Opinion
No. ED89162
July 10, 2007
Appeal from Circuit Court of Washington County, Hon. Troy Hyde.
Monnye R. Gross and Richard A. Wier, for appellant.
Joseph R. Dulle, for respondent.
Opinion
Plaintiff, Cynthia Kleim, appeals from the judgment entered by the probate division of the Circuit Court of Washington County dismissing her will contest petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
Decedent, Elden Choisser, executed a last will and testament on August 17, 2005, in which he made specific bequests of personal property to plaintiff, Mike Orville, Lorayne Pletting, a technical school, and certain public libraries. He left his real estate to defendant, Gregory Sansone. He left one-half of his residuary estate to plaintiff and one-half to Ms. Pletting. He named defendant as his personal representative.
Decedent died on August 18, 2005. On September 12, 2005, defendant filed his Application for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Elden Choisser and his Application for Letters Testamentary in the probate division of the Circuit Court in Washington County. The matter of "In the Estate of Elden Choisser" was opened in the probate division. The probate division did not admit the will when the application was filed.
On November 2, 2005, plaintiff filed a will contest petition with the clerk of the probate division of the Circuit Court of Washington County. The petition named defendant as the sole defendant.
On April 28, 2006, the probate division admitted the will to probate and appointed defendant personal representative of decedent's estate. The probate division clerk first published notice of letters testamentary on May 4, 2006.
Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the will contest for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that 1) the petition was filed with the clerk of the probate division and not with the circuit court, and only the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction, and 2) no petition was filed with the clerk of the circuit court within six months of the publication of the Notice of Letters Testamentary. The probate division subsequently dismissed plaintiff's will contest petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and it thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals from this judgment.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
For her first point, plaintiff contends that the probate division erred in dismissing her petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She argues that the probate division had jurisdiction and the power to transfer the petition to another division of the circuit court and should have done so.
When a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction turns on a question of fact, we review for abuse of discretion. Missouri Soybean v. Missouri Clean Water, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003). However, when the facts are uncontested, as they are here, the issue of whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Because we are primarily concerned with the correctness of the result and not with the route taken by the trial court to reach it, we will affirm the trial court's judgment if it is correct on any ground supported by the record, even if the trial court did not rely on that ground. Id.
A court's authority to adjudicate a controversy is based on three essential elements: jurisdiction of the subject matter, jurisdiction of the res or the parties, and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment in the particular case. Id. at 21. "Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns `the nature of the cause of action or the relief sought' and exists only when the court `has the right to proceed to determine the controversy or question in issue between the parties, or grant the relief prayed.'" Missouri Soybean, 102 S.W.3d at 21 (quoting State Tax Com'n v. Administrative Hearing Com'n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Mo. banc 1982)).
A. Filing with Probate Division Clerk
We first consider whether the filing of the will contest petition with the probate division clerk deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 473.083.1 RSMo (2000) requires will contest petitions to be filed with the clerk of the circuit court of the county within six months after the date of probate or rejection thereof, or six months after the first publication of the notice of granting letters, whichever is later. In this case, plaintiff physically filed her petition with the clerk of the probate division in Washington County and not with the circuit clerk of Washington County. However, filing in the wrong division of the circuit court does not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The 1976 amendments to the Judicial Article abolished probate, magistrate, and municipal courts as separate entities and incorporated them into the circuit system as divisions of the circuit courts. Mo. Const. art. V, section 27.2(a), (b) (1945, as amended 1976);see Gregory v. Corrigan, 685 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo. banc 1985). Specifically, as a result of these amendments, the probate court no longer existed, and the probate division became a division of the circuit court. Gilmore v. Erb, 900 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Mo.App. 1995); Rohrer v. Rohrer, 700 S.W.2d 879, 880 (Mo.App. 1985). In this system, "the filing of a petition with a clerk of any division of the circuit court constitutes a filing with the circuit court." Robinson v. Lohman, 949 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Mo.App. 1997). The filing of a case in the wrong division of the circuit court does not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction; rather, it merely requires transfer to the appropriate division. Rohrer, 700 S.W.2d at 880. Thus, plaintiff's filing of the will contest petition with the clerk of the probate division constituted a filing with the circuit court in compliance with section 473.083.1. The probate division erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on this ground.
