Opinion
No. 59968-2-I.
July 21, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-2-37381-6, Suzanne M. Barnett, J., entered July 6, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, A.C.J., concurred in by Agid and Leach, JJ.
After a trial to the court, sitting without a jury, judgment was entered in favor of the law firm of Lopez Fantel, Inc., P.S. and adverse to attorney Wayne Knutsen. Knutsen appeals from the judgment, contending both that the trial court erred by ordering on summary judgment that, in this fee dispute between Lopez Fantel and Knutsen arising out of their mutual representation of a client, the fee earned should be apportioned between the lawyers pursuant to the factors set forth in McNeary v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 105 Wn.2d 136, 712 P.2d 845 (1986), and that the trial court erred in applying the McNeary factors at trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
Jennifer Nguyen was severely injured by a school bus while crossing a driveway in front of a school on December 6, 2001. Finding of Fact 2. Jennifer's parents consulted with Knutsen and signed a contingency fee agreement with him to pursue her claim for damages. Finding of Fact 2. The trial court found that "Mr. Knutsen took the initial and appropriate steps to preserve evidence, to memorialize the scene of the accident, and to identify witnesses . . . and . . . possible parties at fault." Finding of Fact 3.
Knutsen does not assign error to the trial court's Findings of Fact and only challenges "the finding of fact, set forth within Conclusion of Law 5, that the partial summary judgment held that the parties did not have a special partnership or a joint venture agreement." Br. Appellant at 3 n. 1.
However, the family decided to obtain a second opinion, and Jennifer's sister contacted attorney Jane Fantel of Lopez Fantel. Finding of Fact 4. Jennifer's parents later asked Knutsen to "associate" the firm of Lopez Fantel. He did so. Finding of Fact 6. On January 23, 2002, Knutsen, Jennifer's parents, and Fantel signed an untitled agreement in which the parties agreed that Knutsen would "associate" Lopez Fantel to represent the Nguyen family with regard to Jennifer's case. Together, with attorney Carl Lopez of Lopez Fantel, the same principals subsequently signed a new contingency fee agreement on February 26, 2002. Finding of Fact 9. However, Knutsen and Lopez Fantel never agreed either orally or in writing as to how the contingency fee would be divided between them. Finding of Fact 10.
This agreement provides that "[t]he undersigned agree that Wayne Knutsen will associate the firm of Lopez Fantel to represent the [Nguyen] family with regard to the claims arising from injuries to Jennifer Nguyen on December 6, 2001."
The contingency fee agreement stated, under the heading of "Lawyers Sharing Responsibility and Fees":
In the event that more than one firm of lawyers is a signer to this Agreement, I understand that those lawyers agree to share responsibility for the handling of my case. I agree that my lawyers may share this responsibility.
In the event my lawyers obtain a recovery for me, the lawyers' fee described in this Agreement will be divided between the signers to this Agreement in accordance with agreements reached between those lawyers.
I approve this division of my lawyers' fees.
There is no question but that, from this point forward, Lopez Fantel performed the vast majority of the legal work undertaken on Jennifer's behalf. Knutsen was copied on a letter Fantel wrote to the court-appointed guardian ad litem on March 19, 2002, and was referred to as "co-counsel" in that letter. In his deposition in this case, Knutsen testified that he did not meet with Fantel after March of 2002 and had no conversations with her after April 10, 2002. Knutsen further testified that, although he placed several telephone calls to Fantel, she never returned his calls. The trial court found that Knutsen's last active participation in the case was to attend a meeting in June of 2002 with the guardian ad litem. Finding of Fact 15. The trial court further found that "Lopez Fantel . . . essentially cut Mr. Knutsen out of the case in early summer 2002." Finding of Fact 15.
Lopez Fantel filed a lawsuit on behalf of Jennifer on July 18, 2002, but did not list Knutsen as co-counsel. In deposition testimony, Knutsen admitted that at no time during the two and a half years the case was pending did he ever assert to Lopez or Fantel that he expected to be named in the pleadings as one of Jennifer's lawyers. Moreover, Knutsen acknowledged that he did "not really" do anything on the case between July of 2002 and January of 2003, other than communicating with Jennifer's father and meeting with potential witness Richard Cole. Knutsen further testified that he had no contacts with Fantel during that time and that, other than a letter to Fantel dated January 27, 2003, he did not initiate any contact with Lopez or Fantel from May 25, 2002, through the middle of June 2003. In the January 27 letter, Knutsen asked Fantel to "[p]lease keep me advised of the litigation, since [Jennifer's father] asks me questions about it. If there is anything I can help with, please advise." Fantel wrote Knutsen on June 24, 2003, updating him on the status of the case and asking him to speak with Cole about testifying at trial. Knutsen responded to her letter on July 1, 2003, after speaking with Cole and another potential witness.
