Opinion
4:00CV3110
March 8, 2001
ORDER
This matter is before me on Sandra E. Kramer's Complaint to Review and Set Aside Decision under the Social Security Act and Request for Trial, filing 1, which is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended. See 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. In accordance with my order dated September 13, 2000, the parties have submitted briefs in support of their respective positions. The defendant has also filed an answer to the complaint, along with a transcript of the administrative record (filing 4). After carefully reviewing these materials, I find that the decision must be reversed and the case remanded for further consideration.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on August 12, 1997, alleging that she was disabled and unable to work as of August 1, 1997. Her application was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. At 87-90, 93-97).
The plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, hereinafter "ALJ," on November 28, 1997. The ALJ conducted a hearing on June 2, 1998, and rendered a decision unfavorable to the plaintiff on June 19, 1998. In her decision, the ALJ found, among other things, that:
3. The record establishes that the Claimant has the following medically determinable impairment which has imposed more than slight limitations upon her ability to function: Discogenic and degenerative back disorder.
4. Ms. Kramer's medically determinable impairment has not revealed the same or equivalent attendant medical findings as are recited in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Social Security Administration's Regulations No. 4. However, it has imposed certain limitations upon her ability to perform basic work-related functions. Despite these limitations, Ms. Kramer has the residual functional capacity to occasionally lift up to ten pounds; sit for six hours during an eight-hour workday; stand for two hours during an eight-hour workday; and occasionally climb, balance, stoop, and crawl.
5. Notwithstanding such limitations, the claimant is able to perform her past relevant work as a sorter and a data entry clerk.
6. Ms. Kramer's allegations of total disability were not credible, in view of the criteria set forth under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, Social Security Ruling 96-7p, and Polaski v. Heckler, supra.
7. Accordingly, the Claimant is not disabled, as that term is defined under the Social Security Act, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
8. The Claimant is not entitled to a period of disability or to the payment of disability insurance benefits, under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended.
(Tr. at 23-24.)
The plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration review the ALJ's decision, but her request was denied on March 21, 2000. Thus, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
The plaintiff timely filed this action on May 3, 2000, raising five issues in support of her appeal. First, the plaintiff claims that the finding by the ALJ regarding the plaintiff's ability to return to her prior work "fails to comply with Eighth Circuit standards regarding such findings and is unsupported by substantial evidence." (Pl.'s Br. in Supp. at 2.) Second, she claims that the ALJ did not fully and fairly develop the record regarding the opinions of the plaintiff's treating physician. Third, the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's residual functional capacity was unsupported by substantial evidence. Fourth, the plaintiff claims that the evaluation of her impairments by the ALJ was performed in a piecemeal fashion as opposed to in combination, which is argued to be contrary to applicable regulations and Eighth Circuit precedents. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert omitted certain of the plaintiff's limitations, which in turn renders the answers to those questions incapable of supporting the ALJ's decision.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
On April 27, 1997, the plaintiff slipped and fell, injuring her back. (Tr. at 224.) She sought medical attention within a few days, but her pain persisted. (Id.) In addition to this injury, the plaintiff experiences a number of health problems, including glaucoma (Tr. at 217), Bell's palsy (Tr. at 186-87), and a gastrointestinal problem referred to as "dumping syndrome." (Tr. at 217). Her medical background also includes a broken left ankle (Tr. at 183), early left knee degenerative bony change (Id.), a knee surgery (Tr. at 224), a hysterectomy (Tr. at 48), and gall bladder removal (Id.). There is also some evidence that the plaintiff experienced depression. (Tr. at 189, 53.) The plaintiff left her job as a validator in the Nebraska Department of Revenue on about August 2, 1997, due to her back pain. (Tr. at 224.)
Inconsistencies in the record render it difficult to determine whether the plaintiff's last day at work was on August 1, 1997, or August 2, 1997. Compare Tr. at 224 with Tr. at 120.
