Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:01-CV-220 C
March 8, 2002
ORDER
On November 19, 2001, Plaintiff David Krikie, acting pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that the Middleton Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"), the TDCJ-ID, and Corrections Officer Alexander of the Middleton Unit negligently forced him to work in unsafe conditions. He requests punitive damages and damages for emotional distress and mental anguish. By Order dated November 29, 2001, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The Defendants have not been served.
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof; that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines" that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (stating that when a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or one of its employees, the court shall review the complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if the court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a district court shall on its own motion or the motion of any party dismiss a complaint by a prisoner regarding prison conditions if the court is satisfied the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant).
A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, "such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). A claim has no arguable basis in fact if "after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
District courts must construe in forma pauperis complaints liberally, particularly in the context of dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), but are given broad discretion in determining when such complaints are frivolous. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint may not be dismissed under § 1915(d)(2)(B) "simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely." Jolly v. Klein, 923 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (S.D. Tex. 1996). A civil rights plaintiff must support his claim(s) with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiffs complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff `might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d at 97.
Plaintiff makes the following complaints:
1. Defendant Alexander pulled onto the wrong side of the road when he reached for something between the seats and narrowly missed hitting an oncoming truck when transporting inmates to work on May 4, 2001.
2. Defendant Alexander pulled a trailer to work on May 22, 2001, at 6:30 in the morning, knowing that the trailer did not have brake lights or turn lights, and the TDCJ-ID work vehicle was "just missed by a van at high speeds from behind."
3. Defendant Alexander forced Plaintiff to mow grass in some old graveyards in Jones County and did not provide him with "personal protective equipment" to prevent the inmates from being bit by the rattlesnakes they encountered daily.
Negligence is not a theory for affixing liability under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1989). Many acts that might be a violation of state tort law simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaints regarding swerving into an oncoming lane and pulling a trailer without lights are claims of negligence and fail to state claims for which relief may be granted under § 1983,
To the extent that Plaintiff complains about the failure to provide protective equipment, he does not allege that he was harmed by the failure to provide the equipment nor does he state any facts which rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that an inmate must demonstrate that he "was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection" to demonstrate a failure to protect). Furthermore, Plaintiff requests only punitive damages and damages for emotional distress and mental anguish. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PLRA requires proof of a physical injury that is "more than de minimis" before a prisoner can recover monetary damages for a psychological injury).
In addition, the Eleventh Amendment bars the recovery of monetary damages from a state, its agents, or employees. A suit against a defendant in his official capacity who is an employee or agent of the state is simply a suit against the state and is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs requests for monetary damages from the TDCJ-ID, the Middleton Unit, and Officer Alexander in his official capacity as an employee of an agency of the State of Texas, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Although Plaintiff does not request injunctive relief; to the extent that his complaint can be liberally construed to request such relief; it is moot. Plaintiff complains about events that occurred at the TDCJ-ID Middleton Unit in Abilene, Texas, but at the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, he had been transferred to the TDCJ-ID Lynaugh Unit in Fort Stockton, Texas. This transfer would render any claims for injunctive relief moot. See Cooper v. Sherif Lubbock County, Texas, 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that complaint requesting equitable relief for denial of meals at county jail was rendered moot when inmate was transferred to state prison); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that complaint requesting injunctive relief for unconstitutional prison conditions at state prison unit was rendered moot when inmate was transferred to another unit); and Scott v. Jones, 492 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that complaint requesting injunctive and declaratory relief for denial of psychiatric treatment at county jail was rendered moot when inmate was transferred to state prison).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his complaint and all claims alleged therein should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
Any pending motions are hereby denied.
This dismissal does not release Plaintiff from the filing fee obligations previously imposed.
This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is advised that if he appeals this Order, he will be required to pay the appeal fee of $105.00 pursuant to the PLRA, and he must submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a 6-month Certificate of Inmate Trust Account at the same time he files his notice of appeal.
A copy of this Order shall be mailed to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas 78711 and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77342-0629.