Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-02-727
December 3, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court has before it Defendants Anne Arundel County Board of Education, Peter Zimmer, Heather Mitchell, Dr. Carol Parham, and Kenneth Nichols' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Shirley Cooke, Victor Cooke, Robert Schmermund, and Janet Schmermund's Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Howard Michelsen and Emily Michelsen's Motion to Dismiss, and the papers submitted by the parties relating thereto. The Court finds a hearing unnecessary.
In the present context, the facts must be taken in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
In September or October of 1998, Christine Kitchings ("Christine"), a fourth-grade student at Crofton Woods Elementary School in Anne Arundel County, Maryland ("CWES"), tried out for and was accepted into a extra-curricular after-school program called "Odyssey of the Mind" ("OM"), in which teams of students are formed to compete in various academic competitions and activities. CWES teacher Heather Mitchell ("Defendant Mitchell") was the OM program coordinator. Christine's father, John H. Kitchings ("Kitchings"), was asked by Defendant Mitchell to volunteer as one of the team's coaches. Kitchings agreed. A second parent, Howard Michelson (Defendant Michelson) was named as co-coach with Kitchings. Kitchings is Black; Defendant Michelson is white.
Kitchings has brought the instant case in his individual capacity and, together with Valerie E. Kitchings, as next friend of his daughter Christine Kitchings. Therefore, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs in the plural.
The team began meeting after school hours alternately at the Kitchings' and at Defendant Michelsen's homes. As Kitchings himself states in his Complaint, "allmost immediately, Plaintiff Kitchings and Defendant Michelsen was [sic] unable to work consistently with [Christine's] OM team . . ." See Complaint at ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges that the root of the problems were both the "white supremacist and/or racist behavior of Defendant Michelsen" and, additionally, "attempting to guide the team with two (2) separate and distinct coaches." Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 11.
Kitchings complained to Defendant Mitchell about Michelsen's behavior, including "rude" treatment and "being cut off" by Michelsen, during October and December of 1998. In December, a shoving match ensued at a team meeting when Defendant Michelsen "rushed toward" Kitchings and placed his hands on Kitchings' chest.
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs have made some allegations involving "inappropriate sexual behavior" by Defendant Michelsen with regard to some of the female students in the program other than Christine. Because these allegations are not relevant to and do not form any basis for Plaintiffs' causes of action for discrimination, the Court will disregard them. Similarly, Plaintiffs' allegations of racial discrimination against students other than Christine shall be similarly disregarded as not within Plaintiffs' personal knowledge and not relevant to the instant case.
Also in December, Defendant Mitchell requested that a Coordinator for the OM program for the Anne Arundel County School System intervene to attempt to solve the problem between Kitchings and Defendant Michelsen. According to the Complaint, at a meeting held with the Coordinator at Kitchings' home, Defendant Michelsen "clearly stated that he was intimidated by coach Kitchings because he was `big, Black, educated, and not used to dealing with outgoing Black people.'" Complaint at ¶ 21.
The Coordinator determined that the differences between the two coaches were irreconcilable, and split the team into two groups, one to practice and compete under the direction of Kitchings, and the other under Defendant Michelsen. The team continued to function in this manner during January and February of 1999.
On February 22, 1999, Defendant Michelsen requested a joint meeting of the two groups to work on a specific segment of the project. Another parent, Ruth Slavin, was present as an additional chaperone. At the meeting, "Michelsen verbally abused [Christine] . . . causing her to cry and withdraw from the activities of the session." Complaint at ¶ 32. Defendant Michelsen then told Christine not to tell her parents about what had transpired at the meeting. On arrival home, Christine told he mother what had happened and stated that she felt "embarrassed, humiliated, and vulnerable . . . at the hands of racist Michelsen." Complaint at ¶ 37.
On February 23, 1999, Kitchings wrote and called CWES Principal Peter Zimmer ("Defendant Zimmer") and Defendant Mitchell in an attempt to lodge a complaint against Defendant Michelsen. Kitchings complained to Defendants Zimmer and Mitchell about Michelsen's "verbal abuse" of [Christine], along with complaints regarding Michelsen's refusal to reimburse Kitchings for expenditures on the project and Michelsen's "cutting off other parents when they addressed the children." Defendant Zimmer did not respond to Kitchings' calls. Complaint at ¶ 40.