The record indicates that the plaintiff was born on July 1, 1945, and at the time of her injury, she stood approximately 5 feet, 4 inches tall, and weighed 220 pounds. (Tr. at 39, 43.) She attended school through the tenth grade, and has no high school diploma or equivalent degree. (Tr. at 39.) The defendant has thoughtfully provided a well-supported statement of facts that I have found very helpful in assembling the following summary of the plaintiff's health problems and treatment.
A. The Plaintiff's Ankle and Knee Injuries
A fracture of the plaintiff's left ankle was detected in an x-ray taken on May 8, 1996. (Tr. at 183.) The fracture was treated with a cast, and presented excellent alignment and position throughout the healing process. (Tr. at 175.) The cast was removed on June 6, 1996, although it was recommended that the plaintiff continue to use an air cast when "up and about." (Id.) The ankle was mildly swollen and presented a mildly decreased range of motion. (Id.) At the time of a follow-up visit to her physician on July 17, 1996, normal mobility of the ankle had been restored, although some tenderness persisted. (Tr. at 173.) It was recommended at that time that the plaintiff use a cane in her fight hand and continue to use a compression stocking, an air cast, and ibuprofen for pain, and to continue moderation of her activities. (Id.) Aching pain and stiffness persisted at the time of the next check-up on August 23, 1996, although some improvement was noted. (Id.) Good range of motion, muscle tone, and strength were all noted, and the plaintiff was directed to continue use of the compression stocking and ibuprofen, and to continue range of motion and strengthening exercises. (Id.) On October 4, 1996, the plaintiff reported continuing aches, pains, and stiffness in her ankle. (Tr. at 169.) X-rays revealed excellent healing and no abnormalities. (Id.) The doctor's impression was that the plaintiff presented post traumatic inflamation of the left ankle and moderate obesity. (Id.) It was recommended that the plaintiff reduce her weight, moderate her activity, and continue stretching her left ankle. (Id.) A drug called Oruvail was recommended as well. (Id.)
Somewhat misleadingly, the medical notes in the record suggests that the plaintiff's left knee and ankle injuries occurred together. However, the record reveals that the injury to the plaintiff's knee predated her broken ankle. An arthroscopic surgery was performed by a Dr. Fulcher in February of 1995, and it may be that the event which fractured the plaintiff's ankle aggravated her knee problems. (Tr. at 224, 179.) At any rate, an examination of the knee on May 8, 1996, indicated "early left knee degenerative bony change," and there were no findings of acute fracture. (Tr. at 183.) The plaintiff was advised to take ibuprofen and to reduce her weight in order to reduce the discomfort in her knee. (Tr. at 179, 177.) She was also encouraged to continue to work on improving the range of motion of her knee. (Tr. at 177.) Through October 4, 1996, the plaintiff continued to complain of knee problems, particularly with strenuous activity or "with changes in the weather." (Tr. at 169.)
At the hearing before the administrative law judge, the plaintiff testified that complications relating to her knee and ankle injuries were persisting. She stated that she still experienced swelling and pain, and that she walked with a limp. (Tr. at 55-56.)
B. Gloucoma and Bell's Palsy
The record shows that the plaintiff was issued a prescription to treat her glaucoma by a Dr. Geiger on October 5, 1996, and the prescription was continued following a later visit on April 18, 1997. (Tr. at 187.) Problems related to the plaintiff's glaucoma were noted by a Dr. Loschen during a visit with the plaintiff on May 23, 1998. (Tr. at 217).
Based upon the record in this case, it is unclear whether certain eye difficulties experienced by the plaintiff were caused by glaucoma or Bell's palsy. On April 18, 1997, the plaintiff complained to Dr. Geiger of pain, watering, and throbbing in her left eye, and her vision in that eye tested at 20/400. (Tr. at 187.) Soon thereafter, the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Loschen, who prescribed Prednisone for Bell's palsy and ordered the plaintiff to continue wearing a patch over her left eye. (Tr. at 190.) Dr. Loschen added commentary in the medical record suggesting that Dr. Geiger did not properly treat the plaintiff's eye problems. (Id.) Nevertheless, the plaintiff visited Dr. Geiger again on April 26, 1997. (Tr. at 186.) The records indicate that the plaintiff showed improvement in her ability to close her eye and in her vision, although she had discontinued using her eyepatch because it bothered her. (Id.) She also complained of soreness and tenderness in her face that might have been associated with muscle exercises she had been doing. (Id.)
