Summary
denying a party the status of a BFP as it “had constructive notice of every fact which could have been ascertained by an inspection of the deeds, or mortgages”
Summary of this case from Stern v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Asher)Opinion
Argued October 12, 1894
Decided October 23, 1894
Adolph Rebadow and Johnson Charles for appellants.
Spencer Clinton for the Buffalo Savings Bank, appellant.
F.C. Peck and Frank W. Brown for respondents.
The only serious question presented on the record arises on the claim of the Buffalo Savings Bank, that it was not chargeable with notice nor put upon inquiry to ascertain that the defendant Tozier had no authority to discharge the mortgage in question. The savings bank, when it took its mortgage, had constructive notice of every fact which could have been ascertained by an inspection of the deeds, or mortgages, on record in the chain of title. An inspection of the records would have disclosed the mortgage given by Lester H. Tozier in October, 1875, and that it was given "in trust" for the three minor children of John M. Kirsch, deceased; that the lands covered by the mortgage were subsequently, in 1883, conveyed by Lester H. Tozier to Orange L. Tozier, the mortgagee named in the mortgage given in trust for the minor children of John M. Kirsch; that after such conveyance, and in March, 1886, Orange L. Tozier, then being the owner of the lands and also the mortgagee "in trust," in that mortgage, himself executed and caused to be recorded a satisfaction of the mortgage, and that this occurred before any part of the sum secured by the mortgage had become due. There can be no doubt that the satisfaction of the mortgage was as to the defendant Orange L. Tozier a breach of trust. The satisfaction was without consideration. The question whether Tozier held the mortgage as trustee impressed with a trust in favor of the three children of John M. Kirsch, admits of no doubt. The implication from the nature of the instrument, the character of the beneficiaries and the division of the payments into three equal parts, payable at specified but different dates in the future, is that the instrument was intended to secure to the several beneficiaries as they became of age an equal share of the sum for which the mortgage was given. The acceptance by Orange L. Tozier of the mortgage containing the declaration of the trust was an acknowledgment of the trust on his part and bound him to perform it. The trust was expressed in the instrument, although not fully set out in words, and any act thereafter done by him in contravention of the trust was by the common law and by the statute void. (St. Uses and Trusts, 1 Rev. St. § 65.) The discharge of the mortgage was not intended for the benefit of the infants, but to deprive them of the benefit of the security, and, as we have said, was a plain breach of trust. The bank knew, or must be presumed to have known, when it took its mortgage, because an examination of the records would have disclosed the facts, (1) that the mortgage was taken by Tozier in trust for infants; (2) that he satisfied it before it became due; (3) that his relation to the property had changed, so that when he executed the satisfaction he was himself the owner of the land, having an adverse interest to those beneficially interested in the security, and (4) that in satisfying the mortgage he was dealing with himself. Persons dealing with a trustee must take notice of the scope of his authority. An act within his authority will bind the trust estate or the beneficiaries as to third persons acting in good faith and without notice, although the trustee intended to defraud the estate, and actually did accomplish his purpose by means of the act in question. It has frequently been held that a person dealing with an executor, administrator or trustee, who, from the nature of his office, or by the terms of the trust, has power to satisfy or transfer the securities of the estate, or to vary the investment from time to time, is not bound to go further and ascertain whether in fact the act of the executor or trustee is justified, and that no breach of trust was intended. It is sufficient for his protection that he acts in good faith, and if the act of the executor or trustee is justified by the terms of the power, the party dealing with him is protected. ( Fuld v. Schieffelin, 7 Jo. Ch. 153.) But circumstances were disclosed by the record when the bank took its mortgage, which precluded the bank from relying upon the recorded satisfaction of the prior mortgage. There was no indication in the mortgage that any power was vested in the trustee Tozier to accept payment of the mortgage before it became due, or to vary the trust security. There was no such affirmative power conferred upon him in fact, and the case of McPherson v. Rollins ( 107 N.Y. 316) seems to be a decisive authority that there is no implication of such a power in case of a trustee of a specified security for the benefit of minors, and no other evidence of his actual authority exists than may be implied from the fact that he is trustee of the security. The rule declared in that case operated with great severity upon one who, without any actual notice, bought the property upon an official certificate that no lien existed on the premises, paying full value therefor. There the mortgage was given to secure the payment of an annuity to the mortgagee, and also annuities to two minors until they should become of age. The mortgagee afterwards, and before the expiration of the minority of the two children, without consideration, assumed to discharge the mortgage and the satisfaction was duly recorded. It was held that the trustee had no power to satisfy the mortgage before the termination of the trust, and that the purchaser was not protected. It is difficult to perceive any solid distinction between that case and the present. In McPherson v. Rollins there was no express direction that the mortgage security should remain unchanged during the term of the trust. It was given to secure annuities presumably for maintenance. Here the mortgage was given to secure a gross sum, for the benefit of infants, the shares being payable, as was to be inferred, on their severally attaining full age. There is a very pregnant circumstance in the present case bearing upon the point of constructive notice. The bank relied upon a discharge by Tozier of a lien held by him as trustee on his own land. The transaction as disclosed by the record showed that in executing the satisfaction Tozier was dealing with himself, and that the act was in his own interest, and not only so, but that the mortgage was not due. Tozier was acting in the double capacity of owner of the land and trustee of a lien thereon for other persons. The transaction was unusual and special and the savings bank with knowledge of Tozier's relation to the land as owner and trustee was, we think, bound to inquire by what authority he acted, and if inquiry had been made the invalidity of the transaction would or might have been disclosed. What circumstances will amount to constructive notice or will put a party upon inquiry is, in many cases, a question of much difficulty. A purchaser is not required to use the utmost circumspection. He is bound to act as an ordinarily prudent and careful man would do under the circumstances. He cannot act in contravention to the dictates of reasonable prudence or refuse to inquire when the propriety of inquiry is naturally suggested by circumstances known to him. The circumstances of this case made it, we think, the duty of the bank to inquire in respect to the authority of Tozier to discharge the prior mortgage, and having failed to do so, is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser. ( Baker v. Bliss, 39 N.Y. 70 and cases cited; Story Eq. Jur. sec. 400 et seq.) The other questions are satisfactorily disposed of in the opinions of the referee and at General Term, and do not require further elaboration.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.