Opinion
NO. 5:19-CV-00428-TES-CHW
03-04-2020
DANA KYLE KING, Plaintiff, v. CYRUS VANCE, JR., et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently pending before the Court is a Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Dana Kyle King, a former prisoner in the Georgia Department of Corrections system (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case (ECF No. 2) and has filed a motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 7). For the following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice and that Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief be DENIED as moot. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED for purposes of the Court's review only.
PRELIMINARY SCREENING
Plaintiff has moved to proceed in forma pauperis in this case, and the Court finds it appropriate to GRANT Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 2) for purposes of this Order and Recommendation only. Because Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will also conduct a preliminary screening of Plaintiff's Complaint in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When screening a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are "held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Id. Still, § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss the complaint of a party proceeding in forma pauperis whenever the court determines the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
A claim is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on "indisputably meritless legal" theories and "claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and cannot "merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting a claim. Id. at 556. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations and Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff's claims arise from his term of incarceration in Georgia and a detainer lodged against him by the state of New York. Compl. 4, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff was convicted for theft by deception in 2015 in DeKalb County, Georgia, and he was sentenced to ten years of incarceration with five years to serve. Id. at 1. Plaintiff was released on parole on November 25, 2019.
See https://papapps.pap.state.ga.us/ paroleesearch/search/searchPage (searched King, Dana) (last accessed Mar. 2, 2020).
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to serve New York state officials with a request for final disposition of any untried criminal charges in New York pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2; see also Compl. 4, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends that officials in the New York district attorney's office—Defendants Vance and Young—have failed to respond to Plaintiff's requests. Compl. 4, ECF No. 1. In addition, Plaintiff contends that Defendant DeFranco, a New York police officer, has failed to take custody of Plaintiff despite repeatedly advising Georgia authorities that he plans to do so. Id. Plaintiff further contends that Georgia prison officials repeatedly rescinded his parole because Defendants have not resolved his outstanding New York charges. Id. Plaintiff contends these actions have violated his constitutional rights, and he seeks compensatory damages and dismissal of the New York detainer as a result. Id. at 5.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the New York detainer, he has failed to state an actionable § 1983 claim. "An inmate convicted and sentenced under state law may seek federal relief under two primary avenues: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The line of demarcation between a § 1983 civil rights action and a § 2254 habeas claim is based on the effect of the claim on the inmate's conviction and/or sentence." Id. An inmate who challenges the validity or duration of his conviction or sentence should file a § 2254 petition, while an inmate who challenges the conditions of his confinement should file a § 1983 complaint. See id. These remedies "are mutually exclusive: if a claim can be raised in a federal habeas petition, that same claim cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights action." Id.
In this action, Plaintiff challenges the validity of the New York detainer and New York officials' failure to act in accordance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. "[T]he Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a compact sanctioned by Congress, creates federal rights which may be properly addressed by a federal writ of habeas corpus." Esposito v. Mintz, 726 F.2d 371, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The availability of a federal habeas action to address Plaintiff's challenge to the validity of the New York detainer precludes Plaintiff from raising a § 1983 claim concerning the same issue. Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754. As such, Plaintiff's § 1983 challenge to the validity of the detainer should be dismissed.
It should be noted that when a prisoner attacks an interstate detainer via federal habeas corpus, the district where the detainer originated is generally considered the most appropriate forum for challenging the detainer. See, e.g., Braden v. 39th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 498-99 (1973); cf. also Reed v. Henderson, 463 F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming Georgia district court's decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction to hear federal habeas petition challenging detainer that originated in Connecticut state court). In this case, the most appropriate forum would thus appear to be in the Southern District of New York, which contains the County of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 112(b). --------
Some courts have recognized the availability of a § 1983 claim challenging prison officials' consideration of existing detainers as a factor in determining eligibility for prison programs. See, e.g., Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. also Kerlin v. Bernard, 742 F. App'x 488, 488-89 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (holding that claims "that Georgia officials refused to determine his parole eligibility" were "only cognizable under § 1983"). Plaintiff's allegations that Georgia prison officials "rescinded" his parole because they considered the New York detainer thus suggest that Plaintiff may have intended to raise a § 1983 claim to challenge the constitutionality of the procedures used to determine his eligibility for parole. Plaintiff has not, however, named any Georgia prison officials as Defendants in this action or alleged facts sufficient to show that any named Defendant was responsible for determining Plaintiff's parole eligibility, among other things. Any such claim should therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
In short, Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable § 1983 claim in this case whether he is challenging the validity of his New York detainer or the consideration of the detainer in determining his eligibility for parole on his Georgia sentence. His Complaint should therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED for purposes of this Order and Recommendation only, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. It is also RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's pending motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 7) be DENIED as moot. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Tilman E. Self, III, United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 4th day of March, 2020.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge