Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2675 (GK)
August 14, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs are the Kingman Park Civic Association ("KPCA") and Chevy Chase Civic Association ("CCCA"). KPCA is an unincorporated neighborhood civic association whose members are residents of Kingman Park, a predominately African-American neighborhood located in Capitol East, Washington D.C., CCCA is an unincorporated neighborhood association whose members are residents of Chevy Chase, located in Northwest, Washington, D.C. Defendants are Mayor Anthony Williams, and various named Council members of the D.C. Council.
Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the redistricting of the District of Columbia Ward Boundaries set forth in the District of Columbia "Ward Redistricting Amendment Act of 2001" (the "Ward Plan"). D.C. Code 1-1308 et seq.
The Ward Plan, which was adopted by the D.C. Council following the 2000 Census, took effect in February 2002 and redraws all eight District of Columbia Ward boundaries.
A summary of the changes to ward boundaries are as follows: (1) Ward 1 picks up 2 blocks east of 7th and Florida, including the Howard Dunbar Theaters; (2) Ward 2 picks up Sheridan-Kalorama (west of Connecticut) and also Midway/East Dupont Circle (south of U between 14th and 18th Streets); (3) Ward 3 reunites Palisades and picks up Foxhall Village; (4) Ward 4 picks up Chevy Chase east of Broad Branch Road, including Barnaby Woods; (5) Ward 5 picks up south Fort Totten, Pleasant Hills, and the U.S. Soldiers/Airmans Home; (6) Ward 6 picks up Southwest (south of freeway, west of Anacostia River), Penn Quarter, NoMa; (7) Ward 7 picks up Kingman Park and part of Fairlawn including Marbury Plaza; and (8) Ward 8 picks up Fairlawn (except Marbury Plaza) and Historic Anacostia. See Pls.' Opp'n to Defs' Mot. to Dismiss, ("Pls.' Opp'n"), Ex. 5.
Ward 4 now crosses Rock Creek Park, and Ward 7 crosses the Anacostia. Moreover, Adams-Morgan, Chevy Chase, Fairlawn and Kingman Park are split or moved from their historical ward boundaries into new ward configurations. See Pls.' Qpp'n, Ex. 11.
Plaintiffs allege that the Ward Plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, as well as state law. Their principal allegation is that the transfer of 1,840 Kingman Park residents from Ward 6 to Ward 7 — which splits Kingman Park and draws Ward 7 so that it crosses the Anacostia river — dilutes the strength of African-American votes in Ward 6, and "wastes" African-American votes in Ward 7.
As an initial matter, it must be emphasized that the process of election redistricting is an inherently imperfect one, requiring a careful balance of complex and competing interests. In an effort to comply with the federal one-person, one-vote mandate and to account for the shifts in demographic patterns recorded by the 2000 Census, it is undisputed that the D.C. Council, in the process of making controversial and difficult decisions, has split numerous communities and neighborhoods and transferred thousands of residents from one election ward to another. See Pls.' Opp'n, Exs. 1, 5, and 10. It is not for the Court to pass on the political wisdom of the Ward Plan or to suggest ways in which the Plan might better address the needs of D.C. residents. Rather, the Court is limited to deciding whether the challenged aspects of the Ward Plan violate the Voting Rights Act.
The matter is now before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. It is well-settled that "[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1676 (1999). Moreover, summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). During the Motions Hearing held in this matter on August 13, 2002, parties represented that the essential facts before the Court are undisputed.
Upon consideration of the motions, oppositions, replies, the Motions Hearing held in this matter on August 13, 2002, and the entire record herein, for the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions shall be granted. A. The D.C. Council Has Legislative Immunity
Legislative Immunity is grounded in the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, § 6 and ensures that legislators are free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will be later called to task in the courts for that representation.
It is hornbook law that elected officials enjoy "absolute immunity" from suits for damages and equitable relief for actions taken "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (in constitutional challenge to California Senate's Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, state senators and their aides immune)
This immunity shields federal, state and local legislators acting in their legislative capacities from civil rights suits, including suits under the Voting Rights Act. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (absolute immunity protects local legislators from race discrimination suit stemming from actions taken during mayoral budgetary process);Latino Political Action Committee v. City of Boston, 581 F. Supp. 478 (D. Mass. 1984) (because adoption of Boston's election district plan was within sphere of legitimate legislative activity, city council members were immune from suit)
The D.C. Council is composed of locally elected officials. In drafting and adopting the Ward Plan, the Council was unquestionably engaging in "legitimate legislative activity." Plaintiff has not argued otherwise or provided any other reason as to why legislative immunity should not apply. Therefore, claims against D.C. Council and its members are dismissed on grounds of legislative immunity.
B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Against the District of Columbia Under Section 2.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is violated when reapportionment results in members of a protected minority group having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b).
Specifically, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that:
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs' complaint contains numerous allegations, which essentially fall into two categories. First, Plaintiffs complain that the transfer of 1,840 Kingman Park residents from Ward 6 to Ward 7 dilutes the voting strength of residents in Ward 6 and "wastes" votes in Ward 7. Second, Plaintiffs contend that the boundary changes to all eight wards result in dilution of the voting strength of African-American residents city-wide.
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges three claims under the Voting Rights Act. The first Count alleges boundary manipulation of all eight election wards. The second count is entitled "Ward packing" and contains allegations concerning all eight election wards, and the third count pertains to voting strength dilution in Wards 6 and 7. See Compl. ¶¶ 27-47.
Upon careful examination of all the facts before the Court, which Plaintiffs have represented are uncontested, it is clear that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Section 2.
1. Transfer of Kingman Park Residents to Ward 7
Plaintiffs' primary contention is that the voting strength of KPCA's Ward 6 and Ward 7 members has been diluted as a result of the transfer of 1,840 Kingman Park residents from Ward 6 to Ward 7. They argue that the Ward Plan reduces the African-American majority in Ward 6 from 68% to 62%. They also allege that unless the 1,840 Kingman Park residents are returned to Ward 6, Plaintiffs will not be able to elect a candidate of their choice. See Compl. ¶¶ 33, 36, 41, 43-47; Pls.' Qpp'n at 11.
These allegations do not state a claim under Section 2 for several reasons. First, with respect to Councilwoman Ambrose, who currently represents Ward 6 and is white, it is worth noting that she was elected under the previous districting plan (i.e., before the transfer of 1,840 Kingman Park residents to Ward 7 and when the African-American majority was 68%). In light of this, the Court fails to see how granting the remedy requested by Plaintiffs, namely the return of 1,840 Kingman Park residents, will make any difference in their "opportunity . . . to elect a candidate of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973. They had that opportunity when all 1,840 residents were included in Ward 6, and councilwoman Ambrose for whom many of them voted, as Plaintiffs' counsel has emphasized, was elected.
Second, it is well-settled that while the Voting Rights Act protects "equality of opportunity" for minority voters, it does not guarantee electoral success of a particular candidate. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 (1994) ("[T]he ultimate right of Section 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority preferred candidates of whatever race.")
Third, with respect to Plaintiffs' challenge to the 62% African-American majority in Ward 6, the Voting Rights Act does not entitle Plaintiffs to an African-American majority of a specific size or percentage. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1418 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We believe there is no vested right of a minority group to a majority of a particular magnitude unrelated to the provision of a reasonable opportunity to elect a representative"). Therefore, although the Department of Justice adopted a 65% nonwhite population majority as a benchmark, and although Ward 6 falls short at 62%, this discrepancy alone does not establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1016 (D.D.C. 1981) (In district where blacks comprise 61.11% of total population, the number of blacks is "sufficient to provide them with the chance to elect a candidate of their choice.")
Defendant represents that Ward 6 continues to contain a voting age majority of African-Americans. See Def.'s Motion to Dismiss, at 14, n. 4.
In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1977), the Court recognized that the 65% figure was only a guideline, and not a requirement of Section 2 per se: "it was reasonable for the Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substantial nonwhite population majority — in the vicinity of 65% — would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters." Id.
