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Kinney v. Lechner Lumber Co.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A
Jan 21, 1952
55 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1952)

Opinion

December 4, 1951. Rehearing Denied January 21, 1952.

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Duval County, Claude Ogilvie, J.

Charles T. Boyd, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellants.

Marks, Gray, Yates Conroy, Francis P. Conroy, Jacksonville, for appellee.


Appellants filed their amended complaint on the law side of the Circuit Court in and for Duval County against the appellee, Lechner Lumber Company. The amended complaint contains two counts. The first count alleged that the appellee loaned the appellants $3,000 for which the appellants were to sign a mortgage note for $3,300 with interest at 10%, but that in fact appellants signed a note for $3,600 with interest payable at 6%. It was further alleged that the appellants protested the amount of the note but signed the note upon assurance by an officer of the appellee-corporation that the $3,600 figure was a mistake which would be corrected. The appellants, it was charged, were compelled [they did not state facts showing how or in what manner they were coerced] by the appellee to pay under protest $3,600 in order to secure a satisfaction of the note and mortgage and that such payment was thereby wilfully and maliciously inflicted by the appellee. It was further alleged that the interest amounted to $600 and, being in excess of 10% per annum, it was under Sections 687.03 and 687.04, Florida Statutes, 1949, F.S.A., usurious, whereupon the appellants prayed judgment for $5,000 and costs.

The second count restated the facts recited in the first count and alleged that the appellants were forced and compelled [again appellant failed to allege facts which demonstrated the nature of the alleged compulsion] to pay the unlawful interest under protest by reason of necessity and that therefore the payment was wilfully and maliciously inflicted by the appellee. It was alleged that the $600 interest charged on the note was in excess of 25% per annum and, therefore, in violation of Section 687.07, Florida Statutes, 1949, F.S.A.

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The court below granted said motion and entered final judgment of dismissal.

Counsel for appellants apparently assumes that the trial judge dismissed the amended complaint upon the ground that payment in full of a usurious mortgage note bars the right to bring an action to recover the usurious interest paid. The ruling of the learned Circuit Judge was, in effect, that the amended complaint did not state a cause of action cognizable in the Circuit Court in and for Duval County. We are constrained to agree with such ruling.

As a matter of mathematical calculation we do not find that the second count of the amended complaint shows the alleged usury to have been in excess of 25% per annum and consequently violative of Section 687.07, supra. The actual amount of money loaned was $3,000. The interest allegedly wilfully and knowingly charged or accepted was $600. The loan was originally set up in such manner as to run for a period of time in excess of one year. In fact, the loan was actually paid off after it had been in existence for thirteen months. Interest in the sum of $600 on the loan of $3,000 for a period of one year only amounts to 20%. 25% interest on $3,000 for one year is $750. Consequently, the second count could not in any event be said to state a cause of action.

We now direct our attention to the first count which, as previously stated, charges usurious interest in excess of 10% per annum contrary to Sections 687.03 and 687.04, supra, and thus lays a predicate for a judgment of not more than double the amount of the usurious interest which was taken or reserved or has been paid. Obviously the judgment could not be for more than $1,200 because the amount of the interest paid was $600.

We should and do take judicial notice of the fact that in Duval County, Florida, the Civil Court of Record has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law wherein the sum of money sought to be recovered is less than $3,000. Chapter 8521, Laws of Florida, 1921, Section 33.01, F.S. 1949, F.S.A. Indeed, in the case of State ex rel. Whyte v. Gray, 116 Fla. 510, 156 So. 493, we said: "The effect of the statute creating the civil court of record is to deprive the circuit court of Duval county of original jurisdiction in all cases at law wherein the matter in controversy is less than $3,000." Since the Circuit Court in Duval County did not have jurisdiction to entertain the amended complaint in this case under count One, which is the only count that may be said to state a cause of action, it was not error for the Circuit Judge to enter the final judgment of dismissal from which this appeal was prosecuted.

It is unnecessary for us to determine the question whether a cause of action exists, if filed in the proper tribunal, under the facts and circumstances alleged in count One of the amended complaint. By this we mean to say that we should not, and do not, decide whether the appellants in fact have any cause of action against the appellee since it appears that they long since have paid in full the debt evidenced by the alleged usurious mortgage note.

Affirmed.

SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Kinney v. Lechner Lumber Co.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A
Jan 21, 1952
55 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1952)
Case details for

Kinney v. Lechner Lumber Co.

Case Details

Full title:KINNEY ET UX. v. LECHNER LUMBER CO., INC

Court:Supreme Court of Florida, Division A

Date published: Jan 21, 1952

Citations

55 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1952)

Citing Cases

Emery v. International Glass & Mfg., Inc.

See Ch. 27258, Laws of Florida 1951. See, also, Kinney v. Lechner Lbr. Co. (Fla. 1951), 55 So.2d 917. As we…