Opinion
520459
01-07-2016
Edward KORN, Respondent, v. Robert B. KORN, Appellant, et al., Defendants. (Action No. 1.) Ross Wassermann et al., Respondents, v. Robert Korn Jr., Appellant, and Edward Korn, Respondent, et al., Defendant. (Action No. 2.).
Law Offices of John Seebold, Schenectady (John R. Seebold of counsel), for appellant. Michael L. Breen, Middleburgh, for Edward Korn, respondent. Maynard, O'Connor, Smith & Catalinotto, LLP, Albany (Justin W. Gray of counsel), for Ross Wassermann and others, respondents.
Law Offices of John Seebold, Schenectady (John R. Seebold of counsel), for appellant.
Michael L. Breen, Middleburgh, for Edward Korn, respondent.
Maynard, O'Connor, Smith & Catalinotto, LLP, Albany (Justin W. Gray of counsel), for Ross Wassermann and others, respondents.
Opinion
PETERS, P.J.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered October 6, 2014 in Schoharie County, which, among other things, in action No. 2, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
These actions concern five parcels of real property located on neighboring lots in the Village of Sharon Springs, Schoharie County. Parcels I and II are owned as tenants in common by the estate of Hannah Wassermann, the estate of Robert Korn and defendant Miriam Rothenberg. Parcels III, IV and V are owned as tenants in common by Rothenberg and the estate of Robert Korn. Hannah Wassermann and her husband, Felix Wassermann, were survived by their three sons, Ross Wassermann, Joel Wassermann and Eric Wassermann (hereinafter referred to collectively as the Wassermanns). Robert Korn and his wife, Edith Korn, were survived by their two sons, defendant Robert Korn Jr. (hereinafter defendant) and Edward Korn.
In October 2008, Edward Korn commenced action No. 1 pursuant to RPAPL article 9 requesting that all five parcels be partitioned. Several years later, the Wassermanns commenced action No. 2 seeking a partition of parcels I and II. Thereafter, the Wassermanns moved for summary judgment in their favor in action No. 2 and to consolidate the two actions pursuant to CPLR 602(a). Supreme Court granted the motion, and defendant now appeals.
We first address defendant's contention that Supreme Court abused its discretion in consolidating the two actions. In the order appealed from, Supreme Court left each of the actions intact and did not merge them into a single action under a single caption. Thus, the court did not effectuate a true consolidation of the actions, but rather joined the actions for trial (see Troutman Sanders, LLP v. Parker, 111 A.D.3d 924, 925, 976 N.Y.S.2d 109 2013; Alizio v. Perpignano, 78 A.D.3d 1087, 1087–1088, 912 N.Y.S.2d 132 2010; Matter of Associated Blind Hous. Dev. Corp. v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Pub. Serv., 142 A.D.2d 825, 827, 530 N.Y.S.2d 703 1988 ). “When there are common questions of law or fact, a joint trial is warranted unless the opposing party demonstrates prejudice to a substantial right” (Alizio v. Perpignano, 78 A.D.3d at 1088, 912 N.Y.S.2d 132 [citations omitted]; see CPLR 602[a]; Johnstone–Mann v. Stout, 63 A.D.3d 1713, 1714, 882 N.Y.S.2d 609 2009 ).
Because these actions were not truly consolidated, we are not confronted with a situation where a party would appear as both a plaintiff and a defendant in the underlying action (see Matter of Joseph J., 106 A.D.3d 1004, 1006–1007, 965 N.Y.S.2d 588 2013; Geneva Temps, Inc. v. New World Communities, Inc., 24 A.D.3d 332, 335, 806 N.Y.S.2d 519 2005; M & K Computer Corp. v. MBS Indus., 271 A.D.2d 660, 660, 706 N.Y.S.2d 194 2000 ).
Here, the actions plainly involve common questions of law and fact. Action No. 2 concerns two parcels of land that are also at issue in action No. 1, and both Rothenberg and Robert Korn's estate have an interest in all five parcels. Further, in both actions it will be necessary to determine the ownership rights claimed by the Wassermanns, defendant and Edward Korn. Despite defendant's suggestion to the contrary, each and every factual and legal issue need not be common to the actions (see Kupferschmid v. Hennessy, 221 A.D.2d 225, 226–227, 633 N.Y.S.2d 776 1995; Harby Assoc. v. Seaboyer, 82 A.D.2d 992, 993, 440 N.Y.S.2d 422 1981 ). As defendant failed to demonstrate that a substantial right would be prejudiced by a joint trial, the interest of justice and judicial economy would best be served by a joint trial (see Cusumano v. Cusumano, 114 A.D.3d 633, 634, 980 N.Y.S.2d 1262014; Matter of Powers v. De Groodt, 43 A.D.3d 509, 512, 841 N.Y.S.2d 163 2007 ).
We do, however, agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in awarding the Wassermanns summary judgment in action No. 2. RPAPL 901 limits the persons who may maintain an action for partition to those specifically enumerated in the statute. As relevant here, a partition action may be brought by one who is entitled to ownership of property as a tenant in common by reason of being an heir of a decedent who died while in possession of said property, regardless of whether he or she has possession of the property (see RPAPL 9013 ). The executor of an estate that has joint ownership of real property can also bring an action for partition, provided that approval to do so is obtained from Surrogate's Court (see RPAPL 9014; see also SCPA 19012 [i] ). To prevail on their motion, the Wassermanns were required to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by “tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 1986; see CPLR 3212[b]; Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 833, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159 2014 ).
In support of their motion, the Wassermans failed to submit a copy of Hannah Wassermann's will or proffer any evidence beyond their own unsubstantiated allegations to establish that they have an interest in parcels I and II as Hannah Wassermann's heirs (compare Cadle Co. v. Calcador, 85 A.D.3d 700, 702, 926 N.Y.S.2d 106 2011; Arata v. Behling, 57 A.D.3d 925, 926, 870 N.Y.S.2d 450 2008; Dalmacy v. Joseph, 297 A.D.2d 329, 330, 746 N.Y.S.2d 312 2002 ). The affidavits of the Wassermans' attorney, who had no personal knowledge of the operative facts, were likewise without evidentiary value (see JMD Holding Corp. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 373, 384, 795 N.Y.S.2d 502, 828 N.E.2d 604 2005; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 563, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 1980 ). Further, although Ross Wassermann commenced this partition action, in part, in his capacity as executor of Hannah Wassermann's estate, there has been no showing-nor even an allegation-that he obtained approval from Surrogate's Court to do so (see RPAPL 9014; Hor v. Hor, 32 Misc.3d 1211[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 51250[U] [Sup.Ct., Queens County 2011]; compare Morris v. Adams, 82 A.D.3d 946, 946, 919 N.Y.S.2d 36 2011, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 715, 2011 WL 5041653 2011 ). In the absence of evidentiary facts establishing the Wassermanns' right to maintain action No. 2, their initial prima facie burden has not been met and we need not consider whether the evidence submitted by defendant was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Town of Sidney v. Scutt, 117 A.D.3d 1220, 1220–1221, 985 N.Y.S.2d 333 2014; Salas v. Town of Lake Luzerne, 265 A.D.2d 770, 770–771, 696 N.Y.S.2d 314 1999 ).
McCARTHY, EGAN JR., DEVINE and CLARK, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in action No. 2; said motion denied; and, as so modified, affirmed.