The plaintiff testified before the administrative law judge that her Bell' palsy is stress-related, and that she experienced an onset of symptoms when her mother passed away sometime prior to that hearing. (Tr. at 54.) She testified that her eye swells, sometimes to the point of closure, her mouth becomes numb, her speech slurs, and she drools. (Tr. at 54, 58).
C. Back Pain and "Dumping Syndrome"
The record contains the following account of the initiation of treatment for the plaintiff's back pain:
6/4/97 KRAMER, SANDRA
S: Patient is a 51 year old white female seen for complaints of low back pain. She reportedly fell at a local grocery store the last week of April and was seen in the emergency department within few days of the fall itself. She reports tripping on some rugs that were out in front of the grocery store and falling forward onto her hands and chest area. She had significant bruising at that time and was evaluated by Dr. Greg Woods on 4/27/97. She received Toradol and [illegible] with directions to for Ibuprofen use, which she was utilized occasionally. She did take [illegible] last night when she had difficulty sleeping. She has noticed increased symptoms with prolonged sitting, pain with bending and even with prolonged walking. No additional med's other than Ibuprofen. NKA. Social History: Patient is a non-smoker and does work at a computer for long periods of time. She used to take a break every two hours for bathroom use and to stretch but now she needs to get up within about an hour and ten minutes due to her low back symptoms. No previous history of back injury reported.
(Tr. at 190) (grammar and spelling as in original).
Examinations using various imaging techniques, such as x-rays, computerized tomography, and MRI, consistently failed to show any fractures, dislocations, herniated discs, or bony abnormalities. (Tr. at 190, 193, 199.) The records documenting attempts to treat the plaintiff's back are extensive, and rather than embark upon a written review of each physician's notes, I shall quote a portion of a record dated September 18, 1997, that provides a succinct description of the course of treatment for the plaintiff's back injury:
— Mrs. Kramer is a lady that continues to have low back pain, pain in her right buttocks. Stairs and walking bother her. She did have a fall I believe at Bag N Save. Kind of abdominally she fell, probably hyperextended her back. She continues to have low back pain.
She had a recent MRI that we went over with her that shows no obvious spinal stenosis, herniated disc or any other problems but she just continues to have this generalized low back pain.
She has had physical therapy, epidural steroid injections and continues to have pain.
The pain seems to be mostly in her sacral area, maybe in her SI joint regions also. She also has some tenderness around her greater trochanters bilaterally, right worse than left.
She seems to be neurovascularly intact.
IMPRESSION: Chronic back pain possibly secondary to fall.
Possible sacroiliac joint irritation and possible trochatneric bursitis.
I had a long discussion with her about different treatment options. Whether we can pursue further tests like a bone scan just to try and make sure we are not missing some kind of injury vs. the possibilities of doing differential injections, one into her greater trochanter trying to eliminate any pain from there vs. doing sacroiliac joint injections. She is very frustrated with the whole system that nothing really can be answered as far as her problem. I did offer her further evaluation. We also offered her referrals. She has applied for Social Security Disability so I am not sure how much this will get better.
(Tr. at 199) (grammar and spelling as in original).
Finally, the plaintiff testified that her gall bladder removal has affected the frequency of her bathroom visits. (Tr. at 47.) She claims that she must use the bathroom 20 minutes after she eats due to diarrhea, she must use the bathroom seven times a day, and that she has experienced nausea, cramps, and cold chills. (Tr. at 47-48.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In reviewing the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits, [I] must ascertain `whether there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support' the [Commissioner's] decision." Morse v. Shalala, 16 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hutsell v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 747, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1989)). Substantial evidence consists of "`more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The ALJ's decision shall not be reversed "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite conclusion." Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). However, the court's review is not simply "a rubber stamp for the [Commissioner's] decision and involves more than a search for evidence supporting the [Commissioner's] findings." Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1984). Indeed, "[t]o determine whether existing evidence is substantial, `[I] must consider evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] decision as well as evidence that supports it.'" Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). In addition, the court's review of the decision must include a determination as to whether the proper legal standards were applied. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1983).
The ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis in determining whether an individual claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ continues the analysis until either a claimant is found to be "not disabled" at one of the steps, or the claimant is found to be "disabled" at step three or step five. Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in any substantial gainful activity. Id. at § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is not engaged in any substantial gainful activity, the analysis continues. Step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has an impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits the ability to do basic work activities. Id. at § 404.1520(c). Such activities include walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, seeing, hearing, speaking, and understanding. Id at § 404.1521(b). If the claimant proves such an impairment, the analysis continues. Step three requires the ALJ to compare the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments, as the medical evidence alone dictates, to a list of predetermined "disabling" impairments. Id. at § 404.1520(d). If the claimant has an impairment that is listed or is equal to a listed impairment, the analysis ends and the claimant is found to be "disabled." If a claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, then the analysis proceeds to steps four and five. Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the impairment or impairments prevent the claimant from engaging in past relevant work. Id. at § 404.1520(e). If the claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the final step. Step five requires the ALJ to consider the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience and determine whether the claimant can do work other than that which the claimant has done in the past. Id. at § 404.1520(f). Only if the ALJ determines that the claimant cannot do other work shall the claimant be found to be "disabled" at step five. The burden is on the claimant to show that she is unable to perform any past relevant work at step four, but at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d at 836.
IV. ANALYSIS
As noted above, the plaintiff has advanced five arguments in support of her claim for benefits. My analysis of the first of these arguments indicates that the decision of the ALJ must be reversed.
A. The ALJ's Finding That the Plaintiff Could Return to Her Past Work
The evaluation of whether a claimant can return to her previous work is undertaken by the ALJ at step four of the analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The plaintiff argues that in her case, the ALJ did not properly consider all of the requirements of the plaintiff's past work when determining that the plaintiff could return to her previous position. The plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to compare properly the appropriate work requirements with the plaintiff's actual capabilities.
The following describes the analysis that should be undertaken by an ALJ at step four:
An ALJ's decision that a claimant can return to his past work must be based on more than conclusory statements. The ALJ must specifically set forth the claimant's limitations, both physical and mental, and determine how those limitations affect the claimant's residual functional capacity. The ALJ must also make explicit findings regarding the actual physical and mental demands of the claimant's past work. Then, the ALJ should compare the claimant's residual functional capacity with the actual demands of the past work to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing the relevant tasks. A conclusory determination that the claimant can perform past work, without these findings, does not constitute substantial evidence that the claimant is able to return to his past work.Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). However, the ALJ may use the testimony of a vocational expert at step 4 in order to determine whether a plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work. Walters v. Apfel, 998 F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (E.D.Mo. 1998).
The plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to compare properly her residual functional capacity with the demands of her past work. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ found that the plaintiff could sit for six hours during a work shift, yet the plaintiff's past work required her to sit for eight hours per shift. (See Tr. at 22, 150.) Also, it is alleged that the ALJ completely ignored the bending, reaching, and keystroke requirements of the plaintiff's previous work.