On February 24, 1999, Defendant Mitchell told Kitchings that there was to be a meeting of all the parents and children on the team. According to Mitchell, this meeting was called for the purpose of removing Michelsen from his position as coach. Mitchell told Kitchings that he was to remain as assistant coach, with Mitchell serving as head coach. Kitchings considered this a "demotion" — a punitive measure in retaliation for his complaints about Michelsen. Complaint at ¶¶ 41-47.
At the meeting, which was held on February 25, 1999, Defendant Zimmer took Kitchings aside and asked him to step down as coach of the team. Zimmer indicated that Michelsen would be asked to step down as well. Kitchings voluntarily resigned his position as coach of the team. Defendant Zimmer then announced to the parents gathered for the meeting that both coaches would be removed and Defendant Mitchell would serve as coach from that point onward. Complaint at ¶¶ 49-51.
In the following days, Kitchings was repeatedly contacted by Defendant Mitchell and parent Janet Schmermund ("Defendant Schmermund") who were seeking the return of the OM materials Kitchings had in his home. Because Kitchings was away on business, he did not get the messages. Defendants Mitchell and Schmermund then requested that they be allowed to drive to Kitchings' home to pick up the materials themselves. The materials were not requested of Defendant Michelsen, nor were they retrieved from him. Complaint at ¶¶ 55-58.
On March 5, 1999, Kitchings made a "surprise" appearance at a meeting of the OM team that Christine was attending in order to return the OM materials. There, he discovered that Defendant Michelsen was present and continuing his coaching duties with the team. There is no indication in the Complaint of who else may have been present at the March 5, 1999 meeting. Complaint at ¶ 60.
Also on March 5, 1999, Kitchings lodged a formal letter of complaint with the Anne Arundel County School System, copying Nancy Mann, Assistant Superintendent, Kenneth Nichols, Area Director ("Defendant Nichols"), Defendant Zimmer, and Defendant Mitchell, as well as all of the parents of students on the OM team. Complaint at ¶ 62.
Approximately two weeks later, Kitchings was interviewed by Leslie Stanton, Anne Arundel County School District's Director of Human Relations, who told Kitchings that he would be conducting an investigation of the incident. Complaint at ¶ 64.
In or about the third week of March, 1999, Christine alerted Kitchings that Defendant "Mitchell had asked [Defendant] Schmermund, [Debbie] Hollis [another parent] and the minor Michelsen how progress was going" on the OM project. At that point Christine had apparently not been invited to nor had she attended any meetings of the OM team subsequent to the meeting on March 5. Kitchings concluded from this exchange that meetings had been held from which Christine had been excluded. Complaint at ¶¶ 66-7.
In April and May of 1999, Michelsen, wearing a coach's badge, participated in competitions of the OM team as a registered coach, along with Defendant Mitchell. Complaint at ¶ 78.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 8, 2002, Plaintiff Kitchings, acting on behalf of himself and his daughter Christine, filed this suit against the Anne Arundel County School Board of Education ("Board"), Several School Officials (Principal Zimmer, Heather Mitchell, Superintendent Dr. Carol Parham, and Kenneth Nichols, together, "the Official Defendants"), Michelsen and his wife, and two other sets of parents, Victor and Shirley Cooke and Robert and Janet Schmermund (together, "the Private Defendants"). Plaintiffs alleged the following causes of action:
Count I. Violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Count II. Violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under color of state law, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count III. Violations of some unspecified Maryland law "regarding discrimination."
Count IV. Conspiracy to commit racial discrimination, presumably pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claim under Title VI is brought pursuant to § 602, which pertains to regulations or rules that create a disparate impact on a class, and that therefore Plaintiff has no claim, as § 602 carries no private right of action. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). The Court disagrees with Defendants' characterization of Plaintiff's position. In the Complaint and in the Opposition, Plaintiff cites the language of § 601, which prohibits intentional discrimination in federally-funded programs or activities. A private right of action for such violations exists under § 601, as Defendants concede in their Reply. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
The Board and the Official Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that the Complaint failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted and that the Plaintiff's causes of action are time-barred. The Private Defendants (the Cookes, the Michelsens, and the Schmermunds) joined the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Official Defendants. III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a means of testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint. The Court must deny a motion to dismiss unless it "appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). "The question is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the Complaint states any valid claim for relief." 5A Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 336 (2d ed. 1987).
