Opinion
G052437
04-05-2017
RIMAS KREGZDE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MELODIE SAREBANHA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Rimas Kregzde, in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Appellant. Horvitz & Levy, Barry R. Levy and Shane H. McKenzie; Law Offices of McCarthy & Beavers, Michael R. Mazal for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2014-00697685) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Linda S. Marks, Judge. Affirmed. Rimas Kregzde, in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Appellant. Horvitz & Levy, Barry R. Levy and Shane H. McKenzie; Law Offices of McCarthy & Beavers, Michael R. Mazal for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
The trial court dismissed a personal injury and property damage action on the second day of a bench trial after concluding plaintiff Rimas Kregzde (Kregzde), representing himself, had "engaged in a series of continued misrepresentations which ha[d] led to an undue consumption of time." (Citing Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736 (Slesinger).) In dismissing the case, the court cited Kregzde's perjury in claiming he no longer could drive a car and claiming falsely defense counsel made death threats against him. The court also found Kregzde refused to cooperate with defense counsel or follow court rules in preparing for trial, and was unable or unwilling to provide the court with evidence supporting his claimed damages.
Kregzde forfeited his appellate claims because he failed to present any legal argument or authority to support his claims, and failed to summarize the evidence supporting the court's ruling. Kregzde fares no better even if we decided his appeal on the merits. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding Kregzde attempted to commit a fraud on the court by testifying falsely and engaged in other litigation abuse. We discern no abuse of discretion and therefore affirm.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 10, 2014, 73-year-old Kregzde filed a complaint alleging he suffered bodily injury and property damage when a car driven by Melodie Sarebanha struck his vehicle from behind on January 17, 2012, in the City of Costa Mesa. Kregzde represented himself in the trial court.
The trial court, after noting the parties agreed on a three to four day trial estimate, advised Kregzde he would "go first" and he should have his witnesses, including any expert witnesses, prepared to testify. The court warned it would not proceed to the defense case if Kregzde did not have his witnesses in court. The court asked the parties to submit a statement of the case, and directed Kregzde to provide a witness list. When defense counsel noted he had filed a declaration stating Kregzde had refused to cooperate, the court ordered Kregzde to advise the court "who he intends to call and the order."
The court noted the defense admitted liability and therefore it was a "damages-only case." The court explained Kregzde this meant "[t]here will be no testimony about the accident or how the accident happened, only to the extent of what happened to you when you were hit in the accident." Nevertheless, Kregzde complained that defense counsel had advised him Sarebanha would not attend the trial, explaining Sarebanha was "very important" and "should testify." The court responded there was no reason for the driver to testify because liability was not an issue, and the relevant witnesses "are the doctors who have examined you and any other witnesses that the defense puts on about your treatment and the nature of the treatment you've received and your injuries."
The record does not reflect Kregzde served a notice to appear on Sarebanha. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987, subd. (b) [written notice requesting the party witness to attend trial must be served on the party or her attorney at least 10 days before the time required for attendance unless the court prescribes a shorter time].)
After a recess, Kregzde agreed to waive his right to a jury. The court advised Kregzde he should present an opening statement and then begin with his witnesses. Kregzde listed the names of witnesses he intended to call, including Sarebanha and her defendant parents who owned the car involved in the accident. Defense counsel reported Sarebanha was a Caribbean medical student and would not be attending. When asked for an offer of proof, Kregzde stated defendants denied everything and claimed he was "injured somewhere else." The court advised Kregzde that Sarebanha's testimony was not relevant, explaining it was defense counsel rather than defendants questioning his injuries, and medical experts would determine whether Kregzde's injuries related to the accident. Kregzde stated he respectfully disagreed and wanted to hear "how [and why] it happened" from Sarebanha. The court again noted the defense had conceded liability and there was no reason to call Sarebanha and her parents as a witnesses on the issue of damages.