The reason the 65% figure is not dispositive is that the ultimate inquiry under Section 2 is whether minorities have "the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice," Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1415, which depends on the "totality of circumstances" for each election ward. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b).
In fact, the 6% decrease in the African-American majority in Ward 6 (68% to 62%) under the Ward Plan is not solely the result of the transfer of 1,840 Kingman Park residents into Ward 7. The Ward Plan also placed thousands of Fairlawn residents who were formerly in Ward 6 in other wards. It is undisputed that the remedy that Plaintiffs seek, namely the return of 1,840 residents to Ward 6, will not restore the African-American majority percentage in Ward 6 to 68%.
Plaintiffs have not challenged the other transfers affecting the demographics of Ward 6; nor, as explained infra, do they have standing to challenge these transfers.
Finally, with respect to Plaintiffs' allegations that the transfer of 1,840 residents "wastes" votes in Ward 7, the undisputed facts show that the African-American majority in Ward 7 remained virtually unchanged, decreasing slightly from 96.9% to 96.8% under the Ward Plan. See Pls.' Ex. 10.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' challenge to the transfer of Kingman Park residents to Ward 7 fails to state a claim of vote dilution under Section 2.
2. City-Wide Vote Dilution
Plaintiffs' second major contention is that the Ward Plan manipulates the boundaries of all eight election wards and results in city-wide dilution of the African-American vote.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge voting changes in wards in which their members do not reside. An association has standing only when its members have standing to sue. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). To have standing, Plaintiffs' members must show that they have suffered a concrete and particular "injury in fact" that is "fairly traceable to the challenged action" and that is likely to be redressed by a decision in Plaintiffs' favor. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that even if a governmental actor is discriminating on the basis of race, as in the Voting Rights context, only those persons who are "personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct" have standing to sue. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-744 (1995). The Hays Court found that citizens who did not live in the voting district that was the primary focus of a racial gerrymandering claim lacked standing to bring suit. Id.
Similarly, Plaintiffs' members, namely Kingman Park and Chevy Chase residents, do not have standing to challenge boundary changes affecting residents of other communities and wards in which they do not live. Plaintiffs' members have not suffered a particularized and concrete "injury in fact" as a result of changes to other wards affecting other residents in the District of Columbia.
Moreover, even assuming Plaintiffs have standing, they cannot state aprima facie case of city-wide vote dilution because they cannot show that their opportunity to elect a representative of their choice has somehow been impaired by the Ward Plan.
The undisputed facts establish that the African-American majority remains virtually unchanged in five of the eight wards (Wards 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8); the plurality in Ward 1 also remains unchanged.
The changes in the percentages are for the most part de minimus. For example, under the Ward Plan, the African-American majority decreases from 88.2% to 87.3% in Ward 5; decreases from 96.9% to 96.8% in Ward 7; and increases from 91.8% to 92.4% in Ward 8. As noted above, the majority in Ward 6 decreases from 68.7% to 62.3%, and Ward 4 decreases from 77.9% to 71.9%. See Pls.' Opp'n at Ex. 10.
Furthermore, the Ward Plan simply perpetuates the substantial
majority which existed in Ward 3 (83.6% white under the old plan and 81% under the Ward Plan) and Ward 2 (56% white under the old plan and 65% under the Ward Plan). Because African-Americans were no: a "sufficiently large . . . majority" in Wards 2 and 3 before adoption of the Ward Plan, Plaintiffs cannot claim that the Ward Plan somehow now impairs their opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice in those wards. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51. n. 17 (1986) (establishing a sufficiently large majority is threshold criteria under Section 2 because "unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.") (emphasis in original)
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs' federal claims (Counts I, II, and III) are dismissed. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and therefore, Counts IV-VII are also dismissed. This case is dismissed. An Order will issue with this Opinion.
Plaintiffs recently filed their First Amended Complaint, dropping Count VIII, which had alleged Due Process violations.
ORDER
The matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the motions, oppositions, replies, the Motions Hearing held in this matter on August 13, 2002, and the entire record herein, for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are granted [#3, #8]; it is further
ORDERED, that this case is dismissed. This is a final appealable order.