The Court, when deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider well-pled allegations in a complaint as true and must construe those allegations in favor of the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969). The Court must further disregard the contrary allegations of the opposing party. See A.S. Abell Co. v. Chell, 412 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1969). "However, the Court is not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint." Nat'l Coalition for Students with Disabilities Educ. and Legal Def. Fund v. Scales, 150 F. Supp.2d 845, 849 (D.Md. 2001) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint may be dismissed if the law does not support the conclusions argued, or where the facts alleged are not sufficient to support the claim presented.
III. DISCUSSION A. Claims Against Private Defendants 1. Defendants Victor and Shirley Cooke
Victor and Shirley Cooke are named as Defendants to this lawsuit. However, the Complaint alleges no actions by either of the Cookes with regard to Christine or Kitchings. In fact, neither of their names appears anywhere in the Complaint. Thus, the claims against them will be dismissed for failure to state a claim against them on which relief can be granted.
2. Defendants Robert and Janet Schmermund
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege certain actions taken by Defendant Janet Schmermund in trying to recover from his possession materials used in relation to the OM project. These are the only allegations of any behavior by Defendant Schmermund with regard to either Plaintiff Kitchings or Christine Kitchings. The actions taken by Defendant Schmermund occurred by Plaintiff's own admission prior to March 5, 1999, the date when Kitchings returned the project materials to the school himself.
In Maryland, it is undisputed that a three-year statute of limitations applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 as well as to Title VI. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 1999). Because the Complaint was filed on March 8, 2002, any claims for actions occurring before March 8, 1999 are barred by the statute of limitations. Because all actions alleged to have been committed by Defendant Janet Schmermund occurred before the operative date of March 8, 1999, all claims against her shall be dismissed as time-barred.
No allegations of any action taken by Robert Schmermund are described in the Complaint. Thus the claims against Robert Schmermund shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. B. Defendants Howard and Emily Michelsen 1. Statute of Limitations
The Court notes that apparently Plaintiffs have named as Defendants the spouses of each of the Private Defendants. Plaintiff presents no authority permitting a spouse to be sued for his or her spouse's discriminatory actions or behavior. Thus all claims against spouses who are not themselves alleged to have acted in a discriminatory manner towards the Plaintiffs shall be dismissed.
The Complaint alleges that on March 13, 1999 and on April 24, 1999, Defendant Michelsen acted as coach to the OM team, and that during that same period of time, he acted to intentionally exclude Plaintiff Christine Kitchings from practices, meetings, and competitions. Thus a portion of the alleged discriminatory actions of Defendant Michelsen towards Plaintiff Christine Kitchings were committed after the operative date of March 8, 1999 and are not barred by the statute of limitations.
However, the Complaint alleges no actions by Defendant Michelsen towards or regarding Plaintiff John Kitchings after the operative date. Thus, any claims against Defendant Michelsen with regard to alleged discriminatory actions towards John Kitchings shall be dismissed. There remain pending only claims as to alleged actions directed towards Christine after March 8, 1999.
2. Title VI Claims Against Howard Michelsen
The Complaint alleges violations by Defendant Howard Michelsen of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Michelsen cannot be held liable under Title VI, which prohibits discrimination only by "any program or activity receiving Federal financial aid." 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d). It is undisputed that Defendant Michelsen was not himself the recipient of any monies from the Federal Government. Thus he is not a proper defendant under Title VI. See Farmer v. Ramsay, 41 F. Supp.2d 587, 592 (D.Md. 1999) (unpublished opinion), Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 105 F. Supp.2d 1295, 1311 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (collecting cases from multiple lower Federal courts). The Title VI claims against Defendant Michelsen shall be dismissed.
3. 1983 Claims Against Howard Michelsen
Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations perpetrated by a "person" "under color of" law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant Michelsen's exclusion of Christine from the OM program on the basis of her race violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. A violation of the right to equal protection is clearly a Constitutional violation, subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 523 (1939). Thus Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs have not alleged a "cognizable" claim — e.g., a constitutional harm — actionable under § 1983 is without merit.
In order for a private individual to be liable for a deprivation of Constitutional rights under § 1983, that individual must be found to have acted "under color of law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company, 218 F.3d 337, 341 (4th Cir. 2000). "[T]he `under-color-of-state-law' element of § 1983 excludes from its reach `merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.'" American Mftrs Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
The "color of law" inquiry, the Supreme Court has held, "has been treated consistently as equivalent to the `state action' requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment," and courts often use the terms interchangeably. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 215 § (4th Cir. 1993). "At the bottom, the state action determination requires an examination of all the relevant circumstances, in an attempt to evaluate `the degree of the Government's participation in the private party's activities.'" Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 342, quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). The actions of a private party, to be actions "under color of law," must be "fairly attributable" to the state. American Mftrs., 526 U.S. at 50.
In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Michelsen, a parent volunteer with the school-based OM program, liable under § 1983. There is no question that employees of the School District are acting "under color of law" when performing their official duties. However, whether parent volunteers acting as leaders of a school-based extra-curricular activity can be state actors, and thus liable under § 1983, is a different question.
In Mentavalos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2001), the Fourth Circuit held that unauthorized harassment of freshman cadets by volunteer upperclass cadets who were entrusted by Citadel officials with certain aspects of their training, discipline, and instruction was not "attributable to the state." In deciding the issue, the court examined carefully the facts and circumstances of the cadets' relationship with the school, the conditions of their authority, and the challenged actions.
In the instant case, there have been insufficient factual allegations to permit a determination on the pleadings that Defendant Michelsen was not acting "under color of law" when he acted to exclude Christine from OM practices and competitions, allegedly on the basis of her race. Thus the Court cannot find, on the basis of the pleadings alone, that Plaintiff is able to prove "no set of facts" to support his claim that Defendant Michelsen acted in violation of § 1983 in excluding Christine. Defendant Michelsen's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim must be denied. 4. Emily Michelsen
Plaintiff has alleged no wrongdoing by Defendant Emily Michelsen that would subject her to liability under any of the claimed causes of action. Thus all claims against Emily Michelsen shall be dismissed.
C. Claims Against the Anne Arundel County Board of Education 1. Statute of Limitations
As explained above, though a large portion of the events leading up to Christine's alleged exclusion from the OM team occurred prior to the operative date of March 8, 1999, the actual exclusion of Christine from practices and competitions continued after the operative date, and Kitchings was not aware that the team had continued to meet without Christine until after March 8, 1999. Thus actions against the Board for excluding Christine from participation in the program after March 8, 1999 are not time-barred.
2. Title VI Claims
Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d), provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Plaintiffs allege that the Board constitutes a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." In support of this claim, Plaintiffs have stated in the Complaint that the Board received from the Federal government, in recent fiscal years, "3.05% of the Board's . . . education budget." Complaint at page 5. The Board has not challenged this allegation.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain an action under Title VI, § 602, as that section does not provide a private right of action for citizens to sue of violations. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.275 (2001). While the Court agrees that Plaintiffs may not sue under § 602, it is clear from the Complaint that their claim, at least in part, is brought directly under § 601, which does create a private right of action. Id.; Complaint p. 4.
It is now well-established that a cause of action under § 601 requires a showing of intentional discrimination by a program or activity receiving federal monies. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281. The question of intent is generally a question of fact, and not appropriate for a judgment on the pleadings. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that the Board, through its Officials, acted intentionally to exclude Christine from practices on the basis of her race.
The Court is unable to say, on the basis of the pleadings alone, that there is no possible set of facts and circumstances under which Kitchings will be able to prove a case of intentional discrimination by the Board against Christine. Thus the Title VI claim against the Board shall not be dismissed.
3. Section 1983 Claims
The Board has moved to dismiss on the basis that county school boards in Maryland are considered to be "arms of the state" and thus are protected against suits under § 1983 by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court agrees. "It is well-established that Maryland County School Boards are state entitles for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Barnes v. Anne Arundel County Board of Educ., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10695, *2 (D. Md. 2000), citing Rosenfeld v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 41 F. Supp.2d 581, 586 (D. Md. 1999).
Because the Eleventh Amendment unquestionably protects states and state entities from suits under § 1983, Plaintiffs' suit against the Board under § 1983 must be dismissed. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). D. Claims Against Official Defendants (Zimmer, Parham, Mitchell, and Nichols) 1. Statute of Limitations
As explained above, claims against individual school officers for excluding Christine from participation in the OM program after March 8, 1999 are not time-barred.
