Summary
In Knowles v. Parker Wylie Carpet Co., Inc. et al., 129 Pa. Super. 257, 259, 195 A. 445, it was held by this court, in an opinion by Judge BALDRIGE: "Ordinarily, when an accident occurs to an employee off the employer's premises, there is no presumption that at the time of the accident he was in the course of his employment.
Summary of this case from Smith v. Frederick Investment Co.Opinion
October 6, 1937.
December 17, 1937.
Workmen's compensation — Course of employment — Injury off employer's premises — Presumption — Burden of proof — Travelling salesman — Private affairs disconnected with employer's business.
1. Ordinarily, when an accident occurs to an employee off the employer's premises, there is no presumption that at the time of the accident he was in the course of his employment and that his presence at the place of the accident was required by the nature of his employment; the burden rests upon the claimant to prove, by competent evidence, that when the accident occurred he was actually engaged in a furtherance of the business or affairs of his employer.
2. To determine whether one is injured in the course of his employment, even though he may be a travelling salesman, consideration must be given to what he was doing at the time of the accident and all the attending circumstances; the injury must have some connection or be concerned in some manner with the business of the employer, and not the result of engaging in private affairs disconnected therewith.
3. Decedent, a travelling salesman, had finished his actual duties at 6 p.m. Subsequently, decedent and a customer drove to an inn and were joined by some women companions, with whom they had dinner. After midnight they started back to the city, intending first to take the women to where they resided, which required them to drive ten miles substantially farther than if they had returned directly to decedent's hotel. About 1 or 1:30 a.m., after they had stopped to change a tire, decedent alighted from the automobile, and was struck by another motor vehicle and killed. There was no evidence that the evening's activities were with the approval of decedent's employer. Held that there was no competent proof that decedent met death in the course of his employment.
Appeal, No. 226, Oct. T., 1937, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Phila. Co., March T., 1937, No. 2265, in case of Nan Hill Knowles v. Parker Wylie Carpet Co., Inc. and Hartford Accident Indemnity Co.
Before KELLER, P.J., CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE, STADTFELD, PARKER, JAMES and RHODES, JJ. Judgment reversed.
Appeal by defendants from award of Workmen's Compensation Board.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Award sustained and judgment entered for claimant, opinion by HEILIGMAN. Defendants appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, related to dismissal of exceptions to award.
Frank R. Ambler, for appellants.
John J. Gallagher, for appellee.
Argued October 6, 1937.
This is an appeal from the judgment obtained in a workmen's compensation case by the widow of a deceased employee of the defendant.
The question involved is whether the husband met death in the course of his employment.
Decedent was a salesman for the Parker Wylie Carpet Company, Inc., receiving a commission on his sales but no allowance for expenses. He arrived in Pittsburgh on the morning of September 10, 1935, went to the office of George Wehm Company, wholesalers of floor coverings, his largest customer, and, in company with Wehm, president of the company, called at certain large retail stores, customers of the Wehm company. At 6 p.m. they finished their calls and returned to Wehm's office, where they left their samples and cases. Decedent then invited Wehm to dinner and suggested that they go to some place outside the city. They drove in Wehm's automobile to Hill Top Inn, about twenty-five miles in a northerly direction from the hotel at which deceased was stopping. There they were joined by three women with whom they had dinner, paid for by the decedent.
After midnight they started back to Pittsburgh, intending first to take the women to East Liberty where they resided. This plan required them to drive approximately ten miles farther than if they had returned directly to decedent's hotel. About 1 or 1:30 a.m., they stopped at Hamilton Street, which is near where the women lived, as the car had a flat tire. The decedent alighted from the automobile, and, while waiting for a repairman, who had been summoned, to fix the tire, the decedent was struck by another motor vehicle and killed.
A claim for compensation was filed before a referee, who found that the deceased at the time of his death was not actually engaged in furthering the interests of his employer, and disallowed compensation. The board reversed the referee's findings and conclusions, and granted an award. Upon appeal, the court of common pleas sustained the action of the board.
