Opinion
Submitted January 29, 1900
Decided February 27, 1900
John W. Fisher for appellants.
Leroy Andrus for respondent.
The article in question, according to either translation, was libelous upon its face, because it charged the plaintiff with a want of professional ability and integrity and thus endangered the gain derived from his vocation. ( Cruikshank v. Gordon, 118 N.Y. 178; Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N.Y. 624; Flood on Libel Slander, 114.) Referring to him as a physician, it called him a blockhead or fool, and appealed to all the Poles in Buffalo not to intrust themselves or their families to his professional care, when he so hated them that he would not help them if he could. The words used had a direct relation to his business and assailed him in his capacity as a physician. They touched his profession, because they held him out as unworthy of employment and appealed to his old patients to no longer employ him. Calling a physician, as such, a blockhead or fool necessarily reflects upon his ability to practice medicine, and speaking of him as so influenced by hatred toward his patients that he would not heal them, necessarily reflects upon his integrity as a physician. "To impute duncehood or want of scholarship to a member of either of the learned professions touches his profession." (Cooke's Law of Defamation, 18; Peard v. Jones, Cro. Car. 382.) The reflection was not simply upon the character of the plaintiff as a man, but upon his character as a physician, for it imputed a want of those qualifications which attract patronage and are essential to the calling. It tended to undermine him in the confidence of the community, which is the foundation of professional success. The article was actionable without proof of any damages, for the law imputes malice to the defendants and presumes that damages were sustained by the plaintiff from the bare act of publication. ( Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398; Van Tassel v. Capron, 1 Den. 250; 13 Am. Eng. Encyc. of Law, 312.)
While the plaintiff was thus entitled to recover on account of implied malice, his damages, without further proof, would be limited to such an amount as would fairly compensate him for the actual injury sustained. In order to recover punitive damages, also, it was necessary for him to furnish evidence of express malice, or malice in fact, as distinguished from malice implied. Implied malice, in an action for libel, consists in publishing, without justifiable cause, that which is injurious to the character of another. It is a presumption drawn by the law from the simple fact of publication. Express malice consists in such a publication from ill-will, or some wrongful motive, implying a willingness or intent to injure, in addition to the intent to do the unlawful act. It requires affirmative proof beyond the act of publishing, indicating ill-feeling or such want of feeling as to impute a bad motive. It does not become an issue, when the article is libelous on its face, unless punitive damages are claimed.
In order to establish express malice, the plaintiff was allowed to show, as against all the defendants, that, several years prior to the publication, the defendant Pitass had made remarks about him, expressing contempt and ill-will. There was no connection between these remarks and the other defendants, who neither heard them nor ever heard of them, so far as appears. It is undisputed that Pitass knew nothing about the article until some time after it had been published. He did not directly or indirectly cause or consent to its publication. He was liable only because he owned the newspaper, and was responsible for the acts of his agents in publishing it. His previous statements did not cause the publication, nor have any effect upon it. Between those statements and the fact of publication there was no connection and no relation of cause and effect. They did not enter into, or become part of, or have any bearing upon, the wrong of which the plaintiff complains. As the article would have been published if they had not been made, they were immaterial, for they did not touch the wrongful act, and could not aggravate the damages. Punitive damages, which are in excess of the actual loss, are allowed where the wrong is aggravated by evil motives in order to punish the wrongdoer for his misconduct and furnish a wholesome example. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in an important case, "whenever the injury complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person. But the malice spoken of in this rule is not merely the doing of an unlawful or injurious act. The word implies that the act complained of was conceived in the spirit of mischief, or of criminal indifference to civil obligations." ( Phila., Wilmington Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 213.)
Did Pitass inflict the injury upon the plaintiff maliciously, when he knew nothing about it at the time it was done, and was only liable as owner of the newspaper? Did he, "in a spirit of mischief," conceive the act done by his agent without his knowledge? Could his malicious remarks, made in 1890, leap forward and, without knowledge or action on his part, become blended with the act of his agent in 1894? Did his agent, the editor, conceive the act "in a spirit of mischief," which never entered his own mind, but existed at a remote period in the mind of another? Did the writer of the article act under the influence of words neither spoken in his presence nor communicated to him in any way?
In an action for a tort there can be no recovery of punitive damages for general malice, but only for such particular malice as existed when the tortious act was done and which had some influence in causing it to be done. As was once said by this court, "malice must be proved, not mere general ill-will, but malice in the special case set forth in the pleadings, to be inferred from it and the attending circumstances." ( Howard v. Sexton, 4 N.Y. 157, 161.) Moreover, the malice of one defendant cannot be imputed to another without connecting proof. "If two be sued, the motive of one must not be allowed to aggravate the damages against the other. Nor should the improper motive of an agent be matter of aggravation against his principal." (Bigelow's Odgers on Libel Slander, 296; Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Craker v. C. N.W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 658; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N.J.L. 481; Clark v. Newsam, 1 Ex. 131, 139; Carmichael v. Waterford Limerick Ry. Co., 13 Ir. L.R. 313; Robertson v. Wylde, 2 Moo. Rob. 101.)
Neither the author nor editor was a party to the malice of the publisher, and his malice did no harm because it had no effect upon the result. While he was responsible for their acts, they were not responsible for his motives, of which they had no knowledge. He was not responsible for his motives in connection with their acts, because there was no connection. The malice proved in this case did not cause the conduct complained of. The one guilty of malice did not commit the wrong except through an agent, who knew nothing about the malicious feelings of his principal. The principal was not liable for general malice, but only for such particular malice as was connected with the publication. The agent was not liable for the general malice of his principal, of which he knew nothing, and which had no connection with the wrong done. The writer of the article was not liable for the malice of another, of which he had never heard, and which had no influence upon the wrongful act. Yet the general malice of one out of three defendants, although it had no connection with the wrong, has, as it must be presumed, entered into the verdict of sixty-two hundred and fifty dollars against all, in violation of the rights of each.
As the malice proved neither caused nor prompted the publication of the libel, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
PARKER, Ch. J., GRAY, BARTLETT, MARTIN, CULLEN and WERNER, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.