Opinion
No. 1456 C.D. 2011
04-13-2012
Robyn Kochan, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Keystone Automotive Operations), Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, President Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
This case was assigned to the opinion writer on or before January 6, 2012, when President Judge Leadbetter completed her term as President Judge.
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Petitioner Robyn Kochan (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board reversed a decision of a Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ), which granted Claimant's claim petition. We affirm the Board.
The WCJ granted Claimant's February 14, 2007 claim petition, in which Claimant alleged that she suffered a work injury consisting of chronic fatigue syndrome, toxic effect, allergic rhinitis, and multiple chemical sensitivities while working for Keystone Automotive Operations (Employer).
On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) reversed, concluding that Claimant's petition was time barred under Section 315 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). Section 315 of the Act operates as a statute of repose, requiring claimants seeking benefits for a personal injury to file a petition within three (3) years after the injury. In support of its decision, the Board explained that Claimant alleged to have been exposed to mold and/or mildew in the workplace in September 2001 and, giving Claimant the benefit of the doubt as to continued exposure, until April 2002. At that point, Employer relocated Claimant and other employees to newer or renovated offices. Claimant, however, did not file her claim petition until February 2007—i.e., almost five (5) years later. Thus, the Board concluded that Claimant filed her claim petition beyond the three-year statutory limitation period in Section 315 of the Act.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 602. Based on this conclusion, the Board did not address Employer's other challenges to the WCJ's decision.
Section 315 of the Act, which is at issue in this case, provides as follows:
In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within three years after the injury, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under this article; or unless within three years after the injury, one of the parties shall have filed a petition provided in article four hereof . . . . However, in cases of injury resulting from ionization radiation in which the nature of the injury or its relationship to the employment is not known to the employe, the time for filing a claim shall not begin to run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the existence of the injury and its possible relationship to his employment. The term "injury" in this section means, in cases of occupational disease, disability resulting from occupational disease.
On appeal to this Court, Claimant argues only that she should have the benefit of the discovery rule. If the discovery rule applies, Claimant argues that the three-year period for filing a claim petition did not begin to run until October 2004, when her treating physician first informed her of the linkage between her health problems and exposure to mold in the workplace. In so doing, Claimant acknowledges that the wording of the statute, this Court's precedent, and precedent from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not favorable to her position. Yet, she urges us to revisit this issue, in light of what she contends is an absurd result.
Our standard of review in a workers' compensation appeal is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704. We acknowledge our Supreme Court's decision in Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189, 812 A.2d 478 (2002), wherein the Court held that "review for capricious disregard of material, competent evidence is an appropriate component of appellate consideration in every case in which such question is properly brought before the court." Wintermyer, 571 Pa. at 203, 812 A.2d at 487.
Generally stated, the "discovery rule," when applicable, tolls a statute of limitations until such time as the injured party discovers or, by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have discovered the injury and/or its origin. See Sell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (LNP Engineering), 565 Pa. 114, 771 A.2d 1246 (2001).
Aside from an exception for exposure to ionization radiation, Section 315 of the Act does not contain a discovery rule that extends the time for filing a claim petition. Claimant notes correctly that Section 311 of the Act, which generally requires employees to notify employers of an injury within twenty-one (21) days after the injury, includes language equivalent to a discovery rule that is not limited to claims resulting from exposure to ionization radiation:
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 611.
[I]n cases of injury resulting from ionizing radiation or any other cause in which the nature of the injury or its relationship to the employment is not known to the employe, the time for giving notice shall not begin to run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the existence of the injury and its possible relationship to his employment.(Emphasis added.) Though Claimant acknowledges the absence of similar language in Section 315 of the Act, she finds it absurd that the law would require an employee to file a claim petition within three (3) years of injuries the employe does not yet know of and, due to this lack of knowledge, for which the employe was not yet required to provide her employer notice. Claimant also notes that even in the absence of express statutory language, this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a discovery rule that provides for the tolling of the three-year filing period in the case of "occupational diseases" under Section 108(n) of the Act. See Price v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 533 Pa. 500, 626 A.2d 114 (1993) (holding statute of limitations began to run when claimant knew or should have known that he is totally disabled because of work-related cause); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Feiertag), 496 A.2d 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Though this case is not an occupational disease case, Claimant argues that the courts' reasoning in those cases equally support extending the discovery rule here.
In this regard, Claimant shares the views of the dissenting justices in Eddy v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Transit, Inc.), 534 Pa. 302, 632 A.2d 873 (1993) (Papadakos, J., dissenting), and the dissenting judge in Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), 509 A.2d 945 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (Barbieri, S.J., dissenting).
Act of June 2, 1915, as amended, added by Act of October 17, 1972, P.L. 930, as amended, 77 P.S. § 27.1. The Act defines the term "occupational disease" as limited to seventeen (17) enumerated diseases or categories of diseases, none of which are involved in this case. --------
In Eddy v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Transit, Inc.), 568 A.2d 279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989), aff'd per curiam, 534 Pa. 302, 632 A.2d 873 (1993), this Court expressly recognized the discovery rule's application to cases involving ionization radiation and occupational disease. The Court, however, expressly rejected the argument Claimant raises here—i.e., that the discovery rule should be available to all claimants under Section 315 of the Act, regardless of the type of injury alleged. Instead, because the claimant in Eddy did not allege an occupational disease injury or an injury from ionization radiation exposure, we affirmed the Board's decision that the claimant's claim petition was time-barred under Section 315. Notwithstanding Justice Papadakos' dissenting opinion on appeal, a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed our decision in Eddy.
In Armco, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mattern), 542 Pa. 364, 667 A.2d 710 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed, and rejected, the notion that the courts can, or should, read into Section 315 of the Act a discovery rule applicable to all claims based on the existence of such language in Section 311. It did so based on this Court's decisions refusing to do so in Young and Eddy. In his concurring opinion, a reluctant Justice Cappy (later Chief Justice) concurred, but urged the General Assembly to amend Section 315 to include a discovery rule for all claim petitions. Armco, Inc., 542 Pa. at 379-83, 667 A.2d at 717-19 (Cappy, J., concurring). The General Assembly, however, has not seen fit to amend Section 315 as Justice Cappy suggested.
The issue and arguments that Claimant raises in this appeal are thus not new. Moreover, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has weighed in, this case does not turn merely on our willingness to revisit our precedent on the issue before us. Because the Board's decision below complied faithfully with this Court's precedent and precedent from our Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we affirm the Board.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 2012, the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge