleges that prior to his return he informed the defendant that he would need a reasonable accommodation in order to work with his injury. Despite being aware of the plaintiff's injuries and request for an accommodation, the defendant refused the same.
On July 26, 2002, the defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment. On March 10, 2004 the defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the defendant's business reason for his termination was a pretext for unlawful retaliation in violation of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act.
Although the complaint does not specifically cite § 31-290a C.G.S. as being the plaintiff's cause of action the memorandum of law in opposition of the motion for summary judgment does. Furthermore the plaintiff does not object to the defendant's characterization of the action.
Section 17-45 of the Connecticut Practice Book concerns the proceedings for motions for summary judgment. It provides that:
A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like. The motion shall be placed on the short calendar to be held not less than fifteen days following the filing of the motion and the supporting materials, unless the judicial authority otherwise directs. The adverse party [prior to the day the case is set down for short calendar] shall at least five days before the date the motion is to be considered on the short calendar file opposing affidavits and other available documentary evidence. Affidavits, and other documentary proof not already a part of the file, shall be filed and served as are pleadings.
Before addressing the merits of the defendant's motion, a brief review of the standards for the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment is warranted:
"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., 248 Conn. 195, 201, 727 A.2d 700 (1999).
QSP, Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 351 (2001).
Subsection 31-290a concerns discrimination against employees for filing a workers' compensation claim. Subsection 31-290a(a) provides that:
No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
The burden of proof concerning an action pursuant to § 31-290a is well established in this State. "In setting forth the burden of proof requirements in a 31-290a action, we look to federal law for guidance." CT Page 10685 Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Conn., 216 Conn. 40, 53 (1990).
"In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic allocation of the burdens and order of presentation of proof in cases involving claims of employment discrimination. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Id., 802. In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff must present evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, supra. `If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.' Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 255. The plaintiff then must satisfy her burden of persuading the fact finder that she was the victim of discrimination `either directly by persuading the court [or jury] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' Id., 256." Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 210 Conn. 53-54.
Gordon v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, No. 365472 (May 22, 1998, Levin, J.) 1998 Ct. Sup. 6307.
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under the provisions of § 31-209a C.G.S.
To make out a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge the plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test. The plaintiff must establish "(a) [protected activity, i.e.,] that he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised his rights under chapter 568 of the Connecticut General Statutes [Workers' Compensation Act]; (b) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (c) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Gordon v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 365472 (May 22, 1998) (Levin, J.); see also Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Co., 34 Conn. App. 709, 712 n. 6, 708 A.2d 643, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 908, 648 A.2d 151 (1994).
Contois v. Carmen Anthony Rest. GRP., No. CV00-0160287 S (Mar. 21, 2003, Holzberg, J.) 2003 Ct. Sup. 3632.
In addition to the motion for summary judgment, the defendant filed an affidavit of Mr. Sal Formica in support of said motion. This affidavit provides in pertinent part that: The defendant manufactures high performance, precision aircraft parts for aerospace clients. During January to February of 2002 the defendant sought to hire a Class A Finish Machinist and had received a resume from the plaintiff. On February 2, 2003, the defendant received a written application for employment from the plaintiff. The affiant asserts that the plaintiff led him to believe that the plaintiff had the required experience, skills and abilities to do the subject job and the plaintiff was subsequently hired.
After hiring the plaintiff and monitoring him for a period of time the affiant formed a belief that the plaintiff was not very knowledgeable about operating the machinery in his job description and therefore limited the plaintiff to a different class of work.
The affiant asserts that he limited the plaintiff to "Class B" goods instead of "Class A" goods. Class A are finished goods and Class B are still in a rough condition.
On April 10, 2002 the plaintiff was injured by a piece flying off of the machine that he was working on. Upon inspecting the machine that the plaintiff was working on, the affiant discovered that the plaintiff ran the machine too fast. The affiant also asserts that the plaintiff was attempting to use a much more aggressive cut than he was instructed to use and this contributed to the accident.
It ran at 70 rpm instead of 40 (see affidavit at page 4).
On July 25, 2002, the plaintiff improperly set up a machine and destroyed a part valued at $1,000.00. When questioned about how to set the dials on the subject machine he was unable to give an acceptable response.
A co-worker of the plaintiff informed the affiant that despite the fact that the plaintiff had informed the affiant that he obtained CNC machine setup experience from his previous place of employment, the plaintiff did not have the experience as stated. The affiant contacted the plaintiff's previous employer and this information was verified.
The affidavit of Jerry Poreda supports this statement.
The affiant personally observed the plaintiff and had concluded that he should be terminated during his 90-day probationary period. The plaintiff was subsequently terminated.
The defendant asserts that based on the evidence submitted with its Motion for Summary judgment there are no genuine issues of material facts and therefore it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law; D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980); and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Practice Book § 381 [now § 17-46] . . . Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105, 639 A.2d 507 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 374, 380-81, 713 A.2d 820 (1998).
Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222, 237 (2004).
The plaintiff asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact in existence and the motion for summary judgment should therefore be denied. On March 24, 2004 the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment. In addition to the motion itself, the plaintiff filed an affidavit in support of motion for summary judgment. The affidavit provides in pertinent part that: Prior to the accident a co-worker informed the plaintiff that his supervisor was very happy with the plaintiff's work performance. That after the plaintiff was injured, his doctor told him that he could return to work, but only with light duty restrictions. The plaintiff showed his supervisor a doctor's note concerning the restrictions and was given light duty on July 15th and 16th, 2002.
See paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of the objection to the motion for summary judgment.
On July 18, 2002 the plaintiff was instructed to return to his former department but the work in that area involved large heavy pieces that did not comply with his doctor's light duty instructions. The plaintiff informed his employer that the work was too heavy for him to perform.
On July 23, 2002 the plaintiff informed a co-worker that he was going to complain to OSHA and "workers' compensation" that the defendant was not honoring his doctor's instructions. A coworker informed the plaintiff that "the boss" told him that since the plaintiff was injured he has become a pain in the neck.
The summary judgment process is designed with judicial efficiency in mind.
[The summary judgment process] is an attempt to dispose of cases involving sham or frivolous issues in a manner which is speedier and less expensive for all concerned than a full-dress trial. Town Bank Trust Co. v. Benson, 176 Conn. 304, 306-07.
Mac's Car City, Inc. v. American National Bank, 205 Conn. 255, 261 (1987).
Upon completing its review of this matter, this Court has determined that this case is not suited for the summary judgment process. Although the movant asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party has met its burden to provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of genuine issue of material fact as to the actual reason that the plaintiff was terminated. Said facts are directly related to this issue as to whether the plaintiff's termination was a violation of the provisions of § 31-290a(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is denied. So ordered.
Richard Robinson, J.
July 15, 2004