Opinion
No. 3-549 / 02-2119
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forPolkCounty, Robert D. Wilson, Judge.
An employee appeals from a district court judicial review ruling affirming the denial of his claim for workers' compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Roger Carter of Carter Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.
Michael Jacobs of Rawlings, Nieland, Probasco, Killinger, Ellwanger, Jacobs Mohrhauser, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
On April 13, 1998, Lawrence Kobold, an eleven-year employee of Charlie Zook Dodge, filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits. He alleged that he had suffered a work-related injury to his "low back" on April 12, 1996. Following a July 2001 hearing, a deputy workers' compensation commissioner filed an arbitration decision in August 2001. The deputy addressed not only Kobold's claim of a low back injury, but also claims or questions regarding assertions of a cervical spine injury and recurrent headaches. In a very detailed decision the deputy addressed and reviewed the substantial amounts of medical evidence, including numerous and differing expert opinions concerning diagnosis and causation. The deputy credited certain opinions and discounted others. The deputy expressly found that (1) Kobold's continuing cervical complaints and need for surgery in July 1998 did not relate to his work incident of April 12, 1996, (2) Kobold's complaints of headaches were not a result of his April 12, 1996 work incident, and (3) the record evidence did not demonstrate that Kobold had a permanent low back (lumbar) condition which either directly related to or was substantially aggravated on account of the April 12, 1996 work incident. The deputy concluded Kobold had not established a causal relationship between his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine complaints, or his recurrent headaches, and his work incident of April 12, 1996.
Kobold filed an intra-agency appeal. In an April 2002 appeal decision the interim workers' compensation commissioner confirmed the deputy's proposed decision, with the additional analysis that Kobold was not required to prove that his work injury was the sole cause of his present condition, and the additional finding that Kobold had failed to carry his burden to show that the work injury in 1996 was a substantial cause of his present conditions.
Kobold sought judicial review. In a lengthy and detailed ruling the district court reviewed the evidence, identified the most important issue as being whether substantial evidence existed to support the commissioner's findings, recognized that the record contained differing expert opinions on the question of causal connection, concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings and decision, and affirmed the commissioner's appeal decision. Kobold appeals.
Iowa Code chapter 17A governs judicial review of workers' compensation cases. See Iowa Code § 86.26 (2001). Our review on appeal is limited to correction of errors of law. Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000). We apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to determine whether our legal conclusions are the same as those of the district court that are challenged on appeal. Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1993). If our conclusions are the same, we affirm. Id. Otherwise, we reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10).
When Mortimer was decided we applied the standards of section 17A.19(8). As part of amendments to chapter 17A enacted by the legislature in 1998, what had been section 17A.19(8) was stricken, and in amended form became section 17A.19(10). See 1998 Iowa Acts, ch. 1202, § 24 (codified at Iowa Code § 17A.19(8-12) (2001)). Accordingly, we in fact now apply the standards of section 17A.19(10), as the agency action under review in this case occurred after the revised statute took effect on July 1, 1999. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2003) (holding the district court correctly applied the amended statutory language on judicial review where the agency action did not occur until after the revised statute took effect on July 1, 1999).
Kobold first contends the agency action is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole.
"Substantial evidence" means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.
[E]vidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Nor is evidence insubstantial because of the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from it. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings actually made.
The 1999 amendments to section 17A.19 did not change these existing principles of law applicable to judicial review, but rather were enacted to provide greater specificity. Locate.Plus.Com. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 2002).
City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 554 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Gaskey v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 537 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Iowa 1995)).
The record before the agency, when viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which the finder of fact could reasonably determine either that Kobold's work-related injury of April 12, 1996, was or was not a substantial cause of his conditions. We therefore conclude, as the district court did, that substantial evidence supports the agency's findings and decision on this issue.
Kobold also contends that the agency action does not adequately explain reasons for discounting certain medical opinions. We seriously doubt that this issue has been preserved for our review, as Kobold's district court petition for judicial review does not appear to raise such an issue, and we find nothing in the district court ruling that addresses or passes on such an issue. We nevertheless briefly consider it.
The agency decision reviews in detail the substantial amounts of medical evidence, including numerous and varying expert opinions. The agency decision expressly discounts certain opinions, and states why the agency has done so. The decision implicitly discounts or rejects other expert opinions by comparing and contrasting those opinions to others which it credits. The decision explains in some detail how other evidence, including statements by Kobold himself in this and other proceedings, conflicts with or detracts from certain medical opinions otherwise favorable to Kobold. We conclude the agency adequately explained its reasons for discounting certain expert medical opinions and crediting others.
Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the district court.