Opinion
Civil 02-4864 JMR/FLN.
July 21, 2005
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER came before the undersigned United Magistrate Judge on the following Motions by the Parties: Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment [#65 and #95]; Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#81]; Plaintiff's Motion for Restraining Order [#90]; as well as a series of other non-dispositive Motions. The matter has been referred to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1(c). For the reasons stated below, this Court recommends that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [#65 and #95] should be Granted. As such, this Court recommends that all of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#81] and his Motion for Restraining Order [#90] should be Denied as Moot.
Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite Liberty Interest Conference/Stop Section 1985 [#87], Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery [#88], Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint [#92], Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal [#104], and Plaintiff's Motion for "Equal Protection of Laws" Orders/Restraints [#105], are all addressed in a separate Order.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At all relevant times to the allegations set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff Chris Krych was an inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Moose Lake/Willow River. While there, Plaintiff Krych was charged with inmate discipline violations that arose based on letters he sent to state officials, attorney organizations, and attorneys challenging his conviction. (Affidavit of Joyce Dahl-Tabor, Ex. B "Notice of Violation"). In December 2000, the letters were found to contain threats against the chief judge in the county of Plaintiff's conviction as well as an attempt to organize letter recipients to collectively "hassle" the judge. (Id., Ex. E "Hearings Unit Findings Form regarding Report 005507"). Plaintiff was found guilty of five counts of violating an Offender Disciplinary Rule against threatening others, and one count of violating a Rule against disorderly conduct. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Warden, who delegated review of the appeal to Larnscie Stevenson, the Corrections Program Director. (Id., Ex. F, "Review of Appeal Discipline Report 005507"). On December 27, 2000, Stevenson issued a written decision affirming the hearing officer's findings. (Id.).
Mr. Krych originally filed his Complaint on December 18, 2002 [#1] as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against: Minnesota Department Corrections ("MDOC") Commissioner Sheryl Ramstad Hvass; Minnesota State Judge Leslie Metzen; Warden of Minnesota Correctional Facility (MCF) at Fairbault, Lou Stender; MDOC employees Diana Lind and Mark Uner; and MDOC hearing officer, Nedra Fitzloff-Meyer. Mr. Krych alleged in his Complaint that Judge Metzen conspired with Commissioner Hvass to destroy his legal work and retaliated against him for letters he sent to Minnesota officials complaining about his conviction. He contended that Commissioner Hvass, Ms. Lind and Mr. Uner, violated his due process rights by stealing his legal papers and making false disciplinary reports. He asserted that Commissioner Hvass has threatened his life and assigned him to administrative segregation in retaliation for his writing as well as to deter it. He also alleged that his requests for medication have been ignored and he is "constantly oppressed and abused."
The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation on February 5, 2003, recommending that Mr. Krych's Complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failing to state a cause of action on which relief could be granted [#6]. Chief Judge Rosenbaum adopted the Report and Recommendation [#8]. Mr. Krych appealed Chief Judge Rosenbaum's decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Mr. Krych could not recover damages against the Defendants in their official capacity and that he failed to state an injunctive relief claim because he did not attribute the alleged misconduct to any specific defendant. The Complaint also failed to state claims against Mr. Stender and Ms. Fitzloff Meyer because he named them as defendants without alleging that they were personally involved in any constitutional violations. Nor did Mr. Krych state claims for denial-of access or unconstitutional denial of medical treatment. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that Mr. Krych only plead claims against the Defendants in their official capacities. The Eighth Circuit determined that Mr. Krych had stated individual-capacity claims against Judge Metzen, Commissioner Hvass, Ms. Lind, and Mr. Uner for violations of his First Amendment rights and against Commissioner Hvass for retaliation.
After the case was remanded from the Eighth Circuit, the undersigned issued an Order requiring Plaintiff Krych to serve the Complaint on the Defendants [#30]. Plaintiff was allowed to proceed without prepayment of fees on May 11, 2004, and the United States Marshal was ordered to serve the Complaint on the Defendants. [#32].
Pursuant to the Eighth Circuit's findings, the remaining Defendants in this case include Commissioner Sheryl Hvass, Judge Leslie Metzen, Diana Magaard (previously Diana Lind), and Mark Uner. The only claims remanded from the Eighth Circuit include: (1) claims against Defendants Hvass, Metzen, Lind, and Uner, in their individual-capacities for violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights; and (2) a claim against Defendant Hvass in her individual-capacity for retaliation.