The defendant responds only with the argument that "[t]he ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert's findings regarding the demands of Plaintiff's past work in concluding that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work (Tr. at 24)." (Def.'s Br. at 19.) However, the ALJ's decision makes no mention of the vocational expert's response to the hypothetical question. In fact, the only references to the testimony of the vocational expert in the entire decision occur at page 2 (Tr. at 15) in regard to the "jobs" that combined to form the plaintiff's prior work in quality control and as a revenue clerk, and at page 9 (Tr. at 22) in regard to the number of available jobs locally and nationally that the plaintiff could allegedly perform. Contrary to the defendant's argument, there is no indication that the ALJ relied upon the vocational expert's findings regarding the plaintiff's ability to return to her past work.
I must determine what, if anything, the ALJ did rely upon when rendering her decision at step 4 of her analysis pursuant to § 404.1520. The relevant discussion begins at page 4 (Tr. at 17) of her decision. First, the ALJ embarked upon an assessment of the plaintiff's credibility regarding the extent of her symptoms of pain. The next two pages of her decision consist only of lengthy quotes from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929, and "SSR 96-7p." The ALJ then summarized the plaintiff's testimony regarding her regular activities and the pain she claims to experience. The ALJ noted that "[i]n the instant case, the record shows that the Claimant's medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the type of symptom, i.e., back pain, described during the course of her testimony." (Tr. at 20). The ALJ then proceeded to determine whether the plaintiff experienced pain in an intensity, frequency, and duration "as would preclude all types of substantial and gainful work activity." (Id.) It is at this point that the ALJ began her analysis of the plaintiff's credibility. The ALJ offered three observations in support of her finding that the plaintiff's testimony was not credible, and I shall briefly digress to review those observations.
The relevant work activity at this stage of the analysis consists of a subset of the plaintiff's past work, not "all types of substantial and gainful work activity." Despite the lengthy quotes from the relevant regulations, it appears that the ALJ erroneously held the plaintiff to a much higher standard than the regulations require and shifted the Commissioner's burden to the plaintiff. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d at 836.
First, the ALJ stated that the medical record does not support the plaintiff's description of her "disabling and debilitating back pain," and therefore her testimony is not credible. In support of this finding, the ALJ stated that: 1) an x-ray and a CT of the plaintiff's lower back demonstrated no abnormalities; and 2) progress notes dated June 4, 1997, indicate that the plaintiff previously had to stretch every two hours, but now must stand within an hour and ten minutes to alleviate back pain. (Tr. at 21). It seems to me that this latter fact supports the plaintiff's description of her pain. The ALJ pointed out that the plaintiff testified that she could only sit for 45 minutes, and presumably the ALJ concluded that this testimony was not credible in light of the medical evidence that the plaintiff could sit for an hour and ten minutes. This conclusion is ill-founded in light of the fact that the progress notes were written almost a year to the day before the hearing on June 2, 1998, and that they reflect increasing impairment of the ability to sit over time. In other words, the ALJ makes too much of the discrepancy between the plaintiff's testimony and medical records from the previous year, especially when the records indicate a pattern of increasing impairment. The discrepancy does not provide a legitimate basis for discounting all of the plaintiff's testimony as not credible.
Additionally, a finding that x-rays and other scans reveal no abnormalities cannot, by itself, support an inference that the plaintiff's description of her pain is not credible. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 ("However, we will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available [objective medical] evidence does not substantiate your statements.").
The second basis for the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff's testimony was not credible is the ALJ's observation that the plaintiff's "daily activities include household tasks such as washing the laundry, washing dishes, dusting, preparing meals, and socializing with friends." (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ found that this testimony does not support the plaintiff's "implicit" allegation that her pain "prevents her from performing all types of competitive employment." (Id.)
Initially, I note that once again, the ALJ appears to be requiring the plaintiff to establish the course of an entire a forty-hour week.
The job skills analysis indicates that the plaintiff was employed as a quality control worker at Carol Wright, and as a batcher and data entry clerk at the Nebraska Department of Revenue. (Tr. at 165-66.) The plaintiff cannot return to her previous employment in quality control because the position is classified as "light," with an occasional lifting requirement of 20 pounds. (Tr. at 165, 225). This exceeds the plaintiff's occasional lifting capability cited in her physical residual functional capacity assessment. (Tr. at 203.)