B. Alternate Ground for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant argues that the judgment of dismissal should nevertheless be affirmed because necessary parties were not named and served within ninety days after the petition was filed, which also deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. We do not reach this question for the reason that subject matter jurisdiction never attached to this case because at the time the petition was filed, there was no final judgment of the probate division admitting the will to probate or rejecting it. We affirm because the circuit court never had subject matter jurisdiction.
The action of the probate division accepting or rejecting a will is a condition precedent to the filing of a will contest. Brunig v. Humburg, 957 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Mo.App. 1997); Gillman v. Mercantile Trust Co., Nat. Ass'n, 629 S.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Mo.App. 1981). Acceptance or rejection of the will by the probate division is a prerequisite to the trial court's acquisition of subject matter jurisdiction.Brunig, 957 S.W.2d at 347-48; Estate of Johnson v. Powell, 708 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Mo.App. 1986).
The genesis of this rule predates the 1976 amendments to the Judicial Article abolishing the probate court. Under the prior statutory scheme,
[t]he question for determination in the probate court, in a proceeding to probate a will, is whether or not the paper presented is the will it purports to be, and such is the question in a will contest suit in the circuit court. And the circuit court has no jurisdiction to determine such question until the probate court has determined it one way or the other. . . . In other words, a will cannot be probated in the first instance in the circuit court.
Callahan v. Huhlman, 98 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo. 1936) (internal statutory citation omitted).
After the 1976 amendments to the Judicial Article, the legislature enacted the Court Reform and Revision Act of 1978, which, in part, amended sections 473.050 and 473.083 to implement the constitutional changes. See Gillman, 629 S.W.2d at 446. The amendments to these sections transferred to the probate division the duty to determine whether the paper presented is the will. However, the statutory amendments did not eliminate the requirement that that decision to accept or reject a will was a prerequisite to the circuit court's jurisdiction in a will contest.
Section 473.083 presupposes that the acceptance or rejection of the will by the probate division is a condition precedent for a will contest. See Gillman, 629 S.W.2d at 446. The statute describes the cause of action as "[a]ny contest of the validity of a probated will or any prayer to have probated a will which has been rejected by the judge of the probate division." Section 473.083.5. Further, the period of time for bringing a will contest commences on the date that the probate division orders rejection or probate of the will. Section 473.083.1. Because the statutes have created a will contest as the proper procedure for reconsidering an original order of the probate division admitting or rejecting a will, section 472.160 specifically excludes appeals to appellate courts from orders admitting wills to probate or rejecting wills from probate. See Gilmore, 900 S.W.2d at 670.
In this case, the will contest petition was filed over five months before the will was admitted to probate. Accordingly, the circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction at the time it was filed. When a trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction because a condition precedent to jurisdiction has not occurred at the time the petition is filed, the trial court must dismiss the action as prematurely filed. Rule 55.27(g)(3); State ex rel. County of Jackson v. Public Service Com'n, 14 S.W.3d 99, 102-03 (Mo.App. 2000); Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315, 317-18 (Mo.App. 1996); Wells v. Nolden, 679 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo.App. 1984); Riley v. State, 588 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo.App. 1979). Any other actions or proceedings of a court without subject matter jurisdiction are null and void. Wells, 679 S.W.2d at 891. In these circumstances, the dismissal is without prejudice so the party can refile the petition if the condition precedent for subject matter jurisdiction subsequently occurs. Missouri Soybean, 102 S.W.3d at 29;Riley, 588 S.W.2d at 741.
Although defendant did not object on this ground, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time.Brunig, 957 S.W.2d at 348; Callahan, 98 S.W.2d at 706. Even if the case had been transferred to another division of the circuit court, dismissal without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would have been required. Since the case was dismissed without prejudice, albeit for another reason, point one is denied.
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer
For her second point, plaintiff asserts that the probate division erred in denying her motion to transfer her will contest to another division of the circuit court. While we agree that this would have been proper procedure if the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction, it did not. Accordingly, this point is moot. Point two is denied.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.