Summary
granting motion to dismiss slander claim because the plaintiff did not allege what actual statements were made, to whom they were made, or how the plaintiff was injured
Summary of this case from T-MOBILE USA, INC. v. YOAKOpinion
Case No. 1:02-CV-98 CAS
February 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss four counts of plaintiff's five-count amended complaint, For the reasons set forth below the Court will grant the motion in its entirety. In Count I of her amended complaint, plaintiff Jane Koch claims that defendant St. Francis Medical Center (St. Francis) terminated her employment as a nurse in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. She seeks damages (back pay, fringe benefits, front pay, and liquidated damages), as well as attorney's fees and costs. Defendants' motion to dismiss does not apply to this count.
Plaintiffs request for damages under the FMLA to compensate her for mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation is stricken from the amended complaint, in accordance with the Court's Order of October 23, 2002.
The Court granted Koch's motion to file an amended complaint adding four counts for "damages for slander and tortious interference with a business expectancy" against St. Francis and defendant Nancy Russell, Koch's supervisor at St, Francis. In these counts, Koch alleges that "from and after" her termination, St. Francis maliciously made false and derogatory statements about her job performance and that Russell gave Koch a poor rating on the termination notice. Koch asserts that this harmed her reputation and interfered with her reasonable expectancies of getting another job.
Defendants argue that these counts should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because Koch does not allege what actual statements were made by either St, Francis or Russell, to whom they were made, or that any specific prospective employer refused to hire Koch based on a negative reference from defendants, as required under Missouri law. In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiff relies upon Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), for the proposition that all the elements of a tort need not be specifically pleaded. InSwierkiewicz, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the liberal notice pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) which provides that a complaint must include only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To comply with this requirement, a claimant need not "set out in detail the facts upon winch he bases his claims," but must "simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)): see also Gardner v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 294 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must not only "accept all well-pled factual averments as true," but also must" draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in [the pleader's] favor." At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, then, it is enough for a plaintiff to sketch a scenario which, if subsequently fleshed out by means of appropriate facts, could support an actionable claim. At the pleading stage, a federal district court is to "presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Madsen v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 297 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 2002). This sets the bar quite low, but the Court does not believe that Koch's complaint clears it. Koch has done little more than state that she is suing defendants for defamation and interference with business expectancies.
Under Missouri law, a defamation cause of action requires the plaintiff to show (1) publication, (2) of a defamatory statement, (3) that identifies the plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and (6) damages the plaintiffs reputation.Overcast y. Billings Mut. Ins, Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc), Tortious interference with a business expectancy requires proof of five elements: (1) a valid business expectancy; (2) the alleged interfered knowledge of the relationship; (3) an intentional interference by the alleged interferer inducing or causing a breach of the relationship; (4) absence of justification; and (5) damages. Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d303, 316 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
In Swierkiewicz, the Court held that under the federal notice pleading standards, an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead the elements of a prima facie case for establishing discrimination when he has no direct evidence of such, The Court held that the plaintiffs allegations that he had been terminated on account of his age, detailing the events leading up to his termination, providing relevant dates, and including the age and nationalities of some of the relevant persons involved in his termination gave the defendant fair notice of the ground upon which the plaintiffs claims rested. Here, Koch provide almost no information that would support a claim for either slander or interference with business expectancy as to either defendant. The Court concludes that even under the liberal pleading standards applicable in federal court, Counts II through V of the amended complaint are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. Educ., 933 F. Supp. 817, 822 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (dismissing slander claim under Missouri law where plaintiff did not plead the exact words which were alleged to be defamatory); cf. Madsen, 297 F.3d at 700 (complaint which alleged dates, circumstances and nature of alleged defamatory statements, identity of persons making the statements, and evidence of the statements falsity stated a claim for slander under Missouri law).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, and V of plaintiffs first amended complaint is GRANTED. [Doc. 26]
An Order of Partial Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order,