Jennifer Nguyen, et al. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, et al., King County Sup. Ct. No. 02-2-21227-1SEA.
In her June 24, 2003 letter to Knutsen, Fantel wrote that Cole was responsible for mapping the site of the incident.
Fantel again wrote Knutsen on January 5, 2004, stating: "I understand that you have been attempting to contact me. I don't know how we could have not connected, but if I have failed to return a call or respond to a letter I am sorry." Fantel also notified Knutsen of the month of trial and asked him to send a "cost bill" so that he could be reimbursed. Knutsen replied to Fantel's letter on January 22, 2004, writing: "If you need me to conduct any discovery, I would be happy to do so." He also wrote: "If you have taken the bus driver's deposition, I would like to see it." Knutsen's letter also asserted that "[o]ur office has a claim for reasonable attorneys [sic] fees pursuant to the fee agreement."
According to Fantel, with regard to Jennifer's lawsuit, Knutsen "did not participate in the drafting of the Complaint, did not become an attorney of record, prepared no pleadings, neither took nor defended any depositions, spoke with no material witnesses (other than the Nguyens) and did not participate in or attend the mediation."
Lopez Fantel eventually settled Jennifer's case. A total contingency fee of $205,000 was earned. Fantel declared that an attempt was made to contact Knutsen to "determine the amount of costs and reasonable fees and time that he had expended" in connection with the case. Fantel further declared that Knutsen provided evidence of the costs he had advanced, which were reimbursed, but refused to provide an estimate of the time that he had expended, instead claiming that he was entitled to half of the contingency fee earned. Knutsen filed an attorney fee lien in August of 2004. The trial court found that "[n]either party kept time records for the Nguyen case." Finding of Fact 15(a).
Knutsen subsequently sued Lopez Fantel, seeking half of the fee, on the theory that Lopez Fantel had breached a joint venture agreement the firms had created by entering into the association and contingency fee agreements. Knutsen further alleged that Lopez Fantel adopted a strategy to "freeze" him out of participating in Jennifer's case. Lopez Fantel denied these allegations and counterclaimed for declaratory relief to determine the "basis, measurement and amount of attorneys' fees" owed to Knutsen.
Lopez Fantel moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order determining the legal standard governing the division of the contingency fee between the firms. Lopez Fantel urged the trial court to order that the contingency fee be divided in accordance with McNeary, based upon proportionate services rendered and time expended. Knutsen advocated an equal fee division in accordance with partnership law. The trial court granted Lopez Fantel's motion, ruling that there was no agreement to share the fees equally and therefore "the division of fees between the parties shall be based upon the proportion of the services rendered by each firm and responsibility actually assumed, and other factors as set out by McNeary."
The case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court applied the McNeary factors:
[I]t appears Mr. Knutsen expended a small fraction of the total time expended by all parties on this case. The fact that Mr. Knutsen's efforts add up to approximately 5% of the estimated attorney time does not mean that his work was meaningless or useless or not important. It does indicate that Lopez Fantel chose to ignore that work and chose not to consult with Mr. Knutsen. Defendants' expert estimated that Mr. Knutsen's work was worth about 10% of the case. Plaintiff's expert estimated that Mr. Knutsen's work was worth about one third or 33% of the case.
Finding of Fact 15(a). The trial court then awarded Knutsen 15 percent of the contingency fee. Conclusion of Law 6. He appeals.
II
Knutsen assigns error to the trial court's summary judgment order. We review summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Chee Chew v. Lord, 143 Wn. App. 807, 813, 181 P.3d 25 (2008).
Knutsen also assigns error to the trial court's judgment after trial. We treat unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal, State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 745, 64 P.3d 594 (2003), and when "the parties dispute only the legal effect of those facts, the standard of review is also de novo." Happy Bunch, LLC v. Grandview N., LLC, 142 Wn. App. 81, 88, 173 P.3d 959 (2007). Finally, the trial court must exercise its discretion in awarding fees based on articulable grounds, entering findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the fee award. Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 435, 957 P.2d 632, 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Crest Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 128 Wn. App. 760, 774, 115 P.3d 349 (2005). We review the stated basis for an award of fees for abuse of discretion. Boeing Co. v. Heidy, 147 Wn.2d 78, 90, 51 P.3d 793 (2002). "A trial court abuses its discretion only when the exercise of its discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons." Heidy, 147 Wn.2d at 90.