In October, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#50]. Defendants responded with Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on November 10, 2004 [#65]. Plaintiff later withdrew his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#73 in ref. to #50], but filed another Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 28, 2005 [#81]. Defendant responded with a second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#95]. In addition, Plaintiff has filed various other Motions: Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite [#87]; Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery [#88]; Plaintiff's Motion for Restraining Order [#90]; Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint [#92]; Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal [#104]; and Plaintiff's Motion for "Equal Protection of Laws" Orders/Restraints [#105].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is to be used as a tool to isolate and dispose of claims or defenses that are either factually unsupported or based on undisputed facts. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-27 (1986); Fisher v. Pharmacia Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment permits courts to issue a judgment as a matter of law, on the merits, and without trial, as long as there are no genuine issues of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Reich v. ConAgra, 987 F.2d 1357, 1359 (8th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes, based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proof, and a court should construe all evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, the party opposing summary judgment may not "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-56 (noting that if the evidence submitted by the non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P 56(e). "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Thus, summary judgment is proper when the non-moving party fails to provide the Court with specific evidence indicating that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Maxwell v. K-Mart Corp., 844 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (D.Minn. 1994); Rainforest Café, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 886, 893 (D.Minn. 1999).
A genuine issue of material fact only exists if: (1) there is a disputed fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is genuine. RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401-02 (8th Cir. 1995). For these purposes, a disputed fact is "material" if it must inevitably be resolved and the resolution will determine the outcome of the case; while a dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
A court should afford a pro se litigant the benefit of the doubt in construing his or her pleadings and factual averments.See Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1987); Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984). Pro se plaintiffs must, however, meet the same standards as litigants represented by counsel to survive a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss. "The complaint must allege facts which, if true, state a claim as a matter of law." Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); Quam v. Minnehaha County Jail, 821 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1987); see also, Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (1985) ("[a]lthough it is to be liberally construed, apro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions").
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The only remaining claims before this Court include an individual capacity First Amendment claim against Defendants Hvass, Metzen, Lind (now Magaard), and Uner, as well as an individual capacity Retaliation Claim against Defendant Hvass. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of all other claims against these Defendants, as well as the complete dismissal of Defendants Stender and Fitzloff-Meyer. As such, this Court will focus its attention on the specific claims outlined by the Eighth Circuit, and need not address arguments relating to claims or Defendants for which dismissal has already been affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.
Plaintiff Krych's claims against all the remaining Defendants are barred by Qualified Immunity and the "Favorable Termination" rule. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [#65 and #95] should be Granted.
A. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Qualified Immunity.
Plaintiff Krych claims that the Defendants stole his legal papers at the behest of Defendant Hvass and that Defendant Hvass threatened to kill him. Plaintiff contends that these actions, along with the disciplinary hearing and report, were completed in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment Rights. "Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known."Yowell v. Combs, 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996), citingHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity, when granted, provides complete immunity from suit.See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991). "Qualified immunity protects `all but the plainly incompetent or those who willingly violate the law.'" Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Whether qualified immunity applies is a question of law for the court to determine. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
To determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must engage in a two-pronged analysis. See Rowe v. Lamb, 130 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1997); Manzano v. South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Services, 60 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 1995). First, the plaintiff must allege a specific violation of a constitutional right. See Rowe, 103 F.3d at 814. Second, the court must determine if the constitutional principle at issue was so clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions that a reasonable government official would have known that he or she was violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Manzano, 60 F.3d at 509.
Whether a right is clearly established is an objective test measured against the law of the circuit. See Rowe, 103 F.3d at 814. "For a constitutional right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear and specific that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." McMorrow v. Little, 103 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1997). This does not mean that there must be precedential case law that is factually indistinguishable from the plaintiff's case. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (the issue is not whether "the very action in question has previously been held unlawful"). However, it "must be apparent" that the defendant's actions are unlawful "in the light of pre-existing law." Id.
An inmate's First Amendment rights, as well as other constitutional rights, may be limited if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (constitutional rights of inmates may be limited by legitimate institutional concerns). A correctional facility's need to control and discipline inmates in a prison setting is an accepted institutional concern whereby constitutional rights may be limited. See generally, Id., at 557, 563-67.
