Opinion
February 1, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.).
Renewal was properly granted in light of the excuse presented by plaintiff's attorney for his failure to submit one of the affidavits on the original motion (see, Matter of Beiny, 132 A.D.2d 190, 210, lv dismissed 71 N.Y.2d 994). Upon renewal, summary judgment was properly denied based upon the affidavits submitted, which included not only hearsay, which is admissible in opposition (see, Friedman v. Sills, 112 App. Div. 343, 344) if it is not the only evidence submitted (Wertheimer v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 85 A.D.2d 540, 541), but also statements based upon the personal observations of the affiants. The opinion of decedent's treating physician, who had examined her once weekly for over a year and reviewed her hospital and private physician therapy records, was not merely conclusory (cf., Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 533, n 2), and was not obtained solely for testimonial purposes (cf., Nissen v Rubin, 121 A.D.2d 320, 322; Easley v. City of New York, 189 A.D.2d 599, 600), and therefore sufficed as to both the departures from accepted standards of medical care and the cause of suicide. Because defendant had been decedent's psychiatrist and possessed detailed knowledge of her history (see, 190 A.D.2d 560), it cannot be said that the risk of decedent's suicide as a consequence of defendant's alleged sexual relationship with her was attenuated or unforeseeable (cf., D'Addezio v. Agway Petroleum Corp., 186 A.D.2d 929, 931; Wells v. St. Luke's Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 129 A.D.2d 952, 953-954, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 605). The presence of other stressful factors in decedent's life does not displace defendant's alleged acts as a proximate cause of the suicide, since it is necessary only that they "substantially contributed" to the death (Fuller v. Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 433; see also, Galioto v. Lakeside Hosp., 123 A.D.2d 421). Nor, under the circumstances, was the causal nexus negated by the four-year lapse between the termination of the alleged relationship and decedent's suicide, since the irresistible impulse that must be proven to have caused the suicide need not be a "sudden impulse" (Fuller v. Preis, supra, at 433).
We have considered defendant's other arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Carro, Wallach and Ross, JJ.