III
Prior to September 1, 1985, Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (CPR DR) 2-107 provided that attorneys working for different firms could only divide a contingency fee between themselves in proportion to services performed and responsibility assumed. On September 1, 1985, former Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.5(e)(2) (1985) became effective. McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 139 n. 4. Former RPC 1.5(e)(2) provided:
CPR DR 2-107 provided:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
Belli v. Shaw, 98 Wn.2d 569, 582, 657 P.2d 315 (1983) (Dore, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
. . . .
(2) The division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and the total fee is reasonable.
RPC 1.5(e)(2) was again amended, effective September 1, 2006. It now states, in pertinent part:
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1)(i) the division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(ii) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(iii) the total fee is reasonable.
RPC 1.5(e)(1) (2006).
Because the pertinent events herein occurred between 2002 and 2004, this dispute is governed by former RPC 1.5(e)(2).
Court rules are "subject to the same principles of construction as are statutes." In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against of McGlothlen, 99 Wn.2d 515, 522, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983). Accordingly, we first look to the plain language of the text to determine its meaning. See Homestreet, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 139 Wn. App. 827, 839, 162 P.3d 458 (2007). A rule's plain meaning is discerned from reading the language of the rule as a whole and harmonizing its provisions. State v. Chhom, 162 Wn.2d 451, 458, 173 P.3d 234 (2007). Furthermore, court rules "must be construed so that no word, clause or sentence is superfluous, void or insignificant." City of Kirkland v. Ellis, 82 Wn. App. 819, 826, 920 P.2d 206 (1996).
Applying these principles of construction, the language of former RPC 1.5(e) provided for the possibility of a nonproportionate fee division. Reading the rule as a whole, the language "or, by written agreement with the client" referred to the possibility of a nonproportionate fee division, because that text followed the fee splitting language. If this were not so, the "or" in "or, by written agreement with the client," would serve no purpose.
Although former RPC 1.5(e)(2) permitted nonproportionate division of fees, the question remains whether the rule presupposed that the attorneys must affirmatively agree to divide the fee in a nonproportionate manner in order to avoid a proportionate distribution. The rule permitted:
[Division] in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and the total fee is reasonable.
Former RPC 1.5(e)(2) (emphasis added).
While former RPC 1.5(e)(2) was not a model of clarity, it contained language nearly identical to that of Model Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.5(e).
The model rule states:
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5(e) (2001).
The comment to this rule suggests that a nonproportionate fee division is permissible if the attorneys agree to divide the contingency fee nonproportionately: "[MRPC 1.5(e)] permits the lawyers to divide a fee on [proportionate services rendered] or by agreement between the participating lawyers if all assume responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is advised and does not object." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). The comment further states that MRPC 1.5(e) "does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to receive." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5 cmt. 4. This suggests, at a minimum, that the attorneys must agree to a non-proportionate fee division.
The comment is instructive in interpreting former RPC 1.5(e)(2). If attorneys did not want to share a contingency fee proportionately to the services provided by each lawyer, it was incumbent upon them to indicate their desire in a formal, affirmative agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, attorneys were aware that, by virtue of former RPC 1.5(e)(2), the fees would be divided proportionately.
Knutsen's primary contention is that the trial court erred in ruling that the contingency fee in this case must be divided proportionately, pursuant to the factors in McNeary. Knutsen contends that McNeary is inapplicable because its holding is based on a repealed disciplinary rule that mandated proportionate fee division between different firms. He urges that the contingency fee be equally distributed, in accordance with special partnership or joint venture law. Because the parties did not agree to a nonproportionate fee division, McNeary continues to guide the determination of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fee distribution. Knutsen's contention to the contrary is unpersuasive.