To support his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants acted with the motive to retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights. See Technical Ordinance, Inc. v. U.S., 244 F.3d 641, 651-652 (8th Cir. 2001). To overcome a defense of qualified immunity in a retaliation claim, Plaintiff "may not respond simply with general attacks upon defendant's credibility, but rather must identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of proving the pertinent motive." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998);Technical Ordinance, 244 F.3d at 652.
Plaintiff's allegations of stolen papers seem to be in reference to an October 19, 2000, search of his cell by Defendant Uner. During the search certain letters were confiscated that related to the ongoing disciplinary investigation of Plaintiff writing threatening and disorderly conduct provoking letters to public and judicial officials. (Affidavit of Diana Magaard (previously Lind) ("Magaard Aff."), ¶ 3; Affidavit of Mark Uner ("Uner Aff."), ¶ 2). Defendants have specifically stated that no legal documents were taken and that what was taken, was taken only in connection with a legitimate disciplinary investigation, not for the purposes of retaliation. (Magaard Aff., ¶¶ 3-4; Uner Aff., ¶¶ 2-3). Plaintiff has not produced evidence to the contrary. There is also an absolute lack of evidence that Defendant Hvass threatened Plaintiff's life or instructed any other action in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment rights.
Plaintiff has not provided objective affirmative evidence which supports his general attacks that Defendant Hvass, or any other Defendant, acted with a retaliatory motive. Nor has Plaintiff provided evidence or disputed the evidence provided by Defendants demonstrating the reasonableness of their actions and their entitlement to the defense of qualified immunity. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his First Amendment or Retaliation claims. Nor has Plaintiff been able to override Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on either claim.
B. Plaintiff's Claims Are Also Barred by the "Favorable Termination" Rule.
Petitioner Krych argues that the discipline he received pursuant to the findings of the disciplinary hearings for threatening others and disorderly conduct violated his First Amendment rights and constituted retaliation. Plaintiff has essentially brought this civil rights claim under § 1983 to recover damages due to the alleged wrongful discipline of segregating him in confinement and imposing an extended incarceration time.
Under Heck v. Humphrey's "favorable termination" rule, a § 1983 claim for damages for prison discipline that resulted in extended incarceration does not arise until the discipline has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or successfully challenged in a writ of habeas corpus. Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002), citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). If a damages claim is brought for allegedly unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment, or other harm that was caused by actions which, if found unlawful, would invalidate a conviction or sentence, and that conviction, imprisonment, or harm has not previously been invalidated, the claim is not cognizable under § 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-87. In other words, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement and the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated, the claim must be dismissed. Id. Heck does not prevent a plaintiff from raising his constitutional arguments, but rather, it simply prevents him from doing so for the first time in a Section 1983 action.
The nature of the relief sought is irrelevant, as the focus is on the "essence of the plaintiff's claims." Portley-El, 288 F.3d at 1066, citing Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1996). If a plaintiff seeks damages for the imposition of discipline that included increased incarceration, his damage claim is based on the result of his disciplinary proceedings, and is barred by Heck because it would "necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement." Portley-El, 288 F.3d at 1066, citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486.
In this case, Plaintiff's claims constitute an attack on the validity of the disciplinary action that resulted in his segregation and increased incarceration. Plaintiff seeks damages on the grounds that Defendants disciplined him in retaliation for exercising his constitutional right under the First Amendment. For Plaintiff to succeed he would need to demonstrate that Defendants' wrongly affirmed the discipline in retaliation, thereby rendering the disciplinary result invalid. It is undisputed that Plaintiff's disciplinary sentence has not previously been reversed, overturned, or successfully challenged through habeas corpus review. Indeed, Plaintiff's attempted appeal of the disciplinary findings failed. As such, Plaintiff's claims are also barred by Heck's "favorable termination" rule and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be Granted.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Parties' Motions should be GRANTED and DENIED as follows:
1. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#65] should be GRANTED;
2. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#95] should be GRANTED;
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#81] should be DENIED as moot; and,
4. Plaintiff's Motion for Restraining Order [#90] should be DENIED as moot.