Opinion
Civil No. 03-1166 (JRT/FLN).
June 30, 2003.
T. Joseph Snodgrass, Shawn Raiter, Larson King, St. Paul, MN, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Stephen P. Lucke, Dorsey Whitney, Minneapolis, MN, Attorney for Defendant.
Douglas R Hart, Travis M Gemoets and Fred R Puglisi, Sheppard Mullin Richter Hampton, Los Angles, CA, Attorneys for Defendant.
ORDER AFFIRMING ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Irene Kramer filed this action alleging that her former employer, defendant NCS Pearson, Inc. ("NCS"), violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and Minnesota state law by failing to pay her time-and-a-half for overtime. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself, and other similarly situated individuals. United States District Court Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel issued an Order dated June 2, 2003, compelling disclosure of defendant's "Employee List," compelling a corporate deposition and ordering the defendant to produce responsive documents. In that same Order, the Magistrate Judge denied defendant's motion for a protective order and denied plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Defendant appeals that portion of the Order compelling disclosure of the employee list and compelling the deposition, and also appeals the denial of the protective order.
The parties describe defendant's request for a protective order as the "flip-side" of plaintiff's motion to compel. The Court understands defendant's motion for a protective order sought a stay of certain discovery, including the discovery expressly ordered by the Magistrate Judge. If this understanding is incorrect, the parties may address this issue at the hearing on defendant's motion to stay.
"The standard of review applicable to an appeal of a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive issue is extremely deferential." Reko v. Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d 1005, 1007 (Minn. 1999). The district court will reverse an order of a Magistrate Judge only if the order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.1(b)(2); Chakeles v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1996). Upon review of the parties' submissions and the files, records, and proceedings, the Court affirms the order of the Magistrate Judge.
BACKGROUND
As relevant background facts, NCS was awarded a large government contract to assist the Transportation Security Administration in the hiring of 45,000 federal security personnel to perform airport screening duties and other functions at the country's commercial airports. Plaintiff worked as a full-time, but temporary "Staffing Specialist" to assist NCS in this significant hiring effort. Plaintiff claims that she was hired as an hourly, "exempt" employee, and worked well over forty hours per week, but was not paid time-and-a-half for overtime.
"Exempt" employees must be paid a regular salary, and cannot be paid hourly. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118. Nonetheless, plaintiff claims that the form employment offer provided for hourly compensation and exempt status. This allegation appears integral to plaintiff's FLSA complaint.
Plaintiff filed this action in February of 2003. Similar, though not identical actions are pending in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. See Carlin, et al. v. NCS Pearson, Inc., No. 02-CV-8857; Green, et al. v. NCS Pearson, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-9460. Plaintiffs in this case and the Green case have petitioned for transfer to the Multi-District Litigation Panel. [MDL Docket No. 1544.] In contrast, in the Carlin case, the parties have reached a settlement that has been preliminarily approved by the District Court for the Central District of California. In this case, defendant's motion for a stay is also pending.
ANALYSIS
The FLSA permits employees to pool their resources and proceed collectively with other similarly situated individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("An action to recover the liability prescribed in [section 207] may be maintained against any employer in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated."). In an effort to utilize this important procedural mechanism for bringing claims for overtime wages under the FLSA, plaintiff requests disclosure of an Employee List, as well as other responsive documents.
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's Order compelling this disclosure on several grounds, none of which the Court finds satisfies the clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard for overturning the Order. Defendant argues that the requested discovery renders moot their pending motion for a stay, and conflicts with plaintiff Kramer and the Green plaintiffs' request for MDL status. Defendant also suggests that the requested discovery is unnecessary before this Court rules on defendant's motion for a stay.
Discovery is not automatically placed on hold while alternate motions are pending. Defendant has identified no rule prohibiting discovery while the Court entertains a motion to stay litigation. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 2002 WL 100388 (Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (noting that the Court would not overturn a Magistrate Judge's order compelling discovery because of a pending motion to compel arbitration) (citing Minnesota Odd Fellows Home Found. v. Engler Budd Co., 630 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (Minn. 1986) (permitting discovery while motion to compel arbitration was pending)). Similarly, the Rules of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") specifically note that discovery and other pretrial matters need not be stayed pending the outcome of a transfer order. See Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Rule 18). See also Falgoust, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 WL 462919 (E.D. La. April 19, 2000) ("A pending motion before the JPML does not affect the jurisdiction of the transferor court.") (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Paris, France on March 3, 1974, 376 F. Supp. 887, 888 (JPML 1974)).
Rule 18 states:
The pendency of a motion . . . before the Panel concerning transfer or remand of an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not affect or suspend orders and pretrial proceedings in the district court in which the action is pending and does not in any way limit the pretrial jurisdiction of that court.
The Court recognizes that defendant's motion to stay is pending. Without commenting on the merits of that motion, the Court notes that, even if the motion is granted, the stay will not be dispositive because plaintiff in this case brings issues that will not be resolved by the Carlin settlement. In that respect, the procedural posture of this case is distinct from those cited by the defendant in its supporting brief. See, e.g., Vivid Tech., Inc. v. American Science Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (approving district court's decision to stay discovery pending outcome of claim construction and noting that "[w]hen a particular issue may be dispositive, the court may stay discovery concerning other issues until the critical issue is resolved"); Satcom Int'l Group PLC v. Orbcomm Int'l Partner, L.P., 55 F. Supp.2d 231, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting stay where successful appeal of court's order would divest court of jurisdiction).
Defendant also objects that plaintiff has no immediate need for the requested discovery. The party requesting discovery documents, however, has no burden to show an "immediate need." See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for liberal discovery of "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim." Id. See also Gillen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 156 F.R.D. 120, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting liberal discovery standard). Therefore plaintiff's immediate need, or the lack of an immediate need, is not sufficient to overrule the Order.
The Court is also not persuaded by defendant's related argument that plaintiff is undermining judicial economy by encouraging multiple lawsuits. Regardless of the outcome of the Carlin settlement, it is almost certain that there will be at least two lawsuits. It may be that some plaintiffs will choose not to opt-in to the Carlin settlement because they are convinced that their rights are better represented by participating in this lawsuit. The Court's interest in judicial economy does not outweigh its interest in providing a fair forum for aggrieved parties.
Courts have "broad discretion in matters relating to discovery." Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2002); Gillen, 156 F.R.D. at 121 (noting that "issues pertaining to the scope of discovery are to be resolved, almost exclusively, at the discretion of the district court.") (citing Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987)). Included in that discretion is broad discretion in deciding whether to stay discovery, and whether a protective order is appropriate. May Coating Technologies, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 157 F.R.D. 55, 57 (Minn. 1994). Given this broad discretion, and the absence of any contrary authority, the June 3, 2003 Order cannot be said to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
ORDER
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order of the Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 58] is AFFIRMED.