The plaintiff's employment as a batcher involved less than two hours of standing and walking per day. (Tr. at 166.) Since the batcher job has been classified as sedentary, I presume that the remainder of the workday was spent in a seated position. (Id.) This assumption is consistent with other evidence in the record, as the plaintiff has indicated that all of her jobs that the Nebraska Department of Revenue involved sitting for eight hours per day. (Tr. at 150.) If the plaintiff's past employment as a batcher involves less than two hours of standing and walking, the job would require the plaintiff to work in a seated position for more than six hours per day. This exceeds even the most generous assessment of the plaintiff's sitting capabilities. I find that she cannot return to this position.
The plaintiff's other positions at the Nebraska Department of Revenue are described as data entry clerk positions, and they are also classified as sedentary. (Tr. at 166.) The plaintiff spent most of her time seated at a computer. There is no evidence in the record to contradict the plaintiff's indication that the positions required her to be working in a seated position for eight hours per day. (Tr. at 150.) I find that the data entry clerk positions exceed her capabilities as presented in the functional capacity assessment.
The possibility of the plaintiff returning to any of her prior jobs as of the time of the hearing has been eliminated by comparing her residual functional capacity with each of the jobs' requirements. In addition, the vocational expert testified at the hearing that in her opinion, the plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work if the plaintiff's testimony were found to be credible. It has already been determined that the plaintiff's medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the type of back pain described during the course of her testimony, and it has not been argued that this finding is improper. (Tr. at 20). I shall review each of the five Polaski factors to determine if there is any evidence undermining the plaintiff's credibility. First, although there is no evidence from third parties to corroborate the plaintiff's testimony at the hearing, her description of her life activities was consistent with her claim that she experiences severe pain. (Tr. at 40-42, 61-62.) The duration, frequency and intensity of the pain are reflected by the records generated by her frequent visits to her doctors, which go so far as to include a description of her frustration with the lack of progress in her recovery, and are consistent with the observations of persons conducting her physical functional capacity assessment. (Tr. at 199, 223-229.) The functional assessment notes indicate that the plaintiff's obesity may aggravate her pain. (Tr. at 228.) The plaintiff has largely confined her treatment to ibuprofen (Tr. at 190), physical therapy (Id.), and various injections (Tr. at 189, 195, 198) to control her pain due to her desire to avoid what she feels will be the addicting side effects of more powerful pain medication. (Tr. at 50-52, 62.) However, I do not find that avoiding more "powerful" prescription pain medication necessarily indicates that her pain is not severe, especially in light of the other steps she has taken to treat her pain. Also, the functional restrictions described in the assessments of the plaintiff's physical capabilities are consistent with her testimony regarding her pain. (Tr. at 202-04.) After considering these factors and studying her testimony in light of the entire record, I find that the plaintiff's testimony regarding her symptoms of pain is credible. The vocational expert's opinion that the plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work due to her pain ought to receive weight. In light of the foregoing, I find that the plaintiff cannot return to any of her past relevant work.
Although the plaintiff has established that she cannot return to her past relevant work, it remains to be determined whether the Commissioner can show that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d at 836. It seems to me that the record before me has not been sufficiently developed to enable me to make this determination, even if I were to reopen briefing to allow argument on the issue. Since the ALJ determined that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden at step four, she did not reach step five of the analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. I shall remand the case to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for further consideration. The Commissioner must determine whether the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work. As noted previously, the Commissioner will have the burden of establishing that the plaintiff can perform other work. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d at 836; Davis v. Callahan, 985 F. Supp. 913, 914-33 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is reversed;
2. The plaintiff has satisfied her burden under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 by establishing that she is unable to return to her past relevant work; and
3. The case is remanded to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for further consideration in accordance with this memorandum and order. Specifically, the Commissioner is to determine solely whether the plaintiff possesses the residual functional capacity to perform work other than her past relevant work, and whether the appropriate benefits are to be awarded.