Ordinarily, when an accident occurs to an employee off the employer's premises, there is no presumption that at the time of the accident he was in the course of his employment. The burden rests upon the claimant to prove, by competent evidence, that when the accident occurred he was actually engaged in a furtherance of the business or affairs of his employer (Hunter v. American Steel Wire Co., 293 Pa. 103, 141 A. 635; Altman v. Kaufmann Realty Co. et al., 110 Pa. Super. 178, 167 A. 394; Paulin v. Williams Co. Inc. et al., 122 Pa. Super. 462, 186 A. 415, affirmed by the Supreme Court); and that his presence was required there by the nature of his employment: Shoffler v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 480, 139 A. 192; Leacook v. Susquehanna Coll. Co., 98 Pa. Super. 581; Baumann v. Howard J. Ehmke Co. et al., 126 Pa. Super. 108, 190 A. 343.
In the Baumann Case, supra, cited by appellee, the claimant was employed as a travelling salesman, his territory embracing all the United States. He sold canvas goods, principally picking bags used by growers of apples and citrus fruits, and was furnished an automobile by his employer, frequently stopping with his prospective customers. He left the company's home office in Philadelphia on a trip which required him to go into a number of states, including Oregon where he called on J.H. Hibbs in accordance with instructions from his employer. Hibbs did not desire to buy any of his goods, but he gave Baumann an invitation to make his headquarters at his home for a short time, as it was too early for him to proceed to the citrus belt in California. This proposed arrangement met with the approval of Baumann's employer, and he remained at Hibbs' home, as a guest, paying no board or lodging. On the day of the accident, Baumann was standing near his host's brother, who was chopping up a tree, when he was struck and injured by a chip from a wedge that was being used. That may be regarded as a borderline case, but we felt that at the time of the injury claimant there was not doing something entirely disconnected with or foreign to his duties, as was the deceased here, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the compensation authorities that he was injured in the course of his employment.
The facts in that case, and in Kelly v. Ochiltree Electric Co. et al., 125 Pa. Super. 161, 190 A. 166, where the salesman was injured while returning from a convention sponsored by his employer, for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of his salesmen, are distinguishable from those in the present case.
This case is more analogous in its facts to Paulin v. Williams Co. Inc. et al., supra ( 122 Pa. Super. 462, 186 A. 415), where the deceased was employed as a salesman, whose territory included certain parts of Ohio and Pennsylvania, his employer furnishing him a car. He left his home in Poland, Ohio, in company with his brother, about 9:30 in the evening of July 13, 1933, and called upon a customer in Youngstown, five miles distant, with whom he discussed business. He left there about 12:30 a.m., proceeding in a different direction from his home to a restaurant a few miles away, where he remained until 1:45 a.m. His wrecked car and the bodies of the deceased and his brother were discovered shortly thereafter about 2 a.m. We held there was no competent evidence to show that the deceased had called or intended to call on any other business prospects that evening, and that the accident did not occur in the actual course of his employer's affairs. See, also, Freeman v. Salem Reformed Church, 125 Pa. Super. 367, 190 A. 159.
To determine whether one is injured in the course of his employment, even though he may be a travelling salesman, consideration must be given to what he was doing at the time of the accident — whether actually engaged in the furtherance of his employer's interests — and all the attending circumstances. The injury must have some connection or be concerned in some manner with the business of the employer, and not be the result of engaging in private affairs disconnected therewith: Zenker v. Zenker, 93 Pa. Super. 255, 258.
The evidence in the case in hand clearly established that the deceased's work had ceased at 6 o'clock that day. When the accident occurred, approximately eight hours after he had finished his actual duties, at a place they did not require him to be, he was engaged in a purely personal matter. The women companions he was taking home at that early hour in the morning certainly could not be considered as business prospects, nor can it be fairly concluded that what he was doing at the time of the accident bore any relation to his employment, and there was no evidence that the evening's activities were with the approval of his employer. The accident would not have occurred if he had not been involved in the undertaking of driving these women home, which was something entirely foreign to his employment.
We are constrained to hold that there was no competent proof that this unfortunate death was compensable under our statutes.
Judgment reversed, and now entered for the appellants.