In McNeary, our Supreme Court announced factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees in a proportionate fee division. 105 Wn.2d at 143. In that case, two firms representing an injured plaintiff agreed to divide the work and the contingency fee equally. McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 137-39. However, CPR DR 2-107 at that time forbade non-proportionate fee divisions between attorneys working for different firms. McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 139 n. 4. After trial of the underlying case, one of the attorneys claimed that his firm had performed more than half of the work. McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 140-41. The trial court ordered the fee divided based upon the reasonable and proportionate value of the services performed and the responsibility assumed by the associating attorneys, McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 141, but failed to state a basis for the percentage split it arrived at in allocating the contingency fee. McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 143. Our Supreme Court reversed, utilizing factors contained in the then-applicable ethical rules as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee:
"(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
McNeary, 105 Wn.2d at 143 (quoting CPR DR-206(B)(1-8)).
While it is true that the McNeary court based its holding on a disciplinary rule that is no longer in force, this fact is of little consequence. As with the rule applied in McNeary, former RPC 1.5(e)(2) allowed nonproportionate fee division. In fact, the language of the ethical rules that the McNeary court adopted in announcing the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee were also contained in former RPC 1.5(a) (1991), which mandated that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable." The McNeary court explained that "[w]hile these factors are not strictly applicable in determining the actual division of services and responsibility, they do provide the trial court guidelines for establishing the relative value of the services performed and responsibilities assumed." 105 Wn.2d at 143-44. Knutsen fails to establish a principled basis for declaring McNeary inapplicable to the resolution of a dispute of this type.
The changes between former RPC 1.5(a)(1-8) and CPR DR-206(B)(1-8) were not significant. Former RPC 1.5(a)(1-8) stated:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the terms of the fee agreement between the lawyer and client;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved in the matter on which legal services are rendered and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
(8) Whether the fee agreement or confirming writing demonstrates that the client had received a reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the fee agreement and of the lawyer's billing practices.
Nevertheless, Knutsen contends that the law requires an equal division of the contingency fee, in accordance with joint venture or special partnership law. In support of this contention, Knutsen cites to Brauns v. Housden, 195 Wash. 140, 79 P.2d 981 (1938), and Swanson v. Webb Tractor Equip. Co., 24 Wn.2d 631, 167 P.2d 146 (1946). In the first case, our Supreme Court applied special partnership law to divide a contingency fee equally among attorneys who had not agreed to the terms of its apportionment. Brauns, 195 Wash. at 143. In the second case, two law firms associated for the prosecution of a case without agreeing to the allocation of fees. Our Supreme Court held that the firms had formed a special or limited partnership. Swanson, 24 Wn.2d at 648.
This authority is inapposite. Brauns and Swanson each predate both former RPC 1.5(e)(2) and its two predecessors: CPR DR 2-107 and Cannon 34. In other words, Brauns and Swanson were decided in the absence of applicable ethical rules specifically addressing the division of attorneys' fees. To the contrary, former RPC 1.5(e)(2) governs the division of attorneys' fees herein. The equal division of the contingency fee pursuant to joint venture or partnership law, as advocated by Knutsen, is plainly at odds with the ethical rules governing this case, their predecessors, and their successor.
CPR DR 2-107 became effective on January 1, 1972. Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 94 n. 5, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Bowman v. Two, 104 Wn.2d 181, 187, 704 P.2d 140 (1985). Its predecessor, Canon 34 was adopted on November 22, 1950. Hansen, 14 Wn. App at 94 n. 5. Canon 34 stated: "[n]o division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Droker Mulholland, 59 Wn.2d 707, 716 n. 5, 370 P.2d 242 (1962).
The other cases Knutsen cites to are not helpful, because they do not address the issue of dividing fees among attorneys. See Paulson v. McMillan, 8 Wn.2d 295, 111 P.2d 983 (1941); Pietz v. Indermuehle, 89 Wn. App. 503, 949 P.2d 449 (1998); Botsford v. Van Riper, 33 Nev. 156, 110 P. 705 (1910).
Knutsen himself even asserted in a letter to Lopez Fantel 23 months into the case that he had a claim for "reasonable attorneys [sic] fees pursuant to the fee agreement." He did not allege an entitlement to fifty percent of the fee ultimately earned.
Knutsen and Lopez Fantel never reached an agreement to divide the fee in any specific nonproportionate manner. Finding of Fact 10. This is significant because the Nguyens only acceded to a fee division that was agreed to by all of their attorneys. Thus, because there was no actual agreement among the attorneys to divide the fee in any defined disproportionate manner, the Nguyens' approval was never secured. Clients have an interest in knowing that their attorneys believe that they are being treated fairly. Such a belief is related to the attorney's incentive to perform well on the client's behalf. The Nguyens plainly consented only to a fee division that was agreed to by all of the attorneys. The Nguyens never consented to a situation in which their attorneys would behave disharmoniously and ultimately sue one another. A condition of the Nguyens' consent was the agreement of all attorneys employed on their behalf as to the fairness of a particular nonproportionate fee allocation. This condition was never met.
The trial court's construction and application of former RPC 1.5(e)(2) has the added benefit of being consistent with principles of quantum meruit. Quantum meruit literally means "`as much as he deserved.'" Eaton v. Engelcke Mfg., Inc., 37 Wn. App. 677, 680, 681 P.2d 1312 (1984) (quoting Heaton v. Imus, 93 Wn.2d 249, 252-53, 608 P.2d 631 (1980)). Quantum meruit is a remedy based on quasi-contract and prevents unjust enrichment. Eaton, 37 Wn. App. at 680. It provides a reasonable amount for work done even in the absence of a contract. Heaton, 93 Wn.2d at 252-53 (citing Losli v. Foster, 37 Wn.2d 220, 233, 222 P.2d 824 (1950)).
In the absence of an applicable agreement to the contrary, Knutsen received as much as he deserved. The trial court awarded him 15 percent of the contingency fee, although he contributed only 5 percent of the estimated attorney time spent litigating the case on the Nguyens' behalf. Finding of Fact 15(a); Conclusion of Law 6. Thus, under both the McNeary factors and principles of quantum meruit, Knutsen received a reasonable amount of compensation for his work. Lopez Fantel was not unjustly enriched by, and Knutsen was fairly compensated for, the amount of work he contributed to the litigation on the Nguyens' behalf.
IV
Knutsen next contends that McNeary is inapplicable to the resolution of this dispute because neither firm in that case had ousted the other. Here, the trial court found that "[t]he Lopez Fantel firm essentially cut Mr. Knutsen out of the case." Finding of Fact 15.
Knutsen also contends that it would be inequitable to divide a contingency fee on a proportionate basis when a party breaches its fiduciary duty to its co-counsel by cutting them out. However, our Supreme Court has held that no fiduciary duty exists among co-counsel, reasoning that "both attorneys owe an undivided duty of loyalty to the client." Mazon v. Krafchick, 158 Wn.2d 440, 448-49, 144 P.3d 1168 (2006).
Knutsen's argument is unpersuasive. The McNeary factors do not preclude a trial court from considering whether one firm ousted the other. Here, the trial court accounted for this occurrence. In its analysis of the "time and labor required" in the Nguyen litigation, the trial court explicitly recognized that Lopez Fantel ignored Knutsen's work and chose not to consult with him:
Based upon all of the evidence presented it appears Mr. Knutsen expended a small fraction of the total time expended by all parties on this case. The fact that Mr. Knutsen's efforts add up to approximately 5% of the estimated attorney time does not mean that his work was meaningless or useless or not important. It does indicate that Lopez Fantel chose to ignore that work and chose not to consult with Mr. Knutsen. Defendant's expert estimated that Mr. Knutsen's work was worth about 10% of the case. Plaintiff's expert estimated that Mr. Knutsen's work was worth about one third or 33% of the case.
Finding of Fact 15(a) (emphasis added). The trial court then awarded Knutsen 15 percent of the attorneys' fees. Conclusion of Law 6. Thus, the trial court considered Knutsen's ouster in its analysis of the McNeary factors. In a case such as this, in which Knutsen did not enter into an affirmative agreement with regard to how the fee should be divided and his own expert testified that he performed much less than half of the work that benefited the client, Knutsen cannot convincingly argue that equity requires that he receive 50 percent of the fee earned.
"While fee decisions are entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, this court will exercise its supervisory role to ensure that discretion is based on articulable grounds." Crest Inc., 128 Wn. App. at 774. The trial court properly analyzed the McNeary factors, taking into consideration the ouster when it awarded Knutsen 15 percent of the contingency fee. Finding no abuse of discretion in its decision to award Knutsen 15 percent of the contingency fee, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Knutsen requested an award of attorneys' fees in the trial court and again on appeal. He contends that when joint venturers or partners breach their fiduciary duties, the court has discretion to award attorneys' fees. Because no fiduciary duty exists among co-counsel, Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 449, and because the trial court did not err, we deny Knutsen's request for an award of attorneys' fees.
Affirmed.