The court noted Kregzde previously had refused to submit to an independent medical exam (IME) and had agreed to withdraw a claim for neuropsychological injury. Kregzde disagreed, and insisted the court had denied a defense motion for an IME. The court noted it had only denied an ex parte request to have the motion heard within a shortened period of time. When the court asked Kregzde to describe his injuries, he listed unconsciousness, broken bones in his neck, postconcussion syndrome, memory loss, "pain and suffering with [his] back and shoulders," sleeplessness, loss of balance, and numbness in the fingers of both hands. He also stated he had "lost the feeling of time [knowing what the time of day was]" and had lost 80 percent of his facility with the English language. He also claimed he spent 10 hours of every day in bed. The court again advised Kregzde to have his witnesses ready, again explaining the issues at trial concerned the nature and extent of Kregzde's injuries.
The following day, the court stated it would allow Kregzde to present evidence of pain and suffering, but not that he had suffered a specific mental disability caused by his accident. The court explained Kregzde had not exchanged expert witness information (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034), therefore his witness, Dr. Mahdad, could testify as a treating physician, but could not testify as an expert. The court allowed Kregzde to present testimony from his friends Chiriuc and Smith even though he had not timely identified them before the discovery cutoff date.
Kregzde asserted in his opening statement the accident resulted in a "huge" impact to his vehicle, he lost consciousness for 20 to 40 seconds, and he spent 19 days in the hospital. He claimed after he left the hospital he could not drive, but friends took care of him and helped him survive. His car was totaled and he received compensation of about $1,700. As a result of the accident, his memory had been impaired and he "cannot drive a car" because he could not move his head to check for traffic. He likened the loss of his driving ability to losing "your legs. . . In California, no car, no legs."
Defense counsel's opening statement asserted Kregzde's claimed injuries were inconsistent with the low speed, minor rear end collision that occurred. Counsel asserted the damage estimate for Kregzde's car was $342, and Sarebanha's car suffered $85 in damages. Kregzde was involved in a more severe collision in the same area about four months after the accident with Sarebanha, and also suffered injuries in a 2003 accident. Defense experts would testify the accident did not cause Kregzde to suffer a traumatic injury, and at most he had a mild neck and low back strain.
Kregzde testified in narrative form and generally tracked his opening statement. He claimed he suffered a broken neck after Sarebanha's car struck him from behind while traveling about 35 miles per hour. He walked to a friend's house after the accident and had back and neck pain. The next day he could not walk and spent the day in bed. The day after the accident he went to the emergency room and he believed the hospital performed an MRI and CAT scan. He claimed to have records from the visit, but did not know how much the visit cost him.
Kregzde testified he returned to the emergency room the following day because he had not improved. Kregzde claimed the hospital staff took X-rays and another MRI of his head, neck, and back, and gave him pain medication. Later, he received a call from the hospital doctor stating he had broken bones in his neck. The hospital admitted him on January 23 for more imaging tests and treatment. Kregzde testified he was placed in a wheelchair and told not to walk without permission. He spent 19 days in the hospital and was released with various appliances to support his neck. Kregzde attended a rehabilitation facility for two months and Dr. Mahdad treated him for one year for his head and neck injuries, loss of memory, disorientation, and blurred vision. After the accident he could not drive for approximately five months. He installed a home gym to continue with his rehabilitation, and continued daily to take aspirin for pain.
Kregzde testified at "present time I cannot drive. I don't drive. I have no license because I cannot pass exam" because his "head [was] not working very well to pass the driver license exam." Kregzde claimed his medical bills totaled approximately $63,000. The court asked Kregzde for an itemized breakdown of his bills, and told him to show the bills to defense counsel over the lunch hour before the court reviewed them. Kregzde also claimed he "badly need[ed additional treatment]," including neck surgery costing $60,000. The court again asked him to itemize his bills and to produce a report that Kregzde claimed corroborated his need for neck surgery.
On cross-examination, Kregzde asserted hospital records and Dr. Mahdad would support his claim he suffered broken bones in his neck as a result of the accident. Asked if anyone from the hospital would be testifying, Kregzde said he would try to have a Dr. Dobkin testify. The court advised Kregzde that Dobkin could not testify because Kregzde did not include him on his witness list.
