Summary
In Kroin, the notice of claim, served upon the Comptroller, named only the City of New York, while the ensuing summons and complaint was directed at both the City and HHC. Therefore, although the statutory hearing was conducted by a lawyer appearing on behalf of HHC, it could not be definitively said that the demand for the hearing, had necessarily been made by HHC.
Summary of this case from Mercado v. NychhcOpinion
December 13, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas McKeon, J.).
Defendants were under no duty to raise plaintiff's failure to serve a notice of claim on defendant HHC as an affirmative defense, or otherwise bring to plaintiff's attention that defendant City of New York, on whom plaintiff did serve a notice of claim, was not a proper party defendant (see, Ceely v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 162 A.D.2d 492, 493). Plaintiff's attorney should have known that a notice of claim had to be served on HHC. Defendant's conduct in not affirmatively advising plaintiff, the appearance of an HHC attorney at the General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, and defendants' joint participation in the litigation for years before moving to dismiss for failure to serve a notice of claim on the proper party does not give rise to an estoppel claim (see, Matter of Rieara v City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks Recreation, 156 A.D.2d 206, 207). Further, "[T]he mere fact" that both the City and HHC are represented by the Corporation Counsel "does not provide the necessary nexus to equate service of a notice of claim on one with service on the other" (Ceely v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., supra, at 493). This is not altered by the fact noted above that the City conducted a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h (supra) , at which plaintiff was examined by an HHC attorney (Adams v New York City Tr. Auth., 140 A.D.2d 572). Nor does General Municipal Law § 50-e (3) (c) avail plaintiff. "While a municipal corporation may, by its conduct, waive an irregularity in the notice of claim, the requirements as to the manner or time of service may not be so waived" (Adams v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, at 573). Failure to serve a necessary party is not a mere irregularity.
In any event, the failure to diagnose a medical condition does not constitute continuous treatment (see, McDermott v Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399).
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Kupferman, Asch and Tom, JJ.