2. Title VI Liability
As explained above, individual defendants are not liable under Title VI, which applies only to "programs or activities" receiving Federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d). Because none of the individual school officers named in this suit are themselves the recipients of Federal funding, the claims against them under Title VI must be dismissed.
3. 1983 Liability a. Official Capacity
It is well-established that state officials are protected from suits for damages to compensate past injuries in their official capacities under § 1983. Such a suit is "in essence one for the recovery of money from the state" and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
However, it is equally well-established that state officials such as the School Board officers and faculty named in Plaintiff's suit may be sued in their official capacities for prospective relief. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Because Plaintiff's Complaint seeks injunctive relief, claims against the individual school officers for injunctive relief cannot be dismissed. Claims for damages against the officers in their official capacities will be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The nature of the prospective relief sought, and the appropriateness of such relief, is not specified by Plaintiff in the Complaint. However, the Court's inquiry on a Motion to Dismiss is concerned only with whether it is possible for him to make a claim for injunctive relief against a school official in his official capacity. The Court finds that such a suit is possible, assuming that Plaintiff can meet further burdens of showing such relief is appropriate.
b. Individual Capacity
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage suits against state officials in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Such suits are against private citizens and are not "essentially" suits against the State. Thus, Plaintiff's claim for damages and injunctive relief for violations of constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983. against the Official Defendants in their individual capacities shall not be dismissed.
E. Conspiracy Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for "Conspiracy to Commit Racial Discrimination" (Part V of Plaintiff's Complaint). Presumably this claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
The Fourth Circuit has stated that in stating a claim for conspiracy pursuant to § 1985, a plaintiff "must plead specific facts in a nonconclusory fashion to survive a motion to dismiss." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995). Such facts must tend to show a "meeting of the minds," or "joint plan of action." Id., citing Scott v. Greenville Cty., 716 F.2d 1409, 1424 (4th Cir. 1983). Here, Plaintiff has not satisfied the pleading requirement to survive a motion to dismiss. As in Simmons, where the court found the plaintiff's pleading insufficient as it did not "present any evidence of a conspiracy of two or more persons . . ." Id., here Plaintiff alleges no facts that tend to show that a joint plan or agreement existed to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims shall be dismissed. F. Claims Under "Maryland Law"
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts or any basis on which he is entitled to recover under "Maryland Law Regarding Discrimination," this claim shall be dismissed. See, e.g., Tofighbakhsh v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 2000 WL 1468737, *3 (D. Md. 2000)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendants Victor Cooke, Shirley Cooke, Robert Schmermund, and Janet Schmermund's Motion To Dismiss is GRANTED.
a. All claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED.
b. These Defendants shall no longer participate in the case.
2. Defendants Howard Michelsen and Emily Michelsen's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
a. All claims against Emily Michelsen are DISMISSED.
b. Count I claims against Defendant Howard Michelsen under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d) are DISMISSED.
c. Count II claims against Defendant Howard Michelsen in his personal and individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remain pending.
3. Defendants Anne Arundel County School Board, Heather Mitchell, Dr. Carol Parham, Kenneth Nichols, and Peter Zimmer's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
a. Count I claims against Defendant Anne Arundel County School Board under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d) remain pending.
b. Count II claims against Defendant Anne Arundel County School Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED.
c. Count I Claims against Defendants Heather Mitchell, Dr. Carol Parham, Kenneth Nichols, and Peter Zimmer under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d) are DISMISSED.
d. Count II claims against Defendants Heather Mitchell, Dr. Carol Parham, Kenneth Nichols, and Peter Zimmer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their personal and individual capacities for prospective relief and damages and in their official capacities for prospective relief only remain pending.
e. All claims in Count III are DISMISSED.
f. All claims in Count IV are DISMISSED.
4. There remain pending the following claims and causes of action:
a. Count II claims against Defendant Howard Michelsen pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
b. Count I claims against Defendant Anne Arundel County School Board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d).
c. Count II claims against Defendants Heather Mitchell, Dr. Carol Parham, Kenneth Nichols, and Peter Zimmer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their personal and individual capacities for both prospective relief and damages, and in their official capacities for prospective relief only.
5. The case shall proceed pursuant to the Scheduling Order issued herewith.