Before the noon recess, the court advised Kregzde to "undertake [ ] three items. It's your job to prove to this court you suffered the injury, how much the cost was for your treatment, and if you have future claims for treatment. You need to show the court proof of that." The court stated it wanted an "itemized statement of the medical bills.
When cross-examination resumed Kregzde did not recall the doctor's name who told him he had broken bones in his neck, but stated it was a radiologist, and "[m]aybe" he would call this physician to testify. When defense counsel noted Kregzde had not listed the physician on his witness list, Kregzde responded it was "Doe 1 to 10." Counsel asked if Kregzde had a bill showing medical charges of $63,000 and Kregzde apparently began looking through the defense evidence book. The court asked if he had "that billing statement." Kregzde explained his medical costs of $63,000 were not listed in one billing. "It's maybe 100 different bills from different doctors from hospital . . . ." The court again asked Kregzde "to make a list for the court" with the provider name and the amount of the charge.
Counsel asked a series of questions about a subsequent accident occurring in May 2012. Again, Kregzde could or would not answer many of counsel's and the court's questions directly, but volunteered he was a passenger on this occasion. The court remarked, "Mr. Kregzde, it doesn't require all of - we'll be here for a long time if you don't just answer the questions." Kregzde said his deposition testimony did not jog his memory, and continued to complain he had not been given a chance to correct the deposition transcript and did not sign it. Asked if he recalled being transported to the hospital in an ambulance after the May 2012 accident, Kregzde responded "could be" and "maybe." Kregzde repeatedly provided evasive or nonresponsive answers. He claimed not to have filed a lawsuit for the May 2012 accident, but "maybe made by my attorney. It could be. I didn't make." He did not know if the claim remained pending, and denied any head or neck injuries from the May 2012 accident, which contradicted his deposition testimony.
The following morning, June 18, the court stated it had reviewed the declarations of Kregzde and Chiriuc concerning an incident occurring the previous day. Defense counsel stated he photographed Kregzde driving out of the court parking lot after court. When Kregzde spotted counsel taking his picture, he approached the lawyer and struck his arm, knocking his mobile phone out of his hand. Counsel presented the photos to the court.
Kregzde asked if counsel had "a right to make pictures?" The court told Kregzde, "I don't think you understand something here. . . . What you need to understand is this is a court of law," and the "court is not going to entertain lying, particularly under oath, when you've told the court both in opening statement and you testified yesterday you cannot drive; and that in California, if you cannot drive, and you don't have a car, no car is no legs."
Kregzde said he would "explain why . . . . I was driving." The trial court stated it did not understand Kregzde's declaration, and did not believe defense counsel, as an officer of the court, "would threaten [him] or a witness." The court stated it was "not going to spend anymore time on your case . . . because I think that you are using this system in a way that it is not meant to be utilized." The court declared Kregzde had "shown the court absolutely no evidence at this point. I have no medical bills. I have no medical testimony. I don't believe Dr. Mahdad is going to come and testify in this case." The court stated, "I don't believe you any longer, . . . not after I see photographs of you behind the wheel of a car. Were you behind the wheel of a car yesterday when you left the courthouse? Yes or no?" Kregzde replied he was "protecting my witness" because "he [defense counsel presumably] followed us." The court asked again, "[t]here is a man in this photograph wearing a cervical collar that looks very much like you. Is that you?" Kregzde responded, "Could be." The court replied, "Well, I'm going to say it is you, and I am going to issue terminating sanctions. And I'm dismissing the case at this time."
The court explained, "As far as this court is concerned, the record has been made. [¶] We spent all day yesterday on this case. Mr. Kregzde has been at times belligerent. He has not answered questions truthfully that were posed to him either by the court or by [defense counsel]. He has not provided the court with any itemized billing associated with the injuries he claims in this accident. . . . [h]e has not provided the court with a witness statement of who he's truly going to be calling in this case. [¶] He has sought to - rather than put on a case involving his injuries and damages, he has chosen to attack continuously the integrity of defense counsel. He has filed motions to [recuse defense counsel]."
