Opinion
C. A. 5:22-1072-TLW-PJG
04-18-2022
Eugene King, Plaintiff, v. AG Alan Wilson; Daniel E. Shearous, South Carolina Supreme Court Clerk; Asst. AG Samantha J. Weidauer; Winnfa B. Clark, Clerk Court; Judge Edwar Dickson; Solicitor David Pascoe; Tommy Scott, III, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Eugene King, a self-represented state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Ridgeland Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Plaintiff is serving a term of imprisonment for a 2005 conviction in the Orangeburg County Court of General Sessions. Plaintiff files this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the defendants conspired against him to violate various constitutional rights during his criminal prosecution. For instance, Plaintiff claims that his indictment was a nullity, the court lacked jurisdiction over his case, and he was not indicted by a grand jury. Plaintiff also claims that his confession to police was unlawful because he was intoxicated when he made the confession. Plaintiff further claims that the trial court erroneously admitted a tire iron as evidence of a murder weapon. Plaintiff seeks damages for violations of various constitutional provisions and asks to be released from custody.
The spelling of the defendants' names in the caption reflects the spelling in the caption of Plaintiff's Complaint.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes this action is frivolous and therefore subject to summary dismissal for three reasons-the claims are mostly duplicative of a previous case in this court; the claims are otherwise barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and Plaintiff fails to provide any facts about the defendants that would plausibly show that Plaintiff has non-frivolous claims against them.
First, Plaintiff previously brought a similar action in this court raising various claims about constitutional violations in his prosecution for the same 2005 Orangeburg County conviction. King v. State of South Carolina, C/A No. 5:19-10-TLW. The court dismissed that case, explaining that Plaintiff could not challenge his conviction and sentence through a § 1983 action, and that Plaintiff had already filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (C/A No. 0:12-949-TLW) that was dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims challenging his conviction or sentence in this case are plainly frivolous because they are duplicative of claims already raised to and rejected by this court. See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)).
Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. C/A No. 0:12-1130-TLW.
Second, Plaintiff's claims seeking damages for purported constitutional violations in his state criminal prosecution are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated. Id. at 487; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”). Here, Plaintiff has provided no factual allegations to show that he successfully challenged his conviction. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for damages for constitutional defects in his state criminal proceeding are barred at this time by the holding in Heck.
Third, Plaintiff fails to plausibly show that the defendants violated his rights because he includes no facts about the defendants in the Complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the defendants are plainly frivolous because the Complaint does not provide any plausible basis to show that the defendants violated Plaintiff's rights or caused him any injury.
Relatedly, Plaintiff names only prosecutors, judges, and court officials as defendants, who are all generally immune from suits for damages arising out of criminal court proceedings. See generally Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (immunity for judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (immunity for prosecutors); Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (immunity for court officials). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against these defendants are likely subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(ii)(B)(iii) and § 1915A(b)(2).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
If this recommendation is adopted, this action will constitute a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020) (three strikes rule applies to dismissals without prejudice); see also Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 409 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that dismissal of a case that is frivolous because it is duplicative counts as a strike under the PLRA); Dizzley v. Chiles, C/A No. 8:20-cv-03613-JD-JDA, 2021 WL 3879071, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 30, 2021) (finding that a duplicative case against an immune defendant should be dismissed and count as a strike), appeal filed No. 22-6207 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2022). Plaintiff has two previous cases that count as strikes under the PLRA because they were dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. C/A No. 0:08-4053-TLW; C/A No. 5:19-10-TLW.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).