The court stated "in light of seeing a photograph in which Mr. Kregzde told this court yesterday that he could not drive, that part of his injuries were that he could not drive, that part of his injuries were that he could not pass a driving test, that he is now driving when he claims that as a result of this accident he cannot drive any longer, this court feels is grounds for a terminating sanction. [¶] And the court at this time chooses to exercise its right that everything that Mr. Kregzde has told the court up to now is in serious doubt and serious contention. [¶] So I don't feel at this point that I, certainly as a trier of fact in a court trial, can effectively hear either . . . of your positions and be a neutral, unbiased arbiter of the facts. [¶] So I'm dismissing without prejudice. You want to refile, you can do so, Mr. Kregzde. But for purposes of this trial, and this court, and what you have told this court, I can no longer hear your case and be able to rule on it. [¶] Plus you've lied to the court."
Expressing concern "about your mental state and your ability to proceed on behalf of yourself in this case," the court expressly found Kregzde harbored an "intent not to resolve this case in good faith but to use this system as a vehicle to simply attack the other side and file a declaration involving tampering of witnesses and that [defense counsel] had approached you or approached your witness . . . ." Kregzde interjected, "[w]ith a gun." The court stated the court had "no reason to believe that [defense counsel] as an officer of the court would have a gun in his possession." The court granted the motion for terminating sanctions by dismissing the case without prejudice.
The court allowed Kregzde to make a statement. Kregzde claimed defense counsel followed him and Chiriuc after court adjourned. Kregzde thought something was suspicious and decided to drive to protect his witness, explaining it was his car and he knew how to drive. Defense counsel was behind them taking pictures. When they stopped to pay the cashier, defense counsel approached Kregzde's window and began taking photos of Kregzde's witness. Kregzde confronted him and said "you cannot do this one." Counsel responded, "You are a dead man" at least four times, and then went back to his car. Kregzde believed counsel was getting a gun. Kregzde claimed his witness, Chiriuc, always drove the car, but "[y]esterday I was protecting my witness and reason I took the seat."
Defense counsel stated he was "tired of the personal attacks," and all he did was "take a photograph of [Kregzde] because he had testified in court that he's unable to drive anymore." He denied making any statements to Kregzde. Kregzde insisted he had three witnesses to support his claim. The court repeated its earlier observations about Kregzde's unwarranted attacks on defense counsel, testifying falsely under oath, and failing to present any evidence of actual damages through "medical records, medical testimony, a bill itemizing your expenses. I have none of that before me."
The court explained in its minutes that Kregzde had "engaged in a series of continued misrepresentations which has led to an undue consumption of time. Misrepresentations that are baldly false, and yet have been asserted to be true and accurate by plaintiff. During trial, plaintiff has sought to disqualify defense counsel, and filed a declaration with the court accusing defense counsel of making 'death threats' against him and his witness, and having a gun. Plaintiff has made outlandish accusations against defense counsel which not based in fact, but fiction. Plaintiff has refused to cooperate with defense counsel, and refused to follow court rules in preparing for trial. Finally, plaintiff has lied to the Court during examination under oath and when confronted with these facts has provided yet, another fabrication. Therefore, plaintiff's credibility is at issue. Plaintiff has not been prepared for trial despite the Court advising of same. Plaintiff is unable or unwilling to provide the Court with the facts associated with damages since this was an admitted liability case, but has spent court time making unreasonable and unrealistic demands. [¶] The court dismisses the action in its entirety after granting the motion made by defense counsel for terminating sanctions, and on the Court's own motion after duly considering the facts as presented to the court per Slesinger."
The court filed a judgment August 7, 2015. It awarded defendant $30,043.19 in costs.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Kregzde Forfeited His Appellate Claims
In a handwritten opening brief filed in propria persona, Kregzde briefly recounts the facts of the collision and his injuries, claiming he incurred $63,000 in medical expenses. He asserts Chiriuc and he "got death threats" during trial, claiming his witnesses "[were] scare[d] to be in case and testify." Kregzde denies lying to the court during trial, stating he may have misunderstood the court , his English is poor and "not my native language." He asserts the trial court erred in dismissing his case, and relying on "the criminal activities of defendant's attorney . . . as the tool to win a case." He asserts the Slesinger case is distinguishable, and argues the court erred in not providing him a Romanian interpreter. Finally, he complains the judge's decision to "punish [him] to pay legal expenses of defendant is out of law, out of logic and sounds and looks abusive." He attaches a declaration to his brief "re tampering with a witness," which repeats allegations in his trial court declaration concerning the confrontation with defense counsel. We must reject these contentions because Kregzde's brief fails to comply with standard rules of appellate procedure and therefore he has forfeited his appellate claims.
On appeal we must presume the trial court's rulings are correct, unless and until the appellant demonstrates error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 (Denham).) The appellant bears the burden to show error in the trial record. (See Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [fundamental principles of appellate review include: "(1) a judgment is presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error"].)
Both represented and self-represented appellants must present their claims of error with specific arguments supported by facts and corresponding record citations. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); see, e.g., Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.) A party must "'support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations.'" (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) The reviewing court cannot be expected to make cross-references or connections that a party simply assumes are apparent. "Issues do not have a life of their own" (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99), but instead must be spelled out clearly.
Similarly, "conclusory claims of error will fail." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) "We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them" (In re Marriage of Falcone (2000) 164 Cal.App.4th 800, 830), and a party's status appearing in propria persona does not allow us to overlook these deficiencies. (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1; Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126; see also Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685 ["appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error through reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal authority"].)
Simply put, we may not turn to the record on our own searching for error (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246) because the standard of review is to the contrary. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566; City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287 ["Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has waived a point urged on appeal"].)
Here, Kregzde failed to discuss or cite legal authority to support his contentions, and his opening brief failed to cite the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, as required by the standard of review. Kregzde also failed to address the reasons for the court's decision to grant defendants' motion for terminating sanctions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [opening brief must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority].) Indeed, Kregzde runs afoul of every briefing rule appellants must follow on appeal. (See In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 1004 [appellate court may treat as waived, forfeited or meritless any issue that, although raised in the briefs, is not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument or proper citation of authority.) In essence, Kregzde's brief was no more than a "rambling and disjointed series of accusations." (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817.) Kregzde therefore has forfeited his appellate claims. B. Kregzde's Claims Fail on the Merits
Kregzde's claims also fail on the merits. California courts possess inherent power to issue a terminating sanction for "pervasive misconduct[.]" (Slesinger, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 765; see Osborne v. Todd Farm Service (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43, 51.) We accept the trial court's factual determinations concerning misconduct if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Sauer v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 213, 230-231.) We review the order to issue a terminating sanction based on those factual findings for abuse of discretion. (Slesinger, supra, at p. 765.)
Defendants assert, "There can be no doubt that Kregzde lied to the court on numerous occasions. For example, Kregzde committed perjury in testifying repeatedly that he could not drive a car as a result of the accident. [] When defense counsel presented photographic evidence of Kregzde driving away from court after the second day of trial [], Kregzde did not deny that he had driven the day before []. Rather, Kregzde made 'outlandish accusations,' explaining his driving as somehow necessary to protect himself and his witness from supposed 'death threats' made by defense counsel.[] The trial court found that explanation was also a lie. [] [¶]Thus, not only did Kregzde commit perjury when testifying under oath, but he also committed contempt of court when he lied to the court to cover up his perjury." Defendants also argue Kregzde's trial testimony contradicted his deposition testimony in several respects, including whether he walked or drove from the scene of the accident, whether he remembered what injuries he had received in the 2003 accident, and whether he remembered details concerning the May 2012 accident. They also assert Kregzde deliberately and repeatedly abused the judicial process by refusing to answer questions truthfully, failing to produce evidence of injury, failing to prepare a witness statement, changing his position, and generally misusing the system to attack the defense.
In Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911 (Lyons) the Supreme Court explained trial courts must consider two inquiries when determining whether a plaintiff's actions warrant a dismissal with prejudice. "First, the court must discern whether the plaintiff's pattern of conduct was so 'severe [and] deliberate' as to constitute extreme circumstances. [Citation.] Second, the court must look to see whether alternatives less severe than dismissal are available. The "'sound exercise of discretion requires the judge to consider and use lesser sanctions'" unless the court's authority cannot possibly be otherwise vindicated." (Lyons, supra, at p. 917.)
In Slesinger, relied on by the trial court and defendants, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit and hired an investigator to surreptitiously obtain the defendant's documents. The investigator took thousands of pages belonging to the defendant, including documents marked privileged and confidential, by breaking into the defendant's office buildings and secure trash receptacles, and those of its off-site document destruction company. The investigator transmitted the documents to the plaintiff's attorneys and principals, who reviewed them, but kept no records of the documents they received or of those they discarded. The plaintiff concealed the investigator's activities from the defendant and the court, and altered documents to delete references to confidentiality. Following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for terminating sanctions, the trial court dismissed the case, explaining no lesser sanction could protect the defendant against the plaintiff's use of illicitly-obtained information. (Slesinger, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 740.)
The trial court in Slesinger inferred the plaintiff illicitly obtained insight into the defendant's confidential approach to the litigation it could use to its advantage. (Slesinger, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) The trial court considered lesser sanctions, but was not convinced the plaintiff had either produced or discarded all the illicitly-obtained documents, and concluded it had no confidence the plaintiff would obey a prophylactic order. The appellate court noted the knowledge gained from the stolen documents "could not be purged." (Ibid.) As the trial court found, "'No power the Court possesses . . . can purge [the plaintiff's] knowledge. The full extent of [its] knowledge remains uncertain as does the potential impact of application of that knowledge to potential future litigation decisions and events. No power the Court possesses short of termination can fully guard against the conscious or subconscious application of [the plaintiff's] knowledge in shaping the future course of the litigation and its outcome.'" (Id. at pp. 772-773.)
Here, Kregzde's misconduct, primarily false testimony, is arguably different from the "pervasive litigation abuse" found in Slesinger. Slesinger involved unlawful pretrial behavior to obtain confidential and privileged material outside the bounds of legal discovery, and fraudulent action to conceal the wrongdoing from the court and the defendant. The court found knowledge gained from the stolen documents could not be purged. (Slesinger, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)
On this record, however, we cannot say the trial court abused it discretion. Courts recognize that "false testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable" and a 'flagrant affront' to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings." (see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors (9th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 337 [dismissal for violating discovery rules by withholding relevant financial records, continuously lying about records' existence and condition under oath, and repeatedly violating court's pretrial publicity order not to disparage other party in the media]; Combs v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (9th Cir. 1991) 927 F.2d 486 [affirming dismissal under the court's inherent power as appropriate sanction for falsifying a deposition]; Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1st Cir. 1989) 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 [court possesses the inherent power to deny the court's processes to one who defiles the judicial system by committing a fraud on the court; a "'fraud on the court'" occurs where a party "sentiently set[s] in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense"]; Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp. (4th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 984, 986 [fraud on court may exist where witness and attorney conspire to present perjured testimony]; Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 1983) 709 F.2d 585, 591 [dismissal where plaintiff's denials of material fact were knowingly false and plaintiff willfully failed to comply with discovery orders]; Rozier v. Ford Motor Co. (5th Cir. 1978) 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 [party fabricates evidence].)
Here, substantial evidence supports the court's finding Kregzde attempted to commit a fraud on the court by testifying falsely. He also engaged in other litigation abuse, as recounted above. The court impliedly determined its authority could not be vindicated with a sanction less severe than dismissal. We discern no abuse of discretion.
We agree with defendants the trial court did not err in failing to provide a Romanian interpreter for Chiriuc. (Jara v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 181, 185 [trial court not required to appoint an interpreter for a witness in a civil case].)
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs.
ARONSON, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. THOMPSON, J.